Do banks care about analysts' forecasts when designing loan contracts?

We investigate whether banks rely on the information content in equity analysts’ annual earnings forecasts when assessing the risk of potential borrowers. While a long literature finds that analysts provide useful information to market participants, it is not clear that banks, which have access to privileged information, would benefit from publicly available analysts’ forecasts. If, however, banks do rely on this information, then more precise private information in earnings forecasts may inform banks. We focus our analysis on the requirement of collateral because it is a direct measure of default risk, whereas other loan terms such as interest spread and debt covenants can also protect against other risks, such as asset misappropriation. The direct link between collateral and default risk allows us to examine whether information from analysts is relevant to banks when designing loan contracts. Consistent with our predictions, we find that higher precision of the private information in analysts’ earnings forecasts is associated with a lower likelihood of requiring collateral, and this effect is larger when a borrower does not have a prior relationship with the lender or their accounting or credit quality is low. We also find that this association disappears after the implementation of Regulation FD, consistent with this regulation reducing analysts’ access to private information.     

Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.     

The Informational Efficiency of the Equity Market As Compared to the Syndicated Bank Loan Market

The loan market is a hybrid between a public and a private market, comprised of financial institutions with access to private information about borrowing firms. We test whether this is reflected in informationally efficient price formation in the loan market vis-a-vis the equity markets, and reject this private information hypothesis. We also reject a liquidity hypothesis which suggests that equity markets always lead loan markets, despite bank lenders' access to private information, because of greater liquidity in equity markets. We further test, and reject, an asymmetric price reaction hypothesis that states that loan returns are more sensitive to negative information whereas equity returns respond symmetrically to both positive and negative information. We find evidence most consistent with an integrated markets hypothesis that suggests that both the equity and syndicated bank loan markets are highly integrated such that information flows freely across markets. This is particularly true when the equity market makers are also loan syndicate members.      

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

The impact of IMF term loans on US bank creditors’ equity values: an event study of South Korea's case

This study investigates whether the IMF term loan announcements to South Korea in late November and early December 1997 significantly increased the implicit value of the U.S. bank loans and investments to South Korea and hence, the equity values of its U.S. bank creditors. Using both the market model and the SUR model, this paper examines the potential abnormal performance of a total of 230 U.S. banks during mid-November to early December 1997. The findings show that there was a statistically significant positive equity response to the international bank creditors during the major event announcements. Further, the evidence shows the existence of different pricing behavior of different groups: groups that were more exposed experienced a more positive equity-price response.     

The certification value of private debt renegotiation and the design of financial contracts: Empirical evidence from Europe

By using a sample of bank loan renegotiations by European firms, I show that the renegotiation of financial contracts bears a certification value, while deeply changing the contractual features of the loan over time, to the benefit of shareholders. I find that amendments to financial covenants and to loan amounts increase the cumulative abnormal returns of a borrowing firm by 10–15%. Early and less frequent renegotiations of bilateral loans with short maturities also imply a positive stock market reaction. Amendments signaling the early accrual of new and positive information allow increasing firm value.     

Does competition from new equity mitigate bank rent extraction? Insights from Japanese data

Previous research shows that bank information production mitigates asymmetric information problems. However, this literature has ignored the concern that firms with better growth prospects are more vulnerable to bank rent extraction. This paper points out that funding competition from new equity as an effective natural mechanism solves this important concern. Using Japanese data from 1983 to 1997, we show that the relationship between loan-to-debt ratio and growth, while starting significantly negative (consistent with holdup theory), turns significantly positive towards the high end of the growth spectrum. We confirm that high-growth firms raise more new equity than do low growth firms and use more equity relative to bonds in external finance. This is consistent with a generalized Myers–Majluf framework. These results suggest that for high growth firms, when competition from public debt lessens due to increased growth-based valuations, competition from new equity steps in to restrain bank rent extraction.     

中小企业信用放款的激励相容设计：莱商银行案例

相对于大型和国有企业而言,中小企业信贷风险明显较高。因此,中小企业贷款以担保抵押为前提,已经成为业界的一种常态。但近年来对于担保抵押的有效性出现了越来越多的质疑。在此背景下,莱商银行另辟蹊径试水信用放款。本文从担保失灵与二元市场边界动态迁移角度,对莱商银行信用放款的内生逻辑与外在诱因机理进行了分析,运用激励相容理论,对信用放款制度设计进行了探讨。     

The Value Relevance of Equity Method Fair Value Disclosures

We assess the valuation implications of the fair value disclosures made for publicly traded securities accounted for under the equity method. We test the association between investors' stock price metrics and fair value disclosures while controlling for book values on a sample of 172 investor firm-years during 1993–1997. Our results indicate that the information in the fair value disclosures is incremental to the information provided by both an investment's equity method book value and equity method reported income. This suggests that there is nothing unique about investments in publicly traded common stock that involve significant influence that makes the fair value disclosures irrelevant for firm valuation.     

Testing for abnormal security-price performance under conditions of event-period uncertainty

This paper examines an event study test procedure based on cumulative average residuals (CARs) and a boundary-crossing probability for Brownian motion. The boundary-crossing test procedure is designed to detect abnormal security-price performance under conditions of event-period uncertainty. Simulations with daily security-return data show that the boundary-crossing test is well specified under the null hypothesis and has good power properties under the alternative hypothesis of abnormal security-price performance distributed over an event period of uncertain length.     

Effect of credit rating changes on Australian stock returns

We study the impact credit rating revisions have on stock returns of Australian firms rated by Standard & Poor's and Moody's. Our evidence is consistent with that documented in the USA showing that only downgrades contain price‐relevant information. The reaction is most significant when the downgrade: (i) is unanticipated; (ii) is for an unregulated firm; and (iii) reduces the firm's rating by more than one category.