How much to share: Welfare effects of fiscal transfers

Recent sovereign debt crisis has challenged policy makers to explore the possibility of establishing a fiscal transfer system that could alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric shocks across countries. Using a simple labour production economy, we first derive an analytically tractable solution for optimal degree of fiscal transfers. In this economy, fiscal transfers can improve welfare by moving the competitive equilibrium with fiscal transfers closer to the social planner's solution. We then extend the model to a DSGE setting with capital, international bond and linear taxes, and we analyze how implementation of a simple revenue sharing rule affects welfare and macroeconomic variables over time. Simulation results show that risk sharing through fiscal transfers always improves welfare in the long run. However, under certain model specifications, short‐run transitional welfare loss can outweigh the long‐run benefits. These results suggest that, in designing fiscal transfers across countries, government should take into consideration the intertemporal nature of welfare gains.     

The ‘real’ explanation of the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle

This article shows that global capital markets cannot, by themselves, achieve net transfers of financial capital between countries and that both the integration of global financial markets and the integration of global goods markets are needed to achieve net transfers of capital between countries. Frictions (barriers to mobility) in one or both of these markets can impede net transfers of capital between countries, produce the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) results and prevent real interest rates from being equalized across countries. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that barriers to the mobility of goods and services are an important obstacle to international capital mobility.     

Should the north make unilateral technology transfers to the south?: North–South cooperation and conflicts in responses to global climate change

Whether developed countries should make unilateral technology transfers to developing countries in order to address global environment problems is debatable. This paper discusses the issue in a framework that recognizing nations' joint production of environmental externalities. Unlike the existing literature on unilateral transfers, this paper presents a North–South environmental–economic optimal growth model that allows transfers to mitigate externalities only. The paper derives criteria that would make such transfers feasible. By solving the transfer problem in a modified RICE model [Nordhaus, W.D., Yang, Z., 1996. A regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies, Am. Econ. Rev., 86 (4) 741–65], this paper also provides information on the timing and the amount of unilateral transfers from North to South to address potential global warming problem, one major global environmental externality. A policy implication from this study is that moderate employment of unilateral transfers would benefit North along with the world as a whole.     

The extension of social security coverage in developing countries

We study the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social pension program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries who lack formal risk sharing mechanisms against income and longevity risks. To this end, we formulate a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates defining features of developing countries: a large informal sector, private transfers as an informal safety net, and a non-universal social security system. We find that the extension of retirement benefits to informal sector workers results in efficiency losses due to adverse effects on capital accumulation and the allocation of resources across formal and informal sectors. Despite these losses recipients of social pensions experience welfare gains as the positive insurance effects attributed to the extension of a social insurance system dominate. The welfare gains crucially depend on the skill distribution, private intra-family transfers and the specific tax used to finance the expansion.     

Foreign aid and weakest-link international public goods: An experimental study

In this paper, we investigate efficiency differences between income and in-kind transfers as distribution mechanisms of foreign aid to weakest-link international public goods in a laboratory environment. We find that if there is relatively small difference in country size, then income transfers seem to provide a higher provision of the international public good, and thus higher overall welfare level than that of in-kind transfers. However, if there is a large disparity in country size, then in-kind transfers appear to provide a higher level of IPG provision and higher accompanying global welfare.     

Adjusted net saving and welfare change

The World Bank has estimated Adjusted net (or genuine) saving (ANS) as a macro level index of sustainable development. ANS extends the conventional net saving by adding human capital accumulation and deducting natural resources losses. This paper tests ANSas an index of sustainable development. It examines whether ANS explains changes in welfare. Welfare is measured by Infant mortality rate (IMR) and Human Development Index (HDI). The study was conducted in 36 selected developing and developed countries and covers the period 1971-2000. The results suggest a positive and significant relationship between Adjusted net saving and aggregate welfare but weak in magnitude.     

