CONSUMPTION AND LEISURE EXTERNALITIES, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUILIBRIUM EFFICIENCY

This paper analyzes the effects of consumption and leisure externalities on growth and welfare in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. Both types of externalities are shown to affect the long‐run equilibrium and optimal growth rates in a rather different way. The relationship between the steady state of the market and the centrally planned economy is also analyzed. The optimal growth path can be decentralized by resorting to consumption or labor income taxation, whereas capital income should be untaxed. Numerical simulations suggest that growth and welfare effects of mild consumption and leisure externalities may be quantitatively important.     

集群外部性的发生机制

集群外部性是产生于集群化企业的产业特征或集群自身的特征的外部性,它们在企业集群的演变中起着重要作用。但是,直到今天,人们对它们的发生机制还是所知甚少。通过网络型相互作用的发生机制主要涉及集群区域品牌效应、社会资本累积效应等集群外部性;通过基于市场机制的相互作用的发生机制主要涉及集群中的货币外部性;通过策略性相互作用的发生机制主要涉及集群中的策略性外溢。     

Correcting externalities through taxes on/subsidies to related goods

Optimal corrective taxation is considered in the presence of externalities in cases where only related goods, i.e. complements to or substitutes for externality-creating goods, can be taxed. In the context of identical individuals and separable externalities, taxing and subsidizing complements and substitutes to externalities are analyzed. First, the circumstances under which it is optimal to operate on one market only for a related good are examined. Second, cases are identified where optimality requires taxes on substitutes for (or subsidies to complements to) a good which generates negative externalities.     

On the incidence of profit and equity sharing: Theory and an application to the high tech sector

Profit and equity sharing benefit some firms through improvements in innovation, production quality, retention of key employees and specific human capital formation. The analysis predicts high share contract incidence in the high tech sector, a hypothesis supported by survey data collected from small and large high tech firms. However, externalities associated with this sector's market entry mechanism imply that the optimal level of profit and equity sharing may not have been achieved.     

Optimal location in two-sided markets

As the network externality in an industrial organization has been widely discussed in recent years, many researchers in the field have noted a particular type of market, the so-called two-sided market. In a two-sided market, two or more groups of agents such as buyers and sellers interact while exerting cross-group externalities upon each other. They interact with each other via some sort of medium, called the “platform” of interaction. This paper integrates the concept of two-sided markets into the optimal location problem for two platform providers. We show that when the two groups of customers' cross-side network externalities are equal, the duopoly platforms will agglomerate at the market center with no undercutting. However, disparate conditions exist under which the duopoly platforms will stay apart at the market endpoints, or agglomerate at either endpoint, with no undercutting.     

经济集聚中马歇尔外部性的识别-基于中国制造业数据的研究

本文提出了识别经济集聚中马歇尔外部性的方法,并将其应用于中国制造业数据。通过考察制造业集聚水平和产业间专业化分工的协同演进过程,本文一方面发现两者具有替代关系,验证了马歇尔外部性是经济活动空间集聚后果的理论假说;另一方面证实了马歇尔外部性是推动中国制造业空间不断集聚的基本因素。本文还发现市场化改革是实现马歇尔外部性的积极力量。本文的结论为我国企业选址、产业布局和城市发展政策提供了依据。     

Optimal renewable-energy promotion: Capacity subsidies vs. generation subsidies

We derive optimal subsidization of renewable energies in electricity markets. The analysis takes into account that capacity investment must be chosen under uncertainty about demand conditions and capacity availability, and that capacity as well as electricity generation may be sources of externalities. The main result is that generation subsidies should correspond to externalities of electricity generation (e.g., greenhouse gas reductions), and investment subsidies should correspond to externalities of capacity (e.g., learning spillovers). If only capacity externalities exist, then electricity generation should not be subsidized at all. Our results suggest that some of the most popular promotion instruments cause welfare losses. We demonstrate such welfare losses with data from the German electricity market.     

