Does Institutional Blockholder Short‐Termism Lead to Managerial Myopia? Evidence from Income Smoothing

We examine institutional blockholders’ influence on income‐smoothing practices in the Korean market, which provides an interesting setting where family‐oriented chaebols dictate the corporate landscape and impede shareholder activism. The empirical results reveal that institutional shareholders with a short‐term (long‐term) investment horizon facilitate (constrain) managerial myopia. This positive (negative) association is most evident among firms with domestic institutional investors. Therefore, we argue that the presence of domestic institutional investors with transient investment goals incentivizes firms’ management to smooth out earnings.     

Global Volatility and Forex Returns in East Asia*

During 2001–2010, increases in mature market volatility were associated with declines in forex returns for East Asian economies, consistent with an overall ‘flight to safety’ effect. Estimates from GARCH models suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in mature market equity volatility generated an exchange rate depreciation of up to 3/4 percent. This sensitivity rose during a more tranquil subsample for some countries, reflecting their greater integration with global financial markets. Long‐run forex volatility increased in Asian economies after 2008, reflecting the global reach of the financial crisis in mature markets. Unconditional standard deviations estimated from these models provide operational measures of ‘long‐term’ and ‘excess’ volatility in forex markets.     

Investor Myopia and CEO Turnover

We find that Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover is significantly higher and considerably less sensitive to performance in firms with short investor horizons. Decisions to dismiss a CEO lead to worse operating performance, which is even poorer when investors have short horizons. Furthermore, new managers respond to investor short‐termism by increasing industry‐adjusted capital expenditures while maintaining R&D and patenting activity. In addition, in firms with short‐horizon investors, total risk increases around forced CEO turnovers, largely because of an increase in idiosyncratic risk. The evidence is consistent with short‐term investors distorting corporate policies of firms through their influence on top management turnover.     

A two‐mean reverting‐factor model of the term structure of interest rates

This article presents a two‐factor model of the term structure of interest rates. It is assumed that default‐free discount bond prices are determined by the time to maturity and two factors, the long‐term interest rate, and the spread (i.e., the difference) between the short‐term (instantaneous) risk‐free rate of interest and the long‐term rate. Assuming that both factors follow a joint Ornstein‐Uhlenbeck process, a general bond pricing equation is derived. Closed‐form expressions for prices of bonds and interest rate derivatives are obtained. The analytical formula for derivatives is applied to price European options on discount bonds and more complex types of options. Finally, empirical evidence of the model's performance in comparison with an alternative two‐factor (Vasicek‐CIR) model is presented. The findings show that both models exhibit a similar behavior for the shortest maturities. However, importantly, the results demonstrate that modeling the volatility in the long‐term rate process can help to fit the observed data, and can improve the prediction of the future movements in medium‐ and long‐term interest rates. So it is not so clear which is the best model to be used. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23: 1075–1105, 2003     

Managerial Incentives and Investment Policy in Family Firms: Evidence from a Structural Analysis

This paper provides evidence that CEO incentive pay mediates the effect of family preferences on corporate investment policy. Our study focuses on the option portfolio volatility sensitivity vega, which motivates the risk‐taking behavior of undiversified managers. After controlling for factors that affect incentive pay and investment policy simultaneously, we find that one‐third of underinvestment in riskier R&D projects in active family firms can be attributed to a significantly lower vega. Passive family firms allocate more capital to R&D as opposed to active family firms, and are more active in M&A deal making. In contrast to many prior studies, pay incentives and families are not associated with capital expenditures. Overall, our empirical results suggest that CEO pay incentives induce investment policy contingent on firm risk. Family CEO incentive pay manifests the family preference for lower risk, especially in firms with higher firm risk. Nonetheless, after replacing family CEOs with outside professionals, investments in both R&D and M&A increase, which is consistent with the family preference for extended investment horizons. Interestingly, such a preference seems not to be manifested in incentive pay.     

