Was Deng Xiaoping Right? An Overview of China's Equity Markets

In the western world, stock markets arose from the search by privately owned companies for capital to build their businesses. Over time, the markets became places where ownership interests and even entire companies were bought and sold. In China, the complete opposite has happened. The markets arose out of the need for capital by bankrupt state‐owned enterprises operating in an economy with no history of private property. Deng Xiaoping, China's last emperor, gave the green light for the stock market experiment in early 1992 more with the hope of encouraging reform and efficiency than from any conviction that stock markets were the next sure thing. Now, after more than 20 years of experimentation with domestic and international listings, it appears evident that stock markets whose primary function is to trade minority interests in government‐controlled companies have not achieved the goal of improving enterprise performance, as China's leaders originally hoped. Instead, the combination of state monopolies with Wall Street expertise and international capital has led to the creation of national companies that represent little more than the incorporation of China's old Soviet‐style industrial ministries. As for the markets, the government's determination to prevent real privatization has produced separate classes of shares that are defined almost entirely by one thing: the shareholder's relationship to the government. And with all aspects of stock market activity regulated, managed, and owned by various state agencies, it is not surprising that non‐state investors have become motivated more by speculative opportunities than by investment fundamentals. But a quarter of a century is a short time in any country's development and, for all their shortcomings, the markets in mainland China and Hong Kong have played a significant role raising capital for China. It may be too early, perhaps, to suggest that China's equity markets have failed to accomplish what they were intended to do.     

CARE Conference Hong Kong Polytechnic University,June 9, 2014: Equity Financing for Early‐Stage Companies in China

Many of the smaller private‐sector Chinese companies in their entrepreneurial growth stage are now being funded by Chinese venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) firms. In contrast to western VC markets, where institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments have been the main providers of capital, in China most capital for domestic funds has come from private business owners and high net worth individuals. As relatively new players in the market who are less accustomed to entrusting their capital to fund managers for a lengthy period of time, Chinese VCs and their investors have shown a shorter investment horizon and demanded a faster return of capital and profits. In an attempt to explain this behavior, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner of Harvard Business School have offered a “grandstanding hypothesis” that focuses on the incentives of younger, less established VCs to push their portfolio companies out into the IPO market as early as they can—and thus possibly prematurely—to establish a track record and facilitate future fundraising. This explanation is supported by the under‐performance of Chinese VC‐backed IPOs that has been documented by the author's recent research. Although they continue to offer significant opportunities for global investors, China's VC and PE markets still face many challenges. The supervisory system and legal environment need further improvement, and Chinese funds need to find a way to attract more institutional investors—a goal that can and likely will be promoted through government inducements.     

Financial Reporting Practices of China's Listed Firms

The long‐term success of financial markets depends on the widespread availability of reasonably detailed and reliable financial information. Individual investors depend critically upon companies' regulatory filings and voluntary disclosures to assess their long‐run risks, payoffs, and, ultimately, their intrinsic values. However, a recent string of accounting frauds involving Chinese firms listed on overseas markets has drawn attention to the accounting and governance risks associated with investing in Chinese firms. This article provides a brief overview of the information environment of Chinese capital markets and the primary forces that affect the incentives of Chinese listed companies to provide timely and accurate financial reports. The evidence reviewed here indicates that the adoption of world‐class standards and regulation, although necessary, is not sufficient to generate incentives for transparency. The long‐term health of China's capital markets will also depend upon other reforms that are designed to accomplish the following: (1) improve the protection of investor rights through an effective, independent judiciary court system that promotes civil lawsuits, and through credible regulatory enforcement; (2) strengthen market development activity, especially with respect to foreign investors; and (3) limit political rent‐seeking behavior and deter politicized business decisions, especially in China's state‐owned enterprises. Together, such reforms have the potential to improve corporate governance in China and better align the incentives of the state and majority shareholders with those of minority shareholders, while increasing the ability of accounting to serve a contracting function and the demand for timely information for valuation purposes.     