A market mechanism for electric power transmission

As competition is introduced into the electric power industry, access and pricing policy for transmission will play a pivotal role in shaping future market structure and performance. The externalities associated with the loop flow phenomenon in an electric power network constitute a significant barrier to the formation of efficient markets for electricity and transmission services. In this paper, we present a new approach to the design of an efficient market mechanism for transmission access that resolves these externalities. Under a trading rule that combines the Coasian and the Pigouvian principles to resolution of externalities, property rights are defined so that a competitive market could be established for transmission services and electricity to achieve a social optimum within a power pool. We characterize a dynamic trading process which is Lyapunov stable and always converges to a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we discuss some practical applicability and long-term investment issues.The authors are indebted to Charles Clark, Shmuel Oren, Pravin Varaiya, Robert Wilson, Felix Wu, and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions and particularly to William Hogan for many incisive comments and constructive suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of International Association of Energy Economists in Washington D.C., June 20, 1995, and at the Joint LBS/IFORS International Symposium on Energy Models for Policy and Planning in London on July 18–20, 1995. This paper does not represent the views of EPRI or its members. The authors remain solely responsible for the errors in this paper.     

Optimal product strategies in the presence of network externalities

A network externality exists when a user’s benefit from a product increases with the number of other users in the same network. We examine the possibility that a software firm may exploit network externalities by introducing a limited feature version of its commercially available software into the market. The two versions need not be perfectly compatible and network externalities are allowed to decline as the difference between the versions increases. We obtain conditions under which introducing a limited feature version is optimal.     

Fair,reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms and technology adoption: standard setting vs. incompatible technologies

The present paper shows that in the absence of fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms, the adoption of a standard depends on the degree of network effects. If the degree of network externalities is low, patent holders may opt for developing incompatible technologies in order to avoid the entry deterrence in the downstream market and the resulting decrease in the royalty income. If the degree of network externalities is sufficiently high, patent holders may prefer developing a common standard even though it has a negative impact on the market entry in the downstream market. Generated network externalities are then sufficiently high to create additional demand compensating the losses from the entry deterrence. The application of FRAND terms eliminates the entry deterrence problem and by consequence stimulates the standard adoption. The use of the FRAND commitment has beneficial effects for consumer surplus and total welfare.     

基于区域外部性的城市群协调发展

从微观和宏观两个方面出发,并通过关中城市群实例,分析得出市场外部性与政府行为外部性是导致城市群内部利益矛盾的重要原因,进而造成城市群发展不协调。要减弱外部效应对城市群协调发展的影响,解决思路是外部效应的内部化,通过制度的合理制定,达到城市群的协调发展。     

Stabilization policy and indeterminacy in a small open economy

This paper studies the (de)stabilizing effects of income tax rules in a two-sector small open economy with production externalities. The paper shows that in the model with positive sector-specific externalities in the investment sector and negative sector-specific externalities in the consumption sector (or positive aggregate investment externalities), a regressive income tax rule can stabilize such an economy against indeterminacy, whereas a progressive income tax rule can increase the tendency for indeterminacy to occur. This paper also studies two variants that consider an imperfect world bond market and an endogenous labor supply, respectively, and shows that the qualitative results stated above remain valid. Moreover, increasing the level of sector-specific investment externalities can decrease (increase) the minimal level of tax progressivity required for indeterminacy if the investment externalities are below (above) a certain critical value and if the negative externalities in the consumption sector are taken as given.     

Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model

This paper develops a dynamic real business cycle model that highlights pollution externalities (on welfare and production) and market imperfections and uses it to determine the socially optimal tax policy that encompasses labor income, capital income, and emission taxes. We show that the optimal tax on capital and labor income only addresses the production inefficiency (and is time-invariant), while the tax on the environmental externalities affects both the production inefficiency and the environmental spillovers (and is time-varying). More interestingly, the socially optimal emission tax will be characterized by a Keynesian-like stabilizer that is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, i.e., that will stimulate the economy with a lower emission tax during recessions. In a positive analysis, we show that the beneficial effects arising from pollution taxation will become larger the greater is the degree of the firms' monopoly power. In addition, a triple dividend in terms of improving environmental quality and increasing employment and firms' profit can be simultaneously realized if the environmental production externality is more significant and if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is relatively small.     