Strategic and Tactical Roles of Enhanced Commodity Indices

This article formally compares two traditional long‐only commodity indices, Standard & Poor's Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P‐GSCI) and Dow Jones‐UBS Commodity Index (DJ‐UBSCI), with their enhanced versions that exploit signals based on contract maturity, momentum, and term structure. The enhanced indices are found to be useful for tactical asset allocation. With alphas ranging from 2.77% to 5.49% per annum, the maturity‐enhanced indices offer the best abnormal performance after accounting for liquidity risk. Momentum and term structure enhancements also earn a positive, albeit smaller, alpha of 2.10% per annum on average. All the enhanced indices are found to have comparable effectiveness for risk diversification and inflation hedging as their traditional counterparts, making them useful for strategic asset allocation.     

The Effects of Financial Education on Short‐Term and Long‐Term Financial Behaviors

This study investigates how financial education in high school, college, or in the workplace affects the short‐ and long‐term financial behaviors of adults using the 2015 National Financial Capability Study (NFCS) data. Financial education appears to have generally insignificant effects on short‐term behaviors for which there is regular feedback and penalties, and thus greater opportunity for learning by doing. If consumers do not pay off their credit card bill, they get a monthly statement showing interest charges and penalties. Financial education appears to have more positive and stronger effects on long‐term behaviors with less timely feedback, and for which the adverse consequences are not fully realized until later in life, so learning by doing may not work. Not saving enough money for retirement cannot be easily or quickly corrected, if at all. The benefits to financial education may differ based on the time horizon for the financial behaviors.     

SOCIAL DISCOUNTING AND THE LONG RATE OF INTEREST

The well‐known theorem of Dybvig, Ingersoll, and Ross shows that the long zero‐coupon rate can never fall. This result, which, although undoubtedly correct, has been regarded by many as surprising, stems from the implicit assumption that the long‐term discount function has an exponential tail. We revisit the problem in the setting of modern interest rate theory, and show that if the long “simple” interest rate (or Libor rate) is finite, then this rate (unlike the zero‐coupon rate) acts viably as a state variable, the value of which can fluctuate randomly in line with other economic indicators. New interest rate models are constructed, under this hypothesis and certain generalizations thereof, that illustrate explicitly the good asymptotic behavior of the resulting discount bond systems. The conditions necessary for the existence of such “hyperbolic” and “generalized hyperbolic” long rates are those of so‐called social discounting, which allow for long‐term cash flows to be treated as broadly “just as important” as those of the short or medium term. As a consequence, we are able to provide a consistent arbitrage‐free valuation framework for the cost‐benefit analysis and risk management of long‐term social projects, such as those associated with sustainable energy, resource conservation, and climate change.     

Pay‐for‐Performance,Employee Participation,and SME Performance

This study examines how pay‐for‐performance (PFP) systems affect the performance of small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). We decompose PFP into two dimensions: scope and depth. PFP scope captures the variety of performance measures and reward types included in a firm's PFP system, and PFP depth reflects the relative amount of performance‐based pay compared with total pay. We posit that PFP scope has a positive whereas PFP depth has an inverted U‐shaped effect on employee participation, which in turn enhances SME performance. Analysis of data collected at both employee and firm levels of 444 SMEs during 1999–2006 supported these hypotheses.     

Employment Flexibility,Dual Labour Markets,Growth, and Distribution

Many policymakers and economists have argued in favour of greater labour market flexibility as a part of structural adjustment reforms that are expected to improve economic performance. Existing post‐Keynesian‐Kaleckian (PKK) models are unable to address these issues because they assume away long‐term labour by allowing employment to be short term and adjusting freely with output. This paper introduces long‐term labour into PKK models. We develop a model that provides alternative ways of modelling labour market flexibility and suggest that when aggregate demand issues are important, an increase in employment flexibility is likely to have adverse growth and distributional impacts.     