Regional versus Multilateral Trade Liberalization,Environmental Taxation,and Welfare

The paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets, and compares the impacts of regional and multilateral tariff reduction on strategic environmental taxation and welfare. While both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in tariff‐reducing countries, regionalism also reduces production in a non‐participating country and may decrease its consumption. Consequently, regionalism and multilateralism change pollution tax and welfare in the tariff‐reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local, but in dissimilar ways for global pollution. When pollution is global, regionalism is likely to be preferred to multilateralism for the establishment of free trade among countries.     

Mortality risks,education and child labor

In this paper, we investigate the role of young adult mortality on child labor and educational decisions. We argue that mortality risks are a major source of risks in returns to education in developing countries. We show that, in the absence of appropriate insurance mechanisms, the level of child labor is inefficient, but it can be too high or too low. It is too high when parents are not very altruistic and anticipate positive transfers from their children in the future. Uncertain returns to education, endogenous mortality or imperfect capital markets unambiguously increase child labor. When the level of child labor is inefficiently high, we also show that a cash transfer conditional on child's schooling can always restore efficiency regarding child labor.     

Heterogeneous technology and panel data: The case of the agricultural production function

Economic growth involves reallocating resources from traditional to new techniques of production, creating new relationships between particular resources and productivity. The paper analyzes the implications of this process on the estimation of agricultural production functions using a panel of countries. The data includes a measure of capital in agriculture absent from most studies. We employ a heterogeneous technology framework where implemented technology is chosen jointly with inputs to interpret information obtained in the empirical analysis of panel data. In this framework, estimates depend upon the economic environment, which is represented by state variables. It turns out that the old problem of identifying the production function cannot be resolved through the use of instrumental variables, but can be resolved using the allocation error. The paper discusses the scope for replacing country and time effects by observed state variables. The empirical results differ from those reported in the literature for cross-country studies, largely in augmenting the elasticities of capital and land and reducing those of fertilizer and labor. The evaluation of the marginal value productivity accounts for the flow of capital and fertilizer to agriculture and the flow of labor to other sectors, thereby contributing to overall economic growth.     

Sharing oil rents and political violence

This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the different transfer schemes, fiscal transfers (to subnational governments) yield the highest levels of consumption, but direct transfers (to people) are the most effective in preventing conflict. By averting conflict, transfers can improve ex ante welfare; however, only a subset of the ex ante welfare optimal transfers is optimal ex post and thus self-enforcing. Among them, those that avert conflict by reinforcing repressive regimes are of particular policy interest.     

The limitations of decentralized world redistribution: An optimal taxation approach

A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function, subject to the disincentive effects it would create, generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., with no cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntary world transfers - subject to a free-rider problem - produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the United States either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted.     

Mixed duopoly,privatization, and subsidization with excess burden of taxation

We investigate optimal tax‐subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. We compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes: mixed and private Cournot duopolies and Stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships. We show that, in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem, privatization affects resulting welfare.     

The ‘real’ explanation of the PPP puzzle

This article shows that global financial markets cannot, by themselves, achieve net transfers of financial capital and real interest rate equalization across countries and that the integration of both global financial markets and global goods markets is needed to achieve net transfers of capital and real interest rate equalization across countries. Thus, frictions (barriers to mobility) in one or both of these markets can impede the net transfer of capital between countries, produce the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) finding of high-saving-investment correlations and prevent real interest rates from being equalized across countries. Moreover, frictions in global goods markets can explain why real exchange rates deviate from purchasing power parity (PPP) for extended periods of time and can therefore also explain the PPP puzzle. Consequently, we are able to resolve two of Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (2000) ‘6 major puzzles in macroeconomics’ with essentially the same explanation.     

