An open economy model of the effects of unilateral environmental policy by a large developing country

In this paper, we pose the following question. Why is it that despite the universal recognition of the need for global environmental protection, developing countries have been lax in instituting stringent environmental regulations? Addressing this question from an economic standpoint, we show that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which a large developing country can be worse off if it chooses to implement environmental policy in an uncoordinated fashion. The empirical dimension of this question is stressed and the key parameters – such as elasticities and marginal propensities to consume – which are germane to any policy discussion regarding this issue are identified. Second, we study – once again from the perspective of a large developing country – the possibility of using the domestic tax structure optimally to attain environmental policy objectives in a second-best environment. This scenario involves taxing pollution indirectly, by using product taxes. Finally, keeping the empirical dimension of the question in mind, we show how to compute optimal externality correcting taxes. These taxes are primarily a function of different kinds of elasticities.     

Residence-and source-based taxation of capital income in an overlapping generations model

By using an intertemporal equilibrium model with overlapping generations, this paper explores how residence-and source-based taxes on capital income affect the external current account in small open economies. These taxes influence the saving-investment balance not only through their incentive effects on rates of return but also through their impact on the intergenerational distribution of resources. This paper, in its examination of these effects — both intertemporal substitution and intergenerational distribution — identifies the net effect of the various impacts.The author would like to thank Dieter Bös and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Trade prices and supply in the UK economy

Current account imbalances are a major source of instability in the world monetary and trading system. Measures to correct these imbalances have largely involved adjustments to exchange rates. In the international trade literature, when the current account is in deficit, the Marshall-Lerner condition is sufficient for a successful devaluation. However, this partial equilibrium condition — apart from being based on the assumption that supply elasticities are infinite — abstracts from how the domestic economy responds to the change in relative prices. In this paper we develop a model of price and output determination in an open economy with imperpectly competitive markets, and draw a distinction between goods which are exported and those which are supplied to the domestic market. This means that we have to determine jointly both export prices and the domestic price of house sales. We show that as long as there is no money illusion in the labour market a fall in the nominal exchange rate raises domestic and export prices proportionally and leaves trade volumes unaffected. However, shifts in domestic absorption relative to overseas demand — by changing relative prices — cause shifts in the relative supply of exports and domestically sold goods and affect the trade balance. Thus fiscal and monetary measures directed towards reducing domestic absorption are more likely to be successful in correcting current account imbalances than exchange rate depreciation.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems

The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not yet considered federal structures. In this paper, we show how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes, regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.     

A general-equilibrium intertemporal model of an open economy

Summary This paper develops a very general (general-equilibrium) intertemporal model of a country engaged in international trade which can be used to address a wide variety of issues of interest — in particular, econometric application — under the assumption that prices of tradable commodities (consumer goods and capital goods) and the interest rate are exogenous to the country. It allows for an arbitrarily large number of commodities which are distinguished into seven categories and for finite or infinite periods of time. This model can be used to draw various policy conclusions. We investigate how current net imports, the balance of payments on current account, current consumption expenditure, next-period bondholdings, current wealth, and current internal prices will react to exogenous changes in current external prices, the current interest rate, current taxes, current factor endowments, and current-period bondholdings. This paper also considers the integrability of net-import demand functions.Work supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-8607652. We wish to thank the editor and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions.     

Trading networks with price-setting agents

In a wide range of markets, individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries, who determine prices via strategic considerations. Typically, not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries, and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market. We model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers, sellers, and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders. We show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods. Finally, we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure — roughly, a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an “essential” connection in the network, thus providing a graph-theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders.     

Models of water market mechanisms and an illustrative application to the Middle East

The growing demand by countries in the eastern Mediterranean over the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, and the highly depleted coastal and mountain groundwater reservoirs, raise the need to explore ways and means to ameliorate existing and expected water scarcity. Economists have for some time proposed ways towards more efficient exploitation of existing water supplies, specifically by employing market incentive mechanisms in order to encourage voluntary water sharing among countries and regions. Such trading schemes may involve two or more countries. It can be shown that such schemes — given any initial assignment of property claims to water resources — can often lead to increases in the welfare of the countries concerned.The paper proposes two specific mechanisms for international markets in water claims in the eastern Mediterranean region, in which parties voluntarily engage in such trades, as they would expect to gain real benefits from these transactions. Simulation exercises with real data show that — as is true for any opening of markets to international trade — that all parties in the region might benefit to a greater or lesser degree from auctions of water.     

