Mixed Oligopoly,Privatization, and Strategic Trade Policy

This paper investigates the effects of privatization in the presence of strategic trade policies within an international mixed oligopoly serving a single market. If the government uses a domestic production subsidy, then welfare is always increased with privatization, while the optimal subsidy falls. If the government uses an import tariff, privatization increases welfare over much of the parameter space. The optimal tariff, however, may rise or fall.     

What information is needed for welfare-enhancing policies under international oligopoly?

In the framework of international Cournot oligopoly, we analyze welfare-enhancing policies when policymakers have only limited information on demand and cost structures. We show that even if policymakers have no idea about costs and demand, they can raise welfare by introducing a small production subsidy. If the government knows that demand is not very convex, a small tariff can be used to enhance welfare. With strategic complements, a small import reduction by an import quota deteriorates welfare while a small increase in the number of domestic firms improves welfare. In other cases, some more information is required to determine right policies.     

Vertical trade and free trade agreements

We investigate the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on tariffs and welfare in vertical trade. We consider a three-country model, where an FTA is formed between a country exporting a final good and a country exporting an intermediate good. The FTA unambiguously leads to a reduction in the member country’s tariff, but may cause the non-member country’s tariff level to increase. In the case, where FTA raises the non-member country’s tariff level, the FTA increases that country’s welfare. In contrast, the FTA may render its member countries better off. This result implies that the formation of an FTA may not always be Pareto-improving.     

贸易摩擦背景下关税与货币政策反制策略研究

通过将贸易品美元定价约束、外汇噪声交易和关税反制等特征融入两国DSGE模型,文章对贸易摩擦背景下美国进口关税冲击的传导渠道以及中国的关税反制策略与货币应对政策有效性等问题进行了数值分析。研究发现,关税反制措施能够有效地对冲美国加征进口关税对中国实际产出、消费和净出口的消极影响,并有助于抑制人民币实际汇率贬值。若进一步搭配将出口品关税纳入利率调控框架的积极货币政策,对于经济扩张与保持汇率稳定都更加有效。但从长期社会福利角度看,积极货币政策对美国经济也具有明显的正向溢出作用,关税反制则会产生显著的福利转移效应,不采取任何关税与货币应对政策将使中国遭受最大的福利损失。因此,基于"打击最大化、自损最小化"原则,中国应对美国采取坚决有力的关税反击,同时保持货币政策相对中性、克制,以期实现"以战促和"的战略目标。     

Real Versus Tariff Liberalization: A Welfare Comparison Under Monopolistic Competition

A distinction between real trade costs (e.g., administration, border formalities, transport costs) and tariff costs is introduced into a standard monopolistic competition trade model. Driven by the number of firms, welfare under real trade barriers turns out to be lower than under an equivalent tariff barrier. Based on this finding, the paper shows that integration or rather liberalization measures (generating a certain increase in world trade) that reduce real trade barriers generate a larger welfare gain than integration consisting of a reduction in tariffs.     

Trade and Tax Reforms in a Cash‐in‐Advance Economy

We examine the effects of both tariff‐only and coordinated trade‐tax reforms on market access, government revenue, and welfare for a small monetary economy, under the assumption that a certain fraction of purchases of each good must be financed with cash held in advance. We show that if the cash requirement ratio in the exportable sector is greater than that in the importable, then, contrary to previous results, (i) a uniform radial reduction of tariffs has ambiguous effects on both welfare and market access, (ii) tariff and consumption tax reforms that leave consumer prices unchanged may be more efficient in improving market access and welfare than a reform that involves only tariffs, and (iii) export and production tax reforms that keep producer prices unchanged may be welfare deteriorating.     

How China's accession to the WTO affects global welfare?

