Externalities of investment, education and economic growth

We present a growth model in which investment in physical capital shows positive externalities which build up knowledge capital. A prerequisite for these spillovers to take place is that a country devotes time to education. Externalities associated with investment need education to raise the stock of knowledge capital. Analysing the competitive economy we demonstrate that the model may explain why some low-income countries show convergence whereas others do not. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in the social optimum the level of investment is always higher than in the competitive economy whereas the time spent for education may be lower or higher. We also show how the competitive economy may replicate the social optimum for an appropriate choice of a lump-sum tax and an investment subsidy. Empirical evidence is provided in order to demonstrate the plausibility of our model.     

Optimal Taxation when Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption

I examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in which each consumer's utility depends on consumption relative to a weighted average of consumption by others (the benchmark level of consumption) as well as on the level of the consumer's own consumption. The socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the Modified Golden Rule and by a condition on the intergenerational allocation of consumption in each period. A competitive economy can be induced to attain the social optimum by a lump-sum pay-as-you-go social security system and a tax on capital income.     

Costly structural change and optimal growth

Summary This paper studies the optimal growth of a developing economy that has a choice to expend a fixed amount of resource for a structural change that advances its production technology. It is shown that structural change is undertaken if capital stock is above a critical level. Economies undertaking structural change converge to a larger steady state and economies not undertaking structural change converge to a smaller steady state. The optimal policy correspondences and growth paths are characterized. The social optimum is shown implementable by a competitive equilibrium with lump-sum taxation.We are grateful to Francis Cheung, Carmen Menezes, Peter Mueser, Don Schilling, two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their valuable suggestions.     

The taxation of capital returns in overlapping generations models

This paper shows that in the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with production and capital savings, there is a period-by-period balanced fiscal policy supporting a steady state allocation that Pareto-improves upon the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state (whether dynamically inefficient or efficient) without resorting to intergenerational transfers. The policy consists of taxing linearly (or subsidizing, in the dynamically efficient case) the returns to capital, while balancing the budget period by period through a lump-sum transfer (or tax, respectively) in second period. This intervention grants every generation the highest steady state utility attainable through markets (i.e. remunerating factors by their marginal productivities and without transfers) which under laissez-faire is not a competitive equilibrium outcome. A transition from the competitive equilibrium steady state to this other steady state is also Pareto-improving when the former is dynamically inefficient. The result disentangles from redistributive considerations the impact of the taxation of capital returns on steady state welfare, and thus provides a rationale for the taxation of capital returns that is based on efficiency considerations and not on redistributive goals.     

Fiscal financing and the efficacy of fiscal policy in Korea: An empirical assessment with comparison to the U.S. evidence

This paper aims to assess the empirical implications of fiscal financing in Korea and study how they differ from those of the U.S. We estimate two versions of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model—a small open economy (SOE) model for Korea and its closed economy counterpart for the U.S.—in which the former nests the latter as a special case. The fiscal policy specification posits that government spending, lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation on labor income, capital income and consumption expenditures respond to the level of government debt and the state of economic activity. Analysis of the data from 2000 to 2015 shows that distortionary capital taxes play a critical role in stabilizing government debt in the U.S., whereas non-distorting fiscal instruments are the primary means of fiscal adjustment in Korea. Regarding the magnitude of debt-financed fiscal stimuli, the substantial trade openness of Korea is significant in that it produces relatively smaller government spending and transfer multipliers compared to the U.S.     

Growth, income taxes and consumption aspirations

In a Barro-type economy with exogenous consumption aspirations, raising income taxes favors growth even in the presence of lump-sum taxes. Such a policy is compatible with the behavior of private consumption, income taxes and growth rates observed in actual economies.     

The failure of Ricardian equivalence under progressive wealth taxation

Although the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem holds under a linear estate tax schedule, it fails to hold under a nonlinear estate tax schedule. In a representative consumer economy, a temporary lump-sum tax increase reduces contemporaneous consumption. If different consumers face different marginal estate tax rates because they leave bequests of different sizes, a lump-sum tax increase redistributes resources from consumers in low marginal estate tax brackets to consumers in high marginal estate tax brackets; aggregate consumption may rise, fall, or remain unchanged. These departures from Ricardian Equivalence hold more generally under any nonlinear tax on saving, wealth or income accruing to wealth.     