Global Income Divergence, Trade, and Industrialization: The Geography of Growth Take-Offs

This article formalizesthe theoretical interconnections among four post–industrialrevolution phenomena—the industrialization and growth take-offof rich northern nations, massive global income divergence, andrapid trade expansion. In stages-of-growth model, the four phenomenaare jointly endogenous and are triggered by falling trade costs.In the first growth stage (with high trade costs) industry isdispersed internationally, and growth is low. In the second (mediumtrade costs), the North industrializes rapidly, growth take-off,and the South diverges. In the third (low trade costs), highgrowth and global divergence become self-sustaining. In the fourthstage, when the cases of ``trading' ideas decreases, the Southquickly industrializes and converges.     

The “greening” of trade unions and the demand for eco-taxes

By embedding labour market bargaining considerations in an influence-seeking framework, we show how a union's stance on environmental policy depends on the exposure of their members to the risk of job loss. With a risk of unemployment, unions lobby with employers to resist stricter environmental policies. When employment is secure, unions may support policies that reduce employment opportunities for nonunion workers. “Environmentalism” can therefore arise without explicit environmental concerns among workers. Consequently, pollution taxes may yield a negative welfare dividend in the form of inefficiently high unemployment.     

Tax competition,tax coordination and tax harmonization: The effects of EMU

There is little doubt that the step towards a monetary union in Europe will increase both the distorionary effects of existing differences in national tax systems and the intensity of tax competition for internationally mobile commodity and factor tax bases. This paper discusses selected issues of commodity and capital tax coordination that are likely to be affected by monetary unification. Starting from the distortive present scheme of value-added taxation in Europe we first analyze the effects of a switch to a general origin-based VAT as a way to maintain national tax rate autonomy over this important tax base. While an origin-based VAT would neither distort trade flows — both within the EU and with third countries — nor investment decisions in the long-run, its short-run effects are likely to be severe in the absence of exchange rate flexibility. In the field of capital taxation the focus switches to the feasibility of regional harmonization measures when there is no cooperation with the rest of the world. We argue that in a monetary union the mobility costs of capital will be significantly lower within the EU as compared to outside investments. This provides an efficiency argument for minimum source taxes on both interest income and corporate profits even if cooperation with third countries is infeasible.     

The Ramaswami Argument in a Multi-commodity Setting

This paper considers the optimum taxes and tariffs in a multi-commodity setting. Using the argument in Ramawami (1968), I show that when all goods and factors are tradable, the home country should buy out all the foreign factors. Conditions for the optimal terms of trade are also analyzed. In a single consumption good model, the foreign factors should be bought out at the foreign autarky prices. This result is only partially true in the more general setting. While factor mobility should be prohibited before the buy-out, non-prohibitive tariffs have to be imposed on trade in goods to attain the optimum terms of trade.     

Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information

We study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information. Optimal allocations in these environments are complicated and history-dependent. Yet, we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems. The market structure in these economies is similar to that in Bewley (1986) ; agents supply labour and trade risk-free claims to future consumption, subject to a budget constraint and a debt limit. Optimal taxes are conditioned only on two observable characteristics—an agent's accumulated stock of claims, or wealth, and her current labour income. We show that optimal taxes are generally non-linear and non-separable in these variables and relate the structure of marginal wealth and income taxation to the properties of agent preferences.     

Trade mechanism selection in markets with frictions

We endogenize the trade mechanism in a search economy with many homogeneous sellers and many heterogeneous buyers of unobservable type. We study how heterogeneity and the traders' continuation values—which are endogenous—influence the sellers' choice of trade mechanism. Sellers trade off the probability of an immediate sale against the surplus expected from it, choosing whether to trade with everyone and how quickly. In equilibrium sellers may simply target one buyer type via non-negotiable offers (price posting), or may price discriminate (haggling). We also study when haggling generates trading delays. A price setting externality arises because of a strategic complementarity in the sellers' pricing choices.     

Equity,efficiency, and the structure of indirect taxation

Optimal tax formulae are derived and optimal tax rates calculated for the case where there are many consumers, an income tax is impossible and the government has to trade off efficiency in order to improve the real distribution of income. Consistent aggregation assumptions are used to permit the derivation of simple tax rules depending only on the behaviour of the average consumer and of a socially representative consumer. Calculations for the U.K. in 1972 show how subsidies and taxes vary with the government's revenue requirement and with the degree of egalitarianism in the social welfare function.     

