Capital Regulation,Bailout and Banking Asset Correlation

We study the effect of capital regulation on banking asset correlation. Banks are more efficient users of banking assets. This implies that it may be ex post optimal to bail out a failed bank. We show, under Basel 1 capital regulation, that the financial regulator is committed to a mixed bailout strategy in the state of systemic failure, which reduces banks’ incentive to choose highly correlated assets. The mixed strategy is not creditable under mark‐to‐market capital regulation. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, banking asset correlation increases, resulting in a high probability of systemic failure. We then discuss social losses under different capital regulations.     

Do collective bargaining institutions crowd out discussion and implementation of firm‐related training programs? Evidence from Japan

The paper empirically examines labor‐management communication concerning in‐house training programs and its relation to the actual on‐ and off‐the‐job training policy and wage structure. Using governmental datasets from Japan, we study how different labor‐management communication institutions may affect the training interests of employers and employees differently. We classify these institutions in terms of whether they have a legal (i.e. statutory) foundation (‘de jure’) or not (‘de facto’). We find that collective bargaining, with legal grounds, may crowd out employees’ willingness to communicate about training. However, the existence of ‘de facto’ communication channels such as joint labor‐management councils or shop floor committees is positively correlated with both on‐ and off‐the‐job of training. At the same time, the existence of unions is positively correlated with the steepness of wage profiles for mid‐career workers, which is consistent with the fact that employers and employees assume a long‐term relationship. Thus, we show that a multi‐tiered structure of labor‐management communication, together with a long‐term orientation toward the employment relationship, contributes to strengthen employees’ voice in training matters.     

Capital Controls Re‐examined: The Case for ‘Smart’ Controls

The global financial crisis which began in east Asia in 1997 is not over, neither is the inquest into its implications for adjustment policy. In the wake of this crisis, we focus here on the role of capital controls, which formed a much publicised part of the crisis‐coping strategy in one country (Malaysia) and, less openly, were also deployed by other crisis‐afflicted countries. Evaluation so far has examined different target variables with different estimation methods, generally concentrating on efficiency and stability indicators and ignoring equity measures; it has also typically treated ‘control’ as a one‐zero dummy variable, ignoring the ‘quality’ of intervention and in particular the extent to which efficiency gains are obtained in exchange for controls. Partly because of these limitations, the literature has reached no consensus on the impact of controls; however, it is moving over towards acknowledging that the quality and type of controls is important, as well as their intensity. We propose an approach in which the government plays off short‐term political security against long‐term economic gain; the more insecure its political footing, the greater the weight it gives to political survival, which is likely to increase the probability of controls being imposed. The modelling of this approach generates a governmental ‘policy reaction function’ and an impact function for controls, which are estimated by simultaneous panel‐data methods across a sample of thirty developing and transitional countries between 1980–2003, using, for the period since 1996, the ‘new’ IMF dataset which differentiates between controls by type. We find that controls appear to cause increases in income equality, and are significantly associated with political insecurity and relatively low levels of openness to trade. They do not, in our analysis, materially influence the level of whole‐economy productivity or GDP across the sample of countries examined, although they do influence productivity in particular sectors. But the dispersion around this central finding is wide: the tendency for controls to depress productivity by encouraging rent‐seeking sometimes is, and sometimes is not, counteracted by purposive government policy actions to maintain competitiveness. Whether or not this happens is vital, on both efficiency and equity grounds. We make the case for ‘smart’ capital controls – controls which are time‐limited and contain an inbuilt incentive to increased productivity.     

A Credible Path for Ending Too Big to Fail

The high degree of concentration in the U.S. financial system has been intensified in the wake of the 2007–09 financial crisis. Implicit government support of banks that are deemed “too big to fail” has resulted in excessive risk taking and a focus on short-term rewards rather than long-term performance. This paper proposes a three-step plan to limit the federal safety net to commercial depository institutions and to restructure institutions so that no one institution poses systemic risk in the event of failure and that the largest banks face the same kind of risks of closure and market risk as the smallest.     