Natural capital, subjective well-being, and the new welfare economics of sustainability: Some evidence from cross-country regressions

The measurement of natural capital and its management during the economic development process are important aspects of the capital approach to sustainable development. However, the assessment of social welfare in terms of genuine savings (or changes in total wealth per capita) is arguably too limited. This paper tries to make a case for the incorporation of subjective well-being measures in debates about sustainable development by exploring the macro-level relationship between subjective well-being and natural capital in a cross-country setting. It is tested whether natural capital per capita is correlated with subjective well-being in a sample of fifty-eight developed and developing countries, using natural capital data from the World Bank's Millennium Capital Assessment. Bivariate regressions indicate that it is. When multiple regression models are estimated that include (a) major country-level determinants of subjective well-being (GNI per capita, social capital, income distribution, unemployment, inflation), and (b) regional dummy variables for ex-Soviet Union and Latin American countries, the positive correlation remains. The role of data outliers is carefully explored, and the sensitivity of the results to the use of alternative subjective well-being measures (i.e. life satisfaction, happiness, and a combined life satisfaction and happiness index) is investigated. This does not change the nature of the results. The findings arguably strengthen the case for a ‘new welfare economics of sustainability’ that takes subjective well-being measures into account.     

环境技术转移的最优社会福利选择——以发展中国家为视角

本文以发展中国家为视角,构建一个基本的双寡头Cournot模型,来分析环境技术从发达国家转移至发展中国家,对发展中国家商品生产和社会福利产生的影响.本文认为环境技术从发达国家无偿转移至发展中国家,对发展中国家社会福利的影响具有不确定性.通过引入福利函数并求解最优的社会福利,发现对发展中国家而言,最优的社会福利选择是:当国内企业生产成本等于国外企业生产成本与环境技术的产量溢出之差时,环境技术的完全转移才是发展中国家的最优社会福利选择.并据此推导出社会福利最优的环境技术转移路径.     

Unilateral transfer of abatement capital

In a model of global carbon dioxide control, Yang (Yang, Z., 1999. Should the North make unilateral technology transfers to the south? North–South cooperation and conflicts in responses to global climate change. Resource and Energy Economics 21 (1), 67–87.) advocates the unilateral transfer of abatement capital from North to South. It is argued here that such transfers should be contingent on the South's willingness to equiproportionally abate and sequester emissions according to an efficient version of Rose and Stevens' (Rose, A., Stevens, B., 1993. The efficiency and equity of marketable permits of CO₂ emissions. Resource and Energy Economics 15, 117–146.) sovereignty criterion, a straightforward and popular, though not necessarily equitable, burden sharing rule for reducing greenhouse gases on a global scale. Under this program, the North would abate less and preserve a smaller quantity of forests than it would if there were equiproportional reductions in the absence of capital transfers.     

BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND BIOTECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

This paper assesses the role of Biotechnology Development Agreements (BDAs) in creating incentives to conserve biodiversity. A major cause of species loss is the conversion of tropical forests to crop and pasture land. Biodiversity conservation, therefore, fundamentally depends on the economics of agricultural land use in developing countries. BDAs can play only a limited role in a comprehensive strategy to increase incentives for biodiversity conservation. Policymakers must examine biodiversity policies in the broader context of land tenure, rural poverty, and agricultural development in tropical countries .     

Natural land productivity,cooperation and comparative development

This research advances the hypothesis that natural land productivity in the past, and its effect on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, had a persistent effect on the evolution of social capital, the process of industrialization and comparative economic development across the globe. Exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land productivity across (a) countries; (b) individuals within a country, (c) migrants of different ancestry within a country, and (d) individuals residing in regions within a country, the research establishes that lower level of land productivity in the past is associated with more intense cooperation and higher levels of contemporary social capital and development.     

North–South asymmetry,unilateral environmental policy and carbon tariffs

This paper focuses on the potential impact of a carbon tariff on carbon emissions, North–South trade and welfare. We use a North–South trade model, where North implements a unilateral environmental policy on domestic carbon-intensive industries followed by a carbon tariff on imports from South. Unlike the existing studies, we allow asymmetry in clean production technologies and marginal environmental damage. We show that a carbon tariff can reduce the global carbon emission via the use of a more advanced clean production technology in North, which increases the firm profit and welfare. However, improvement in welfare of North is associated with a decrease in global trade flows and welfare of South. We find that, in the presence of asymmetry in clean production technologies between North and South, a carbon tariff introduced by the North can eliminate carbon leakage, but the exports of South decrease below the pre-unilateral environmental policy level and hence North can potentially use a carbon tariff for trade protectionism in the name of reducing carbon leakage in South.