共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Pedro C. Vicente 《Journal of development economics》2010,92(1):28-38
This paper explores the oil discovery announcements in Sao Tome and Principe (1997-1999) to assess the role of natural resources in determining corruption. For this purpose, we use a natural experiment framework which contrasts Sao Tome and Principe to Cape Verde, a control West African country sharing the same colonial past and important recent economic and political shocks. Our measurement is based on tailored household surveys we conducted in both island countries. The unique survey instrument was retrospective and used personal histories to elicit memories from the respondents. We analyze changes in perceived corruption across a wide range of public services and allocations. We find clearest increases on vote buying, education (namely in the allocation of scholarships) and customs, ranging from 31 to 40% of the subjective scale. We interpret these findings as symptoms of increased competition for core state resources. 相似文献
2.
Using a general equilibrium endogenous growth model we explain underperformance in the small and medium enterprise sector as an effect of corruption and non-competitive banking. Limited competition in the banking sector causes a high loan-deposit spread, worsens the initial effect of corruption, and depresses growth. Fostering bank competition, for instance, by allowing foreign bank entry, would be a simple solution to this problem, but frequently, authorities choose to hamper bank competition. Therefore, we explain the persistence of non-competitive banking as a result of governments’ regulatory choice. If the government has a stake in the banking sector there exists a trade-off between current benefits from bank profits and future growth. Firm-level corruption affects intertemporal optimization and distorts the government’s choice towards more restrictive regulation, i.e., less bank competition, even if the deciding institution itself is not corrupt. These results show that the two prominent problems for small and medium enterprises, corruption and finance, are mutually reinforcing. 相似文献
3.
While financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively, their interaction has not. We develop a simple model in which low corruption and financial development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects, but act as substitutes in doing so. The substitutability arises because corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus makes financial improvements more potent; conversely, financial underdevelopment makes corruption more onerous and thus raises the gains from reducing it. We test this substitutability by predicting growth, of countries and industries, using measures of financial development, lack of corruption, and a key interaction term. Both approaches point to positive effects from improving either factor, as well as to a substitutability between them. The growth gain associated with moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in one factor is 0.63–1.68 percentage points higher if the second factor is at the 25th percentile rather than the 75th. The results show robustness to different measures of corruption and financial development and do not appear to be driven by outliers, omitted variables, or other theories of growth and convergence. 相似文献
4.
We examine the effects of province-level financial development and corruption on the performance of Vietnamese firms in terms of the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker. Employing a large firm-level dataset of more than 40,000 firms for the period 2009–2013 and applying a heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy, we find that province-level financial development promotes firm growth, while corruption hinders it. Most importantly, the marginal effect of financial development on firm growth depends negatively on the level of corruption. Moreover, financial development exacerbates the growth-retarding effect of corruption. 相似文献
5.
This study explores how initial endowments at the start of transition have shaped reform outcomes and reform trajectories in 27 former communist countries in Europe and Central Asia. Countries of the former Russian Empire that had a large resources sector at the start of transition underperformed other countries in terms of the speed and the depth of economic reforms. The effect is particularly strong for privatization, enterprise restructuring and competition policy. Within country, Ottoman or Russian provinces that had a large natural resources sector in 1989 have a lower share of entrepreneurs and of small and medium sized enterprises today and also experience endemic corruption. Our results indicate that the propensity, or ability, of special interest groups to capture the reform process that would erode their rents were facilitated by the quality of institutions whose foundations go back centuries; and that the effects on the local economy are real. 相似文献
6.
Rajeev K. Goel Michael A. NelsonMichael A. Naretta 《European Journal of Political Economy》2012,28(1):64-75
We apply a standard specification of the causes of corruption to a large sample of countries to investigate the effect of internet awareness about corruption on prevalence and perceptions of corruption. The main hypothesis is that greater corruption awareness acts as a corruption deterrent. A unique data set of internet searches on Google and Yahoo is compiled using alternate variations of “corruption”, “bribery” and “country name” keywords to capture internet corruption awareness. Results show that internet hits about corruption per capita correlate negatively with corruption perceptions and corruption incidence. This finding generally holds for different specifications and other robustness checks. 相似文献
7.
