Do foreign banks increase competition? Evidence from emerging Asian and Latin American banking markets

In this paper we examine the impact of foreign bank penetration on the competitive structure of domestic banking sectors in host emerging economies. We focus our analysis on Asia and Latin America during the period 1997-2008. Using bank-level panel data to identify foreign banks and to estimate measures of banking competition, we are able to provide robust empirical evidence that an increase in foreign bank penetration enhances competition in these host countries’ banking sectors. We find that this positive foreign bank penetration and banking competition link is associated with a spillover effect from foreign banks to their domestic counterparts. This spillover effect becomes stronger when more efficient and less risky foreign banks enter into less concentrated host country markets. We also find that the spillover effect is greater when foreign banks enter in the form of ‘de novo penetration’ than through mergers or acquisitions of domestic banks (‘M&A penetration’).     

Restructuring,consolidation and competition in Latin American banking markets

This study examines the competitive conditions in the banking industries of eleven Latin American countries for the period 1993–2000. For these countries, the time interval under examination corresponds to an era characterized by substantial reforms to restructure their banking systems, increased consolidation and foreign bank penetration. The banks in our sample are found to be earning their revenues as if operating under monopolistic competition, as in many other developed and emerging financial systems. The results indicate that, overall, market concentration is not significantly related with competitive conduct. At the country level, however, we do observe a decline in competition for Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela in late 1990s which may be attributable to increased consolidation. Further, we observe that deregulation and opening up of the financial markets for foreign participation serves as an important catalyst to increase the competitiveness of banking markets. Higher degree of competition in the sector, in return, is associated with reduced bank margins and profitability but improved cost efficiency.     

Concentration and foreign penetration in Latin American banking sectors: Impact on competition and risk

In the 1990s, Latin American banking sectors experienced an accelerated process of concentration and foreign penetration that prompted diverse views regarding its implications for the competitive behavior of banks and the financial stability of the system. In this paper, we examine these issues exploiting a rich bank-level database for eight Latin American countries. We find that, while increased concentration did not weaken banking competition within the region, foreign penetration appears to have led to a less competitive industry. Moreover, we find that bank risk has been negatively associated with competition which, coupled with the previous finding, explains the positive link between banking sector stability and foreign penetration revealed by the data.     

Explaining banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa

The study examined banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results reveal that banking spread (Net Interest Margin – NIM) is the main determinant of stability and the major means to achieve stability during crises periods. We however find the existence of a threshold effect in NIM.Crises in the banking sector consistently showed to reduce stability. While the results show that high percentage of foreign banks reduce stability, we find foreign banks help stabilize the banking sector in periods of crises. The results show that diversification could also have a positive impact on stability (Z-score) even though this relationship was not robust enough. The results also largely support the competition-fragility view. Particularly, we find that less competition during crises periods can help improve stability. Again, we find evidence for both concentration-stability and concentration-fragility hypotheses depending on the stability measure used. We however find that when large banks in concentrated markets are well regulated, stability could be improved. Weak regulatory environment reduces stability (Z-score) directly and matters during crises periods. Our results are robust to the use of different indicators of stability and estimation methods.     

Market power in local banking monopolies

By means of two NEIO techniques, this paper analyzes the conduct of a group of Italian single-branch banks operating as monopolists in small local areas (municipalities) in the years 1988–2005, in order to assess pricing behavior in highly concentrated banking markets. Both tests strongly reject the hypothesis of pure monopoly pricing: regardless the advantageous condition, these banks are able to exploit only partially their market power, principally by reason of the nearby competition, the latest banking consolidation trend and the local presence of big banks. Employing another sample, we also show that in duopolistic markets the conduct of single-branch banks is virtually competitive.     

Assessing competition in the banking industry: A multi-product approach

This paper investigates the competitive aspects of multi-product banking operations. Extending Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) model to the case of a multi-product banking firm, we show that higher economies of scope in multi-product banking are associated with lower Panzar–Rosse measures of competition in the banking sector. To test this empirical implication and determine the impact of multi-production on market power, we use a new dataset on the Brazilian banking industry. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that banks that offer classic banking products (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other banking products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than banks that offer only classic products. These results suggest a positive bias in the traditional estimates of competition in which multi-output actions are not considered.     

Protectionism and international banking : Sectorial efficiency, competitive structure and National policy

This paper deals with barriers to trade in services. More specifically, the paper deals with competition and its absence in the provision of international intermediation services by banks. Section 2 of the paper examines the substitutability of international trade and FDI (foreign direct investment) in the services sector as a basis for international competition. It also considers the overlap between commercial policy measures and regulations governing the entry and operations of foreign affiliates. Section 3 describes the types of restrictions imposed on foreign banks and evaluates their effects. Existing practices in some countries are outlined in the fourth section. The countries are the U.S., the U.K., Switzerland, Australia, Brazil and Taiwan. Section 5 evaluates competitive conditions in offshore banking centers, and compares them with conditions in onshore markets. The last section evaluates the costs and the benefits of an ‘open’ (free-trade) banking system. Such a system will tend to improve world welfare as well as the welfare of those countries who have a comparative advantage in international banking. The results are not clear with regard to the countries who have a comparative disadvantage in banking.     

