Public versus private insurance system with (and without) transaction costs: optimal segmentation policy of an informed monopolist

Computer-mediated transactions allow insurance companies to customize their contracts, while transaction costs limit this tendency toward customization. To capture this phenomenon, we develop a complete-information framework in which it is costly to design a new market segment when the segmentation policy (number and design of segments) is endogenously chosen. Both the case of a private and a public insurer are considered. Without transaction costs, these two insurance systems are equivalent in terms of social welfare and participation. With transaction costs, this equivalence is no longer present, and the analysis of this difference is the subject of this article.     

Effects of the structural change on transaction costs between North America natural gas spot markets

Threshold cointegration between market pairs before and after the potential structural break associated with the shale gas revolution is examined. Pairwise transaction costs differ between the pre- and post-break periods. During the post-break period, five of seven pairwise transaction costs decrease, while the remaining two pair-wise transaction costs increase relative to the pre-break period. Alterations in natural gas flows as the result of the shale gas revolution partially explain the changes in transaction costs.     

The role of transaction costs and risk aversion when selecting between one and two regimes for portfolio models

Estimation of the inputs is the main problem when applying portfolio analysis, and Markov regime-switching models have been shown to improve these estimates. We investigate whether the use of two-regime models remains superior across a range of values of risk aversion and transaction costs, in the presence of skewness and kurtosis and no short sales. Our results for US data suggest that, due to differences in their risk preferences and transactions costs, most retail investors may prefer to use one-regime models, while investment banks may prefer to use two-regime models.     

The transaction costs perspective on international supply chain management; evidence from case studies in the manufacturing industry in the Netherlands

Transaction costs are barriers for internationalisation processes. This paper investigates the practical relevance of transaction costs economics (TCE) for international supply chain management (SCM) in this era of globalisation, which is characterised by splitting up the supply chain in more and more parts. The analysis is based on data from in-depth interviews with seven manufacturing companies in the Netherlands which are actually engaged in this modern way of organising production. It is shown that the balance between transaction costs and sheer production costs (transformation costs) plays a prominent role in the strategic decisions on how and where to organise production. Especially intangible (or ‘soft’) transaction costs are important in this respect. The analysis provides insight in practical experience in the manufacturing industry in the Netherlands with transaction costs and shows how transaction costs affect decisions on transaction management, personnel policy and internationalisation of R&D. This study is to our knowledge the first to confront the theory of TCE with practice of manufacturing firms in their internationalisation decisions using in-depth interviews instead of survey data.     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Determinants of household savings in China and their role in quasi‐money supply1

This study derives household saving potential empirically from econometric models of Chinese urban and rural household consumption and uses this potential to explain household bank deposits. Model simulations are performed to analyse the effects of interest rates, income and income uncertainty on the saving potential and the bank deposits. The bank deposits variable is then used to explain quasi‐money supply. High bank absorption of household savings is found to account mainly for the rapid growth in quasi‐money, which in turn explains the exceptionally high M2/GDP ratio. Households’ savings are largely predictable from their regular consumption.