Does trust extend beyond the village? Experimental trust and social distance in Cameroon

In this paper we use experimental data from rural Cameroon to quantify the effect of social distance on trust and altruism. Our measure of social distance is relevant to everyday economic interactions: subjects in a Trust Game play with fellow villagers or with someone from a different village. We find that significantly more money is sent when the players are from the same village. Other factors that influence transfers at least as much as the same-village effect are gender, education and membership of rotating credit groups. To test whether Senders are motivated by altruism, they also play a Triple Dictator Game. Senders transfer significantly more money on average in the Trust Game than in the Triple Dictator Game. However, there is also a social distance effect in the Triple Dictator Game. Results from a Risk Game suggest that Trust Game transfers are uncorrelated with attitudes to risk.     

The trust system and ecological civilization:A case study of “green trust”

To promote the ecological civilization has been determined as one of the significant agenda for China’s development strategy. However, the shortfall of funding might hinder the progress. Therefore, new financing resources and channels are urgently required. Trust has been seen as a popular investing and financing instrument due to its comprehensive benefits such as equity restricting, financial independence and continuity, etc. If trust companies provide services to environmental protection and establish "green trust" or "green funds", it would fully widen financing channel of green industry and contribute to China’s sustainable development.     

Playing the trust game with other people’s money

We experimentally investigate to what extent people trust and honor trust when they are playing with other people’s money (OPM). We adopt the well-known trust game by Berg et al. (in Games Econ. Behav. 10:122–142, 1995), with the difference that the trustor (sender) who sends money to the trustee (receiver) does this on behalf of a third party. We find that senders who make decisions on behalf of others do not behave significantly different from senders in our baseline trust game who manage their own money. But receivers return significantly less money when senders send a third party’s money. As a result, trust is only profitable in the baseline trust game, but not in the OPM treatment. The treatment effect among the receivers is gender specific. Women return significantly less money in OPM than in baseline, while there is no such treatment effect among men. Moreover, women return significantly less than men in the OPM treatment.     

A model of trust in quality and North–South trade

Why do some countries produce higher quality goods than other countries? This paper suggests that one reason is self-perpetuating reputations, modelling the idea with a Klein–Leffler reputation model embedded in a general equilibrium model of trade. Reputation differences are particularly interesting because reputation is a form of “social capital”. Like product differentiation, it can explain why countries might trade even if their technologies and endowments are identical, why firms could profit from exports even if the foreign price is no higher than the domestic one, and why governments like to have “high-value” sectors. Ideally, a developing country would shift its own producers to a high-quality equilibrium; if that is not possible, the next best thing is to import experience goods and substitute to home production of goods for which reputation is not important.     

Human resource management and productivity in the “trust game corporation”

Contemporary production activity is crucially determined by the performance of complex tasks with the characteristics of corporate trust games. In this paper, we outline a productivity paradox showing that, under reasonable conditions, the noncooperative solution, which yields a suboptimal firm output, is the equilibrium of corporate trust games when relational preferences are not sufficiently high. We show that tournaments and steeper pay for performance schemes may crowd out cooperation in the presence of players preferences for relational goods. These findings help to explain firm investment in workers’ relationships and the puzzle on the less than expected use of such schemes.     

Do reputation feedback systems really improve trust among anonymous traders? An experimental study

Feedback systems are claimed to be a crucial component of the success of electronic marketplaces like eBay or Amazon Marketplace. This article aims to compare the effects of various feedback systems on trust between anonymous traders, through a set of experiments based on the trust game. Our results indicate that trust is significantly improved by the introduction of a reputation feedback system. However, such mechanisms are far from being perfect and are vulnerable to strategic ratings and reciprocation. Our findings indicate that some changes in rating rules may significantly improve the efficiency of feedback systems, by avoiding strategic rating or reciprocation, and hence stimulate trust and trustworthiness among traders. In particular, a system in which individuals are not informed of their partner's rating decision before making their own decision provides better results, both in terms of trust and earnings.     

Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust

We advance the measurement of trust in economics in two ways. First, we highlight the importance of clearly identifying the target of trust, particularly for obtaining concordance between attitudinal and behavioral measures of trust. Second, we introduce a novel behavioral measure of (dis)trust, based on individuals? willingness to pay to avoid being vulnerable to the target of trust. We conduct an experiment in which we vary the target of trust among passersby at several locations around a city, measuring both behavioral distrust and trust attitudes towards these varying targets. We find that subjects discriminate based on perceived characteristics of different targets in determining whether to trust, in a manner consistent with trust elicited using attitudinal measures and with actual trustworthiness. Risk aversion and altruism do not correlate highly with our measure of distrust.     

The impact of terrorism on expectations,trust and happiness – the case of the November 13 attacks in Paris,France

I use quasi-experimental evidence to measure the impact of the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris, France, on various channels through which terrorism can affect the economy. The evidence suggests the attacks reduced optimism and increased trust in the national government but did not affect current life satisfaction nor political orientation.     

Homogeneous middleman groups as superorganisms,endogamous ethnic groups,and trust networks: Reply to comments on Janet Landa’s target article, ‘The bioeconomics of homogeneous middleman groups as adaptive units’

This article responds to some of the very valuable comments on my target article (Landa, J Bioeconomics 10(3):259–278, 2008) on homogeneous middleman groups (HMGs) as adaptive units. In addition to viewing HMGs as adaptive units, I discuss the idea of viewing HMGs as superorganisms and as endogamous ethnic groups, as well as re-emphasizing the importance of HMGs as trust networks. My theory of HMGs as adaptive units shares some similarities with biologists’ ‘biological market theory’ of mutualistic interactions between species.