Gender- and frame-specific audience effects in dictator games

We study dictator allocations using a 2×2$2\times 2$ experimental design that varies the level of anonymity and the choice set, allowing observation of audience effects in both give and take frames. Changes in the distribution of responses across treatment cells allow us to distinguish among alternative motives as elaborated in recent theory. We observe significant audience effects that vary by both frame and gender. The pattern of responses suggests that heterogeneous concerns for reputation and self-signaling across gender give rise to the contextual effects associated with the give and take frames that have previously been observed in the literature.     

Hyperbolic Discounting,Borrowing Aversion and Debt Holding

Analysis of an original Internet‐based survey reveals that debt holding is related to time discounting through: (i) present bias, measured by the degree of declining impatience in the generalized hyperbolic discount function; (ii) borrowing aversion, captured by a sign effect in that future losses are discounted at lower rates than future gains; and (iii) impatience, measured by the overall discount rate. Hyperbolic respondents are classified naïve if their answers reveal them to be time‐inconsistent procrastinators, and otherwise sophisticated. Naïve respondents with more steeply declining impatience are more likely to be debtors. The sign effect relates negatively to borrowing. Survey responses indicative of high or declining impatience are associated with credit card borrowing and other overborrowing indicators.     

Do previous good deeds to a third party make people more tolerant of bad deeds against them? An experimental investigation

How do people react to a mix of good deeds to a third party and bad deeds against them? A modified ultimatum game shows that previous good deeds make responders substantially more tolerant to unfair proposals.     

Discount functions and self-control problems

In this paper we propose a new strategy for comparing the behavior of a hyperbolic discounter who possesses self-control problems to an exponential discounter who does not. Our strategy controls for inherent differences in overall levels of impatience across discount functions, which thereby allows us to isolate the pure effect of self-control problems. We argue that self-control problems, in their pure form as we identify them, can have a very surprising effect on intertemporal choices. Our method reveals that differences in decision making that could be attributed to self-control problems are at least partly (and perhaps entirely) just an artifact of an uncontrolled comparison.     

Working under pressure: Evidence from the impacts of soccer fans on players’ performance

In this paper we study how pressure affects individual’s behavior. For this purpose we use sports data, where the attendance is a proxy for pressure, to investigate if the number of fans in the stadium affects the performance of the players. We overcome the reverse causality problem by proposing an instrument variable: a promotion in Brazil during which low cost tickets were assigned to random soccer matches. In contrast to previous literature, our results suggest that pressure does not significantly affect players’ behavior.     

How real people make long-term decisions: The case of retirement preparation

Large variations in retirement wealth are common, with some households accumulating hundreds of thousands of dollars and others accumulating next to nothing. We examine to what extent formal planning or simple rules of thumb contribute to these differences in wealth accumulation. In particular, we investigate whether those who follow simple rules of thumb or those who come up with more complete plans accumulate more wealth than those who take an unsystematic approach. We test this empirically using a specifically designed survey about retirement preparation. We find that people who rely on a rule of thumb behave like literal planners. However, people without any systematic approach save substantially less. Our results, taken together with evidence from psychology, suggest that financial planning advice based on simple rules of thumb may be helpful for those who currently take no systematic approach.     

The Troika paradox

In three binary choice problems, people reveal a choice pattern which falsifies expected utility theory and many generalized non-expected utility theories. This new paradox challenges popular non-expected utility models analogously to how the Allais paradox challenged neoclassical expected utility theory.     

Overconfidence as a social bias: Experimental evidence

The overconfidence bias is discussed extensively in economic studies, yet fails to hold experimentally once monetary incentives and feedback are implemented. We consider overconfidence as a social bias. For a simple real effort task, we show that, individually, economic conditions effectively prevent overconfidence. By contrast, the introduction of a very basic, purely observational social setting fosters overconfident self-assessments. Additionally, observing others’ actions effectively eliminates underconfidence compared to the individual setting.     

Public goods and optimal paternalism under present-biased preferences

This paper concerns the provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model under present-biased consumer preferences. The preference for immediate gratification facing the high-ability type weakens the incentive to adjust public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.     

Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study

We present evidence from laboratory experiments of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load that spread across strategic contexts. In the experiments, subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. We find that the strategies chosen and the efficiency of outcomes in one game depends on the other game that the subject plays, and that play is altered in predictable directions. We develop a measure of behavioral variation in a normal form game, outcome entropy, and find that prevalent strategies in games with low outcome entropy are more likely to be used in the games with high outcome entropy, but not vice versa. Taken together, these findings suggest that people do not treat strategic situations in isolation, but may instead develop heuristics that they apply across games.     