Market Access and WTO Border Tax Adjustments for Environmental Excise Taxes under Imperfect Competition

The literature identifies linkages between domestic environmental policies and trade, the treatment of imports being an important issue in administration of domestic environmental excise taxes. With the aim of ensuring foreign exporters do not attain a competitive advantage, border tax adjustments are used. Since most environmental excise taxes apply to intermediate goods, the relevant border tax adjustment applies to final imported goods. However, when both intermediate and final goods markets are oligopolistic, border tax adjustments may be non‐neutral. Moreover, even if market access is unchanged, border tax adjustments can still lead to redistribution of profits between domestic and foreign firms.     

Will low technology products disappear?: The hidden innovation processes in low technology industries

Political discussions and analyses have usually been devoted to an understanding of the development of high technology products, although low technology products have dominated the industrial structure of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The important role of low technology products in these countries raises the question of whether we can observe a technological paradox in the industrial structure of the more advanced nations, the dominant role of this sector in spite of its competitive disadvantages because of high wages. Using the Danish packaging industry as an example, a central thesis in the article is that innovation processes are important in low technology industries. They are also often an integrated part of the marketing and production functions of the firm. The innovation processes in the low technology industries are therefore too complex for traditional R&D analyses to handle. The article points out that—especially in small firms—the “practical man” and his “tacit knowledge” play a very central role in both product and process development, and that low technology, even in the future, will play a central role in the industrial structure of the OECD countries.     

On the Double Dividend under Imperfect Competition

We investigate whether, and under which conditions, a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform may yield an employment double dividend, i.e., an improvement of environmental quality and an increase in aggregate employment. Using a model with two market imperfections – a rigid real wage and imperfect competition in one industry – we show that an employment dividend is plausibly obtained. However, for countries where labor taxes are high and households spend a large share of their income in favor of environmentally harmful consumption goods a double dividend can nevertheless not be obtained, for under these conditions environmental quality deteriorates.     

International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages

I review and extend three approaches to trade and environmental policies: competitive general equilibrium, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. The first two have surprisingly similar implications: deviations from first-best rules are justified only by constraints on policy choice (which motivates what I call a “single dividend” approach to environmental policy), and taxes and emissions standards differ in ways which reflect the Le Chatelier principle. I also show how environmental taxes may lead to a catastrophic relocation of industry in the presence of agglomeration effects, although not necessarily if there is a continuum of industries which differ in pollution intensity. *An earlier version was presented as an invited plenary lecture to the European Association for Environmental and Resource Economics Conference, Oslo, 1999.     

Does the Degree of Development Matter in the Impact of Banking Crises on International Trade?

This paper analyzes how a country's degree of economic development affects the impact of banking crises on international trade. To this end, we estimate a gravity model of trade using a sample of 139 countries over the period 1975–2012. Our results show that middle income countries are generally the most negatively affected. In contrast, financial turmoil appears to have less impact on bilateral trade flows among high income countries and, more specially, among low income nations. The level of financial development, contract enforcement, as well as the extent of the use of banking credit within international trade all help to explain our findings.     

Die Entwicklung des österreichischen Volkseinkommens und seiner Hauptkomponenten 1956 bis 1973

Summary The study ist based on the work of M. Kalecki who anticipated the main elements of the Keynesian theory by constructing a dynamic modell of business cycles. Kalecki's theory includes i.a. a theory of profits, saving, income distribution and investment decisions. Until he died in 1970 Kalecki never ceased in his endeavour to adapt his intuition to the new questions posed by the postwar developments in the industrialised capitalist countries. This led him to develop a theory of growth that incorporated the problems of effective demand; he succeeded in making his theory operational in the field of empirical economic analysis.The authors of the study apply Kalecki's method to data on the Austrian GNP and its main components during 1955–1973. (Mr. Szeworski, while being one of Kalecki's assistants in the sixties, applied the analytical method to an investigation of the economic development in some of the most important capitalist economies together with Kalecki.)Chapter 1. represents an introduction into the analytical method and its foundation in Kalecki's work. At first we show how to distinguish that part of production which is subject to the laws of motion of a capitalist economy more precisely than is usual from the part which is not. This serves to open the way to a better understanding of the influences of government activities. With the same intention taxes are divided into consumption-diminishing and accumulation-absorbing taxes. All this results in a modified concept of GNP, in volume as well as in arrangement.Chapter 2. investigates the long-term development of the Austrian economy; it makes evident its chief characteristics and discusses possible reasons emphasizing the importance of foreign trade. An examination of the changes in the main components of GNP leads us to observe an increase in the importance of governmental intervention. Finally, income distribution is shown to tend towards increasing polarisation — which means increasing shares of corporate profits and income of employees in the national income.