The impact of culture and ecology on cooperation in a common-pool resource experiment

Context affects decision-making in many ways. In this paper we explore differences in cooperation behaviour between communal farmers in Namibia and South Africa, who share the same ethnic origin but have had different historical and ecological constraints. We report on a series of field experiments based on a common-pool resource model. Our experimental design is framed according to the grazing situation in semi-arid rangelands. Dependent on the behaviour in previous rounds, participants are facing different states of resource availability with varying need to cooperate, coordinate and to be patient. While only 4% of the grazing areas in South Africa remain in good quality, Namibians achieve a level of 42%. We analyse the different experimental states and find that Namibians behave in all states more cooperatively. We argue that the large difference between the two regions is due to a combination of different historical developments and ecological preconditions: Namibian resource users have a longer experience in cooperative resource management and intact traditional norms. Moreover, the real-life payoffs to cooperation are higher in Namibia stemming from ecological factors.     

Environmental regulation and investment: Evidence from European industry data

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effects of environmental regulation on investment. In particular, we ask whether and how strongly an industry's investment responds to stringency in environmental regulation. Environmental regulation is measured as (i) an industry's total current expenditure on environmental protection, and (ii) a country-industry's revenue from environmental taxes. Focusing on European data of manufacturing industries between 1998 and 2007, we estimate the differential impact of environmental stringency on four types of investment: gross investment in tangible goods, in new buildings, in machinery, and in ‘productive’ investment (investment in tangible goods minus investment in abatement technologies). Both environmental variables enter positively, and their quadratic terms exhibit significantly negative parameter estimates. This, in turn, indicates a positive but diminishing impact of environmental regulation on investment.     

Poverty growth in Scandinavian countries: A Sen multi-decomposition

We show in this paper that the growth rate of the Sen index is multi-decomposable, that is, decomposable simultaneously by subgroups and income sources. The multi-decomposition of the poverty growth yields respectively: the growth rate of the poverty incidence (poverty rate) decomposed by subgroups, the growth rate of the poverty depth (poverty gap ratios) decomposed by sources and subgroups, and the growth rate of inequality decomposed by sources and subgroups. We demonstrate that the multi-decomposition is not unique. It is mainly dependent on poverty lines defined on the space of income sources. An application to Scandinavian countries shows that poverty lines based on non-correlation between the income sources imply serious risks of underestimation of the contribution levels of the different components of the global poverty growth. The main contribution of our paper is to pay particular attention to the poverty growth and its source components in order to avoid underestimation of poverty growth.     

Heterogeneous producers facing common shocks: An overlapping-generations example

An analytically tractable model of a competitive, full-information economy is provided in which, for some parameter values, entry and exit over the course of the business cycle is concentrated among small firms. This model is intended to make the logical point that the relatively high sensitivity of small firms to business-cycle fluctuations does not necessarily indicate the presence of informational or incentive constraints in financial markets.     

Irreversible investment with regime shifts

Under the real options approach to investment under uncertainty, agents formulate optimal policies under the assumption that firms’ growth prospects do not vary over time. This paper proposes and solves a model of investment decisions in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times. A value-maximizing investment policy is derived such that in each regime the firm's investment policy is optimal and recognizes the possibility of a regime shift. Under this policy, investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q. Moreover, investment typically is very small but, in some states, the capital stock jumps. Implications for marginal q and the user cost of capital are also examined.     

Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth Model with Investment‐specific Technological Change

This paper examines a dynamically optimal subsidy policy in a continuous‐time version of the endogenous growth model developed by Krusell (Krusell, P. (1998) “Investment‐Specific R&D and the Decline in the Relative Price of Capital”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 131–141), in which investment‐specific technological progress occurs endogenously because of R&D performed by monopolistic firms. It is demonstrated that a combination of the time‐invariant subsidy for investment and the time‐variant subsidy for R&D enables the market equilibrium to replicate the socially optimal allocation.     

Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism in developing countries: An empirical assessment

We find that political freedom has a significant and non-linear effect on domestic terrorism, but has no statistically significant effect on transnational terrorism. Geography and fractionalization limit a country’s ability to curb terrorism, while strong legal institutions deter terrorism.     

Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games

Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk–Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the game. These findings support distinctive predictions of evolutionary game theory.     

The effects of market structure on industry growth: Rivalrous non-excludable capital

We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where firms use rivalrous but non-excludable industry-specific capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation depends on utilization, so firms influence the evolution of the capital equipment through more or less intensive supply in the final-goods market. Strategic incentives stem from, (i) a dynamic externality, arising due to the non-excludability of the capital stock, leading firms to compete for its use (rivalry), and, (ii) a market externality, leading to the classic Cournot-type supply competition. Comparing alternative market structures, we isolate the effect of these externalities on strategies and industry growth.     

Political foundations of the resource curse

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.     

War, peace, and the size of countries

This paper studies the relationship between international conflict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and nonpeaceful confrontations are possible. We show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood, benefits, and costs of conflict and war. We also study the role of international law and show how better defined international ‘property rights’ may lead to country breakup and more numerous local conflicts.     