航天军工单位经济增加值导向下的全面预算管理

近年来在国资委大力推行央企经济增加值（简称EVA）考核指标的引导下,航天军工单位经营理念将转向价值增值。如何将经济增加值管理手段和全面预算管理体系相融合,如何减少单位的短视行为,以提高资本回报率和核心竞争能力为导向,注重长期价值的创造,做强主业,优化资源的配置,追求科学的可持续发展,将对航天军工单位的全面预算管理带来全新的理念和应用上的挑战。     

基于EVA的国企价值管理体系构建

2010年始,国资委在央企全面推行以EVA为核心指标的年度经营业绩考核体系,国企如何建立与此相适应的价值管理体系是亟需解决的理论和实践问题.本文在阐述EVA的历史沿革、核心理念、国资委EVA考核体系政策意义基础上,初步探讨了以EVA为导向的国企价值管理体系的几个核心要素-战略管控、财务决策、绩效考核和激励制度设计相关问...     

Why EVA Bonus Plans Failed—and How to Revive Them

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure their financial performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings growth may come at the expense of future earnings through, say, shortsighted cutbacks in corporate investment, including R&D or advertising. But growth in earnings per share can also be achieved by “overinvesting”—that is, committing ever more capital to projects with expected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, exceed the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance, and often fails to motivate corporate managers who believe that meeting consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA often doesn't work well because increases in current EVA often come with reduced expectations of future EVA improvement—and reductions in current EVA are often accompanied by increases in future growth values. Since EVA bonus plans reward current EVA increases without taking account of changes in expected future growth values, they have the potential to encourage margin improvement that comes at the expense of business growth and discourage positive‐NPV investments that, because of longer‐run payoffs, reduce current EVA. In this article, the author demonstrates the possibility of overcoming such short‐termism by developing an operating model of changes in future growth value that can be used to calibrate “dynamic” EVA improvement targets that more closely align EVA bonus plan payouts with investors’ excess returns. With the use of “dynamic” targets, margin improvements that come at the expense of business growth can be discouraged by raising EVA performance targets, while growth investments can be encouraged by the use of lower EVA targets.     

Board interlocks and capital structure dynamics: evidence from China

Using a sample of Chinese A‐share listed companies from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2016, this paper investigates the effects of director network centrality on the speed of capital structure adjustment. The results indicate that firms in the central position of the director network have a higher speed of capital structure adjustment and a lower extent of deviation from the target capital structure. This effect is mainly significant for non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). Collectively, the evidence shows the network of interlocked directors creating mechanisms for information and resource exchanges, which enhance the efficiency of corporate financing polices.     

EVA AND THE "NEW ECONOMY"

Some have observed that the new economy means the end of the EVA performance measurement and incentive compensation system. They claim that although the EVA system is useful for oldline companies with heavy investments in fixed assets, the efficient management of investor capital is no longer an imperative for newage firms that operate largely without buildings and machinery–and, in some cases, with negative working capital. This article argues that EVA is not only suitable for the emerging companies that lead the new economy, but even more important for such firms than for their “rust belt” predecessors. While there may be a new economy in terms of trade in new products and services, there is no new economics– the principles of economic valuation remain the same. As in the past, companies will create value in the future only insofar as they promise to produce returns on investor capital that exceed the cost of capital. It has made for sensational journalism to speak of companies with high valuations and no earnings, but this is in large part the result of an accounting framework that is systematically flawed. New economy companies spend much of their capital on R&D, marketing, and advertising. By treating these outlays as expenses against current profits, GAAP accounting presents a grossly distorted picture of both current and future profitability. By contrast, an EVA system capitalizes such investments and amortizes them over their expected useful life. For new economy companies, the effect of such adjustments on profitability can be significant. For example, in applying EVA accounting to Real Networks, Inc., the author shows that although the company reported increasing losses in recent years, its EVA has been steadily rising–a pattern of profitability that corresponds much more directly to the change in the company's market value over the same period. Thus, for stock analysts that follow new economy companies, the use of EVA will get you closer to current market values than GAAP accounting. And for companies intent on ensuring the right level of investment in intangibles– neither too much nor too little– EVA is likely to send the right message to managers and employees. The recent decline in the Nasdaq suggests that stock market investors are starting to look for the kind of capital efficiency encouraged by an EVA system.     

