The integration of bank syndicated loan and junk bond markets

This paper hypothesizes that the special role of banks as corporate quasi-insiders has been changing due to developments in informational, legal and institutional infrastructures of syndicated loan markets. We investigate the integration of intermediated and disintermediated financial markets through highly leveraged transaction (HLT) syndicated loans during the 1990s. We demonstrate that, with the emergence of traded HLT syndicated loans as an alternative high-yield asset to high-yield bonds, market integration has dramatically increased. Taking the late 1980s and 1990s together, different factors explain the movement of credit spreads of the two markets. HLT loan market’s spreads are strongly affected by bank liquidity. Bank liquidity’s effect on HLT loan spreads disappears after 1993. From 1994–1999, junk bond market liquidity factors affect bank loan pricing. We interpret these changes as evidence of the erosion of bank specialness.     

Agency and Internal Capital Market Inefficiency: Evidence from Banking Organizations

Using banking data, I provide evidence that agency problems are at the root of internal capital market inefficiency. I find that publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs) are less efficient in their internal capital allocation than nonpublicly traded BHCs. This suggests that the divergence of interests between the chief executive officer and the shareholders is an important source of the internal capital misallocation. I also demonstrate that BHCs incorporating a tiered organizational structure are less efficient than nontiered BHCs, but only within a sample of BHCs that are publicly traded. These findings imply that a greater degree of rent‐seeking activity by division managers contributes to internal capital market inefficiency only if the top manager is an agent. This is consistent with theoretical models that explain internal capital misallocations through the multiple layers of agency within an organization.     

Further Evidence on the Information Content of Bank Examination Ratings: A Study of BHC-to-FHC Conversion Applications

Certain nonrecurring circumstances associated with the passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley (GLB) Act create a unique opportunity for the market to infer bank examination ratings. This natural experiment enables an assessment of the market's views on this, heretofore, private information. We find little evidence that the stock market extracted and/or valued regulatory information from these conversion announcements. Upon implementation of the GLB Act, systematic risk increased for most of our sample—both converting and non-converting BHCs. We find smaller bond spreads for converting BHCs compared to non-converters. While the expanded bank powers from the GLB Act increases systematic risk exposure to shareholders, bondholder exposure to credit-risk appears to decrease.     

Liquidity and Credit Risk

We develop a structural bond valuation model to simultaneously capture liquidity and credit risk. Our model implies that renegotiation in financial distress is influenced by the illiquidity of the market for distressed debt. As default becomes more likely, the components of bond yield spreads attributable to illiquidity increase. When we consider finite maturity debt, we find decreasing and convex term structures of liquidity spreads. Using bond price data spanning 15 years, we find evidence of a positive correlation between the illiquidity and default components of yield spreads as well as support for downward‐sloping term structures of liquidity spreads.     

Did the Market Signal Impending Problems at Northern Rock? An Analysis of Four Financial Instruments

The academic literature has regularly argued that market discipline can support regulatory authority mechanisms in ensuring banking sector stability. This includes, amongst other things, using forward‐looking market prices to identify those credit institutions that are most at risk of failure. The paper's key aim is to analyse whether market investors signalled potential problems at Northern Rock in advance of the bank announcing that it had negotiated emergency lending facilities at the Bank of England in September 2007. A further aim of the paper is to examine the signalling qualities of four financial market instruments (credit default swap spreads, subordinated debt spreads, implied volatility from options prices and equity measures of bank risk) so as to explore both the relative and individual qualities of each. The paper's findings, therefore, contribute to the market discipline literature on using market data to identify bank risk‐taking and enhancing supervisory monitoring. Our analysis suggests that private market participants did signal impending financial problems at Northern Rock. These findings lend some empirical support to proposals for the supervisory authorities to use market information more extensively to improve the identification of troubled banks. The paper identifies equities as providing the timeliest and clearest signals of bank condition, whilst structural factors appear to hamper the signalling qualities of subordinated debt spreads and credit default swap spreads. The paper also introduces idiosyncratic implied volatility as a potentially useful early warning metric for supervisory authorities to observe.     

Did the financial crisis affect the market valuation of large systemic U.S. banks?

We examine the impact of the financial crisis on the stock market valuation of large and systemic U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). Using the Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016) model of fundamental valuation of bank equity, we provide evidence that the financial crisis has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank characteristics. In particular, before, during, and after the crisis, investors in large and systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, albeit temporarily. Both before and after the crisis, they reward size in the short run. This pattern is appearing only briefly during the crisis. We also show that bank opacity plays no role in market valuation either in the short run or in the long run. Last but not least, we find evidence that stress testing has been informative to the market and that those BHCs that failed at the post-crisis stress tests were not subsequently valued differently by the market.     