内在性问题三种研究范式的比较与分析

在西方主流经济学中,内在性是被计入生产价格的成本的。根据研究领域的不同,可以把内在性问题的相关理论归纳为三种范式:市场行为的内在性、政府行为的内在性及个体行为的内在性。尽管这三种范式是由不同的学者基于不同的研究在不同的领域发展的,但作为一种理论分析工具,有一些本质的内容是一致的:内在性是由行为人承担的额外成本或收益,它在本质上是一个产权界定的问题,信息的不完全是其产生的主要原因。     

INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AND THE OPTIMAL POLICY INTERVENTION: THE CASE OF COURNOT‐TYPE COMPETITION UNDER NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

We derive the optimal subsidy policy for an interconnection agreement between two symmetric Internet service providers (ISPs) competing á la Cournot in a network service market. The interconnection quality agreed upon is lower than the socially optimal level, as suggested by Crémer et al. (2000 ). In the basic model where both ISPs compete in the domestic market, the optimal investment subsidy rate depends positively on the strength of network externalities. In the extended model where home and foreign ISPs compete in the home market, the optimal subsidy rate for the home government is higher than in the basic model.     

Sustainable Forestry: Timber Bequests, Future Generations and Optimal Tax Policy

This paper analyzes harvesting and timber bequest behavior in a two-period overlapping generations model where the government uses site productivity, yield and inheritance taxation. The ceteris paribus effects of forest and inheritance taxes are derived first, then the paper discusses the optimal design of forest and inheritance taxes by assuming that intergenerational externalities are either absent or operative. In the absence of intergenerational externalities, it is optimal to use only the site productivity tax, and not to introduce yield and inheritance taxes at all. In the presence of intergenerational externalities the situation changes. The paper demonstrates that the externality can be internalized by introducing either a yield tax or an inheritance subsidy, or both. If the government is able to use both at the same time, it is desirable to use the yield tax to 'punish' excessive harvesting and an inheritance subsidy to 'bribe' to give bequests.     

Optimal Management of Environmental Externalities with Time Lags and Uncertainty

Many environmental externalities occur with time lags that can range from a few days to several centuries in length, and many of these externalities are also subject to uncertainty. In this paper, we examine the key features of an optimal policy to manage environmental externalities that are both lagged and stochastic. We develop a two-period, two-polluter model and obtain closed-form solutions for optimal emissions levels under different combinations of damage functions and stochastic processes. These solutions show that it is not obvious whether greater control should be exerted on polluters that generate externalities with longer lags or on polluters that generate externalities with shorter lags. We find that the optimal ranking of polluters with respect to the length of the time lag associated with their externality will depend on (a) the discount rate, (b) conditional expectations of future states of the polluted resource, (c) persistence of the pollutant, and (d) initial conditions.     

Utility and production externalities, equilibrium efficiency and leisure specification

This paper analyzes the implications that the specification of the leisure activity has on the equilibrium efficiency in a two-sector endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. We consider external effects of consumption and leisure in utility, and sector-specific externalities associated to physical and human capital in production. The optimal tax policy to correct for the distortions caused by the externalities is characterized under all the typical leisure specifications considered in the literature: home production, quality time and raw time. We show that the optimal policy depends markedly on the leisure specification.     

(In)determinacy, increasing returns, and the optimality of the Friedman rule in an endogenously growing open economy

This paper sets up a monetary endogenous growth model with Benhabib–Farmer production externalities for an open economy, and then uses it to investigate the possibility of indeterminacy. Moreover, the paper examines how the monetary authorities will set its optimal anchor of the money growth rate from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. Several main findings emerge from the analysis. First, when investment does not involve adjustment costs, the monetary equilibrium is locally determinate regardless of the strength of the labor externality and the extent of world capital market imperfections. Second, in the presence of investment adjustment costs, the monetary equilibrium may exhibit indeterminacy when the aggregate increasing returns-to-scale in production is sufficiently strong. Third, in the presence of world capital market imperfections, the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate fails to be optimal. Fourth, in the face of perfect world capital markets, the optimal nominal money growth rate is maintained at the rate that is conformable to the Friedman rule, regardless of whether investment involves adjustment costs or not.     

Insurance,self-protection,and the economics of terrorism

This paper investigates the rationale for public intervention in the terrorism insurance market. It argues that government subsidies for terror insurance have the effect of discouraging self-protection and limiting the negative externalities associated with self-protection. Cautious self-protective behavior by a target can hurt public goods like national prestige if it is seen as “giving in” to the terrorists, and may increase the loss probabilities faced by others by encouraging terrorists to substitute toward more vulnerable targets. We argue that these externalities in protection are essential for normative analysis of government intervention in insurance markets and may also explain why availability problems in this market have engendered much stronger government responses than similar problems in other catastrophe insurance markets.