Hybrid Contests

This paper examines hybrid contests where participants commit two types of resources to improve their probability of winning the prize. The first type is forfeited ex ante, before the prize is allocated, by winners and losers alike, while the second is committed ex ante by all contenders but expended ex post, after the prize is allocated, and only by the contestant that wins the prize. The model yields a number of interesting results. Among them is the finding that, as the number of contestants increases, the ex ante expenditures of individual contestants decrease while the ex post expenditure increases. Even more interesting, the total of the ex ante and ex post expenditures by the contenders in a hybrid contest may decrease with the number of competitors. The study also finds that there is no rent overdissipation, and compares the total expenditures in the contest and “all‐pay” allocation mechanisms.     

Complementarity in contests

To facilitate the study of contests in general equilibrium, we examine winner-take-all contests in which the prize is complementary to the effort of the contestants, as inputs are in production functions or final goods in utility functions. We focus on the effects of technological factors and endowments on the effort and the welfare of the contestants. Most of our findings differ considerably from the standard model of contests in which prize and effort are independent. In particular, we find a critical role for the elasticity of substitution between prize and effort. For example, under low elasticities of substitution, a higher prize reduces the effort exerted by the contestants.     

Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence

We examine equilibrium selection in a two-stage sequential elimination contest in which contestants compete for a single prize. This game has a continuum of equilibria, only one of which satisfies the Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) refinement. That equilibrium involves “burning out” by using all of one's resources in the first stage. It is Pareto-dominated by many other equilibria. We find that CPNE predicts well when four people compete, but not when eight people compete for two second-stage spots. Using a cognitive hierarchy (CH) framework, we show that when the number of players and the mean number of thinking steps are large, the CH prediction involves burning out. This provides a partial explanation of our results. We also develop a formal argument as to why CPNE logic is more compelling with more players. We conclude that more competition leads to higher bids, and that burning out is indeed a competitive phenomenon.     

Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

We revisit the two bidder complete information all-pay auction with bid-caps introduced by Che and Gale (1998), dropping their assumption that tie-breaking must be symmetric. Any choice of tie-breaking rule leads to a different set of Nash equilibria. Compared to the optimal bid-cap of Che and Gale we obtain that in order to maximize the sum of bids, the designer prefers to set a less restrictive bid-cap combined with a tie-breaking rule which slightly favors the weaker bidder. Moreover, the designer is better off breaking ties deterministically in favor of the weak bidder than symmetrically.     

Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments

This paper studies entry decisions in contests with private values. Potential contestants observe their value and the common opportunity cost of entry, and make entry decisions simultaneously. Theory predicts that whether or not contestants are informed of the number of entrants prior to choosing their expenditures has no effect on entry or aggregate expenditures. We test these assertions in our experiments. We find substantial over-entry in both information structures. However, entry is higher when contestants are informed. Since expenditures do not, on average, differ across information structures, aggregate expenditure is also higher when contestants are informed. Contestants earn on average less than the opportunity cost of entry.     

Nonlinearity and asymmetry in the exchange rate pass‐through: What role for nominal price stickiness?

This paper examines the importance of nominal rigidity for nonlinearity and asymmetry of exchange rate pass‐through. For this purpose, we rely on company‐level data of French importing firms. We find that the well established fact that “prices rise faster than they fall,” which is characterized by the convex import price reaction function, lies primarily with the presence of nominal rigidity. Once price stickiness is controlled for, there is empirical evidence that the import price reaction function is rather concave if the linearity assumption can be rejected, indicating that firms aim primarily to protect their market share.     

Remittances and healthcare expenditure: Human capital investment or responses to shocks? Evidence from Peru

This paper estimates the effect of international remittances on healthcare expenditures, taking into account both the interdependence with other consumption goods and the effects of health shocks. More precisely, we assess whether the budget allocation decisions of remittance‐receiving households reveal different preferences to invest in health capital, even when the simultaneous effect that health shocks may have on the demand of remittances and on other types of nondurable expenditures is accounted for. Using data from the “Peruvian National Survey of Households,” we find that remittances have a positive impact on healthcare budget shares, net of the remittance‐related income effect and independently of the occurrance of a health shock. They also have a positive impact on housing and a negative one on other expenditure items, that is, clothing, transport, and education. Hence, our results indicate a “pure” tendency of remittance‐receiving households to devote larger shares of their budget to health capital investment, rather than to other types of consumption goods.     

Oligopoly and entry

This paper investigates the price and nonprice response of a wealth-maximizing leader firm under threat of entry, taking into account the effects of “learning” through cumulative output. The important characteristic of all the comparative statics results is that along the equilibrium trajectory, price and demandincreasing cost expenditures (capitalizable and noncapitalizable) are “substitutes” in the current contribution to wealth, and demand-increasing cost expenditures are “complements” in the current contribution to wealth. That is to say, an increase in price decreases the marginal contribution of demandincreasing cost expenditures to the current contribution to wealth such that to keep the current contribution to wealth constant, expenditures on demandincreasing costs must fall; and conversely, for a price reduction.     

