ON THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE CASE FOR A GOLDEN RULE

This paper uses the SVAR methodology to investigate the effects of public investment on GDP and, more specifically, the effects of the introduction of a golden rule of public finance. We extend the existing literature by estimating a model for the British economy that takes into account long-run factors such as public debt accumulation and policy interactions. We find that in such a long-run framework, public investment has a significant and permanently positive effect on GDP; this result runs counter to the most recent literature on the topic using SVAR, which was limited to a short-run specification. We further find, by comparing different subsamples, that the introduction of the golden rule in 1997 strengthened the positive effect of public investment.     

A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF SERVICES

Not one of the many service definitions proposed by various authors and applied in practice enjoy general acceptance. Is it feasible to reach an international agreement on the definition of services? The answer is probably yes; however, is it worthwhile to spend considerable resources to reach such an agreement. Does an overall services aggregate indeed provide important analytical uses? Many doubts are expressed in this respect. Authors of recent international work on the statistics of services tend to accept a more flexible attitude: instead of having one single definition on services, several service concepts could be applied depending on feasibilities and other circumstances of the various statistics. However, all service definitions should be based on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) and on the Central Product Classification (CPC), recently approved by the Statistical Commission of the United Nations.     

ON THE PRICE EFFECTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS: A THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION

Horizontal mergers are usually under the scrutiny of antitrust authorities due to their potential undesirable effects on prices and consumer surplus. Ex‐post evidence, however, suggests that these effects do not always take place and even relevant mergers may end up having negligible price effects. The analysis of mergers in the context of non‐localized spatial competition may offer a further interpretation to the ones proposed in the literature: in this framework both positive and zero price effects are possible outcomes of the merger activity.     

THE EFFICIENCY OF THE STATE‐OWNED FIRM AND SOCIAL WELFARE: A NOTE

We consider a mixed market where a state‐owned firm competes with private firms. If the number of firms is exogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm might improve social welfare. This situation occurs when the state‐owned firm is inefficient and private firms are efficient. However, if the number of firms is endogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm must reduce social welfare.     

A NOTE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY AND THE EX ANTE VALUE OF INFORMATION

This paper examines the ex ante value of information in the property rights model where the possibility exists that an investing agent can be provided with relevant information before investments are undertaken. When contracts are incomplete, from an ex ante perspective, informing the investing agent does not necessarily increase the expected surplus resulting from a relationship between two economic agents. The paper highlights the fact that the second‐best nature of the problem that arises from contractual incompleteness can ensure this.     

基于动态规划方法的产业集群绿色经营主体的甄选与组合研究

绿色代表的是环境保护—环境与人类和谐生存、共同持续发展的思想理念。然而,要是从企业的观点看,无论是短期还是长期经营,基本的问题都是找到最好的方式来确保持续的利润。本文以绿色经营为指导思想,选择层次分析与动态规划的数学研究方法对湖南省衡阳松木塘工业园区的20个企业的环境价值链进行系统分析,以期达到在该产业园区实现产业集群经营主体组合最优化的效果,从而为衡阳市松木塘工业园区内企业实现绿色经营提供智力支持。     

EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITHIN A FIRM ON OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET OUTCOMES

I analyze the implications of the Laffont–Tirole type agency problems on oligopolistic market outcomes. In the model, a firm's marginal cost is decreasing in managerial effort and is subject to an additive shock. Both managerial effort and the realization of the shock are a manager's private information. A firm first offers a menu of contract to its manager, and then competes in the product market. As in the model of single principal and single agent, the incentive contracts implement efforts that are distorted downward relative to full information. In this model, with multiple agency relationships, an additional source for upward distortion of effort emerges as a result of the interaction in the product market. The results are robust to whether firms compete in price or quantity.     

新制度经济学委托代理理论视野的拓展

新制度经济学中的委托代理理论基于"经济人理性"假定,设计出了精密、精巧、精致的委托代理制度,有效化解了现代企业中委托人与代理人之间利益冲突并提升了企业运营效率。然而,现代企业实践已经证明,即使委托代理制度十分精密、精巧、精致,仍然没有彻底解决委托人与代理人之间的利益冲突和企业运营效率进一步提升问题。因此,必须拓展既有理论视野,从"经济人理性"假定拓展到"经济人+社会人+家庭人复合理性"假定,这样就能够实现委托代理理论视野的拓展。运用新制度经济学研究方法和双边对称信任数理模型表明:基于委托代理制度,进一步强化委托人与代理人之间双边对称信任度,可以进一步化解他们之间的利益冲突并且改善企业运营效率。基于这一结论,强化委托人与代理人之间双边对称信任度的具体路径是优化社会信任环境系统。     

A NOTE ON 'AN INFRAMARGINAL ANALYSIS OF THE RICARDIAN MODEL'

Abstract.  This is a note about Cheng et al. 's paper, in which we consider a dual structure of division of labour and trade that is missed in the model of Cheng et al. Though the inclusion of the dual structure will not change the main results in the paper by Cheng et al. , it explores an interesting way to use a general equilibrium model to describe a dual structure with underemployment in a transitional period of economic development.     

A NOTE ON THE NONLINEAR EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES

We use a labor search model with worker experience to assess the effects of minimum wage increases. Minimum wages can have nonlinear effects on unemployment as higher minimum wages become binding for larger portions of the underlying productivity distribution. The model is used to assess the increases proposed by the Obama Administration from $7.25 an hour to $9.00 and then to $10.10 per hour. We find that minimum wage increases have large effects on youth unemployment. These large effects cast doubt on using past empirical estimates of the effects of minimum wages that do not account for potential nonlinearities. (JEL E24, J08, J24, J64)     

EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN THE YANO MODEL OF PRICE LEADERSHIP

Abstract. A number of studies have provided a theoretical explanation for the fact that the technologically superior firm becomes a price leader in a duopoly market for a homogeneous product. While previous studies show that the state in which the technologically superior firm becomes a price leader is a Nash equilibrium (superior leader equilibrium), they do not eliminate the possibility that the state in which the technologically inferior firm becomes a price leader is also a Nash equilibrium (inferior leader equilibrium). We demonstrate that an inferior leader equilibrium can be eliminated by the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.     

THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK ON SELF‐ASSESSMENT

It is a well‐known phenomenon that people have difficulties in assessing their ability correctly. Often they overestimate their (relative) abilities. We conduct an experiment to test whether the self‐assessment of individuals improves when they receive feedback and there are incentives to make a correct self‐assessment. We investigate the subjects' reactions to feedback in several subsequent rounds to see not only if, but also when and how they react. Our main finding is that feedback influences subjects' decisions and can improve their overall self‐assessment. The effects, however, depend on the kind of feedback. Furthermore, we observe differences in the reactions of subjects (e.g., to what extent they follow feedback), the robustness of their belief about their relative ability, and how they process feedback.