数字金融对商业银行风险承担的影响研究

数字金融技术可以帮助商业银行实现经营多元化，降低风险，提高客户体验。然而，这种创新也带来了新的风险和挑战，如网络安全风险和合规风险。为了适应数字金融时代的变化，商业银行需要提高风险管理和合规能力，并积极与金融科技公司合作，增强创新能力和竞争优势。     

互联网金融对商业银行风险承担的影响研究

当前,互联网金融已经纳入了国民经济发展计划之中。商业银行作为传统金融的主体,需要抓住互联网金融发展所带来的机遇,进行升级改造。因此,本文认为,通过互联网技术与商业银行的结合,颠覆商业银行发展的旧模式,可以使商业银行以数据为核心,以互联网技术为动力,打造金融领域新的支撑点。     

高管社会资本对银行风险承担的影响——基于我国上市银行的面板数据分析

本文以我国2007—2016年16家上市银行为分析对象,把高管所拥有的社会资本划分为政治资本、金融资本以及其他社会资本三类,研究了其对银行风险承担的影响。研究结果表明,在考虑多个影响因素的情况下,三类社会资本对银行风险均呈现较为显著的负效应。引入银行绩效和治理水平两个因素后分析发现,在银行绩效的影响下,政治资本和其他社会资本会增加银行风险。在治理水平的作用下,银行高管的社会资本则更多体现为风险抑制作用。     

利率政策对商业银行风险承担影响研究

本文基于我国2006-2012年期间有关的宏观经济数据,以及32家商业银行的微观金融数据,采用GMM一阶差分动态面板估计模型,实证检验了我国利率政策的风险承担渠道的存在与否以及银行异质性是否并且如何作用于该渠道。实证检验结果表明:(1)在我国,确实存在着利率政策的风险承担渠道,并且利率政策的立场与银行的风险承担意愿及水平之间,呈现出负相关关系,即低利率环境将导致银行更高的风险承担;(2)在我国,利率政策对银行风险承担的影响依赖于银行的资本充足状况和资产规模,资本越充足、规模越大的银行其抵消利率政策影响的能力越强,其风险承担对利率政策的反应相对不敏感;(3)利率政策对不同类型的商业银行(国有大型银行、全国性股份制商业银行、城市商业银行)风险承担的影响存在差异。     

金融科技对银行风险承担影响的实证研究——以上市银行为例

近年来,金融科技迅速发展,深刻改变了银行的风险承担状况,一方面,金融科技冲击商业银行,增加了银行的风险。另一方面,金融科技助推银行发展,降低了银行的风险,因此,研究上市银行在金融科技发展下的风险承担具有重要意义。文中尝试研究了金融科技对上市银行风险承担的影响,从理论层面出发的同时,运用实证方法对理论结论进行验证,先通过文本挖掘法构建fintech指数作为解释变量,再选取股票波动收益率作为被解释变量,将名义GDP增速、货币供应量增速、前四大银行资产占比、资产收益率、流动资产比率、总资产周转率和银行总资产作为控制变量;利用37家上市银行2010-2020年的年度数据,通过动态面板系统广义矩估计实证研究fintech对银行风险承担的影响,最终得出结论：金融科技对银行风险承担的影响呈倒“U”型。据此提出建议：在金融科技的发展下,银行应防范金融风险,与金融科技协同发展,监管机构要加强金融监管,政府机构应大力支持改革,促进经济长期发展。     

金融科技应用对我国商业银行风险承担的影响研究

文章选取2011-2021年32家商业银行的财务数据进行实证分析,利用文本挖掘法构建金融科技指数作为核心解释变量,选用风险加权资产与总资产的比重作为被解释变量,应用固定效应模型进行回归分析,得出结论：随着金融科技水平的提高,我国商业银行风险承担水平不断降低;金融科技应用可以提高商业银行风险管理能力和盈利能力,推动商业银行稳定且持续健康发展。最后,文章根据实证结果提出强化金融科技意识、合理应用金融科技,以及不同类型的商业银行根据自身情况高效应用金融科技的建议。     