Persuasive propaganda during the 2015 Argentine Ballotage

We study a propaganda campaign sponsored by the Argentine government against the main political challenger in the days preceding the 2015 runoff presidential election. Subjects in the treatment group watched an “ad” that had been aired during soccer transmissions as part of this campaign. They were then asked about their vote intentions. Relative to subjects in the control group, their declared preference for the challenger drops by 6.5 percentage points for a persuasion rate of 11.2%. We find no effects of the three types of defenses employed by the challenger (a positive message unrelated to the “ad”, a reply to the accusations in the “ad”, and a counter-attack). The propaganda effect is driven by women.     

Effort and Performance in Public Policy Contests

Government intervention often gives rise to contests in which the possible “prizes” are determined by the status quo and some new public policy proposal. In this paper we study a general class of such two‐player public policy contests and examine the effect of a change in the proposed policy, a change that may affect the payoffs of the two contestants, on their effort and performance. Our results extend the existing comparative statics studies that focus, in symmetric contests, on the effect of a change in the value of the prize or, in asymmetric contests, on the effect of one contestant's valuation of the prize. Our results hinge on a fundamental equation that specifies the equilibrium relationship between the strategic own‐stake effect and the strategic rival's‐stake effect. This fundamental equation clarifies the role of the three possible types of ability and stake asymmetry in determining the effect of payoff variations on the efforts and performance of the contestants.     

Asymmetries in the revenue–expenditure nexus: A tale of three countries

The objective of this paper is to examine the government revenue and expenditure relationship in the context of what is known as the soft and hard budget constraint strategy. We adopt a nonlinear framework with structural breaks and focus our empirical analysis in three countries. Two of them represent the two extremes of polities in the EU: Sweden and Greece and the third, Germany is used for comparison purposes. Our results indicate absence of any asymmetries, TAR or MTAR, for Sweden and Germany. The symmetric ECM provides support for the fiscal synchronization hypothesis of revenues and expenditures in both countries. For Greece, however, we find evidence for asymmetries of the MTAR form, which in turn support the spend-and-tax hypothesis with asymmetric adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. This indicates that the Greek fiscal authorities would cut deficits only if they exceeded a high “trigger” threshold, which gives support to the soft budget constraint strategy to gain political support. The fiscal adjustment takes place by cutting government expenditure. The out-of-sample forecast results suggest that a shift from a univariate model specification to a multivariate model improves marginally the forecast performance.     

The measurement and decomposition of nonuse values: A critical review

We critically review the literature that claims that existence values, or nonuse values in general, are a large and measurable component of total value for certain environmental resources. Our concern is not with the question “do nonuse values exist?” For some individuals they surely do. Rather, our concern is with two interrelated questions: are there operationally meaningful theorems which might lead to the specific measurement of nonuse values, and do we in fact have a body of credible evidence which shows that nonuse values, particularly components of any nonuse value, are “large”? We find nothing in the way of operationally meaningful hypotheses which would permit the estimation of values attributable to specific motives of individuals. We find no credible basis for claims related to either the measurement of existence and other motive-related values or claims for the “large” relative size of such values. In short, we question the conventional wisdom that such values are measurable and that they are significant as a component of total value.     

Credible communication in dynastic government

This paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government. When information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations, each administration has an incentive to choose its (suboptimal) one-shot expenditure policy, and then misrepresent its choice to its successor. Consequently, it has been suggested that “horizontal accountability,” i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible disclosure of a government's activities. This paper suggests a cautious approach to that view.The baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period. Even with auditing, credible disclosure is shown to be problematic. Various extensions to this baseline model are examined. In one extension, “liberal” (i.e., those prefering larger government expenditures) and “conservative” (those prefering smaller expenditures) regimes and auditors evolve over time. It is shown that “conservative” (“liberal”) auditors are not credible when the current regime is also “conservative” (“liberal”). Moreover, because information transmission stops when the auditor's and the regime's biases coincide, effective deterrents even in the “good” periods (when the auditor's and the administration's biases differ) are difficult to construct. In all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices. These constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium. Various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed.     

Reexamination of Strategic Public Policies

This paper attempts to reinterpret the familiar approach to strategic public policies from the viewpoint of inefficiencies involved in oligopoly where firms engage in Cournot competition. To this end, we introduce tools called “quasi‐reaction functions” and “quasi‐supply curves”. These tools allow us to conduct analyses through use of the standard partial‐equilibrium diagram, i.e. the quantity‐price plane. We can find the relationship between prices and quantities directly and, hence, deal with inefficiencies easily and also suggest policies to correct such inefficiencies. Specifically, we reexamine public policies related to mixed‐oligopoly, excess entry, technology choices with free entry and exit, and foreign oligopoly.     

