Output sharing in partnerships as a common pool resource management instrument

Many economic environments are susceptible to either free-riding or overuse. Common pool resources (CPRs) fall in the latter category. Equally sharing the output of a CPR in partnerships introduces a free-riding incentive that may offset overuse. Socially optimal harvesting can be induced by dividing the set of resource users into a number of partnerships in such a way that each resource users’ tendency to over-harvest from the resource is exactly offset by his or her tendency to free-ride on the contributions of others. We conduct a laboratory experiment to assess the performance of this partnership solution by introducing equal-sharing subgroups of size one, four and six into a twelve-person CPR environment. Group assignment is either unchanging throughout a 15 period session or randomly mixed each decision round. Group size significantly affects aggregate effort, while group assignment makes no significant difference. The distribution of total payoffs is more equitable for randomly mixed groups. Implications of our results for voluntary and centralized implementations of the partnership solution are discussed.

Common pool resources and contextual factors: Evolution of a fishermen's cooperative in Calcutta

The CPR school has successfully rebutted Hardin's pessimistic Tragedy of the Commons model. However, in recent years, critics have focussed on the inward orientation and lack of contextual analysis characterising the writings of the CPR school.Oakerson [A Model for the analysis of common property problems. Working Paper R86-13. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 1986] and Ostrom [Governing the Commons. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990] have detailed the list of variables that have to be studied to understand the mechanics of collective action. However, these factors are internal to the community. Recent critics' point out that the actions of individual agents are also influenced by the alternatives embedded outside the system. These variables are collectively labelled contextual factors.In our paper, we have analysed the case of a fishermen's cooperative in the Calcutta Metropolitan District to show how the historic and economic context shapes targets of resource users and affects the feasibility of alternative courses to achieve the target by determining opportunity and transaction costs of actions. This indicates the importance of contextual factors in explaining the formation and evolution of the resource regime.     

Head-enders as stationary bandits in asymmetric commons: Comparing irrigation experiments in the laboratory and the field

The emergence of large-scale irrigation systems has puzzled generations of social scientists, since they are particularly vulnerable to selfish rational actors who might exploit inherent asymmetries in the system (e.g. simply being the head-ender) or who might free ride on the provision of public infrastructure. As part of two related research projects that focus on how subtle social and environmental contextual variables affect the evolution and performance of institutional rules, several sets of experiments have been performed in laboratory settings at Arizona State University and in field settings in rural villages in Thailand and Colombia. In these experiments, participants make both a decision about how much to invest in public infrastructure and how much to extract from the resources generated by that public infrastructure. With both studies we find that head-enders act as stationary bandits. They do take unequal shares of the common-pool resource but if their share is very large relative to downstream participants' shares, the latter will revolt. Therefore for groups to be successful, head-enders must restrain themselves in their use of their privileged access to the common-pool resource. The comparative approach shows that this result is robust across different social and ecological contexts.     

Dissertation abstract: The experimental analysis of the political economics of fisheries governance

This dissertation focuses on the political economy of fisheries governance. The study develops a formal model of fisheries governance by combining the features of the common pool fishery and the political institution of lobbying; designs a laboratory fishery governance institution and conducts economic experiments to test the hypotheses derived from the formal model. Specifically, the study analyzes how fishing firms invest in efforts to influence fishery regulation and management through voluntary contribution lobbying. The study also analyses and compares contribution and effort behavior in the lobbying and the CPR using data from economic experiments. The results indicate that lobbying to change suboptimal fishery regulations was significantly below the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction and contributions to raise the cap were significantly different than contributions to lower the cap toward the social optimum. Study results show that subjects successfully lobbied to raise inefficiently low fishing quotas, but were unable to lobby to reduce inefficiently high fishing quotas. Detailed analysis of subjects’ contribution and effort behavior suggest that despite the interesting benefit-cost duality between pure public goods and CPRs, the pattern of cooperative behavior in these two social dilemma situations was different and the level of cooperation in the voluntary contribution lobbying experiment was lower than those reported in other public goods experiments. To provide external validity to these experimental findings, the study further analyzes and compares lobbying expenditures in the fishery sector with those in other natural resource industries using field data from the United States. A comparison of actual lobbying expenditures as percentage of valued added shows that lobbying effort in the U.S fishery sector is not significantly different than those in other natural resource industries such as mining and electric utility industries, but the pattern of lobbying is different. Whereas fishing firms lobby through associations or pressure groups, firms in other natural resource industries lobby unilaterally. This observation suggests that differences in industrial structure and incentives influence the pattern of lobbying and the lobbying behavior of firms across industries. The theoretical predictions derived from the formal model of fisheries governance are consistent with our experimental findings and with the field data on lobbying in the US fisheries sector. These findings suggest that heterogeneity drives rent-seeking activities in the US fisheries sector and that fishing firms attempt to circumvent political collective action problems by forming and lobbying through associations of stakeholders with relatively homogenous policy preferences. JEL Classification D22, D72, D78, H41 Advisor: Prof. Jon G. Sutinen     

