Rebuilding water rights system from the perspective of usufruct

As the source of life,water is indispensable to human beings.Being aware of the water stress imposed by population growth,climate change,rapid urbanization,pollution,many scholars and decision makers argue that the establishment of water rights and their system is the primary measure to tackle the water crisis problem.However,no consensus has been reached regarding the definition,nature and content of water rights both practically and academically.By examining the existing theories regarding water rights,this article tries to redefine the entitlements from the aspect of civil law.Meanwhile,it provides a system which classifies various rights by the four functions of usufruct.     

Environmental rights on the futures markets an application to the dutch manure market

A study was carried out to analyze futures markets for tradable rights after a cash market was initiated. Furthermore, some indication was given on the size of such a futures market to provide insight into its viability. Futures markets can play a role in solving environmental problems, by making the market for pollution rights (i.e. P₂O₅ rights) and agro rights (milk rights, sugar rights and P₂O₅ rights) more effective and transparent. Moreover, the market for tradable rights would be able to meet the users' need for hedging. This paper investigated the possibility of introducing a futures markets for tradable P₂O₅ rights and the commodity manure. Because there is already a cash market for manure, although not well developed yet, and there will be a cash market for P₂O₅ rights, a futures market is a logical sequel. The futures market can play a role in implementing agricultural policy efficiently and with respect to manure and P₂O₅ rights can be an economically efficient solution to environmental problems.We acknowledge the financial support of the ATA (Agricultural Futures Market Amsterdam).     

The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach

The initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes. We generalize the analysis of Böhringer and Lange (2005, Eur Econ Rev 49(8): 2041–2055) to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter-firm relative performance comparisons (including grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms). We show that using firms’ historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting, while using firms’ historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor, which is independent of output and emissions. We then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism.     

Insecurity of property rights and social matching in the tenancy market

This paper shows that insecurity of property rights over agricultural land can have large efficiency and equity costs because of the way it affects matching in the tenancy market. A principal-agent framework is used to model the landlord's decision to rent when he takes into account the risk of losing the land to the tenant and when contract enforcement is decreasing in social distance with the tenant. These effects are quantified for the case of local land rental markets in the Dominican Republic. Results show that insecure property rights lead to matching in the tenancy market along socio-economic lines, severely limiting the size of the rental market and the choice of tenants for landlords, both with efficiency costs. Social segmentation reduces access to land for the rural poor, with high equity costs. Simulations suggest that improving tenure security would increase rental transactions by 21% and the area rented to the poor by 63%. Increased property rights security is hence beneficial not only to asset owners, but also to those with whom they might interact in the market.     

Defining national property rights to a common property resource: The case of the West Bank aquifers

This article introduces a methodology to define Israeli and Palestinian property rights to the three aquifers straddling the Green Line between Israel and the West Bank, i.e. the Yarqon-Tanninim, Northern, and Nablus-Jenin aquifers. A set of procedures for determining a fair division of waters is described for the hypothetical planning year 2000. Following this, the calculated allocation of water rights is evaluated in terms of the projected over-all water consumption and supply balance for Israel and a Palestinian sovereign authority (PSA) for the year 2000. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts on the relative merits of this methodology.     

Watershed externalities, shifting cropping patterns and groundwater depletion in Indian semi-arid villages: The effect of alternative water pricing policies

Frequent droughts and groundwater depletion are critical constraints to improving agricultural productivity in the semi-arid tropics. India has been promoting integrated watershed management in drought-prone areas to address these constraints. Watershed communities are being assisted to invest in groundwater re-charging facilities. While communities and the public bear such costs, individual farmers capture irrigation benefits. Groundwater is a free common property resource and land users hold de-facto use rights. This has accelerated private irrigation investments and depletion of aquifers resulting in iniquitous distribution of irrigation water. Power subsidies and negligible pumping costs aggravate the problem. These policy failures and low irrigation costs to farmers are displacing water-efficient crops in favor of water-intensive crops in water-scare areas. The paper reviews the village-level externalities that aggravate groundwater depletion and evaluates potential policy options to enhance local collective action in water management. Using 3SLS, an econometric crop-water productivity model is used to evaluate alternative water policy instruments. The results indicate that different types of water user charges can be introduced with modest consequences on profitability and farm incomes. If properly implemented and managed by the local communities, pro-poor policies could bring considerable sustainability benefits and also ensure enhanced equity in access to the resource.     