This paper compares corruption in China over the past 15 years with corruption in the US between 1870 and 1930, periods that are roughly comparable in terms of real income per capita. Corruption indicators for both countries and both periods are constructed by tracking corruption news in prominent US newspapers. Several robustness checks confirm the reliability of the constructed corruption indices for both countries. The comparison indicates that corruption in the US in the early 1870s, when its real income per capita was about $2800 (in 2005 dollars), was 7–9 times higher than China’s corruption level in 1996, the corresponding year in terms of income per capita. By the time the US reached $7500 in 1928, approximately equivalent to China’s real income per capita in 2009, corruption was similar in both countries. The findings imply that, while corruption in China is an issue that merits attention, it is not at alarmingly high levels, compared to the US historical experience. In addition, the paper articulates a theoretical framework within which the relationship between corruption and economic development can be understood. The model is used to explain the “life-cycle” of corruption in the development process–rising at the early stages of development, and declining after modernization has taken place. Hence, as China continues its development process, corruption will likely decline. 相似文献
8.
Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms. This paper examines whether corruption is affected by local democratization and by the party composition of local assemblies. Democratization occurred in 1999 and decentralization in 2001. We have firm-level data for 2001 and 2004. The 2001 data benchmark corruption at the time of decentralization. We find that corruption declines between 2001 and 2004 overall, but much less so in districts with more secular party as opposed to Islamic party representatives in district assemblies. For a larger sample of districts, correspondingly, we find that corruption in 2004 is more in districts which voted more in favor of secular party representatives in the first elections in 1999. We argue that the effects seem to be causal, over above any effects of changing religiosity and economic circumstances across districts. 相似文献
9.
We develop an economic model that explains historical data on government corruption in Ming and Qing China. In our model, officials' extensive powers result in corrupt income matching land's share in output. We estimate corrupt income to be between 14 and 22 times official income resulting in about 22% of agricultural output accruing to 0.4% of the population. The results suggest that eliminating corruption through salary reform was possible in early Ming but impossible by mid-Qing rule. Land reform may also be ineffective because officials could extract the same rents regardless of ownership. High officials' incomes and the resulting inequality may have also created distortions and barriers to change that could have contributed to China's stagnation over the five centuries 1400–1900s. 相似文献
10.
We use rich firm-level data and national input–output tables from 17 countries over the 2002–2005 period to test new and existing hypotheses about the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the efficiency of domestic firms in the host country (i.e., spillovers). We document that backward linkages have a consistently positive effect on productivity of domestic firms while horizontal and forward linkages show no consistent effect. We also examine how the strength of spillovers varies by sector, FDI source, institutional environment (corruption, red tape, level of development), firm’s distance to the technological frontier, and other firm- and country-specific characteristics. 相似文献
11.
The marginal impact of corruption on income inequality is shown to be a linear function of the size of the informal sector. This implies that anti-corruption policies alone are unlikely to reduce inequality in countries with a large informal sector. 相似文献
12.
Does financial development reduce corruption? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Yener Altunba? 《Economics Letters》2012,114(2):221-223
We estimate the impact of bank credit to the private sector on corruption, using indicators of a country’s legal origin as instrumental variables to assess causality. We find that bank credit to the private sector reduces corruption, with the result robust to instrumenting for bank credit and for many different controls. 相似文献
13.