China,India and the Commodity Boom: Economic and Environmental Implications for Low‐income Countries

The international role of China has risen steadily for two decades – and has become even more important in the current global recession. The growing supply of labour‐intensive manufactured exports from China has been accompanied by a huge expansion in its imports both of raw materials and of skill‐intensive manufactured parts and components. This ‘offshoring’ of intermediates production by a large, labour‐abundant economy has economic and environmental implications for other developing economies. More recently, the rapid expansion of the Indian economy and trade indicates that it too will soon exert similar effects on global markets. We sketch a model showing how the growth of these developing‐country ‘giants’ generates adjustment pressures on other developing economies. We discuss in particular how differences in relative factor endowments of resource‐rich economies can produce quite different outcomes in the context of product fragmentation and expanding commodity trade. We also explore the effects on production, trade, environment and prospects for future growth in resource‐rich economies, particularly in the context of weak institutions and other market failures. We illustrate these different impacts by considering the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand and highlight implications for growth, development and policy.     

Europäischer Zinslastenausgleich — eine sinnvolle Alternative zu EZB-Anleihekäufen

The eurozone’s public debt crisis is not over yet - as displayed in the still substantial yield spreads between “northern” and “southern” euro government bonds. Whereas the ECB tried to tackle this problem by announcing (in Sept. 2012) its willingness to conduct unlimited “outright monetary transactions” to the benefit of the southern countries, the German “Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)” offered a less risky option in its “Kiel policy brief” (Jan. 2013): it suggested narrowing this yield spread by establishing a “yield spread compensation fund”, which would balance out interest payments among euro countries. Though this may sound like the first concrete eurozone bailout mechanism, the idea really is a risk-free debt alleviation tool, matching windfall gains with windfall profits without too much of a bailout.     

How to reduce the default contagion risk of intercorporate credit guarantee networks? Evidence from China

This study uses data from 2011 to 2018 for Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises to construct a weighted directed network to investigate the topology of intercorporate credit guarantee networks. Moreover, based on the DebtRank algorithm, it develops a novel GuaranteeRank model that includes three factors to comprehensively examine default risk contagion and systemic risk in various scenarios. The results demonstrate that (1) credit guarantee network has the topological characteristics of “scale-free” and “small world”; (2) default contagion and systemic risk increase significantly when the macro-external shock and company's off-balance-sheet debt exceed certain threshold values, while continuous bank credit support can notably reduce the risk; (3) credit guarantee network is “robust yet fragile”, such that targeted shocks increase systemic risk much more than do random shocks; (4) in addition to the prevalent “too big to fail” and “too central to fail” phenomena, a “too connected with the central to fail” phenomenon is also identified for the first time. Therefore, this study provides an important reference for regulators and financial institutions to reduce the default contagion risk of intercorporate credit guarantee networks.     

Anti‐dumping Protection in a Liberalising Country: Mexico's Anti‐dumping Policy and Practice

The use of anti‐dumping policy has been steadily growing in recent decades, and so has the theoretical and empirical literature on anti‐dumping. However, while developing countries as a whole have become at least as active as the ‘traditional’ anti‐dumping regimes (the USA, the EU, Canada and Australia), the literature is almost exclusively concerned with the latter group. This article gives an overview of anti‐dumping policy and practice in Mexico, one of the leading ‘new’ anti‐dumping regimes. It assesses how anti‐dumping has expanded since the country began liberalising trade in the mid‐1980s, and discusses how the policy has been applied in a protectionist way that is not dissimilar to policy practice in the traditional user countries.     

Fiat Money,Individual Rationality and Production

Wallace's ‘Monetary Dictum’ insists that monetary models must specify why the monetary object is so used. Another important specification is that the use of this object as money should always be individually rational. We construct a model of ‘team production’ under uncertainty with a contract where a ‘hostage’ in the form of future purchasing power is handed over. The model is extended to show the rational development of banks as hierarchical enforcement mechanisms and government backing of the monetary system. The link thus established between money issue and production may be useful for the analysis of monetary policy.     