Persuasion as a contest

We examine how the probability of persuading an audience depends on resources expended by contending parties as well as on other factors. We use a Bayesian approach whereby the audience makes inferences solely based on the evidence produced by the contestants. We find conditions that yield the well-known additive contest success function, including the logit function. We also find conditions that produce a generalized ??difference?? functional form. In all cases, there are three main determinants of audience choice: (i) the truth and other objective parameters of the environment; (ii) the biases of the audience, and (iii) the resources expended by the interested parties.     

Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments in Japan: An Application to Cultural Expenditure

In the context of limited local government resources, cultural expenditures are often targeted for reduction. In Japan in particular, with its aging population, cultural expenditures have low priority. This paper examines whether or not local governments strategically influence each other with respect to cultural spending, using data from Japanese local governments. By estimating the reaction functions for local cultural expenditures, we find that there exists free‐rider behaviour between local cultural expenditures that produce beneficial spillover effects. We also find a larger free‐rider incentive the shorter the distance between neighbouring regions, the shorter the travel time between neighbouring regions, and the larger the neighbouring region's population. Furthermore, our results reveal that the provision of cultural services through intergovernmental strategic behaviours is more elastic with respect to the relative change of the distance or the travel time among neighbouring regions than to that of the population size among neighbouring regions.     

Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

We investigate the effects of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the share contest a contestant receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures, while in the lottery contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures. In share contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In lottery contests information feedback has an opposite, and even stronger, effect: when subjects only get feedback on own earnings we observe high levels of rent dissipation, usually exceeding the value of the rent, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings has a significant moderating influence on expenditures. In a follow-up treatment we make information feedback endogenous by allowing contestants in a lottery contest to make public or private expenditures. Subjects make the vast majority of expenditures privately and overall excess expenditures are similar to the lottery contest with own feedback.     

Lab and framed lab versus natural experiments: Evidence from a risky choice experiment

Some recent papers have studied data from TV game shows to examine the behaviour of individuals towards risk. It is generally agreed that data from these shows are useful in detecting individual risk aversion in the field, with both “real life” subjects and incentives. Field experiments also include some interesting reality features that could affect individuals’ behaviour and possibly lead to different findings. This paper aims at investigating lab versus field evidence in risk taking attitudes, especially controlling for framing effects. To assess whether the behaviour of subjects in the field is consistent with that of experimental subjects, we designed an experiment to mimic (with experimental rewards and subjects) the rules of a well-known Italian TV game show, Affari Tuoi, in two different settings: a traditional lab setting, where the game was played individually (109 subjects) (Treatment 1); and a framed lab, in which the experiment was replicated in the Italian public television (RAI) studio where the show was actually recorded, with a smaller sample of undergraduate students (33) and in the presence of an audience (Treatment 2). Our comparison between the two different settings aims at establishing whether the presence of an audience, or of a situation that reproduces the stress that contestants must experience in the TV studio, can affect experimental subjects’ choices. We did not find any significant evidence of framing effects: students behave in a similar way in the two lab settings, responding essentially to incentives. Comparing the risk attitudes shown by experimental subjects in the two lab treatments with those exhibited by the contestants in the field, we found that contestants in the TV show are generally more risk averse than students in the lab.     

Dynamic Difference‐Form Contests

This study presents a multistage contest designed by an organizer who chooses the (indivisible) winner prize together with the ranking scheme. When the organizer's objective is to maximize efforts, the optimal ranking scheme that selects the prize recipient coincides with a version of the piecewise linear difference‐form success function postulated by Che and Gale (2000). Even if the organizer's objective is not necessarily to maximize agents' effort, a noisy ranking of the difference‐form remains optimal.     

Testing the efficiency of the Athens Stock Exchange: Some results from the banking sector

In this study we test the efficient market hypothesis in the Athens Stock Exchange for a number of selected stocks from the banking sector. We distinguish between a “weak” and “semistrong” version of the hypothesis depending on the agents' information sets. For the “weak” version we apply a recently developed test by Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman (1987) to test for the presence of nonlinear structure in the residuals of rates of return regressions of these stocks. To test the “semistrong” form of the efficiency hypothesis we carry out tests of cointegration following the methodology of Granger and Engle (1987). We find no noticeable presence of nonlinearties in the standardized residuals for these series. Also we find no evidence of cointegration and hence no Granger causality between the different stocks. Our findings support the “weak” and “semi-strong” versions of the efficient market hypothesis.