On the Use of the Inflation Tax When Nondistortionary Taxes Are Available

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model in which money is valued because of a legal restriction, we show the following: (a) a benevolent government may make some use of the inflation tax in conjunction with a lump-sum tax on the young but not if lump-sum taxes on the old are available, and (b) the welfare-maximizing monetary policy may deviate from the Friedman rule (contract the money supply so as to equate the real return on money and other competing stores of value) in either case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E58, E63, H21.     

The Macroeconomic Consequences of Financing Health Insurance

Employer-financed health insurance systems like those used in the United States distort firms’ labor demand and adversely affect the economy. Since such costs vary with employment rather than hours worked, firms have an incentive to increase output by increasing worker hours rather than employment. Given that the returns to employment exceed the returns to hours worked, this results in lower levels of employment and output. In this paper, we construct a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model where individuals differ with respect to their productivity and employment opportunities. Calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, we generate steady state results for several alternative models for financing health insurance: one in which health insurance is financed primarily through employer contributions that vary with employment, a second where insurance is funded through a non-distortionary, lump-sum tax, and a third where insurance is funded by a payroll tax. We measure the effects of each of the alternatives on output, employment, hours worked, and wages.     

Fiscal Policy, Congestion, and Endogenous Growth

We devise an endogenous growth model with private and public physical capital, and human capital, which allows for relative and absolute congestion. According to empirical evidence, long-run growth is invariant to fiscal policy. Despite its complexity, the dynamics of the market economy and the centralized economy are analyzed in detail. We show that an increase in absolute congestion reduces the long-run growth rate of output. In contrast, relative congestion does not affect long-run growth. In the absence of congestion, it is optimal to use lump-sum taxation, and with congestion it is optimal to also tax income.     

Double dividend,dynamic Laffer effects and public abatement

In a very stylized endogenous growth economy with pollution and public abatement activities and without any production externality, we show that the government may exploit dynamic Laffer effects to achieve a double dividend through an environmental tax reform, while fulfilling its commitment to provide an exogenously specified sequence of expenditures in the form of lump-sum transfers to consumers.     

A computational analysis of core convergence in a multiple equilibria economy

We examine the structure of the core of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria as the number of traders (N) is varied. The core first splits into two pieces at N=5 and then splits a second time into three pieces at N=12. Both of these splits occur not at a point but as a contiguous gap. We find that the speed of convergence of the core toward the three competitive equilibria is not uniform but when N is large, the convergence rate is approximately of the order 1/N.     

Capital income taxation,tax criteria,and intergenerational welfare

In a two-period overlapping-generations model, residence criteria are shown to be optimal with lump-sum transfers to the younger generation in a dynamically efficient open economy even if all wage income, corresponding to rent income under exogenous labor supply, is not taxed away. When tax revenues are also distributed to the older generation — which indeed may be desirable for short-term intergenerational welfare distribution reasons — a weighted average rule is derived for optimal international taxation. The taxation of domestic savings income follows the inverse elasticity rule in respect to savings and, surprisingly, higher investment elasticity increases the tax level. Finally, for a small open economy and for large identical economies, tax competition with a mixed scheme of residence-based taxes and source-based subsidies yields the same tax policy as tax cooperation with no restrictions on the domestic and international capital income tax instruments.     

Optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclassical growth model

This paper provides a counterexample to the simplest version of the redistribution models considered by Judd (1985) in which the government chooses an optimal distortionary tax on capitalists to finance a lump-sum payment to workers. I show that the steady-state optimal tax on capital income is generally non-zero when the capitalists’ utility is logarithmic and the government faces a balanced-budget constraint. With log utility, agents’ optimal decisions depend solely on the current rate of return, not any future rates of return or tax rates. This feature of the economy effectively deprives the government of a useful policy instrument because promises about future tax rates can no longer influence current allocations. When combined with a lack of other suitable policy instruments (such as government bonds), the result is an inability to decentralize the allocations that are consistent with a zero-limiting capital tax. I show that the standard approach to solving the dynamic optimal tax problem yields the wrong answer in this (knife-edge) case because it fails to properly enforce the constraints associated with the competitive equilibrium. Specifically, the standard approach lets in an additional policy instrument through the back door.     