Value investing in credit markets

We outline a parsimonious empirical model to assess the relative usefulness of accounting- and equity market-based information to explain corporate credit spreads. The primary determinant of corporate credit spreads is the physical default probability. We compare existing accounting-based and market-based models to forecast default. We then assess whether the credit market completely incorporates this default information into credit spreads. We find that credit spreads reflect information about forecasted default rates with a significant lag. This unique evidence suggests a role for value investing in credit markets.     

Bank acquisition of non-bank firms An empirical analysis of administrative decisions

This study uses stock price data to examine certain aspects of Federal Reserve Boards' administrative decisions regarding non-bank acquisitions by bank holding companies (BHCs). The results suggest that stockholders of BHCs whose acquisition plans were approved realized positive abnormal returns following the announcement of the acquisition of a non-bank firm. This result is consistent with the synergy interpretation of non-bank acquisitions by BHCs. Another finding is that stockholders of BHCs that were denied permission to acquire non-bank firms sustained significant losses during the five weeks following the Board's decision. These abnormal losses can be interpreted as foregone synergy rents or as a market reaction to the Board's signal that the BHC in question is excessively risky.     

How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios?

U.S. banks hold significantly more equity capital than required by their regulators. We test competing hypotheses regarding the reasons for this “excess” capital, using an innovative partial adjustment approach that allows estimated BHC-specific capital targets and adjustment speeds to vary with firm-specific characteristics. We apply the model to annual panel data for publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 1992 through 2006, an extended period of increasing bank capital that ended just before the subprime credit crisis of 2007–2008. The evidence suggests that BHCs actively managed their capital ratios (as opposed to passively allowing capital to build up via retained earnings), set target capital levels substantially above well-capitalized regulatory minima, and (especially poorly capitalized BHCs) made rapid adjustments toward their targets.     

Measures of the riskiness of banking organizations: Subordinated debt yields,risk-based capital,and examination ratings

Recently there have been a number of recommendations to increase the role of subordinated debt (SND) in satisfying bank capital requirements as a preferred means to discipline the risk-taking behavior of systemically important banks. One such proposal recommended using SND yield spreads as the triggers for mandatory supervisory action under prompt corrective action guidelines introduced in US banking legislation in the early 1990s. Currently such action is prompted by bank capital ratios. Evidence from previous research suggests that yield information may be a better predictor of bank problems. This paper empirically analyzes potential costs and benefits of using SND signals to trigger prompt corrective action.     

Measuring Distress Risk: The Effect of R&D Intensity

Because of upward trends in research and development activity, accounting measures of financial distress have become less accurate. We document that (1) higher research and development spending increases the likelihood of misclassifying solvent firms, (2) adjusting for conservative accounting of research and development increases the number of correctly identified distressed firms, and (3) adjusted measures of distress alleviate previously documented anomalously low returns of large, high distress risk, low book‐to‐market firms. The results hold after updating stale parameters and under various tax assumptions. Our evidence raises concerns about interpretation of extant literature that relies on accounting measures of distress.     

The emergence of market monitoring in Japanese banks: Evidence from the subordinated debt market

This paper uses a unique data set on the spreads of subordinated debts issued by Japanese banks to investigate the presence of market monitoring. The results show that subordinated debt investors punished weak banks by requiring higher interest rates. Moreover, I find that the spreads and the sensitivity of spreads to Moody’s bank ratings both increased dramatically after the Japanese government allowed a large city bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, to fail and passed the Financial Reform Act and the Rapid Revitalization Act in the late 1990s. These results suggest that the decline of conjectural guarantee led to the emergence of market monitoring. In addition, I find the relationship between spreads and accounting measures of bank risk to be quite fragile.     

Ceo Compensation And The Transformation Of Banking

We examine the compensation strategies of commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1992–2000. In particular, we analyze whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to the presence of growth options and to risk than is revealed in earlier research. We also examine whether BHC entry into investment banking has influenced compensation policies. Our evidence shows a stronger link between growth options and CEO compensation in the 1990s than observed in earlier studies and that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities are substantially larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting business. We also find that BHC leverage and variability in returns have positive effects on CEO incentive pay. Finally, we find some evidence supporting the hypothesis that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities decline generally at BHCs as return variability increases, as agency theory predicts.     

The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post-FDICIA Period

In this article we examine whether the federal safety net is viewed by the market as being extended beyond de jure deposits to other bank debt and even the debt of bank holding companies (BHCs). We extend previous research by focusing on the post‐FDICIA period and by examining the risk‐return relation of bonds issued directly by banks, not BHCs. Our results provide evidence that both bank and BHC bonds are priced by the secondary market in relation to their underlying credit risk, particularly for less capitalized issuers, suggesting that proposals requiring banks to issue subordinated debt may enhance market monitoring and discipline and be useful in supplementing regulatory discipline.     