Competition in fragmented markets: New evidence from the German banking industry in the light of the subprime crisis

Of all of the EU member states, Germany has the largest banking market. However, not all German banking institutions necessarily face fierce competition. Because the industry is highly fragmented, strict separation of the three existing banking pillars may impede competition, with negative effects on financial stability. We assess the competitive stances of 1,888 universal banks from 2001 to 2009 by using the Panzar–Rosse revenue test. We find evidence that measuring competition at an average country level does not necessarily generate valid evaluations of fragmented markets. In addition, we find no clear indication that either the particular objectives of cooperative and savings banks or the legal protection of these institutions impedes competition or discriminates against private banks. Therefore, as long as the relationship between competition and financial stability is dubious, the overall effect and the social costs or benefits of political measures that influence the structure of the German banking market are at least questionable.     

Openness, profit opportunities and foreign banking

Using new data from the World Bank and OCC surveys, we show correlations across a wide range of countries between foreign banking and domestic economic, financial and bank regulatory conditions. Foreign banking tended to be more prevalent in countries that were more open to foreign ownership of their banks, more open to banks’ engaging in a wider range of financial activities and more open to international trade. Restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic banks that were in place in the late 1970s reduced the current extent of foreign banking. Foreign banking was negatively correlated with current restrictions on banks’ securities, insurance and real estate activities. Countries that had more international trade tended to have more foreign banking. Foreign banking was more pervasive in countries where banking was more profitable and where the domestically-owned banking sector was smaller relative to GDP.     

Market structure and competitive conditions in the Arab GCC banking system

This paper investigates the market structure of Arab GCC banking industry during the years of 1993–2002 using the most frequently applied measures of concentration k-bank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and evaluates the monopoly power of banks over the ten years period using the ‘H-statistic’ by Panzar and Rosse. The results show that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE have moderately concentrated markets and are moving to less concentrated positions. The measures of concentration also show that Qatar, Bahrain and Oman are highly concentrated markets. The Panzar–Rosse H-statistics suggest that banks in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate under perfect competition; banks in Bahrain and Qatar operate under conditions of monopolistic competition; and we are unable to reject monopolistic competition for the banking market in Oman.     

Technological innovations in the Indian banking industry: the late bloomer

Given that technological innovations in the banking sector in industrialised countries have been shown to increase productivity of this industry around the world, then why did India shy away from adopting this technology until the 1990s? Why has India been a late adopter of technology in the banking industry when it could have reaped the benefits from the existing R&D expertise developed by innovators and early adopters? This article charts out the path of technological innovation in the Indian banking industry post-economic liberalisation (1991-2) and identifies initial conditions in terms of competitive environment and regulatory pressures that have contributed to the diffusion of these innovations. The article highlights the role of labour unions in public sector banks and their initial opposition to technological adoption. The empirical analysis demonstrates the superior performance of the early adopters of technology (private sector and foreign banks) as measured by productivity, returns on equity, and market share, as compared to the late or passive adopters (public sector banks).     

Competition in markets with dominant firms: A note on the evidence from the Italian banking industry

In this paper we consider the Italian banking industry, where the eight largest firms operate at a national level, manage about a half of total loans, and have a notably larger dimension than the other competitors. We estimate a structural model containing a behavioural parameter, in order to assess the market conduct of the largest banks for the period 1988–2000. Our finding is that, in spite of their noteworthy size and significant market share, these banks have been characterised by a more competitive conduct than the Bertrand–Nash outcome: this is in line with the results of the latest literature of the field, for which in the banking industry there is often no conflict between competition and concentration.     

手机银行差异化发展策略浅议

手机银行越来越成为改变金融业竞争格局的新型服务渠道。同时也是现代商业银行应对竞争的一种必然选择。随着我国金融业开放程度进一步扩大,中外银行在新业务领域的竞争将更加激烈。因此,银行业大力发展手机银行,应该迎接个性化、多元化、国际化等各个方面的挑战,走差异化路线。本文结合实际,提出了手机银行差异化发展的五个可行方向,试图提高手机银行业务对客户的吸引力。     

Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence

Using aggregate balance sheet data from banks across the EU-25 over the period from 1997 to 2005 we provide empirical evidence that national banking market concentration has a negative impact on European banks’ financial soundness as measured by the Z-score technique while controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory, and institutional factors. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that Eastern European banking markets exhibiting a lower level of competitive pressure, fewer diversification opportunities and a higher fraction of government-owned banks are more prone to financial fragility whereas capital regulations have supported financial stability across the entire European Union.     

