Reflections on the Double Dividend Debate

We survey the history of carbon taxation, the range of market-based instruments (MBIs) of environmental control, and the state of the double dividend debate, in order to suggest directions for future research into MBIs. Returning MBI revenues as lower distortionary taxes rather than as lump sums raises aggregate welfare, but we favour MBIs which raise little or no revenue, for reasons of political acceptability to interest groups. At the same time, the overall case for any environmental improvement is weaker because of general equilibrium interactions with prior distortionary taxes. Research seems most necessary on quantifying the efficiency benefits of market control of heterogeneous polluters, the benefits of environmental improvement, the tax interaction effect, and the various information costs of an MBI, all on a case-by-case basis for different pollutants and places.     

Standard Oriented Environmental Policy: Cost-Effectiveness and Incentives for 'Green Technology'

Abstract. In their seminal 1971 paper, W. J. Baumol and W. E. Oates analyzed effluent charges and 'command and control' regarding their ability to attain a given standard of environmental quality at minimum cost. In the subsequent literature,transferable discharge permits (TDPs) have been added to the portfolio of standard oriented environmental policy instruments. We place these instruments in a dynamic context. Here, cost minimization is defined in an intertemporal setting allowing for induced technical change. It turns out that the relative performance of alternative policy instruments regarding their 'dynamic cost-effectiveness' crucially depends on the information available to the involved agents. Under adverse informational conditions,only a TDP system with future markets is dynamically cost-effective.     

Prices vs. Quantities with fiscal cushioning

Enforcement of international environmental quantity regulations (e.g. tradable pollution permits) is often expected to be stricter than that of price regulations (e.g. emission taxes). While both instruments provide opportunities for misrepresenting actual pollution, enforcement of international price-based instruments is additionally hampered by potential fiscal cushioning, i.e. an adjustment of domestic fiscal policies offsetting the tax incentive to reduce emission reductions. The present paper extends the formal debate on Prices vs. Quantities by including the risk of fiscal cushioning. We find the level of the marginal benefit curve and the variance of costs become key elements for instrument choice and can render quantity regulations strictly preferable. Remarkably, in the latter case, the slopes of the marginal curves do not affect optimal instrument choice. Numerical calculations, using data taken from the international climate policy context, support the potential dominance of quantity regulations found in our formal analysis.     

Real option analysis for effects of emission permit banking on investment under abatement cost uncertainty

The present paper analyzes the investment effects of emission trading scheme (ETS) when emission permits are bankable and there is technological uncertainty with regard to the abatement cost. A real option model is employed to accommodate irreversibility of investment and cost uncertainty. In the absence of abatement cost uncertainty, a bankable ETS reduces a firm's incentive for environmental investment, because the firm can utilize the banked permits for future compliance which act as substitutes for abatement investment. However, when cost uncertainty is prevalent, investment may reduce the opportunity cost of irreversible investment under the banking system, thereby increasing a firm's investment incentive. The condition is derived under which a bankable ETS provides higher investment incentives than a non-bankable ETS does.     

Policy mechanism choice for environmental management by non-commercial “lifestyle” rural landholders

For some environmental assets in rural areas, the landholders who are having the biggest impact are people with small holdings and an emphasis on lifestyle rather than commercial gains from their land. This paper aims to better understand the motivations and likely responses to policy for lifestyle landholders in Australia, in order to assess which policy mechanisms, if any, are likely to be most efficiently used to influence their land management. Through face-to-face interviews, we find that lifestyle landholders have important differences from commercial farmers, including much smaller properties, a stronger interest in environmental outcomes, a lack of land-management skills and a lack of time for land-management activities. From the perspective of environmental policy programs, engaging with lifestyle landholders is likely to involve higher transaction costs, and there are likely to be higher learning and transition costs per unit area. A framework for selection of policy tools is modified to take account of these findings. It is concluded that the prospects for worthwhile public investments in land-use changes by lifestyle landholders are lower than for commercial landholders.     

Climate Policy,Learning, and Technology Adoption in Small Countries

A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions requires international cooperation in emission abatement as well as individual countries’ investment in the adoption of abatement technology. The existing literature on climate policy pays insufficient attention to small countries, which account for a substantial proportion of global emission. In this study, we investigate how climate policy and learning about climate damage affect investment in abatement technology in small countries. We consider three alternative climate policy instruments: emission standards, harmonized taxes and auctioned permits. We say that learning is feasible if an international environmental agreement (IEA) is formed after the resolution of uncertainty about climate damage. We find that, either with learning and quadratic abatement costs or without learning, harmonized taxes outperform emission standards and auctioned permits in terms of investment efficiency. Without learning, a large cost of nonparticipation (that a country incurs) in the IEA can be beneficial to the country. Whether learning improves investment efficiency depends on the size of this nonparticipation cost.     