China Trade Policy Review: A Political Economy Approach

Chinese trade policy has experienced ‘great reversal’ in the year of 2008. A series of constraining measures taken previously have been loosened eventually. We investigate this situation using a political economy approach. Unlike in democratic countries, where interest groups play a crucial role in trade policy change, in China, given the political reality, leaders’ will and trade partners’ pressure are the determinant factors. We call this top‐down and outside‐in trade policy. Actually the idea of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘scientific development’ emphasised by top leaders in October 2006 paved the road for the following trade policy adjustment: i.e. reducing tax rebate, limiting processing trade, compressing the catalogue for foreign investment, etc. However, with the shock of a global financial tsunami, these measures get coastal areas relying on foreign trade heavily into trouble. The economic downturn in Pearl River Delta even astonished the decision‐making body, calling on a quick reversal in foreign trade policy. If interest groups had been allowed to express their demand formally and adequately from the very start, the cycle of ‘taking up first but giving up last’ in policy design would have not taken place. In other words, the bottom‐up and inside‐out trade policy should be more stable. Although flexibility is necessary in the face of uncertainty, frequent and discretionary trade policy change usually produces effects of ‘pro‐government’ not ‘pro‐market’. This is unfavourable for the transformation in China. The constraining trade policy in mid‐2007 to mid‐2008 has been a part of the government’s desire to seek healthier development. However, with the inside and outside surroundings getting worse, the structural adjustment (long‐run objective) has had to concede to the economic growth (short‐run objective).     

International Co‐movements of Business Cycles in a ‘Phase‐locking’ Model

The possibility of co‐movements in the cyclical variations of aggregate output in different countries has received increasing attention in recent years. The present paper derives sufficient conditions for the occurrence of persistent co‐movements in the mean processes of aggregate economic variables of different countries, an effect called ‘phase‐locking’. The fact that the ‘phase‐locking’ effect results under fairly elementary assumptions may be taken to challenge the sophisticated theoretical speculations about the international transmission of business cycles. International co‐movements may simply be due to a ‘technical’ effect which is generic to interrelated cycling dynamic systems.     

Tensions between politico‐institutional factors and accounting regulation in a developing economy: insights from institutional theory

The study contributes to building an understanding of the impact of political forces on the information environment of listed firms in a developing economy. Specifically, it investigates the tensions between politico‐institutional factors and accounting regulation on the prolonged and incomplete implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Bangladesh from 1998 to 2010. Two phases of interviews were conducted in 2010–2011 and IFRS‐related enforcement documents from 1998 to 2010 were evaluated. The study contributes that IFRSs are being diffused to developing countries like Bangladesh, but they invariably interact with local institutions (political institutions in this case), with variable outcomes (i.e. negative outcomes of IFRS implementation). Coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphisms are low in Bangladesh. Notably, political forces have been undermining mimetic isomorphism because of the high level of government intervention and the high level of political lobbying. Political institutional pressures stand in the way of mimetic isomorphism and constitute negative forces that add further tension to accounting regulation (e.g. the implementation of IFRS) in Bangladesh. Regarding the low level of normative isomorphism, there is evidence of a ‘blame culture’, with state institutions and professional accountancy institutions in the country blaming each other for the poor progress in IFRS implementation. Although the study focuses on Bangladesh, its results have implications for international policy makers (the International Accounting Standards Board, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), as well as the governments and regulators of other developing economies facing similar challenges in implementing IFRS.     

SHAREHOLDER VALUE ORIENTATION,DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH—SHORT‐ AND MEDIUM‐RUN EFFECTS IN A KALECKIAN MODEL

We discuss the effects of rising shareholder power on distribution and capital accumulation in a Kaleckian model. In the short run, increasing shareholder power may have either positive (‘finance‐led’), negative (‘normal’) or ‘intermediate’ (‘profits without investment’) effects on capacity utilization, profits and capital accumulation. In the medium run, the positive (‘finance‐led’) effects may be maintained in a stable regime under very special conditions, whereas the negative (‘normal’) and the ‘intermediate’ (‘profits without investment’) effects turn into disequilibrium processes with falling rates of capital accumulation and rising outside finance–capital ratios. Therefore, this process gives rise to a ‘paradox of outside finance’.     