Competition, Market Structure, and Bid-Ask Spreads in Stock Option Markets

This paper examines the effects of competition and market structure on equity option bid-ask spreads from 1986 to 1997. Options listed on multiple exchanges have narrower spreads than those listed on a single exchange, but the difference diminishes as option volume increases. Option spreads become wider when a competing exchange delists the option. Options traded under a "Designated Primary Marketmaker" (DPM) have narrower quoted spreads than those traded in a traditional open outcry crowd. Effective spreads are found to be slightly narrower under the DPM than in the crowd, but only since 1992, and only on low-volume options.     

Assessing the Information Content of Mark-to-Market Accounting with Mixed Attributes: The Case of Cash Flow Hedges

We examine how outsiders rationally interpret a reported loss on derivatives when the application of mark‐to‐market accounting to cash flow hedges creates a mixed attribute problem. We find that because of the mixed attribute problem, the information content of mark‐to‐market accounting is related to the information content of historical cost accounting in a very specific way. This relationship allows us to identify the circumstances under which mark‐to‐market accounting facilitates and when it detracts from the objective of providing an early warning of potential financial distress. We show that the reporting of an impending derivative loss by a distressed firm can actually lead outsiders to infer that the firm is in a better financial position than what they would have inferred under the silence associated with historical cost accounting. Without the mixed attribute problem, mark‐to‐market accounting would always yield more accurate assessments of the firm's financial position.     

Idiosyncratic volatility vs. liquidity? Evidence from the US corporate bond market

Our objective in this paper is to determine empirically the extent to which fixed-income investors are concerned about the relative effects of equity volatility and bond liquidity in the cross-section of corporate bond spreads. Our tests reveal that while both volatility and liquidity effects are significant, volatility, representing ex-ante credit shock, has the first-order impact, and liquidity represented by bond characteristics and price impact measure has the secondary impact on bond spreads. Conditional analysis further reveals that distressed bonds and distress regimes are both associated with significantly higher impact of volatility and liquidity shocks. However, the relative impact of these effects varies conditional on the underlying bond attributes and overall market conditions.     

Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is it Feasible?

Although accurate bond prices are difficult to come by, many have advocated that bank supervisors use subordinated debt spreads in the surveillance of large banking organizations. Our findings indicate that subordinated debt spreads are most consistent across data sources for the most liquid bonds (i.e., those of relatively large issuance size, relatively young age, issued by relatively large firms) traded in a relatively robust overall bond market. We also find a high degree of concordance in rankings of firms by their minimum spreads across bonds with especially strong agreement about which large firms are in the tails of the spread distribution at each point in time. Our time-series results further support and provide additional guidance for the use of subordinated debt spreads in supervisory monitoring, support the need for careful judgment when interpreting such spreads, highlight difficulties with currently available data sources, and motivate the need for further research.     

REVISITING THE HIGH YIELD BOND MARKET: MATURE BUT NEVER DULL

Ten years ago the author of this article wrote a piece for this journal reviewing the history of the "junk" bond market from its start in the mid-1970s through the collapse of the leveraged restructuring movement at the end of the 1980s. In the summer of 1990, the high yield market was at a critical point in its development. With defaults high and still rising, the yield spreads over Treasuries of junk bonds had jumped to over 700 basis points and the new issue market had all but dried up. Drexel Burnham Lambert had recently filed for Chapter 11, and Michael Milken had been indicted. At that time, when many market observers were pronouncing the junk bond market "finished," the author of this article said that the market performed a valuable economic function and, despite investor losses, would weather the crisis.
In describing the remarkable recovery of the high yield market in 1990s, this article notes some important changes in the market. And, although there are now troubling similarities (including rising default rates and spreads) to conditions in the early '90, there are also important differences that are likely to make the start of this decade a better one for investors.     

Are Bank Holding Companies a Source of Strength to Their Banking Subsidiaries?

I document evidence that a bank affiliated with a multi-bank holding company (MBHC) is significantly safer than either a stand-alone bank or a bank affiliated with a one-bank holding company. Not only does MBHC affiliation reduce the probability of future financial distress, but distressed affiliated banks are also more likely to receive capital injections, recover more quickly, and are less likely to fail over the next year. Moreover, the measured benefits of affiliation are much larger than those that existed before recent reforms of bank holding company regulation, suggesting that much of the observed benefit can be attributed to regulation and not the market.