An exploration of the positive effect of inequality on common property forests

This paper analyzes the household level forces driving the positive impact of inequality on common property forest cover in Mexico. A game theoretic model demonstrates that when common property goods are complementary to private inputs in production, an increase in wealth inequality can lead to a decrease in exploitation of the commons. Data from 350 Mexican common properties show that as inequality increases, those on the lower end of the land distribution are less likely to use the commons. The data also show a negative correlation between inequality and poverty. Alternative hypotheses for these results are considered.     

A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings

The budget deficit bias is modeled as the result of a domestic common pool problem and of an international externality. Deficits can be used to finance both unproductive and productive public spending. An optimally set supranational deficit ceiling is examined and welfare is compared to the unconstrained outcome and to the case of nationally set deficit ceilings. The supranational deficit ceiling is found to be welfare improving relative to similar national arrangements, but does not fully eliminate the deficit bias unless combined with a domestic fiscal institution allowing for precommitment to productive public spending.     

On the scope of experiments in economics: comments on Siakantaris

The problem of ‘parallelism’ or external validitycan in principle be solved; I try to show how by means of twosimple examples. I also criticise attempts to dismiss experimentaleconomics that appeal to alleged ontological differences betweenthe natural and the social realm.     

Dissertation abstract: Three essays on the determinants of behavior in the commons-experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia

This dissertation presents the results of a series of common pool experiments conducted in three regions of rural Colombia with individuals who face a social dilemma in their everyday lives that is similar to what was presented in the experiment. The research objectives are to develop an empirical characterization of how individual behavior deviates from purely self-interested Nash behavior and to further our understanding of the effects of alternative institutions to promote more conservative choices in common pool experiments.Groups of five subjects participated in a 20-period common pool resource game framed as a harvest decision from a fishery. Every group first played 10 rounds of a baseline limited access common pool resource game and then 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions: face-to-face communication, one of two external regulations, and communication combined with one of the two regulations. The two external regulations consisted of an individual harvest quota that was set at the efficient outcome, but differ with respect to the level of enforcement. A total of 420 individuals participated in the experiments, with individual earnings averaging slightly more than a day’s wages. The results are presented in three essays.The first essay, What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users?, develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by combinations of self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion or conformity. The results suggest that a model which balances self-interest with a strong preference for conformity best describes average strategies. The data are inconsistent with a model of pure self-interest, as well as models that combine self-interest with individual preferences for altruism, reciprocity and inequity aversion.The second essay, Communication and Regulation to Conserve Common Pool Resources, tests for interaction effects between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and non-binding verbal agreements to do the same. The results indicate that formal regulations and informal communication are mutually reinforcing in some instances, but this result is not robust across regions or regulations. Therefore, the hypothesis of a complementary relationship of formal and informal control of local natural resources cannot be supported in general; instead the effects are likely to be community-specific. There is some evidence to suggest that these effects are correlated with the relative importance of formal regulations versus informal community efforts in the community.The third essay, Within and Between Group Variation in Individual Strategies in Common Pools, analyzes the relative effects of groups and individuals within groups in explaining variation in individual harvest decisions for particular institutions, and uses a hierarchical linear model to examine how these sources of variation may vary across institutions. Communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies within groups, but these coordinated strategies vary considerably among groups. In contrast, externally-imposed regulatory schemes (as well as unregulated limited access) produce significant variation in the individual strategies within groups, but these strategies are roughly replicated across groups so that there is little between-group variation.     

The importance of a common understanding in emergency management

An emergency situation brings together individuals belonging to many different organizations, representing different organizational cultures including different usage of language. In this paper we propose that a common understanding is vital in managing emergency situations. Firstly, a simple emergency situation is presented where one of the causes for increased damage was simply due to a misunderstanding of language. Secondly, we propose a theoretical framework of how different organization cultures with their different uses of language can be integrated on the terminological level where the communication takes place. Thirdly, the presented example is reviewed. We show how situations such as the one in our example can be analyzed by means of the theoretical framework. Finally, we present the findings from a Delphi study conducted in Finland, which support the central thesis, i.e. the importance of a common understanding in emergency situations, and we propose using the Delphi method to find the critical domains in the flow of information between the different actors involved in disaster management.     

The participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty: a spatial probit analysis

This paper represents treaty participation as a two-stage game, for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation. The resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced-form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages. This spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full-information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated with public good spillins at both stages. When the procedure is applied to the Helsinki Protocol, we find that the strategic influence of a variable may drastically differ depending upon which stage is scrutinized.     

What motivates membership in non-renewable resource cartels?: The case of OPEC

In this paper, we analyze the question of membership in a non-renewable resource cartel, with specific application to OPEC. One would expect the benefits of cartel membership to be positively related to the size of remaining reserves, while domestic petroleum consumption should be negatively related to membership if countries care about consumer interests. Our econometric analysis indicates that larger reserves and lower consumption are positively associated with OPEC membership. On the other hand, membership does not appear to be systematically related to countries’ religious makeup. Our regressions correctly predict membership for the vast majority of oil-producing countries.     

Sharing a common resource in a sustainable development context: The case of a wood innovation system

This case study of the Aquitaine wood filière emphasizes the need to integrate a stronger consideration of natural resources in the analysis of innovation systems. The analysis focuses on eight eco-innovation projects representing the Aquitaine wood filière, and carried out under the aegis of the Industries and Maritime Pine of the Future ‘competitiveness cluster.’ We show that dependence on the wood natural resource can configure the limits, objectives and expected performance of such innovation systems. While previous approaches have considered similar innovation systems from territorial, sectoral or technological perspectives, we argue that centering the analysis on this natural resource better enables consideration of the technological and environmental tensions and risks that are likely to destabilize the system.     

The association of pain interference and opioid use with healthcare utilization and costs,and wage loss among adults with osteoarthritis in the United States

Abstract

Aim: To examine associations of opioid use and pain interference with activities (PIA), healthcare resource utilization (HRU) and costs, and wage loss in noninstitutionalized adults with osteoarthritis in the United States (US).

Methods: Adults with osteoarthritis identified from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for 2011/2013/2015 were stratified by no-opioid use with no/mild PIA, no-opioid use with moderate/severe PIA, opioid use with no/mild PIA, and opioid use with moderate/severe PIA. Outcomes included annualized total HRU, direct healthcare costs, and wage loss. Multivariable regression analyses were used for comparisons versus no-opioid use with no/mild PIA (referent). The counterfactual recycled prediction method estimated incremental costs. Results reflect weighted nationally representative data.

Results: Of 4,921 participants (weighted n?=?20,785,007), 46.5% had no-opioid use with no/mild PIA; 23.2% had no-opioid use with moderate/severe PIA; 9.6% had opioid use with no/mild PIA; and 20.7% had opioid use with moderate/severe PIA. Moderate/severe PIA and/or opioid use were associated with significantly higher HRU and associated costs, and wage loss. Relative to adults with no/mild PIA, opioid users with moderate/severe PIA were more likely to have hospitalizations, specialist visits, and emergency room visits (all p?<?.001). Relative to the referent, opioid use with no/mild PIA had higher per-patient incremental annual total healthcare costs ($11,672, 95% confidence interval [CI]?=?$11,435–$11,909) and wage loss ($1,395, 95% CI?=?$1,376–$1,414) as did opioid use with moderate/severe PIA ($13,595, 95% CI?=?$13,319–$13,871; and $2,331, 95% CI?=?$2,298–$2,363) (all p?<?.001). Compared with the referent, estimated excess national total healthcare costs/lost wages were $23.3 billion/$1.3 billion for opioid use with no/mild PIA, and $58.5 billion/$2.2 billion for opioid use with moderate/severe PIA.

Limitations: Unobservable/unmeasured factors that could not be accounted for.

Conclusions: Opioid use with moderate/severe PIA had significantly higher HRU, costs, and wage loss; opioid use was more relevant than PIA to the economic burden. These results suggest unmet needs for alternative pain management strategies.     

Relating the philosophy and practice of ecological economics: The role of concepts, models, and case studies in inter- and transdisciplinary sustainability research

We develop a general and unifying methodology for ecological economics which integrates philosophical considerations on the foundations of ecological economics with an adequate operationalization. We argue that the subject matter and aims of ecological economics require a specific combination of inter- and transdisciplinary research, and discuss the epistemological position on which this methodology is based. In accordance with this understanding of inter- and transdisciplinarity and the underlying epistemological position, we develop an operationalization which comprises simultaneous analysis on three levels of abstraction: concepts, (generic) models and case studies. This provides a systematic and integral view on ecological economics, and thus allows one to see the relationship between contributions to the field that have so far been perceived as very heterogeneous and largely unrelated. At the same time, this methodological framework may provide orientation for the further development of ecological economics.