论商品房按揭中主体权益保障与规制——以按揭权人利益保障为视角

商品房按揭制度中各方主体之间良好的权益制衡机制,是实践中房地产开发商、银行、购房人都对此项制度青睐有加的重要原因。基于三方主体所形成的相对复杂的法律关系,在实践中也出现了诸多问题。就此问题进行的系列研究表明,这样的特殊制度在满足不同当事人的需要的同时,如何克服其在运用过程中产生的问题,使得该制度得到更好的适用和完善,是制度制定者和研究者共同的出发点。     

Complementarity between water pricing, water rights and local water governance: A Bayesian analysis of choice behaviour of farmers in the Krishna river basin, India

To ensure efficient water allocation and use, policy designers have adopted various strategies, including price setting, decentralising irrigation water management or improving water rights. Most of these strategies have been applied individually, without considering the complementary relationships between them. This paper uses a discrete choice model to analyse the scope for combinations of tools for irrigation water demand management and farmers' acceptance of these. In terms of local irrigation water governance, the presence or absence of collective irrigation water management, in the form of a Water Users Association, is considered. Water rights are specified in terms of the duration and quality of the entitlement and its transferability. Finally, four types of water pricing methods (area, crop, block and volumetric pricing) are considered. Using a choice experiment, we elicit the most preferred water pricing method, under different water rights situations, at different price levels and under various contexts for local irrigation water governance. Our results indicated that under conditions of improved water rights, preference for volumetric pricing increases, whilst the presence of a Water Users Association reduces this preference. Furthermore, it was found that using an appropriate combination of water demand management tools considerably increases the willingness to pay for a change in scenario.     

Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.     

Study on the Definition and Allocation of the Rights to Water Utilization in the Ecological Environment

With the rapid development of population and economy, the conflict between the supply and demand of water resources is becoming outstanding increasingly, In China, many people concern about the problems of ecological environment water expenditure.However, owning to the shortage of water resources and indefinite water rights, “the hustle effect” of per capita water resource is appeared, Moreover. it caused a series of environment problems. This article differentiates and analyzes the relevant concepts about the ecological enviromnent, and puts forward the defined concept of the rights to the ecological environment water utilization. In addition, it points out the characteristic of those rights, and does elementary study on the allocation principle, methods, and steps on the rights.     

生态环境用水权的界定和分配

With the rapid development of population and economy, the conflict between the supply and demand of water resources is becoming outstanding increasingly. In China, many people concern about the problems of ecological environment water expenditure. However, owningto the shortage of water resources and indefinite water rights, "the hustle effect" of per capita water resource is appeared. Moreover, it caused a series of environment problems. This article differentiates and analyzes the relevant concepts about the ecological environment, and puts forward the defined concept of the rights to the ecological environment water utilization. In addition, it points out the characteristic of those rights, and does elementary study on the allocation principle, methods, and steps on the rights.     

Payments for environmental services as an alternative to logging under weak property rights: The case of Indonesia

Decentralization reforms in Indonesia have led to local communities negotiating logging agreements with timber companies for relatively low financial payoffs and at high environmental cost. This paper analyzes the potential of payments for environmental services (PES) to provide an alternative to logging for these communities and to induce forest conservation. We apply a game-theoretical model of community-firm interactions that explicitly considers two stylized conditions present in the Indonesian context: (i) community rights to the forest remain weak even after decentralization, and (ii) the presence of logging companies interested in the commercial exploitation of the forest. Intuition may suggest that PES design should focus on those communities with the lowest expected payments from logging deals. However, we show that these communities may not be able to enforce a PES agreement, i.e., they may not be able to prevent logging activities by timber companies. Moreover, some communities would conserve the forest anyway; in these cases PES would not lead to additional environmental gains. Most important, the introduction of PES may increase a community's expected payoff from a logging agreement. A failure to consider this endogeneity in expected payoffs could lead to communities opting for logging agreements despite PES, simply allowing communities to negotiate better logging deals. Our results indicate that PES design is a complex task, and that the costs of an effective PES system could potentially be much higher than expected from observing current logging fees. Using data collected in Indonesia on actual logging fees received by communities, we illustrate how the theoretical results could be used in empirical analysis to guide PES design. Our results are likely to be useful in other cases where local people make resource use decisions but have weak property rights over these resources, and where external commercial forces are present. The results highlight the importance of understanding the details of the local context in order to design PES programs appropriately.     

A study of zero-out auctions: testbed experiments of a process of allocating private rights to the use of public property

Summary This paper applies an experimental testbed methodology to the evaluation of a proposed mechanism for allocating the right to land at the New York airports. The mechanism is called a zero-out auction because it is supposed to allocate the rights efficiently like an auction while leaving all of the consumer's surplus with the buyers (as opposed to allocating some to the seller as would be the case with an ordinary auction). A new behavioral hypothesis is introduced to account for limited rationality of individuals and unusual behaviors of the process. The axiom, called theunbiased expectations hypothesis, does a good job of modeling individual behavior in the context of a game model.We acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. Comments by David Grether, John Ledyard, Michael Levine, Jennifer Reinganum, and Richard Sutch have been very helpful.