The Changing Nature of Currency Crises

Abstract.  Currency crises that have been observed in recent years are not a new phenomenon, but the main features of the crises in Latin America in the 1970s and early 1980s are quite different from the crisis in Europe in 1992. Theoretical literature has evolved over time to account for the changing nature of these crises. While many theoretical and empirical papers have been written about various episodes of these crises, the change in their mechanism over time has not been demonstrated well. This paper fills the gap in the literature by graphically depicting the main features of these crises. Such a visual analysis should allow the reader to better understand and follow the changes in the mechanisms over time.     

Spatial Aspects of Contagion among Emerging Economies

Abstract

A spatial model is used to specify and then test for the existence of contagion among emerging market economies. We consider both trade and regional channels of contagion. Our results suggest that contagion is a statistically significant factor in foreign exchange markets and, furthermore, its effects are not uniform across the countries considered. Our results also suggest that trade links are significant channels of contagion transmission; on the other hand, geographic distances do not appear to be significant channels of contagion transmission. We also report results which indicate the extent of contagion. These results relate to effects which emanate from one country to another.

Aspects spatiaux de la contagion parmi les économies émergentes

Résumé?Nous faisons usage d'un modèle spatial pour spécifier, puis tester, l'existence d'une contagion parmi les économies des marchés émergents. Nous nous penchons sur les vecteurs commercial et régional de cette contagion. Nos résultats indiquent d'une part que la contagion est un facteur significatif sur le plan statistique dans les marchés à commerce extérieur, d'autre part que ses effets ne sont pas uniformes dans les pays examinés. Nos résultats nous permettent d'affirmer également que les relations commerciales sont des vecteurs significatifs de transmission de la contagion; par contre, les distances géographiques ne semblent pas être des vecteurs significatifs de transmission de la contagion. Nous présentons également des résultats qui soulignent l’étendue de la contagion: ces résultats portent sur les effets émanant d'un pays à un autre.

Aspectos espaciales del contagio entre economias emergentes

Résumén?Se utiliza un modelo espacial para especificar, y luego se comprueba la existencia de contagio entre las economías de mercados emergentes. Consideramos canales de contagio, tanto comerciales como regionales. Nuestros resultados sugieren que el contagio es un factor estadísticamente significativo en los mercados de divisas, así como que sus efectos no son uniformes a través de los países considerados. Nuestros resultados también sugieren que los lazos comerciales son canales significativos para la transmisión de contagio; por otra parte, las distancias geográficas no parecen ser canales significativos de transmisión de contagio. También incluimos resultados que indican la extensión del contagio. Dichos resultados se relacionan con efectos que emanan de un país a otro.

     

金融全球化过程中银行危机的传染性及我国的应对策略

随着经济全球化的深化,随着我国整个金融体系开放程度的加深,任何来自国际金融市场的危机都可能对我国商业银行体系造成灾难性冲击,本文从分析银行危机跨国传染的路径着手,提出了我国防范国际金融危机传染的对策和建议,以期为我国银行体系的改革提供新的思路。     

Does more finance mean more inequality in times of crisis?

Many recent empirical studies show that both banking crises and financial development (FD) play an important role in understanding the dynamics of income inequality (IncI) over the last decades. However, so far no study has investigated the role of FD in the amplification of IncI following banking crises. This paper seeks to address this issue based on a sample of 69 banking crises in 54 countries over the 1977–2013 period. Our analysis suggests that FD is associated with a significant increase in IncI in the aftermath of banking crises. This result is robust to a broad range of alternative specifications and is unaffected by various potential sources of endogeneity. We also show that the relationship between FD and the redistributive consequences of banking crises is not subject to a threshold effect and is stronger for developing countries.     

Bank failures caused by Large withdrawals: An explanation based purely on liquidity

In a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [Diamond, D., Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401–419.] model with aggregate uncertainty, we show that there exists an equilibrium with the following properties: all consumers deposit at the bank, all patient consumers wait for the last period to withdraw, and the bank fails with strictly positive probability. Furthermore, we show that the probability of a bank failure remains bounded away from zero as the number of consumers increases.This equilibrium explains bank failures driven by extreme withdrawals solely on liquidity since they happen because both banks and depositors are illiquid. Furthermore, it does not require much of the elements typically emphasized, including: consumers well informed about the true state of nature, a non-zero consumption after a crisis, consumers’ panic and sunspots. We therefore think that aggregate risk in Diamond-Dybvig-like environments can be an important element to explain bank crises.     

On the relation between currency and banking crises in developing countries, 1980–2010

This paper investigates the relationship between the occurrence of currency and banking crises using high-frequency data for a sample of 94 countries during 1980–2010. The two types of crises are proxied by continuous, multi-categorical and dummy variables based on market pressure indexes, and a dummy variable from the Laeven–Valencia banking crises database. Results suggest that a bidirectional leading relationship exists between the two types of crises. However, banking crises do not lead currency crises robustly when banking crises are proxied by dummies based on market pressure indexes. Finally, currency crises have robust state dependence, but this is not the case for banking crises.     

Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures

We investigate how coordination requirement, measured by the coordination parameter, affects the occurrence of miscoordination-based bank runs in controlled laboratory environments. We identify an indeterminacy region of the coordination parameter such that games with the parameter within the region have varying coordination outcomes and exhibit persistent path dependence. Experimental economies with the parameter above (below) the region stay close or converge to the run (non-run) equilibrium. Switches between the two equilibria occur even with fixed economic fundamentals. The experimental results are well accounted for by a version of the evolutionary algorithm that uses experimentation rates estimated from the experimental data.     

Systemic risk in banking networks: Advantages of “tiered” banking systems

This paper studies the risk and potential impact of system-wide defaults in a tiered banking network, where a small group of head institutions has many credit linkages with other banks, while the majority of banks have only a few links. A network is random and displays a given distribution of the number of banks׳ linkages, known as degree. We model tiering by a negative correlation between degrees of neighboring banks and by a scale-free degree distribution. The main findings of the paper highlight the advantages of tiering. Both the risk of systemic crisis and the potential scope of the crisis are lower in systems with negative correlation of bank degrees than in other types of systems. Similarly, in scale-free networks, the resilience of the system to shocks is increasing with the level of tiering.     

Relative risk aversion and the transmission of financial crises

We study how investor behavior affects the transmission of financial crises. If investors exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion, then negative wealth shocks increase the risk premium required to hold risky assets. We integrate this into a second generation model of currency crises which allows for contagion through changes in fundamentals. Investor behavior can be a transmission channel of financial crises, as changes in risk premia increase the coverage ratio and makes the defense of a peg less attractive for the policy maker. The feedback effect of the risk premia on the probability of devaluation also makes multiple equilibria more likely. The possible stabilization effects of capital controls and a Tobin tax on the international transmission of financial crises are also studied.