Incentives and Investor Expectations

This article argues that the Expectations‐Based Management (EBM) measure proposed by Copeland and Dolgoff (in the previous article) is essentially the same measure that EVA companies have used for years as the basis for performance evaluation and incentive compensation. After pointing out that the analyst‐based measures cited by Copeland and Dolgoff do not provide a basis for a workable compensation plan, the authors present the outline of a widely used expectations‐based EVA bonus plan. In so doing, they demonstrate the two key steps in designing such a plan: (1) using a company's “Future Growth Value”—the part of its current market value that cannot be accounted for by its current earnings— to calibrate the series of annual EVA “improvements” expected by the market; and (2) determining the executive's share of those improvements and thus of the company's expected “excess” return. One of the major objections to the use of EVA, or any single‐period measure, as the basis for a performance evaluation and incentive comp plan is its inability to reflect the longer‐run consequences of current investment and operating decisions. The authors close by presenting a solution to this “delayed productivity of capital” problem in the form of an internal accounting approach for dealing with acquisitions and other large strategic investments.     

What Determines TSR

Researchers have long wrestled with the question of what determines a company's total shareholder return, or TSR, and their results have been decidedly mixed. Some empirical studies come down in favor of dividends or earnings per share, while others favor return on capital or other profitability measures. In this article, the author takes a “first principles” approach that begins by demonstrating that TSR should be a function of a company's economic profit, or its Economic Value Added (or EVA). He shows that, from a theoretical standpoint, the sum of dividends and share price appreciation—which is the definition of TSR—is ultimately a function of increasing EVA and, along with it, a company's “aggregate NPV.” He further shows that if stock prices are determined by discounting expected cash flows, corporate NPV will equal the discounted value of EVA, and increasing NPV will come down to increasing EVA. In developing his argument, the author demonstrates that TSR is actually a leveraged version of a measure he calls “TIR,” or total investor return, which is the blended return that an investor would earn from owning the entire capital structure of a company, bonds as well as stock. He then presents the findings of regression analysis showing that a company's TIR and TSR are both strongly positively correlated with its EVA performance plus the change in its aggregate NPV (with R²s equal to 1.0 and 0.94, respectively). In a final step, the author shows that the change in EVA provides a better statistical explanation than other financial measures for changes in aggregate NPV and, hence, actual TSR     

央企是否迎合了EVA考核?——基于高管持股因素影响的研究(英文)

Since 2010, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (hereafter SASAC) started the full implementation of the EVA evaluation system in central enterprises. Our research finds out that the central enterprises have obvious acted to meet the EVA assessment, that is, executives intentionally regulate major EVA adjustments to gain a higher EVA performance. We also find that the factor of shareholding rate of executives may in some extent weaken the effect of the EVA assessment and there shows a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relation between shareholding rate and each adjustment indicator.     

