How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

Explicit deposit insurance design: International effects on bank lending during the global financial crisis✰

Studies find that during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, loan spreads rose and corporate lending tightened, especially for foreign borrowers (a flight-home effect). We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance (DI) made smaller reductions in total lending and foreign lending, experienced smaller increases in loan spreads, and had quicker post-crisis recoveries. These effects are more pronounced for banks heavily relying on deposit funding. Evidence also reveals that more generous or credible DI design is associated with a stronger stabilization effect on bank lending during the crisis, confirmed by the difference-in-differences analysis based on expansion of DI coverage during the crisis. The stabilization effect is robust to the use of country-specific crisis measures and control of temporary government guarantees.     

Investor information and bank instability during the European debt crisis

Outside of financial crises, investors have little incentive to produce private information on banks’ short-term liabilities held as information-insensitive safe assets. The same does not hold during crises. We compare the information effects of different policy interventions. We measure information production using credit default swap spreads during the Global Financial Crisis and the European debt crisis. We study abnormal information production around major events and find that capital injections reduced abnormal information production while early European stress tests increased it. High levels of information production predict bank balance sheet contraction and higher government expenditures to support financial institutions.     

存款保险、市场竞争与银行经营稳健性

本文基于银行存款市场空间竞争模型,探讨存款保险制度的实施效果和福利效应,及其与市场竞争政策的交互作用。研究表明,政府隐性担保尽管能够保障存款人利益,但会降低存款人对银行经营稳健性的要求,使得银行追求高风险高收益资产从而降低经营稳健性;而市场化的存款保险制度通过费率与风险挂钩的激励机制,能够有效提升银行经营稳健性,同时避免过高政策成本负担,实现较高的社会福利水平。随着市场竞争强化,引入风险差别费率保险制度,在提升银行经营稳健性和增进社会福利方面的效果逐渐增强。模型分析表明,当长期允许机构自由进出市场时,政府强化竞争政策短期可能降低银行的经营稳健性,但长期内高风险银行逐渐退出市场而更有效率的低风险银行进入市场,这种柔性市场退出机制使得银行业整体经营稳健性增强。因此,在金融市场中强化竞争政策,推行并完善当前市场化的风险差别费率存款保险制度,长期内有助于在保护存款人利益的同时,提升银行稳健性和社会福利。     

存款保险制度应对国际金融危机的变革措施及启示

本文通过回顾国际上存款保险制度的历史沿革,系统梳理发达国家在本次国际金融危机中所采取的强化存款保险制度的相关措施及对我国的启示,建议遵循有效存款保险制度的核心原则,借鉴国际经验,加快出台我国存款保险制度并明确具体的制度安排。     

Extreme risk spillover network: application to financial institutions

Using the CAViaR tool to estimate the value-at-risk (VaR) and the Granger causality risk test to quantify extreme risk spillovers, we propose an extreme risk spillover network for analysing the interconnectedness across financial institutions. We construct extreme risk spillover networks at 1% and 5% risk levels (which we denote 1% and 5% VaR networks) based on the daily returns of 84 publicly listed financial institutions from four sectors—banks, diversified financials, insurance and real estate—during the period 2006–2015. We find that extreme risk spillover networks have a time-lag effect. Both the static and dynamic networks show that on average the real estate and bank sectors are net senders of extreme risk spillovers and the insurance and diversified financials sectors are net recipients, which coheres with the evidence from the recent global financial crisis. The networks during the 2008–2009 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis exhibited distinctive topological features that differed from those in tranquil periods. Our approach supplies new information on the interconnectedness across financial agents that will prove valuable not only to investors and hedge fund managers, but also to regulators and policy-makers.     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

Depositors’ trust: Some empirical evidence from Indonesia

We develop a comprehensive index, based on Robbins and Judge’s (2008) five dimensions of trust, to measure depositors’ trust in individual banks as well as trust in the banking industry and financial safety net. Using a survey of 992 retail depositors in Indonesia, we find that trust in individual banks where depositors save their money is greater than trust in the overall banking industry and financial safety net. We also find that depositors’ trust is affected by personal characteristics—for instance, women and older depositors have relatively less trust. Depositors tend to put their trust in individual banks and the financial system if they have greater trust in information conveyed by the government. Religious and economic values have positive effects on depositors’ trust at both the micro and macro levels. Our results also document that risk-taking behavior is positively associated with depositors’ trust. Furthermore, we find that more-educated depositors have significantly less trust. This finding might imply that the erosion of market discipline by depositors in a country with relatively generous deposit insurance, such as Indonesia, can be mitigated through greater financial literacy.     

Governance and bank characteristics in the credit and sovereign debt crises – the impact of CEO power

The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. A common question is whether the recent experience with the credit crisis has helped in dealing with the sovereign debt crisis. We study more specifically whether banks with powerful CEOs perform better or worse than other banks, and if there is any difference in this relationship between the two crises. Using unique hand-collected data for 378 large global banks, we find that CEO power has a significant positive relation to bank profitability and asset quality, but also to insolvency risk, during the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, strong CEOs do not appear to be detrimental to bank performance. Our results also support the idea that deposit insurance may have contributed to the credit crisis.     