Institutional foundations of export diversification patterns in oil-producing countries

While it is well known that resource exporting countries have higher export concentration, it is lesser known that there is substantial variance in export concentration fortunes within resource-based countries. Using several estimation techniques and other sensitivity checks, this paper offers a new explanation for success and failure in export diversification patterns in oil countries, an explanation which has an institutional and political background. In measuring the number of years between the beginning of oil production and the attainment of political independence in oil developing countries, we found that the greater the number of years, the higher the degree of export diversification ceteris paribus. Our interpretation of this result is grounded in an analysis of political constraints to diversification in resource-based countries. Institutions, unfavorable to diversification, which arose from the pre-independence period, were blocked in their positive evolution by national political elites in the post-independence period. This result contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics of institutions in resource-based countries.     

The monetary transmission mechanism: Evidence from the industries of five OECD countries

This paper studies the monetary transmission mechanism using disaggregated industry data from five industrialized countries. Our goal is to document the cross-industry heterogeneity of monetary policy effects and relate it to industry characteristics suggested by monetary transmission theories. Sizable and significant cross-industry differences in the effects of monetary policy are found. Such differences swamp the hardly detectable cross-country variability. Sectoral output responses to monetary policy shocks are systematically related to the industry output durability, financing requirements, borrowing capacity and firm size. These findings are consistent with a quantitatively non-negligible role of financial frictions in the monetary transmission.     

Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.     

The impact of urbanization on CO2 emissions: Evidence from developing countries

This paper analyzes the impact of urbanization on CO₂ emissions in developing countries from 1975 to 2003. It contributes to the existing literature by examining the effect of urbanization, taking into account dynamics and the presence of heterogeneity in the sample of countries. The results show an inverted-U shaped relationship between urbanization and CO₂ emissions. Indeed, the elasticity emission-urbanization is positive for low urbanization levels, which is in accordance with the higher environmental impact observed in less developed regions. Among our contributions is the estimation of a semi-parametric mixture model that allows for unknown distributional shapes and endogenously classifies countries into homogeneous groups. Three groups of countries are identified for which urbanization's impact differs considerably. For two of the groups, a threshold level is identified beyond which the emission-urbanization elasticity is negative and further increases in the urbanization rate do not contribute to higher emissions. However, for the third group only population and affluence, but not urbanization, contribute to explain emissions. The differential impact of urbanization on CO₂ emissions should therefore be taken into account in future discussions of climate change policies.     

Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data

A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which players make partial commitments and allows us to characterize conditions under which equilibria result in socially desirable outcomes. However, since the game has many equilibrium outcomes, the theory lacks predictive power. To produce stronger predictions, one can restrict attention to the set of sequential equilibria, or Markov equilibria, or symmetric equilibria, or pure-strategy equilibria. This paper explores the relationship between equilibrium behavior in a class of monotone games, namely voluntary contribution games, and the behavior of human subjects in an experimental setting. Several key features of the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (SMPE) are consistent with the data. To judge how well the SMPE fits the data, we estimate a model of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) [R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for normal form games, Games Econ. Behav. 10 (1995) 6-38; R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games, Exp. Econ. 1 (1998) 9-41] and find that the decision rules of the QRE model are qualitatively very similar to the empirical choice probabilities.     

Bargaining and network structure: An experiment

We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. We perform an experimental test of a graph-theoretic model that yields unique predictions about equilibrium prices for the networks in our sessions. The results diverge sharply depending on how a connection is made between two separate simple networks, typically conforming to the theoretical directional predictions. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link, and we find evidence of a form of social learning.     

Improving consumption measurement and other survey data through CAPI: Evidence from a randomized experiment

This paper reports on a randomized survey experiment among 1840 households, designed to compare pen-and-paper interviewing (PAPI) to computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). We find that PAPI data contain a large number of errors, which can be avoided in CAPI. Error counts are not randomly distributed across the sample, but are correlated with household characteristics, potentially introducing sample bias if dubious observations need to be dropped. We demonstrate a tendency for the spread of total measured consumption to be higher on paper compared to CAPI, translating into significantly higher measured inequality. Investigating further the nature of PAPI's measurement error for consumption, we fail to reject the hypothesis that it is classical: it attenuates the coefficient on consumption when used as explanatory variable and we find no evidence of bias when consumption is used as dependent variable. Finally, CAPI and PAPI are compared in terms of interview length, costs and respondents' perceptions.     

On the permanent effect of an aggregate demand shock: Evidence from the G-7 countries

This paper extends the work of Cover, Enders and Hueng (2006) to examine the idea that an aggregate demand shock may have permanent effect on the output level by indirectly shifting the aggregate supply curve. We utilize the bivariate SVAR modeling and adopt an identification scheme, which allows for the possibility that a shift in the aggregate demand curve may induce the long-run aggregate supply curve to shift. We have shown that aggregate supply shocks are positively affected by the demand shocks in each of the G-7 countries. It is found that a one-time positive aggregate demand shock increases the output level permanently in these industrialized economies. We have also shown that our decomposition strategy can help resolve anomalies in the responses of inflation to a positive aggregate supply shock observed in a simple Blanchard-Quah decomposition.