Bank-to-bank lending channel and the transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from France

Good liquidity is essential for the banking system to function properly and supply credit to the real sector. However, several banks all over the world face large shocks to their liquidity supply due to numerous factors. This study contributes to the literature on the transmission of liquidity shocks by investigating the bank-to-bank lending behavior of French banks during the global financial crisis (2008 and 2009). In addition, we examine the factors strongly influencing the liquidity of the interbank deposits market. First, using a fixed-effects model on a sample of 85 French banks for the period from 2005 to 2010, we find that the deposits channel plays an important role in the transmission of liquidity shocks across the banking system. Second, we use difference-in-difference methodology to study the effects of liquidity shock on bank lending. Our results show that French banks reduced their bank-to-bank lending significantly during the financial crisis period. Moreover, our results suggest that the reduction could have been due to deposit activities.     

Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions: Small Business Loan Supply before and during the Financial Crisis

We estimate a structural model of bank portfolio lending and find that the typical U.S. community bank reduced its business lending during the global financial crisis. The decline in business credit was driven by increased risk overhang effects (consistent with a reduction in the liquidity of assets held on bank balance sheets) and by reduced loan supply elasticities suggestive of credit rationing (consistent with an increase in lender risk aversion). Nevertheless, we identify a group of strategically focused relationship banks that made and maintained higher levels of business loans during the crisis.     

Global retail lending in the aftermath of the US financial crisis: Distinguishing between supply and demand effects

This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers. In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and loans granted. Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure and unaffected savings banks. The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected and nonaffected banks. More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks. This result is particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side effects.     

From Wall Street to Main Street: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Consumer Credit Supply

How did the collapse of the asset‐backed securities (ABS) market during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis affect the supply of credit to the broader economy? Using new data on the U.S. credit union industry, we find that ABS‐related losses are associated with a large contraction in the supply of credit to consumers, especially among those credit unions that began the crisis with weaker capitalization. We also find that this credit supply shock restricted the availability of mortgage and automobile credit. These results show how movements in the prices of financial assets can affect the real economy.     

Conditional conservatism and trade credit during the global financial crisis

We investigate conditional conservatism and firms’ access to trade credit during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Previous studies argue that suppliers prefer conservative customers because of information asymmetry in production networks; we extend this line of research by focusing on trade credit during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, a period that was characterized by a credit supply shock. We first document a positive association between conditional conservatism and firms’ access to trade credit both before and after the onset of the crisis, which indicates suppliers’ demand for conditional conservatism. Meanwhile, the association between conditional conservatism and trade credit experienced a significant decline following the onset of the crisis, and this only held when suppliers and customers had frequent transactions or were in close proximity, when transacted goods were standardized rather than differentiated, when customers were financially constrained and had high bargaining power, and when suppliers had sufficient liquidity. It implies that, when information asymmetry along the supply chain was low and customers had strong bargaining power, liquid suppliers increased their tolerance to less conservative customers, and they were even willing to grant trade credit to the less conservative customers that were financially constrained. Overall, this study adds to previous literature by demonstrating suppliers’ multifaceted demand for conditional conservatism.     

Liquidity crisis,relationship lending and corporate finance

This paper investigates the consequences of the liquidity shocks in wholesale funding markets during the 2007–2009 financial crisis on bank lending and corporate financing. We show that banks that relied more heavily on wholesale funding contracted lending more severely than banks that relied more on insured deposits. We then examine the effects of loan contraction on the financial positions of publicly traded firms. We find that both during and after the crisis, the change in leverage of bank-dependent firms is less than that of firms with access to public debt markets. In addition, bank-dependent firms rely more on cash than net equity issuance to finance operations. We also find that firms with established bank lending relationships weather the crisis better. Such firms are able to attain higher levels of leverage during the crisis, add to their cash holdings, secure new bank credit, and achieve higher profitability as a result.     

Reprint of: Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

Do liquidity or credit effects explain the behavior of the BKBM–LIBOR differential?

This paper examines the evolution of the relationship between the onshore and offshore benchmarks for New Zealand dollar funding during the global financial crisis. In August 2007 the BKBM–LIBOR differential switched from positive to negative and then widened considerably following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, before narrowing gradually as the turmoil in financial markets subsided. Our structural regression model and decomposition analyses show that changes in liquidity, proxied by bid/ask spreads, largely explain the changes in the BKBM–LIBOR differential over this period and that credit risk factors only played a minor role. However our analysis also shows that bid/ask spreads in the offshore market price information regarding counterparty credit risk, suggesting that our initial results could understate the role played by credit risk factors.     

Market-specific and currency-specific risk during the global financial crisis: Evidence from the interbank markets in Tokyo and London

This paper investigates how international money markets reflected credit and liquidity risk during the global financial crisis. After matching the currency denomination, we examine how the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR) was synchronized with the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). We find remarkably asymmetric responses in market-specific and currency-specific risk during the crisis. The regression results suggest that market-specific credit risk increased the difference across markets, whereas liquidity risk caused the difference across currency denominations. They also support the view that liquidity shortage of the US dollar occurred in international money markets during the crisis. Coordinated central bank liquidity provisions were useful in reducing the liquidity shortage of the US dollar, but their effectiveness was asymmetric across markets.     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

Deflation,bank credit growth,and non-performing loans: Evidence from Japan

In this paper, I examine the link between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in an economy with deflationary pressures. Using panel OLS regressions and two-step GMM regressions, I find evidence for the time-varying relationship between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in a sample of 82 publicly listed commercial banks in Japan during the period 1993–2013. I show that bank credit growth positively correlates with non-performing loans prior to the onset of the global financial crisis of 2007 but negatively correlates with non-performing loans afterwards. I find evidence to support the notion that large banks drive the observed effects of credit growth on non-performing loans. In addition, credit growth and non-performing loans have no effect on profitability. Overall, the findings suggest that while the increase in the supply of bank loans increases the level of non-performing loans, it does not lead to higher profitability.     

Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?

Following the debate on the role of credit risk transfer (CRT) in exacerbating the 2007–2009 crisis, this paper investigates the usage and effects of loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives in U.S. commercial banks over the last decade, with special emphasis on the financial crisis. We find that in times of severe funding constraints, the need to raise financial resources becomes the principal incentive behind CRT. We document some beneficial effects of CRT on the economy, since the funds released through CRT are subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply, also in recession. However, we report higher overall riskiness in banks that engage intensively in loans sales and securitization, which translates into higher default rates during the crisis. Interestingly, the benefits and drawbacks of CRT are much stronger for loan sales and securitization than for credit derivatives.     

Why do small businesses have difficulty in accessing bank financing?

This study investigates bank financing to small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and evaluates whether the difficulties of SMEs in accessing bank financing during a period of financial crisis are due to a reduction in the supply of credit, or to a decrease in the demand for credit. The results show that the macroeconomic setting matters: demand effects are unlikely to drive the decline in the stock of bank loans, while the supply of credit causes SMEs difficulties in accessing bank credit. During a crisis period, in particular, an increase in the risk of lenders leads to the reduced supply of credit and credit rationing (i.e. the bank lending channel). In a post-crisis period, SMEs with increased risk and decreased profits have great difficulties in securing bank loans (i.e. the borrower balance sheet channel). Taken together, these results suggest that supply effects initially emerge through the bank-lending channel and then shift to the borrower balance sheet channel over a period of financial crisis.     

Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis

Liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing, which are stable sources of financing, continued to lend relative to other banks. Banks that held more illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. Off-balance sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit origination as increased takedown demand displaced lending capacity. We conclude that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.     

Understanding commonality in liquidity around the world

We examine how commonality in liquidity varies across countries and over time in ways related to supply determinants (funding liquidity of financial intermediaries) and demand determinants (correlated trading behavior of international and institutional investors, incentives to trade individual securities, and investor sentiment) of liquidity. Commonality in liquidity is greater in countries with and during times of high market volatility (especially, large market declines), greater presence of international investors, and more correlated trading activity. Our evidence is more reliably consistent with demand-side explanations and challenges the ability of the funding liquidity hypothesis to help us understand important aspects of financial market liquidity around the world, even during the recent financial crisis.     

The determinants of vulnerability to the global financial crisis 2008 to 2009: Credit growth and other sources of risk

In this paper, we identify initial macroeconomic and financial market conditions that help explain the distinct response of the real economy of a particular country to the recent global financial crisis. Using four measures of crisis severity, we examine a data set with over 90 potential explanatory factors employing techniques that are robust to model uncertainty. Four findings are of particular note. First, we find empirical evidence for the pivotal role of pre-crisis credit growth in shaping the real economy's response to the crisis. Specifically, a 1% increase in pre-crisis lending translates into a 0.2% increase in the cumulative loss in real output. Moreover, the combination of pronounced growth in lending ahead of the crisis and the country's exposure to external funding from advanced economies is shown to intensify the real downturn. Economies with booming real activity before the crisis are found to be less resilient to the global shock. Buoyant growth in real GDP in parallel with strong growth of credit particularly exacerbated the effects of the recent crisis on the real economy. Finally, we provide empirical evidence on the importance of holding international reserves in explaining the response of the real economy to the crisis. The accumulation of international reserves mitigated the harmful effects of financial stress on the real economy, in particular when domestic funding via credit is abundant. The results are shown to be robust to several estimation techniques, including those allowing for cross-country spillovers.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

The effect of liquidity and solvency risk on the inclusion of bond covenants

Studies have analyzed the impact of firm and issue characteristics but not liquidity and solvency components of financial distress on the use of bond covenants. Using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from 2001 to 2012, we find that firm liquidity, measured by standardized Lambda, has a negative statistical and economic impact on the inclusion of all categories and sub-categories of restrictive bond covenants. Developed from financial statement information by Emery and Lyons (1991), Lambda is designed as a coverage ratio that, under certain distribution assumptions, maps into the probability of a firm being unable to pay its short-term bills. The strongest solvency proxy is the 10-year credit default swap (CDS) spread which is significant across the categories and sub-categories for investment and payment covenants, weakly significant for the subordinated debt sub-category of the subsequent financing covenant, but strongly significant for the control poison put sub-category of event covenants. This evidence supports a model that uses SLambda as a proxy for liquidity risk and the 10-year CDS spread as a proxy for solvency risk. The liquidity/covenant relationship is dampened when firms have access to commercial paper funding or bank loans. However, during the recent financial crisis liquidity event this liquidity/covenant relationship was enhanced especially for firms which were dependent on commercial paper during this time when the commercial paper market was deteriorating.     

德国利率市场化改革的特点与其金融业发展

利率市场化是指金融机构在货币市场经营融资的利率由市场供求来决定,它包括利率决定、利率传导、利率结构和利率管理的市场化。文章考察了德国利率市场化改革的特点及其对金融业发展的积极影响。德国利率市场化改革分步骤平稳推进。改革后,在全能银行模式下德国金融业没有出现象美、英那样的银行集中倒闭危机;银行贷款在非金融部门融资中仍居于主导地位,而住户部门的金融资产结构发生显著变化;德国的货币政策主要是通过改变银行的流动性来影响金融市场利率,进而间接影响银行信贷政策以及实体经济。