The paper analyzes the strong but complex relation between corruption and development. The corruption/honesty index is explained by three variables measuring aspects of development: Income, Polity and Fraser (for Economic Freedom). The last two indices represent the political and the economic system. Two problems arise: (i) Development is a common factor in all four variables, giving the variables strong confluence, so it is difficult to sort out the contribution of each explanatory variable. However, kernel regressions on the corruption/income scatter give a well-defined long-run transition path, which permits an identification of the specific contributions of institutions to corruption. (ii) The correlation of corruption to the first difference of the three development variables is negative. This gives a substantial lag in the corruption/income relation in the form of wide J-curves, but the main direction of causality is still from development to corruption. High income and modern institutions cause low corruption after some time. The corruption/development-relation is a fuzzy but strong long-run connection. 相似文献
14.
This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development. 相似文献
15.
This paper presents a model of the interaction between corrupt government officials and industrial firms to show that corruption is antithetical to competition. It is hypothesized that a government agent that controls access to a formal market has a self-interest in demanding a bribe payment that serves to limit the number of firms. This corrupt official will also be subject to a detection technology that is a function of the amount of the bribe payment and the number of firms that pay it. Under quite normal assumptions about the shape of the graph of the detection function, multiple equilibria can arise where one equilibrium is characterized by high corruption and low competition, and another is characterized by low corruption and high competition. Some suggestive empirical evidence is presented that supports the main hypothesis that competition and corruption are negatively related. 相似文献
16.
Tsebelis and Nardi (2016) and Tsebelis (2017) report that constitutional length correlates with lower levels of GDP per capita. They argue that this may be the case because longer constitutions lead to greater corruption. However, uncovering a causal relationship between constitutional length and corruption is difficult. On the one hand, political elites may pressure drafters to include specific provisions that facilitate their rent-seeking efforts. On the other hand, constitutional drafters may be responding to corruption by including a large number of specific safeguards. Our aim in this paper is to explore whether there is a causal effect of constitutional length on corruption. We utilize data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) to identify 5 cases when a country experienced a ≥50% increase in constitutional length. For each of those cases, we compare the subsequent change in corruption to that of a synthetic control. We report evidence of a significant post-treatment increase in corruption for 3 out of 5 cases (Ecuador in both 1997 and 2008; Venezuela in 1999). However, the 2008 Ecuador result is not robust to a placebo test; and in the case of Venezuela it is difficult to distinguish a constitutional length effect from a “Chavez effect” (Grier and Maynard 2016). The evidence that longer constitutions corrupt is weak. 相似文献
17.
I investigate the long-run relationship between corruption and innovative activity using annual data from 48 contiguous U.S. states between 1977 and 2006. Using U.S. data allows me to work with a panel long enough to exploit time series properties of the data. I use two different measures of innovative activity: one measuring the quantity and the other measuring the quality of the patents granted. I also use two different measures of corruption: one based on the number of corruption convictions, the other based on number of corruption stories covered in Associated Press news wires. Following Pedroni (1999, 2000), I estimate the cointegrating relationship between corruption and innovative activity with Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS). The results indicate that corruption indeed slows down innovation in the long-run. 相似文献
18.
The nexus between corruption and economic growth has been examined for a long time. Many empirical studies measured corruption by the reversed Transparency International's Perception of Corruption Index (CPI) and ignored that the CPI was not comparable over time. The CPI is comparable over time since the year 2012. We employ new data for 175 countries over the period 2012–2018 and re-examine the nexus between corruption and economic growth. The cumulative long-run effect of corruption on growth is that real per capita GDP decreased by around 17% when the reversed CPI increased by one standard deviation. The effect of corruption on economic growth is especially pronounced in autocracies and transmits to growth by decreasing FDI and increasing inflation. 相似文献
19.
Exploiting a unique data set containing information on the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms, we study the relationship between bribery payments, taxes and firm growth. Using industry-location averages to circumvent potential problems of endogeneity and measurement errors, we find that both the rate of taxation and bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth. A one-percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in firm growth of three percentage points, an effect that is about three times greater than that of taxation. This provides some validation for firm-level theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards the development process to an even greater extent than taxation. 相似文献
20.
This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures. 相似文献