Beyond EVA

A former partner of Stern Stewart begins by noting that the recent acquisition of EVA Dimensions by the well‐known proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) may be signaling a resurgence of EVA as a widely followed corporate performance measure. In announcing the acquisition, ISS said that it's considering incorporating the measure into its recommendations and pay‐for‐performance model. While applauding this decision, the author also reflects on some of the shortcomings of EVA that ultimately prevented broader adoption of the measure after it was developed and popularized in the early 1990s. Chief among these obstacles to broader use is the measure's complexity, arising mainly from the array of adjustments to GAAP accounting. But even more important is EVA's potential for encouraging “short‐termism”—a potential the author attributes to EVA's front‐loading of the costs of owning assets, which causes EVA to be negative when assets are “new” and can discourage managers from investing in the business. These shortcomings led the author and his colleagues to design an improved economic profit‐based performance measure when founding Fortuna Advisors in 2009. The measure, which is called “residual cash earnings,” or RCE, is like EVA in charging managers for the use of capital; but unlike EVA, it adds back depreciation and so the capital charge is “flat” (since now based on gross, or undepreciated, assets). And according to the author's latest research, RCE does a better job than EVA of relating to changes in TSR in all of the 20 (non‐financial) industries studied during the period 1999 through 2018. The article closes by providing two other testaments to RCE's potential uses: (1) a demonstration that RCE does a far better job than EVA of explaining Amazon's remarkable share price appreciation over the last ten years; and (2) a brief case study of Varian Medical Systems that illustrates the benefits of designing and implementing a customized version of RCE as the centerpiece for business management. Perhaps the most visible change at Varian, after 18 months of using a measure the company calls “VVA” (for Varian Value Added), has been a sharp increase in the company's longer‐run investment (not to mention its share price) while holding management accountable for earning an adequate return on investors’ capital.     

A Better Way to Measure Operating Performance (or Why the EVA Math Really Matters)

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.     

The effect of the split share structure reform on working capital management of Chinese companies

Before the introduction of the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) of 2005, a dual stock system characterized Chinese-listed firms. The states owned non-tradable shares and private owners held tradable shares. The dual system generated agency problems because state owners enjoyed all the rights reserved for tradable shares but escaped the stock market risk faced by non-state shareholders. Because executives of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) received rewards based on the book value of assets rather than the market price of shares, they had no incentive to maximize the share price. The SSSR led to the conversion of non-tradable shares to tradable shares, with two major implications: (1) the interests of government and private owners are now more closely aligned and (2) government agents of SOEs are now rewarded and punished based on a firm's market performance. Thus, the expectation is that government agents turn their attention to improving a firm's market performance rather than its book value during the post-reform era. We examine the impact of the SSSR on Chinese firms' investments in working capital. Based on 511 manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2011, we find that the SSSR is associated with significant reductions in working capital investments during the post-reform period. The reduced investment in working capital is associated with improved market performance of these firms.     

中国式经济增加值考核是否会导致投资不足

以央企控股上市公司为样本,研究发现经济增加值不仅没有导致企业投资不足,而且起到了抑制作用。研究结果表明,经济增加值为核心的业绩评价方式对当前央企构建价值投资理念和实现股东价值最大化经营目标具有重要正向作用。     

STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS: TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO RESULTS

A large and growing number of companies worldwide are adopting strategic performance measurement (SPM) systems to help them execute their business strategies. SPM systems use some combination of financial, strategic, and operating measures to evaluate management's success in improving operating efficiency and adding value for shareholders. In many cases, the SPMs also provide the primary basis for rewarding top management, divisional operating managers, and, increasingly, rank‐and‐file employees. Some SPM systems are based entirely on a financial measure like economic value added (or EVA), which encourages managers to consider the opportunity cost of investor capital in making all operating and investment decisions. Other systems are based heavily on nonfinancial considerations, such as the balanced scorecard's emphasis on customer and employee satisfaction, operational excellence, and new product introduction. In this article, the author uses the findings of his recent survey of 113 North American and European companies to shed light on a number of questions: What are the most popular measures in such systems—are they primarily financial, nonfinancial, or amix of the two? To what extent is incentive compensation tied to such measures—and how far down in the organization are such measures (and incentives) extended? What are the most formidable challenges to implementing SPM systems in large corporations, with often diverse collections of businesses and tens if not hundreds of thousands of employees? Among the article's most notable conclusions, a majority of companies expect in the next three years to publish SPM targets and results in their annual reports. The most commonly cited financial SPMs will be cash flow, return on capital employed, and other variations of EVA. The most frequently cited nonfinancial SPMs are customer satisfaction, market share, and new product development. The greatest challenge in implementing SPMs is translating the vision and strategic objectives at the corporate level into performance measures that are relevant to activities at the business unit level, and securing buy‐in from business unit managers and employees.     