Growing through Cycles in an Infinitely Lived Agent Economy

This paper extends the analysis of K. Matsuyama (Econometrica67 (1999), 335–347) to the case of an infinitely lived representative agent economy. The economy grows endogenously through endogenous fluctuations, perpetually moving back and forth between two phases. In one phase, there is no innovation, the market structure is competitive, and the economy grows solely by capital accumulation. In the other phase, new goods are introduced and the market structure is monopolistic. In the long run, both investment and innovation grow at the same rate, but the economy alternates between the periods of high investment and the periods of higher innovation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, O11.     

Oligopoly equilibria in exchange economies: a limit theorem

In a pure exchange economy, agents have the possibility of behaving strategically by putting only a part of their initial endowments on the market. An oligopoly equilibrium is defined to be a Nash equilibrium of the game in which agents choose simultaneously quantities to be put on the market. It is proved that under standard hypotheses, the oligopoly equilibrium leads to the competitive equilibrium when the economy is replicated an infinite number of times. Received: May 26, 1999; revised version: April 3, 2000     

Indirect taxation and the welfare effects of altruism on the optimal fiscal policy

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of altruism on the optimal fiscal policy. The existence of positive bequests links present and future generations in the economy. We show that these altruistic links provide a new role for indirect taxation (consumption and estate taxes) with important welfare implications. We use three different altruistic approaches (warm-glow, dynastic, and family) to illustrate how the presence of bequests in the budget constraint of the donee gives the government the ability to use indirect taxation to mimic lump-sum taxes and to implement the first-best outcome in the long-run. This channel is not present in economies without altruism, such as the infinite-lived consumer economy or the overlapping generations economy, where long-run welfare is suboptimal and indirect taxation is irrelevant.     

Growth in economies with non convexities: sunspots and lottery equilibria

Summary. We investigate the relation between lotteries and sunspot allocations in a dynamic economy where the utility functions are not concave. In an intertemporal competitive economy, the household consumption set is identified with the set of lotteries, while in the intertemporal sunspot economy it is the set of measurable allocations in the given probability space of sunspots. Sunspot intertemporal equilibria whenever they exist are efficient, independently of the sunspot space specification. If feasibility is, at each point in time, a restriction over the average value of the lotteries, competitive equilibrium prices are linear in basic commodities and intertemporal sunspot and competitive equilibria are equivalent. Two models have this feature: Large economies and economies with semi-linear technologies. We provide examples showing that in general, intertemporal competitive equilibrium prices are non-linear in basic commodities and, hence, intertemporal sunspot equilibria do not exist. The competitive static equilibrium allocations are stationary, intertemporal equilibrium allocations, but the static sunspot equilibria need not to be stationary, intertemporal sunspot equilibria. We construct examples of non-convex economies with indeterminate and Pareto ranked static sunspot equilibrium allocations associated to distinct specifications of the sunspot probability space.Received: 25 August 2003, Revised: 16 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D84, D90.Correspondence to: Paolo SiconolfiWe thank Herakles Polemarchakis for helpful conversations on the topic. The research of Aldo Rustichini was supported by the NSF grant NSF/SES-0136556.     

A comparison of alternative incentive structures for centrally planned economic systems

This paper addresses the problem of incentive compatibility in a centrally planned economy with a stochastic environment. A relatively decentralized planning procedure is analyzed in which the planner allocates certain scarce resources and enterprise managers make all other decisions. It is found that the New Soviet Incentive Model loses its desirable incentive properties when resource allocation is introduced. However, the traditional Soviet quota-bonus reward schemes can be modified to achieve incentive compatibility. The requisite modification consists in a specific formula for quota setting and in deletion of the lump-sum bonus for quota fulfillment.     

Welfare effects of changing commodity tax rates toward uniformity

This paper presents a theory of tax reform that is applicable to a many-good economy where (i) the initial tax structure is arbitrarily given, (ii) no lump-sum tax exists, and (iii) the initial tax revenue must be maintained after the reform. Sufficient conditions are established under which tax changes definitely result in increases in welfare. They indicate that in a wide class of situations the uniform tax structure can be a useful intermediate target on the way to optimum.