Time inconsistency and retirement planning

We quantify the welfare gains from better retirement planning using a model in which retirement planning is time inconsistent. A modest increase in a household’s planning horizon by just a few years generates large aggregate and individual welfare gains.     

Risk attitudes and the stag-hunt game

A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the opponent’s action. Both players may want to obtain high payoff but uncertainty about the opponent’s action may prevent them to take such strategic risk. This paper investigates how information about the risk attitude of an opponent affects a player’s action choice in the stag-hunt game. I find that although a subject’s propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent’s risk attitude, it does not depend on her own risk attitude.     

The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice

We test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal–agent problem with multiple agents. Models of ambiguity aversion suggest that, under ambiguity, comparative compensation schemes may become more attractive than independent wage contracts. We test this by presenting agents with a choice between comparative reward schemes and independent contracts, which are designed such that under uncertainty about output distributions (that is, under ambiguity), ambiguity averse agents should typically prefer comparative reward schemes, independent of their degree of risk aversion. We indeed find that the share of agents who choose the comparative scheme is higher under ambiguity.     

Non-consequentialist voting

Standard theory assumes that voters’ preferences over actions (voting) are induced by their preferences over electoral outcomes (policies, candidates). But voters may also have non-consequentialist (NC) motivations: they may care about how they vote even if it does not affect the outcome. When the likelihood of being pivotal is small, NC motivations can dominate voting behavior. To examine the prevalence of NC motivations, we design an experiment that exogenously varies the probability of being pivotal yet holds constant other features of the decision environment. We find a significant effect, consistent with at least 12.5 percent of subjects being motivated by NC concerns.     

Anonymity in the dictator game revisited

Giving in the dictator game has often been interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. We suspect that giving is determined by subjects’ attempts to appear fair in the eyes of recipients and the experimenter. Therefore, we investigate behavior in the dictator game by using the randomized response technique to increase anonymity. Overall, 290 subjects participated in two experiments. The results demonstrate that the randomized response technique reduces giving to negligible amounts compared to the standard double blind condition. Thus, our results suggest that individuals closely follow egoistic motives in the dictator game when anonymity is convincingly implemented.     

On the role of social wage comparisons in gift-exchange experiments

This study extends a bilateral gift-exchange experiment by Clark et al. (2010). We investigate how the provision of either quantitative or qualitative information on the average wage paid in all worker-employer relationships impacts the wage set by employers and worker performance. We find that information on the average wage reduces (increases) both wage offers and effort levels in one-shot (repeated) relationships.     

Non-addictive habits: optimal consumption-portfolio policies

We formulate a model of preferences with non-addictive habits, where consumption is required to be non-negative at all times, but can fall below a “standard of living” index that aggregates past consumption. We study the consumption-portfolio problem taking account of the non-negativity constraint on consumption, and provide a constructive proof for the existence of an optimal policy on a finite time-horizon [0,T]. We show that the consumption constraint binds up to an endogenous stopping time τ∗∈[0,T], after which it remains slack until T. A decomposition of constrained consumption involving an Asian average-strike capped call-option is demonstrated.     

Illiquidity, position limits, and optimal investment for mutual funds

We study the optimal trading strategy of mutual funds that face both position limits and differential illiquidity. We provide explicit characterization of the optimal trading strategy and conduct an extensive analytical and numerical analysis of the optimal trading strategy. We show that the optimal trading boundaries are increasing in both the lower and the upper position limits. We find that position limits can affect current trading strategy even when they are not currently binding and other seemingly intuitive trading strategies can be costly. We also examine the optimal choice of position limits.     

Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable

Societies provide institutions that are costly to set up, but able to enforce long-run relationships. We study the optimal decision problem of using self-governance for risk sharing or governance through enforcement provided by these institutions. Third-party enforcement is modelled as a costly technology that consumes resources, but permits the punishment of agents who deviate from ex ante specified allocations. We show that it is optimal to employ the technology whenever commitment problems prevent first-best risk sharing and fixed costs are sufficiently low, but never optimal to provide incentives exclusively via this technology. Commitment problems then persist and the optimal incentive structure changes dynamically over time with third-party enforcement monotonically increasing in the relative inequality between agents.     

External balance,dynamic efficiency,and the welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in interdependent economies

This paper investigates domestic and foreign welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in a two-country overlapping generations model with producer carbon emissions. We show that the welfare effects of a more stringent cap on emissions depend on the external balance of the policy implementing country, the dynamic (in)efficiency of the world economy, and the preference for environmental quality. Under dynamic efficiency, the global welfare loss of policy implementation in a net foreign creditor country is lower than of a policy in the net foreign debtor country. Moreover, although the country which has unilaterally implemented a permit policy would gain from a multilateral policy, the associated welfare loss for the other country is larger than that of a unilateral policy abroad.