Ethics,capital and talent competition in banking

We model optimal ethical standards, capital requirements and talent allocation in banking. Banks with varying safety-net protections, including depositories and shadow banks, innovate products and compete for talent. Managers dislike unethical behavior, but banks heed it only because detection imposes costs. We find: (i) higher capital induces higher ethical standards, but socially optimal capital requirements may tolerate some unethical behavior; (ii) managerial ethics fails to raise banks’ ethical standards; (iii) banks with lower ethical standards attract better talent and innovate more; and (iv) it is socially optimal to allocate better talent to shadow banks instead of depositories, and this allocation results in higher capital requirements and ethical standards for depositories. Consequently, with capital capacity constraints, the shadow banking sector is larger than the depository sector; talent competition induces a race to the bottom in ethical standards, and the regulator responds by setting capital requirements to magnify this size difference.     

New competitors in banking services

In this paper the authors investigator the evolution of new competition in banking. As a consequence of the deregulation of this market and the opportunities the new technologies offer, new non-banking competitors — companies whose main activity is not finance — have decided to venture into a promising sector that is unknown to them. This conceptual paper aims to present an overview of the competitive situation that has arisen from the entrance of new participants in the banking industry, and to describe the different strategies that banks may use in order to face this new situation. Data were sourced from a literature review and new entrants' websites in order to ascertain their origin, their promoters and partners as well as their actual situation.     

Competition and risk‐taking in investment banking

How does competition affect the investment banking business and the risks individual institutions are exposed to? Using a large sample of investment banks operating in seven developed economies over 1997–2014, we apply a panel VAR model to examine the relationships between competition and risk without assuming any a priori restrictions. Our main finding is that investment banks’ higher risk exposure, measured as a long‐term capital‐at‐risk and return volatility, was facilitated by greater competitive pressures for both boutique investment banks and full‐service investment banks. Overall, we find some evidence that more competition leads to more fragility before and during the recent financial crisis.     

The economic effects of foreign bank presence: Evidence from the Philippines

This study examines the economic effects of the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines from 1990 to 2006. The findings provide strong evidence on the dominance of competition effects from foreign bank presence which lead to the reduction in the profitability and overhead costs of domestic commercial banks. These findings, which reveal that both the actual market penetration and mere presence of foreign banks seem to exert competitive pressure to domestic banks, imply that foreign banks may serve as an effective competitive force, reducing the excess profits earned by domestic banks and compelling domestic banks to update their production technologies and techniques to improve their cost efficiency.From a policy perspective, the findings on competition effects of foreign banks in the domestic banking system justify the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines. The main findings demonstrate that the goal of banking liberalization in transforming domestic banks to be more competitive and efficient works considerably well in the case of the Philippines. Aside from the policy of easing the entry of foreign banks, bank-specific conditions can have significant impact on the performance of domestic banks. Therefore, a sustained improvement in the efficiency of domestic commercial banks requires not only liberalizing the entry of foreign banks, but also on continued strengthening of domestic prudential regulation and supervision on the commercial banking system.     

Do local banking market structures matter for SME financing and performance? New evidence from an emerging economy

This paper investigates the relationship between local banking structures and SMEs’ access to debt and performance. Using a unique dataset on bank branch locations in Poland and firm-, county-, and bank-level data, we conclude that a strong position for local cooperative banks facilitates access to bank financing, lowers financial costs, boosts investments, and favours growth for SMEs. Moreover, counties in which cooperative banks hold a strong position are characterized by a more rapid pace of new firm creation. The opposite effects appear in the majority of cases for local banking markets dominated by foreign-owned banks. Consequently, our findings are important from a policy perspective because they show that foreign bank entry and industry consolidation may raise valid concerns for SME prospects in emerging economies.     

Are foreign banks more profitable than domestic banks? Home- and host-country effects of banking market structure, governance, and supervision

Using both bank- and country-level data on banking sectors from 70 countries over the period 1992-2006, this paper empirically investigates the joint home- and host-country effects of banking market structure, macroeconomic condition, governance, and changes in bank supervision on foreign bank margins. We find that foreign banks are more profitable than domestic banks when they operate in a host country whose banking sector is less competitive and when the parent bank in the home country is highly profitable. Moreover, when foreign banks operate in a host country with lower growth rates of GDP, higher interest and inflation rates, and more stringent regulatory compliance with Basel risk weights, their margins increase. Specifically, changes in bank supervision of a parent bank’s ownership restrictiveness in the home country significantly increases foreign bank margins, while supervisory changes in regulatory compliance with Basel risk weights in the host country enhances foreign bank margins.