Controlling Shareholders’ Incentive and Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Natural Experiment in China

The split share structure reform removes a significant market friction in China's capital market by allowing previously non‐tradable shares to be freely tradable at market prices. Such a reform reduces the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the former now care more about stock prices. We find that state‐owned firms, but not non‐state‐owned firms, significantly increased their tax avoidance activities after the reform. We attribute this differential effect to the dual role of the government as state‐owned firms’ controlling shareholder as well as the tax claimant. Further, this effect is more pronounced for state‐owned firms that are more likely to be influenced by the government prior to the reform. Finally, the reform reinforces a positive association between tax avoidance and firm value. Overall, our study suggests that when controlling shareholders are more concerned about stock prices, state‐owned firms engage more in tax avoidance activities to enhance firm value.     

An Unconventional Conglomerateur: Henry Singleton and Teledyne

Capital allocation involves decisions about raising and returning capital, and about acquiring and selling companies—all of which can have major effects on shareholder value. Rather than judging CEOs by growth in revenues or earnings, the author argues that they should be judged by increases in the per share value of the companies they manage and also in comparison with the returns generated by peer firms and the broader market. Successful CEOs have been able to overcome the “institutional imperative”—the tendency of managers to focus on the sheer size of their enterprises and to avoid doing things that might be seen as unconventional. In this chapter from his recent book, The Outsiders, which provides accounts of eight remarkably successful and long‐tenured CEOs, the author describes the successful management by Henry Singleton of the conglomerate Teledyne from 1963 to 1990, a period during which the company's shareholders enjoyed annualized returns of over 20%. During the 1960s, the company produced high returns mainly by making large acquisitions funded by new equity issues. During the 1970s and '80s, by contrast, Teledyne used massive share repurchases to return excess capital to shareholders. Thus, Singleton adjusted his capital allocation strategy in response to changes in product and financial markets—and to changes in the perceived difference between market and intrinsic values. When investors provided capital with relatively low required rates of return, as in the 1960s, Singleton was an aggressive buyer investor in a wide range of businesses. But when interest rates were high and equity valuations were low, as in the 1970s and early 1980s, Singleton used share repurchases to create value by reducing investment and limiting growth. The company's shareholders were well rewarded in both environments.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

A Primer on the Financial Policies of Chinese Firms: A Multi‐country Comparison

Chinese companies have grown rapidly over the past few decades, and become increasingly global in the process. In the past five years, the aggregate market capitalization of public companies in China increased more than ten‐fold and their revenue from outside China grew 60%. Nevertheless, Chinese companies have financial policies that are notably different from those of their global counterparts in North America and Europe, and that difference could end up limiting their future profitability and growth. In this report, J.P. Morgan's Corporate Finance Advisory team compares the capital structures of large Chinese companies to those of the largest companies in the U.S., the U.K. and Germany. Among the most important findings, Chinese companies have materially more leverage, much greater reliance on bank loans than bonds, and maturities that are almost 80% shorter than those of typical U.S. companies. To bring their balance sheets in line with those of their global peers, Chinese companies are likely to have to raise over 5 trillion yuan (over $750 billion) in equity while also issuing roughly the same amount in bonds. At the same time, in order to attract that capital on economic terms, they will likely need to find ways to increase the profitability of their businesses, whose return on equity is well below international standards. As the authors point out in closing, making such significant changes in financial and operating policies could be challenging for all stakeholders, and cause some potential dislocation in the short run. But however disruptive, such changes are most likely to ensure the ability of Chinese companies to create the most value in the long run.