Accounting for government guarantees: perspectives on fiscal transparency from four modes of accounting

Government guarantees are increasingly important as a policy instrument in public infrastructure investment and to assist the banking and financial sectors following the global financial crisis. This paper analyses how different modes of accounting characterize such guarantees in the contexts of public sector financial reporting, statistical accounting, budgeting and long-term fiscal projections. Guarantees are difficult to specify for accounting treatment and consistent conceptualization of liabilities. These difficulties make it attractive for governments to treat obligations as off-budget and off-balance sheet contingent liabilities, rather than recognize them in financial statements and statistical accounts. Miller and Power’s territorializing, mediating, adjudicating and subjectivizing roles of accounting are utilized to analyse the reporting of UK government guarantees. Provisioning for guarantees is complex in financial reporting statements and often absent in national accounts, a deficiency which Eurostat has attempted to address by devising the concept of standardized guarantees and by securing more disclosure of contingent liabilities. There is potential for future research especially where there is greater mediation between the four modes of government accounting.     

Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations

The 2007–2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy. We provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. In our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard, which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks. Consequently, socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium. Deposit insurance – or, equivalently, bank recapitalization – corrects this market failure. We find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation. The optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system. Hence, when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain, governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations.     

Phasing out the GSEs

We develop a new model of the mortgage market that emphasizes the role of the financial sector and the government. Risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers. Both borrowers and intermediaries can default. The government provides both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance. Underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage originations and higher financial sector leverage. Mortgage crises occasionally turn into financial crises and government bailouts due to the fragility of the intermediaries’ balance sheets. Foreclosure crises beget fiscal uncertainty, further disrupting the optimal allocation of risk in the economy. Increasing the price of the mortgage guarantee “crowds in” the private sector, reduces financial fragility, leads to fewer but safer mortgages, lowers house prices, and raises mortgage and risk-free interest rates. Due to a more robust financial sector and less fiscal uncertainty, consumption smoothing improves and foreclosure rates fall. While borrowers are nearly indifferent to a world with or without mortgage guarantees, savers are substantially better off. While aggregate welfare increases, so does wealth inequality.     

The fading stock market response to announcements of bank bailouts

We analyze the effects on bank valuation of government policies aimed at shoring up banks’ financial conditions during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Governments injected into troubled institutions massive amounts of fresh capital and/or guaranteed bank assets and liabilities. We employ event study methodology to estimate the impact of government-intervention announcements on bank valuation. Using traditional approaches, announcements directed at the banking system as a whole were associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns, whereas announcements directed at specific banks with negative ones. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that individual institutions were reluctant to seek public assistance. However, when we correct standard errors for bank-and-time effects, virtually all announcement impacts vanish in Europe, whereas they weaken in the United States. The policy implication is that the large public commitments were either not credible or deemed inadequate relative to the underlying financial difficulties of banks.     

Private deposit insurance,deposit flows,bank lending,and moral hazard

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.     

金融宏观审慎管理框架下我国存款保险制度主要问题探讨

存款保险是经济金融危机的产物,也是防范系统性金融风险的重要宏观审慎管理工具。本文基于政策设计的视角,对我国金融宏观审慎管理制度框架下的存款保险制度建设中的主要问题进行探讨,以期增加我国存款保险制度的完备性和效用性。     

Impact of FDICIA internal controls on bank risk taking

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005). We study the impact of these requirements on banks’ risk-taking behavior prior to the recent financial crisis and the consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.     

次贷危机以来中央银行的作为——对中美两国央行资产负债表的考察和分析

随着次贷危机及之后蔓延全球的金融危机不断发展,对危机的研究也从不同角度展开。由于中央银行是负责一国货币政策的政府部门,也是危机中能够做出迅速有力反应的机构,因此对中央银行的研究非常重要。本文以中、美两国的中央银行作为观察对象,以它们的资产负债表作为切入点,研究中央银行在危机以来的行为。本文首先对2007年以来两国中央银行资产负债表的基本情况进行观察;然后对两个央行的资产负债表中所表现出的一些特征进行分析;进而对形成这些特征的原因及相关问题进行深入的探讨;最后对全文进行总结。     

Deposit insurance coverage,ownership, and banks' risk-taking in emerging markets

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary effect of partial deposit insurance systems in a cross-section analysis of industrial and emerging market economies, as well as in emerging markets alone. The coverage that maximizes market discipline depends on country-specific characteristics of bank governance. This “risk-minimizing” deposit insurance coverage is compared to the actual coverage in a group of countries in emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia.     

Bank recapitalization and economic recovery after financial crises

Does support to distressed banks early on during financial crises mitigate the macroeconomic consequences of financial distress, and if so does it matter what form the intervention takes? We analyze the effects of government and central bank interventions in 69 systemic banking crises since 1980, of which 29 are part of the recent global financial crisis. Our estimation approach controls for the correlation between intervention measures and the time-invariant component of unobservable crisis severity. We find that timely bank recapitalizations substantially reduce the duration of recessions, underscoring the distortions caused by zombie banks and the costs of regulatory forbearance.     

The cooperative bank difference before and after the global financial crisis

We compare characteristics of the banks' specialization (cooperative versus non-cooperative) at the world level in a time spell including the global financial crisis. Cooperative banks display higher net loans/total assets ratios, lower shares of derivatives over total assets and lower earning volatility than commercial banks. With a diff-in-diff approach we test whether the global financial crisis produced convergence/divergence in these indicators. We finally document that, in a conditional convergence specification, the net loans/total assets ratio is positively and significantly correlated with value added growth in some manufacturing sectors but not in others.