Conventional wisdom suggests that, if a large nation reduces tariffs, the Rest of the World (RoW) as a whole should immediately experience gains from trade. However, little simulation evidence has been provided to evaluate the welfare effects of China's tariff reduction upon its WTO accession on each of its trade partners. This paper addresses the above issue under both the perfectly competitive model and the monopolistic competition framework à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). Armed by the method of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007, 2008) to quantify the individual countries' responses to the “China (trade liberalization) shock” at equilibrium, we could check the extent to which global welfare benefit from the import tariff reduction after China's entry into the WTO. The quantitative results show that, both China and the RoW benefit from Chinese participation into the WTO, with estimated welfare gains falling in a range of [1.4697%, 3.8743%] and [0.0743%, 0.1015%], respectively. That is to say, about 58.24% of total benefits extracted from China's accession into the WTO worldwide flow to countries other than China under perfect competition; while under monopolistic competition, the whole world enjoys a 0.1571% welfare increases if firms' entry is restricted, of which 42.64% are injected into the RoW, an equivalent amount of 23.3903 billion US dollars. Since allowing for firms' entry and exit would lead to adjustments in both aggregate price indices and government tariff revenues, welfare gains of the world significantly increase (0.2474%), but these adjustments would slightly distort the welfare changes for other countries in the sense that only 36.50%, which is equivalent to 32.1008 billion US dollars, overflow to the RoW. As a result, some countries gain more, while some less.     

Rural-Urban Wage Differentials,Unemployment, and Efficiency Wages: An Open Economy Policy Analysis

This paper analyzes the desirability of various policies designed to counteract the distorting nature of an equilibrium rural-urban wage differential in a small, open, two-sector economy with urban unemployment. A dual labor market model with an efficiency wage in the urban sector and urban unemployment is analyzed for the distributional and national output effects of an urban wage subsidy, an urban production subsidy, and a tariff on the urban good. While a small subsidy or tariff raises the value of national output, redistribution effects may limit the viability of intervention. However, subsidies can also be Pareto improving policies.     

Subsidy policies in a fertility choice model

This paper compares the effects that a subsidy to health expenditure or a subsidy to child-rearing costs has in a fertility choice model in which mortality is also endogenously determined. Whichever subsidy is instituted, the population growth rate rises. While a subsidy to health expenditure reduces welfare, a subsidy to child-rearing costs might increase welfare. The welfare analysis also suggests that a subsidy to health expenditure should be financed by a capital income tax, while a subsidy to child-rearing costs should be financed by a consumption tax.     

双寡头竞争下最优进口贸易政策选择

文章在水平差别产品的伯川德模型中对从量和从价关税进行了分析比较。研究发现,效用函数必须满足一些严格的假设,才能保证征收关税将改善本国社会福利。从量关税的进口限制效果明显强于从价关税。但对于均衡从量关税,总存在一个对能给本国带来更高社会福利的从价关税。两者的差距取决于均衡点本国市场对外国产品的需求弹性,需求弹性越小,社会福利差距越大。     

Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms

This article considers how political interaction between policymakers and domestic and foreign firms endogenously determines tariff rates. We show that because of lobbying competition between foreign and domestic firms, even a less competitive foreign firm can successfully elicit a tariff reduction under reasonable conditions. Moreover, lobbying competition may also increase the level of aggregate domestic welfare when the market powers of the competing firms are sufficiently alike.     

排污税与减排补贴的减排效应比较研究

研究排污税、减排补贴对减排的影响机理,并从污染排放控制效果、等量污染排放下的社会福利影响等方面对减排效应进行比较分析,得出以下结论:排污税率、减排补贴率均与污染排放负相关,与社会福利水平的关系均受税率和补贴率的影响;当税率和补贴率等量提高时,排污税效果比减排补贴的效果好;当经济由未采用政策到采用政策而导致等量减排时,就社会福利的增加量而言,减排补贴比排污税的社会福利增加量大。此研究结论从政策的减排效果和福利影响方面,给予政府制定减排政策提供了参考依据。     

More on tariffs vs. import quotas

This paper uses the offer-curve approach to analyze the welfare effects of a tariff and of the static-equivalent quota in a country which experiences changes in its import demand. For a small country, a tariff is always superior to the static-equivalent quota when it experiences an increase in its import demand. On the other hand, a tariff is always inferior to the static-equivalent quota when it experiences a decrease in its import demand. However, one cannot rank a tariff and the static-equivalent quota from a welfare standpoint in a large country. This is true whether the large country experiences an increase or a decrease in its import demand.     

Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under R&D competition: Output versus R&D subsidies

We compare Cournot and Bertrand competitions with R&D investment under output versus R&D subsidy policies. We demonstrate that Cournot firms invest more (less) in R&D and the government grants more (less) subsidies than for Bertrand firms with output (R&D) subsidies. We also find that both competition modes yield the same welfare with output subsidy, while Bertrand yields higher welfare than Cournot with R&D subsidy. Finally, firms' profits and welfare in Cournot are higher under output subsidies, while they can be higher in Bertrand under R&D subsidies if the product substitutability is high and the firm's R&D investment is efficient.     

Protection of trade for innovation: the roles of Northern and Southern Tariffs

Using a North–South trade model with innovation and imitation, we investigate the interaction of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and trade protection. We show that unlike a Southern tariff, a Northern tariff supplements IPR protection and is not necessarily a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. The globally optimal Northern tariff increases as IPR protection in the North or the South decreases. Global welfare may rise as Northern tariff increases, but necessarily declines as Southern tariff increases. This suggests that pushing for freer trade in the South is more urgent than in the North in innovation-intensive sectors where IPR protections are weak in both regions.     

The U.S.–China trade war: Tariff data and general equilibrium analysis

The current trade war between the United States and China is unprecedented in modern history. This study introduces a database of tariff increases resulting from the trade war and quantifies the impacts using the canonical GTAPinGAMS model calibrated to the recently released GTAP version 10 accounts. We find that the remaining tariff increases as of March 2020 after the phase one trade deal decrease welfare in China by 1.7% and welfare in the United States by 0.2%. Impacts on sectoral revenue are reported for both countries. China's exports to and imports from the United States are reduced by 52.3% and 49.3%. The trade flow between the United States and China will be diverted to their major trade partners resulting in higher welfare in those countries, including many Asian countries. The estimated impacts are robust to using alternative trade elasticities and are amplified in the absence of the phase one tariff reductions.     

中国—俄罗斯FTA的贸易、关税及福利效应——基于WITS-SMART的模拟分析

当前,中国与俄罗斯亟需通过FTA夯实双方战略伙伴关系的经贸基础。文章利用WITS-SMART模型估算了中俄FTA的贸易、关税以及福利效应,结果显示:随着FTA框架下关税不断削减,中俄两国大多数产品部门都将从贸易规模扩张中受益,尽管两国的关税收入会出现下降,但是整体的经济福利都将获得提升。如果两国能够尽快实现零关税,那么两国之间的贸易往来会获得快速增长。因此,中俄两国需要从战略层面把握中俄FTA建设的重要意义,尽快推动中俄FTA谈判与建设。     

Industrial Concentration Reverses the Timing in a Trade Policy Game

Faced with an export subsidy by a foreign government, importing countries have to decide whether they should impose countervailing duties or not. Using a Cournot duopoly model, Collie (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130: 191–209) shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium occurs when the importing country sets its production subsidy and tariff at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at stage two. That is, an importing country will choose to commit itself not to use countervailing duties. In this paper, we extend Collie's duopoly model to the case of a Cournot oligopoly and show that the country in which industry is less concentrated tends to emerge as the Stackelberg leader.     

BILATERALISM IS GOOD: TRADE BLOCS AND STRATEGIC EXPORT SUBSIDIES

This paper considers the effect of exogenous trade bloc enlargementin a multi-country version of the Brander-Spencer export subsidygame. In the single-shot game, it is shown that trade bloc enlargementleads to a reduction in the Nash equilibrium export subsidiesand thereby increases the welfare of the exporting countries.Although the welfare of the importing countries decreases, worldwelfare may increase if the export subsidies are financed bydistortionary taxation. When the export subsidy game is infinitelyrepeated, it is shown that trade bloc enlargement reduces thecritical discount factor making it easier to sustain free trade.     

WTO框架下政府战略性补贴政策应用研究

本文研究表明：作为战略性出口贸易政策替代品的战略性研发补贴，在提升本国企业竞争力和提高国民福利的应用过程中，其政策效果一方面严重依赖于企业产品成本和产品间替代弹性等微观因素；另一方面也受各国政府反应策略的极大制约。