互联网金融对商业银行风险承担的影响研究——基于中国30家商业银行的实证分析

为了研究互联网金融对商业银行风险承担的影响,本文以2009—2018年互联网金融对中国30家典型商业银行风险承担影响的数据为基础,运用动态面板广义矩估计方法对互联网金融对我国商业银行风险承担的影响进行了研究与分析。结果表明:(1)互联网金融对我国商业银行风险承担的影响呈现倒U形分布,即互联网金融发展初期通过抢占市场份额,加剧了行业竞争,抢占了商业银行利润,进而加大了商业银行风险承担的成本;但随着商业银行对互联网前沿技术的不断融合、金融产品服务的创新以及风险管控水平的提升,商业银行风险承担的成本下降。(2)面对互联网金融的冲击,不同类型商业银行对风险承担反应具有异质性:在宏观层面,大型国有银行拥有庞大的资产规模和政策保障,对其冲击反应较为滞后;股份制银行和城市商业银行缺乏上述优势,对其冲击反映较为敏感,但股份制银行后期风险承担显著下降;农村商业银行因主要服务于乡村建设,受其影响较为有限。在微观层面,面对互联网金融的冲击,与资本充足率和流动性水平较低的大型商业银行相比,资本充足率和流动性水平较高的小规模商业银行风险承担显著增加。     

金融科技发展与商业银行风险承担：影响机理及实证检验

金融科技的快速发展既推动了商业银行的转型升级,也加剧了市场竞争,使金融风险更加复杂。本文基于数量、质量和环境三个维度构建我国金融科技发展水平指数,并在此基础上以我国174家商业银行2013—2020年面板数据为样本,实证分析金融科技发展对商业银行风险承担的影响及其内在机理。研究结果表明：第一,金融科技发展对商业银行风险承担的影响呈先升后降的倒U型趋势;第二,金融科技发展对不同规模商业银行风险承担的影响具有异质性,对大型商业银行的影响更为显著;第三,金融科技发展通过加剧竞争、压缩净息差渠道提高了银行风险承担,通过提升银行信息搜寻能力和管理效率降低了银行风险承担。在金融与科技深度融合的背景下,商业银行应主动将先进科技运用于传统的金融业务,提升管理效率,降低管理成本;加强业务风险防范能力,构建动态风险评价体系,缓解金融科技带来的风险冲击;中小银行应积极应对金融科技带来的竞争压力,创新产品和服务,与大型银行开展差异化竞争。     

高管变更对上市公司股价变动的实证研究

基于效率资本市场假设,利用事件研究法,以2011-2015年我国深市主板上市公司的611个高管变更事件为样本进行系统观察,研究高管变更公告后继任高管的政治背景与市场反应之间的关系.研究发现,继任高管的政治背景会产生积极的市场反应.进一步研究发现,源于外部的高管继任者其政治背景会比内部提拔起来的高管引起更积极的市场反应;相同条件下,在高新技术企业内继任高管政治背景产生的市场反应比传统产业要弱一些.     

How Theories of Financial Intermediation and Corporate Risk-Management Influence Bank Risk-Taking Behavior

This paper examines the rationales for risk-taking and risk-management behavior from both a corporate finance and a banking perspective. After combining the theoretical insights from the corporate finance and banking literatures related to hedging and risk-taking, the paper reviews empirical tests based on these theories to determine which of these theories are best supported by the data. Managerial incentives are the most consistently supported rationale for describing how banks manage risk. In particular, moderate/high levels of equity ownership reduce bank risk while positive amounts of stock option grants increase bank risk-taking behavior. The review of empirical tests in the banking literature also suggests that financial intermediaries coordinate different aspects of risk (e.g., credit and interest rate risk) in order to maintain a certain level of total risk. The empirical results indicate hedgeable risks such as interest rate risk represent only one dimension of the risk-management problem. This implies empirical tests of the theories of corporate risk-management need to consider individual sub-components of total risk and the bank's ability to trade these risks in a competitive financial market. This finding is consistent with the reality that banks have non-zero expected financial distress costs and bank managers cannot fully diversify their bank-related personal investments.     

Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans

This paper analyzes whether the political connections of listed firms in the United States affect the cost and terms of loan contracts. Using a hand‐collected data set of the political connections of S&P 500 companies over the 2003–2008 time period, we find that the cost of bank loans is significantly lower for companies that have board members with political ties. We consider two possible explanations for these findings: a Borrower Channel in which lenders charge lower rates because they recognize that connections enhance the borrower's credit worthiness and a Bank Channel in which banks assign greater value to connected loans to enhance their own relationships with key politicians. After employing a series of tests to distinguish between these two channels, we find strong support for the Borrower Channel but no direct evidence supporting the Bank Channel. Finally, we demonstrate that political connections reduce the likelihood of a capital expenditure restriction or liquidity requirement commanded by banks at the origination of the loan. Taken together, our results suggest that political connections increase the value of U.S. companies and reduce monitoring costs and credit risk faced by banks, which, in turn, reduces the borrower's cost of debt.     

货币政策、银行资本与风险承担

考虑存款准备金率作为我国货币政策的重要工具,本文在D-L-M模型中引入了法定存款准备金,分析了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,发现货币政策对银行风险承担的影响取决于银行资本状况。接着利用我国14家上市银行的季度数据,采用门限面板回归模型实证分析了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响。实证结果表明紧缩的货币政策对银行风险承担     

Financial Turmoil, Failed Bank Acquisitions, and Bank Business Lending Behavior

This paper utilizes bank Call Report and FDIC receivership data from 1987 to 1991 to examine the impact of a failed bank acquisition on the growth rate of commercial and industrial (C&I) lending at the acquiring institutions. Using a two-stage least squares model with fixed effects, we find that banks acquiring a failed bank's assets experience a significant decline in both the growth rate of C&I lending and their capital asset ratios in the period of the acquisition. The results support anecdotal evidence that failed-bank borrowers may experience difficulties in accessing credit once their bank fails and underscores the importance of bank-borrower relationships in C&I lending. Finally, the paper provides an alternative explanation for banks' stagnant or declining business lending activity during this period of financial turmoil.     

特许权价值、市场结构与银行风险承担

银行业的风险程度关系到整个经济体的稳定与发展,控制风险是银行经营的重要目标之一。目前对银行风险承担的研究主要从特许权价值和市场竞争的角度分别展开分析。本文以156家中国商业银行为研究对象,同时分析了银行特许权价值、市场竞争程度对银行风险的影响。通过实证分析,我们发现目前影响我国商业银行特许权价值的因素主要来自银行因素而非市场因素;在没有控制内生性的前提下,发现银行特许权价值有效地约束了银行风险,而市场竞争的加剧增加了银行风险行为;在控制银行风险和特许权价值内生性后,发现特许权价值对中国商业银行风险的约束效应基本不存在。因此,要维持银行业的稳定,需要规范银行的竞争行为,提高特许权价值的风险约束效应。     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.     

Foreign Bank Behavior during Financial Crises

This paper studies whether lending by foreign banks is affected by financial crises. We pair a bank‐level data set of foreign ownership with information on banking crises and examine whether the credit supply of majority foreign‐owned banks that underwent home‐country crises differ systematically from those of other foreign banks. In contrast to the literature, our broad global coverage allows us to exploit variations between foreign banks; this enables us to identify an average treatment effect directly attributable to crises. Our baseline results show that banks exposed to home‐country crises between 2007–08 exhibit changes in lending patterns that are lower by between 13% and 42% than their noncrisis counterparts. This finding is robust to potential alternative explanations, and also holds, though less strongly, for the 1997/98 Asian crisis.     

Growth Opportunities and Risk-Taking by Financial Intermediaries

We show that growth opportunities which cannot be converted to cash under conditions of financial distress $\left(G_z\right)$ are a critical determinant of an intermediary's choice of risk. Financial institutions in which $G_z$ is a low proportion of total assets will be much more likely to engage in go-for-broke behavior. The model leads to a reevaluation of the effectiveness of several traditional remedies for dealing with banks that take excessive risks such as raising insurance premiums, intervening before capital is depleted, and restricting investment options. The model also has implications about a new approach to the examination of financial intermediaries.