Environmental impact of household activity in Spain

The objective of this paper is to analyse the environmental impacts of the Spanish economy by way of water and atmospheric pollution on the basis of a Spanish Accounting Matrix for 1999. Only households were taken as an exogenous account. The pollution measures are estimated for seven categories of pollution: three atmospheric pollutants (CO₂, NO_x and SO_x) and four indicators for water (waste water, nitrogen, metals and biological oxygen demand (BOD)). The environmental data base was obtained from the Spanish Statistical Institute.The analysis reveals that pollution in Spain is closely linked to food production, energy, extractive industries and paper manufacturing. We show that services, taken as a whole, are major polluters, though this is due to the volume of household expenditure they represent rather than their pollution potential as such. We also show that the Spanish economy avoids a great deal of pollution by importing inputs, which pollute where they are produced. Finally, the study also provides per capita pollution values for the aforementioned seven pollutants.     

Sectoral systems of environmental innovation: An application to the French automotive industry

This article seeks to show how a sectoral system approach may contribute to the analysis of the determinants of environmental innovations. By using Malerba's [F. Malerba: Sectoral systems of innovation and production, Res. Policy Vol. 102, 845-859, (2002)] concept of sectoral system of innovation and production, we develop a sectoral framework based on three building blocks: technological regimes, demand conditions and environmental and innovation policy. Within this framework, the sectoral patterns of environmental innovation result from the interplay between these three blocks. The conceptual framework is applied to the case of the French automotive industry, with a specific focus on the development of low emission vehicles. The analysis shows how technological regime and demand conditions lead to technological inertia, and so to a strong persistence of the dominant design. Finally, environmental and innovative policy are considered in an integrated way, so that we can study how they influence technological regime and demand conditions, and in the meantime how they are conditioned by these two blocks.     

Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology:: Will the true ranking please stand up?

We investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology. First, we study the case where the regulator makes long-term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology. We show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits, auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives, and standards may give stronger incentives than permits. Second, we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies. We show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first-best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested, whereas this does not always hold if he moves first.     

Conserving biodiversity with tradable permits under changing conservation costs and habitat restoration time lags

Tradable permits are a common environmental policy instrument that has recently been applied also to the conservation of biodiversity. Biodiversity conservation differs in many respects to the classical applications of tradable permits like emissions control. One particularity is that, even if the permit system maintains a constant total amount of species habitat, habitat turnover (the destruction of a habitat and restoration elsewhere) affects the ecosystem. Another particularity is that the restoration of habitats often takes much time, leading to time lags between the initiation of restoration activities and the time when restored habitat is available for trading. We use an agent-based model of a tradable permit market to study the influence of heterogeneous and dynamic conservation costs and habitat restoration time lags on key variables of the market, such as the costs incurred to the market participants and the amount of habitat turnover. Our results show that there may be trade-offs between these key variables. We also find that restoration time lags can lead to fluctuations in permit prices that reduce the efficiency of the permit market. We conclude that temporal lags deserve a careful analysis when implementing tradable permit systems for the preservation of natural habitats and biodiversity.     

Emission Trading with Fiscal Externalities: The Case for a Common Carbon Tax for the Non-ETS Emissions in the EU

A government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first-best level of public spending. When involved in emission trading, a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales. This fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries. Our theory explains how, and when, fiscal externalities may be expected to arise. Moreover, we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities, the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect: (1) the price of emission permits, (2) the global distribution of abatement effort, and (3) total greenhouse gas mitigation costs. This is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets. Our findings are especially relevant for the EU which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between EU member countries for all emissions outside the European Emissions Trading System.     

Free trade and the burden of domestic policy

Abstract. Consider a small economy facing accession to a exogenously defined trade agreement. Before accession, the government controls trade and pollution policy. After accession, it retains control over pollution policy, but must allow free trade in all goods. This is a choice many governments face while joining trade agreements today. They decide whether greater market access to other members is more valuable than control over trade policy. I ask two questions. All else being equal what happens to environmental policy after accession? Second, what affects the choice of accession and how does this choice impact aggregate welfare? I show that a loss in control over trade policy alters the political incentives determining environmental policy. Before accession, producers can transfer a portion of their burden of environmental regulation to consumers through price increases. After accession the same regulation is borne entirely by producers. Owing to the change in burden, there exist plausible conditions under which the adoption of free trade can lead to more stringent environmental regulation, a reduction in the preferential treatment of special interest groups, and an increase in aggregate welfare.     

Static and dynamic efficiency of pollution control strategies

A great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. Most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non-market instruments. According to several analytical studies, market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non-market instruments. In the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress. Empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking.The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The paper deals with an empirical estimation of abatement costs for the emission of SO₂ of coal-fired electricity units in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2000. First, the working of market instruments and non-market instruments (the existing environmental policy of the Dutch government) is simulated in a static situation. Second, we analyse the learning effects of flue gas desulphurization. The efficiency advantage of market instruments turns out to be larger in a situation of technological progress than in a static situation.     