Vulnerable options,risky corporate bond,and credit spread

In the current literature, the focus of credit‐risk analysis has been either on the valuation of risky corporate bond and credit spread or on the valuation of vulnerable options, but never both in the same context. There are two main concerns with existing studies. First, corporate bonds and credit spreads are generally analyzed in a context where corporate debt is the only liability of the firm and a firm’s value follows a continuous stochastic process. This setup implies a zero short‐term spread, which is strongly rejected by empirical observations. The failure of generating non‐zero short‐term credit spreads may be attributed to the simplified assumption on corporate liabilities. Because a corporation generally has more than one type of liability, modeling multiple liabilities may help to incorporate discontinuity in a firm’s value and thereby lead to realistic credit term structures. Second, vulnerable options are generally valued under the assumption that a firm can fully pay off the option if the firm’s value is above the default barrier at the option’s maturity. Such an assumption is not realistic because a corporation can find itself in a solvent position at option’s maturity but with assets insufficient to pay off the option. The main contribution of this study is to address these concerns. The proposed framework extends the existing equity‐bond capital structure to an equity‐bond‐derivative setting and encompasses many existing models as special cases. The firm under study has two types of liabilities: a corporate bond and a short position in a call option. The risky corporate bond, credit spreads, and vulnerable options are analyzed and compared with their counterparts from previous models. Numerical results show that adding a derivative type of liability can lead to positive short‐term credit spreads and various shapes of credit‐spread term structures that were not possible in previous models. In addition, we found that vulnerable options need not always be worth less than their default‐free counterparts. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 21:301–327, 2001     

Small‐cost asymptotics for long‐term growth rates in incomplete markets

This paper provides a rigorous asymptotic analysis of long‐term growth rates under both proportional and Morton–Pliska transaction costs. We consider a general incomplete financial market with an unspanned Markov factor process that includes the Heston stochastic volatility model and the Kim–Omberg stochastic excess return model as special cases. Using a dynamic programming approach, we determine the leading‐order expansions of long‐term growth rates and explicitly construct strategies that are optimal at the leading order. We further analyze the asymptotic performance of Morton–Pliska strategies in settings with proportional transaction costs. We find that the performance of the optimal Morton–Pliska strategy is the same as that of the optimal one with costs increased by a factor of . Finally, we demonstrate that our strategies are in fact pathwise optimal, in the sense that they maximize the long‐run growth rate path by path.     

Reevaluating hedging performance

Mixed results have been documented for the performance of hedging strategies with the use of futures. This article reinvestigates this issue with the use of an extensive set of performance‐evaluation metrics across seven international markets. The hedging performances of short and long hedgers are compared with the use of traditional variance‐based approaches together with modern risk‐management techniques, including value at risk, conditional value at risk, and approaches based on downside risk. The findings indicate that use of these metrics to evaluate hedging performance yields differences in terms of best hedging strategy as compared with the traditional variance measure. Also, significant differences in performance between short and long hedgers are found. These results are observed both in sample and out of sample. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:677–702, 2006     

Long‐Term Oriented Marketing Relationships and Ethical Conduct in Outsourcing Sector

The study evaluates the positive effect of long‐term oriented marketing relationship on ethical conduct from the perspective of the service provider (i.e., the agent‐firm), by integrating the relevant literature from relationship marketing, ethics, and long‐term orientation domains. The paper proposes that service providers that build relationship quality with their clients will display increased ethical conduct toward them. Specifically, the study examines the positive influence of the dimensions of relationship quality (that are relevant to the offshoring services context) that the service provider firm's employees undertake and their impact on ethical conduct. Overall, the results indicate that the commitment‐only full mediation model of relationship marketing variables on ethical conduct is a better representation than both direct‐effects model and other competing mediating models examined in this study. Fundamentally, it means that customer service officers should incorporate long‐term orientation and commitment in their principal–agent relationships that will provide the impetus for undertaking ethical behavior. The article concludes with a discussion and implications of the findings.     

Forecasting performance of extreme‐value volatility estimators

This study evaluates the forecasting performance of extreme‐value volatility estimators for the equity‐based Nifty Index using two‐scale realized volatility. This benchmark mitigates the effect of microstructure noise in the realized volatility. Extreme‐value estimates with relatively simple forecasting methods provide substantially better short‐term and long‐term forecasts, compared to historical volatility. The higher efficiency of extreme‐value estimators is primarily responsible for this improvement. The extent of possible improvement in forecasts is likely to be economically significant for applications like options pricing. By including extremevalue estimators, the forecasting performance of generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) can also be improved. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 27: 1085–1105, 2007     

The IMF After the Asian Crisis: Merits and Limitations of the ‘Long‐term Development Partner’ Role