Subsidy‐induced Dumping

More than two‐thirds of all anti‐subsidy investigations in the EU are paired with an anti‐dumping investigation against the same non‐EU producers. The outcome may be a two‐component duty where one duty addresses the ‘unfairness’ of the subsidy and the other the dumping behaviour. The philosophy behind this practice is that, at least to some extent, the observed dumping has been induced by the subsidy, and as the GATT Treaty, Article VI commits the claimant not to impose double remedies for the same ‘misbehaviour’, it is necessary to make an assessment of the hypothetical dumping without the subsidy. The EU quantification of the hypothetical dumping margin assumes that an export subsidy translates fully to the dumping margin, while a domestic subsidy leaves the dumping margin unchanged. Using an oligopoly model, we show in this paper that in case of an export subsidy, the EU anti‐dumping duty is lower than the predicted hypothetical dumping margin from the oligopoly model. For a domestic subsidy, the results are ambiguous, and the difference between the size of the duty following the EU procedure and the model predictions is relatively small.     

Long‐term Effects of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis in Goodwin‐type Economies

The existence of an efficiency wage mechanism in Goodwin‐type models may lead to the unexpected appearance of an economically meaningful equilibrium with zero labour share, which is globally stable for some parameter constellation and allows the system to attain its ‘maximal growth'. A subsequent ‘normative’ comparison between the possible long‐term regimes of the economy shows that (1) the zero labour share equilibrium can be the ‘preferred’ equilibrium in terms of welfare; (2) in all the long‐term regimes the welfare is higher than in the original Goodwin model; (3) a point of maximal welfare exists. Moreover, the effects of rational behaviour of firms are compared with the ‘traditional’ situation in which rationality is not explicitly assumed. A striking result appears: myopic rationality can have deleterious effects on the profit of firms and on the overall welfare of the economy.     

Consumers’ perceptions of GM‐free labelled foods: A sensory experiment

As of today, the views of European consumers and policy makers on GM foods are still divided. While only few GM labelled foods (‘does contain’) have entered the market, GM‐free labelling (‘does not contain’) is increasingly introduced in many EU member states. This study aims to examine whether GM‐free labelling affects consumers’ sensory profiling, emotional conceptualizations and overall liking. Based on a within‐subjects experimental design, 126 Belgian subjects evaluated GM‐free and nonlabelled samples of three food products: yogurt, traditional biscuit (‘speculoos’) and crisps. The results show that overall liking did not differ significantly according to label (no vs. GM‐free), regardless of participants’ knowledge of, or attitude towards GMOs. Furthermore, regarding the impact of GM‐free labelling on consumers’ subjective taste perceptions and emotional profiling, few significant differences were reported for crisps and traditional biscuit. Regarding the latter, less positive and more negative emotional terms have been assigned to the GM‐free labelled sample. The findings of this study should be viewed in the context of the stringent EU mandatory GM food labelling policy, which led to an increase of GM‐free rather than GM labels. Future research is needed to further underpin these findings and examine differently framed labels in various settings.     

From the Soviet Union to the European Union: Estonian Trade Policy, 1991–2000

This paper examines the political economy of Estonian trade policy in the 1990s. Estonia is a unique case in the world economy, in that the country rapidly implemented unilateral free trade after regaining independence and sustained it right through the 1990s. We analyse the circumstances, interests, ideas and institutions that have shaped Estonian trade policy during the past decade. Our stress is on institutions, particularly the national decision‐making setting for trade policy. Through this prism we try to understand how a free trade regime was implemented and sustained, and what this experience suggests for the feasibility of tree trade elsewhere. We also look at the increasingly ‘multi‐track’ nature of Estonian trade policy through bilateral free trade agreements, WTO accession and, especially, the movement towards EU accession. Although the other trade policy tracks to some extent provide a lockin for unilateral reforms, we argue that EU accession is undermining the simple, classical liberal trade policy regime that existed during the 1990s.     

The Pathological Export Boom and the Bazaar Effect: How to Solve the German Puzzle

Germany is the laggard of Europe, yet the country is world champion in merchandise exports. The paper tries to solve this theoretical and empirical puzzle by diagnosing a ‘pathological export boom’ and a ‘bazaar effect’. Excessively high wages defended by unions and the welfare state against the forces of international low‐wage competition destroy too big a fraction of the labour‐intensive sectors and drive too much capital and labour into the capital‐intensive export sectors, causing both unemployment and excessive value added in exports. Moreover, excessive wages induce too much outsourcing of upstream production activities, which implies that export quantities grow too much in relation to value added contained in exports. Finally, excessive wages cause capital flight resulting in a too large current account surplus.     

R&D policies, trade and process innovation

We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.