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一个人,可能是智商超高的聪明人,却不一定是一个有智慧的智者.聪明人是百里挑一,然而智者虽然并不一定很聪明,但却是万里无一,罕见难寻.马云说:“聪明是智慧者的天敌,傻瓜用嘴讲话,聪明的人用脑袋说话,智慧的人用心说话.”说聪明是智慧者的天敌,这句话未免有失偏颇:比尔·盖茨能考上哈佛必定是智商超群的人,要是不聪明他必定不能创办出令人惊叹的微软公司.然而他不智慧吗?答案了然于心.聪明人知道赚取财富,而智者知道如何在有了财富后让财富创造更大的价值一聪明人都梦想着有一天能成为盖茨那样的首富,拥有巨额的财产.而智者才会在拥有了令人称羡的财富后还能把几乎所有的财产捐给基金会,为慈善事业做贡献.这也就是人们所说的“聪明人懂得把握机会,而智者懂得放下一切.”就凭这一点,我们就应该承认比尔·盖茨是一个有智慧的人,而这也说明了聪明人也是可以成为智者的. 相似文献
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作为一名在保险业摸爬滚打了近10年的从业者,孙冬对保险有着深刻的理解和认识。2001年孙冬误打误撞地进入了保险业,如今作为首创安泰人寿保险公司市场支援部的经理,面对记者提出的 相似文献
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徐成刚 《河南财政税务高等专科学校学报》2004,18(5):20-21
在我国证券市场上存在着大量的壳公司,买壳、卖壳活动屡见不鲜。从期权的角度出发对比分析期权与壳资源后可以认为,我国证券市场的壳实质是一种变相期权。壳资源变相期权价值的存在及其特点.对于我国证券市场产生了非常重要的不良影响:应采取包括推动公司整体上市、弥补国有企业公司治理方面的体制缺陷等措施,弱化壳资源的变相期权特性。 相似文献
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This paper examines dynamic information losses associated with loan terminations. We assume that the aggregated returns of current borrowers contain information about the mean returns to future borrowers. In a competitive loan market, the value of this information is not fully internalized by individual borrowers and lenders, and loan decisions fail to be first best. Introducing heterogeneous borrowers, who know their own risk characteristics better than lenders, safer borrowers are less willing to borrow when risk premia rise. As they cease borrowing, the information generated in credit markets becomes noisier and this tends to increase risk premia. The model produces alternating and persistent periods of “tight” and “loose” credit. 相似文献
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写信是一种方式,一条纽带,更是一份情谊。
2014年新年之际,我们再一次用这种传统的方式,给CFO写一封信,借以传导中国公司理财领域的脉动与心跳,表达我们对中国企业CFO阶层的期许、支持、鼓励与祝福。 相似文献
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Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards Number Five, Accounting for Contingencies (SFAS 5), financial institutions record a provision for loan losses and establish loan loss reserves when impairment of a loan is probable and the loss can be reasonably estimated. Increasingly, Markov chain models are being used to estimate these losses. This paper develops and test the suitability and forecast accuracy of alternate Markov chain models of mortgage payment behavior using transition data from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). In developing the models, the Freddie Mac transition data is examined to see if it satisfies the Markovian assumptions of stationary transition probabilities and homogenous payment behavior. The data examined in this paper did not satisfy these assumptions. With respect to accuracy in forecasting loan losses, the Markov chain approach, when incorporating recent information on transition probabilities, performed better than a random-walk model of loan losses. 相似文献
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Riccardo De Lisa Stefano Zedda Francesco Vallascas Francesca Campolongo Massimo Marchesi 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2011,40(3):123-141
This paper extends the existing literature on deposit insurance by proposing a new approach for the estimation of the loss
distribution of a Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) that is based on the Basel 2 regulatory framework. In particular, we generate
the distribution of banks’ losses following the Basel 2 theoretical approach and focus on the part of this distribution that
is not covered by capital (tail risk). We also refine our approach by considering two major sources of systemic risks: the
correlation between banks’ assets and interbank lending contagion. The application of our model to 2007 data for a sample
of Italian banks shows that the target size of the Italian deposit insurance system covers up to 98.96% of its potential losses.
Furthermore, it emerges that the introduction of bank contagion via the interbank lending market could lead to the collapse
of the entire Italian banking system. Our analysis points out that the existing Italian deposit insurance system can be assessed
as adequate only in normal times and not in bad market conditions with substantial contagion between banks. Overall, we argue
that policy makers should explicitly consider the following when estimating DIS loss distributions: first, the regulatory
framework within which banks operate such as (Basel 2) capital requirements; and, second, potential sources of systemic risk
such as the correlation between banks’ assets and the risk of interbank contagion. 相似文献
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