Issues in environmental justice within the European Union

This paper surveys pressing issues facing current and future social policies in the European Union (EU) at the juncture of social justice demands and environmental concerns. European policy-makers have in fact only recently acknowledged the notions of environmental justice and environmental inequalities, which have been part of the US policy arsenal for almost two decades. Yet, challenges to equality and fairness in the environmental domain are many and growing within the European Union. After having defined environmental justice and environmental inequalities in the European context, the paper addresses two contemporary dimensions of those challenges for EU social policies: vulnerability and exposure to environmental disaster and risk; and fairness in environmental taxation and the related issue of fuel poverty.     

Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation

Acknowledging the differential ability of individuals to privately mitigate the consequences of domestic pollution for their health is essential for an understanding of their demands for regulation of the environment and of trade in dirty goods, and for analysis of the implications of these demands for equilibrium policy choices. In a small open economy with exogenous policy, we first explain how private mitigation at a cost results in an unequal distribution of the health consequences of pollution in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, and consequently how the benefits and costs of trade in dirty goods interact with choices concerning private mitigation to further polarize the interests of citizens concerning environmental stringency. The economy is then embedded in a broader political economy setting, and simulated to investigate the role of private mitigation in shaping political equilibria. We show that when citizens can choose between mitigating the health consequences of domestic pollution privately and reducing pollution through public policy, the same polarization of interests underlies equilibrium policy choices in both democratic and autocratic regimes.     

Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy

Concentration permits are regarded as an interesting policy tool for regulating emissions where, besides absolute amounts, also local concentration is important. However, effects of governance structure, trading system and possible policy interventions in the permits' allocation are not yet well analysed and understood. This paper explores in how far tradable fertilisation standards can be seen as a concentration permit trading (CPT) system which can be fine-tuned for further policy intervention. Indeed fertilisation standards such as obliged by the EU Nitrate Directive can be regarded as local nitrate emissions limits, and thus concentration permits. A multi-agent spatial allocation model is used to simulate the impact of defining the manure problem in terms of concentration permits rather than conventional emission permits. Impacts are simulated in terms of environmental performance and increased reallocation costs. The model is applied on the Flemish manure problem.     

Factors that determine the cost-effectiveness ranking of second-best instruments for environmental regulation

This paper develops a conceptual model to analyze how specific factors affect the compliance costs of three suboptimal policy instruments, when compared to the optimal ambient permit system (APS) benchmark. The model considers a non-uniformly mixed pollutant and explicitly incorporates the following factors: number of polluting sources; size, in terms of emissions, of each process; marginal abatement costs for each process; effluent concentrations; the transfer coefficient that relates emissions to environmental quality at the receptor; and the desired environmental quality target. APS is compared to a suboptimal emission permit system (EPS), and two Command and Control (CAC) policies—equal percentage reduction (PER) and a uniform effluent concentration standard (STD). The results show the importance of the different factors and their interactions in determining each policy instrument’s cost-effectiveness ranking. Surprisingly, EPS performs well within the usual values of these factors and in specific cases STD and PER also perform similarly to APS.      

Hybrid Carbon Incentive Mechanisms and Political Acceptability

This paper analyses how hybrid systems of carbon taxes and tradeable permits optimize some conflicting dimensions of political acceptability related to the design of these instruments. Pure systems like taxes without exemptions or auctioned tradeable permits cause problems for political acceptability in open economies due to high overall costs (abatement cost plus payments on the tax or auctions) for current polluters. Unfortunately, pure systems based on grandfathering of emission rights across the board do not provide a feasible alternative because of monitoring and enforcement problems. In contrast, consciously designed hybrid systems employ grandfathering of emission rights together with either carbon taxes or auctioned carbon permits in order to overcome acceptability problems of pure systems, while leaving incentives to reduce emissions at the margin untouched. Moreover, monitoring and enforcement costs of the hybrid systems are less due to the lower number of participating agents compared with the pure systems, while opportunities for cost- or burden-sharing exist as well.     

The Effects of Emission Permits on Growth and the Environment

We develop an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment in which industrial firms produce environmentally harmful emissions. A government controls the emissions by assigning emission quotas to firms, and permits could be issued and freely traded as financial instruments across firms on the basis of the quotas. We show that an environmental policy that decreases an aggregate number of emission quotas could degenerate economic growth and lower environmental quality in the long run. We also show the implications of this result for environmental policy.     

Mitigation and adaptation strategies for the control of biological invasions

Biological invasions are recognised to be a problem of growing severity. Human pathogens, weeds or pests in terrestrial systems and dominant alien species in freshwater or marine aquatic systems all impose significant costs in terms of forgone output or costs of control in every major system. Like many of the other environmental consequences of globalisation, biological invasions require that decisions be taken under uncertainty. Decision-makers in such circumstances have to choose between two main strategies: mitigation and adaptation. This paper characterises invasive species problems in terms of the properties of the stochastic processes they induce. It considers how mitigation and adaptation strategies may be modelled, and identifies the conditions in which each approach may be efficient and effective.