We examine the view, espoused by a number of commentators in recent months, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should seek to withdraw from its long‐term lending operations, in the wake of the recent financial crisis in Asia and elsewhere, and restrict itself to its ‘core competency’ of preventing and where necessary lending into financial crisis. This view is based on a belief that such long‐term lending crowds out both private sector operations and short‐term IMF lending; and that it is ineffective, because of weaknesses in the IMF’s conditionality. Both of these propositions, we argue, can be challenged. In the poorer developing countries there is virtually no private sector to crowd out, and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) operations have been conspicuously successful, not only at promoting growth, but also at achieving structural changes not at all achieved by aid donors such as strengthening the tax base. Such changes inevitably require a longer time‐period than the standard three years of an IMF standby, not only in order to induce a production response but also in order to achieve the necessary measure of stabilisation and economic reform without imposing social pressures which wreck the production response. The latter argument is particularly powerful in middle income countries, and provides an argument for IMF support to these countries also whilst they are temporarily excluded from international capital markets. Often also a long‐term presence is needed to achieve effective leverage in short‐term operations. In such cases the IMF’s long‐term lending should be seen as preconditional to the success of, and not as an alternative to, its short‐term operations. We therefore argue for the retention of the Fund’s long‐term lending function; and for this function not to be transferred to the World Bank, which has less credibility in global financial markets and less comparative advantage in macro‐economic management. Measures are indeed needed to reduce the level of the IMF’s exposure to risk in poorer developing countries, but those, we believe, should consist of the preventive measures currently going on, and measures to increase the ratio of equity to debt, rather than measures which would jeopardise the progress in long‐term poverty alleviation capacity achieved by the Fund over recent years     

On the relation between linearity‐generating processes and linear‐rational models

We review the notion of a linearity‐generating (LG) process introduced by Gabaix and relate LG processes to linear‐rational (LR) models studied by Filipovi? et al. We show that every LR model can be represented as an LG process and vice versa. We find that LR models have two basic properties that make them an important representation of LG processes. First, LR models can be easily specified and made consistent with nonnegative interest rates. Second, LR models go naturally with the long‐term risk factorization due to Alvarez and Jermann, Hansen and Scheinkman, and Qin and Linetsky. Every LG process under the long forward measure can be represented as a lower dimensional LR model.     

Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia

This study examines the structure of voting control and blockholders’ contestability for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms in Colombia during 1996–2004. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and blockholder power, which implies low separation ratios between cash flow rights and voting rights. On average the separation ratios for the largest voting block is 0.95, while that for the fourth largest shareholder is 0.75. Corporate control is privately biased when there is direct monitoring of firm management by controlling owners. Regression results show that a more equal distribution of equity among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. Contestability matters most when firm shares are liquid and actively traded on the stock market. This finding is reinforced when the probability that the largest block can form a winning coalition decreases and performance variables, such as market to sales ratio and return on equity, are included in the estimating equations as substitutes for firm value. In addition, our estimations provide evidence that diversion of rents (tunneling) is limited by blockholders’ contestability.     

The impact of inward FDI on local companies’ labour productivity: evidence from the Italian case

The article aims to investigate the impact of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) occurring through acquisition upon the local target company’ performance, as measured by labour productivity. It relies upon the idea that multinational enterprises (MNEs) act as a device to transfer firm‐specific proprietary assets, thus causing their subsidiaries to exhibit better performance than their host country rivals. Specifically, our results show that foreign acquisitions generally increase the local target companies’ labour productivity in the medium term after the acquisition. The empirical evidence refers to foreign acquisitions that occurred in Italy in the period 1994–1997.     

Target‐Setting,Pay for Performance,and Quality Improvement: A Case Study of Ontario Hospitals’ Quality‐Improvement Plans

This study examines whether difficult targets and quality indicators in executives' pay‐for‐performance (P4P) plans affect performance. The impact of target‐setting and P4P plans on quality improvement in the public sector is unclear. The Ontario government initiated the Quality Improvement Plan (QIP), which requires hospitals to set targets for quality indicators annually and link executive pay to target achievement since 2011. Analyzing Health Quality Ontario's database and hospitals' 2012–2013 QIPs, this study shows greater quality improvement in hospitals with difficult targets than hospitals with easy targets or without assigned targets; however, the positive impact disappears for high‐performance hospitals relative to their peers. We find no significant effect of the use of quality indicators in executives' P4P plans on quality improvement. Copyright © 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.