What Do Employees Know About Their Pension Plan?

Original survey data based on 529 respondents in a large organization are used to analyze how much employees know about various features of their occupational pension plan. While the level of understanding was quite low among all employees, it was quite high among those for whom the knowledge matters most in terms of their behavioral decision making. Our results show that rather than being optimal labor contracts that workers enter into with full knowledge at the time of employment, pension contracts are more like contingent claims contracts evolving under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information.     

Financialization and the rise of atypical work

The current literature on financialization and the labour process focuses disproportionately on how corporate financialization induces the use of atypical work and largely overlooks the role of household financialization. This paper presents several mechanisms through which household debt and pension fund financialization increase the financial insecurity of employees, which, in turn, can curb their resistance to accepting such work contracts. To assess our arguments, we estimate the effects of corporate and household financialization on involuntary part-time and temporary employment, using a panel dataset of OECD economies. Our findings provide robust support that financialization increases significantly non-standard employment rates for the total workforce and women, but less for older employees.     

Work and Volunteering: Longitudinal Relationships between Work‐Related Experiences and Volunteering Behaviour

This study examines the effect of work‐related experiences on employees’ engagement in community volunteering, using data from a British longitudinal panel of employees. Using a novel analytical approach that separates variation in volunteering due to within‐person changes in work conditions from variation due to between‐person work differences, we more robustly test existing and new hypotheses about the effects of work on volunteering. New to this literature, we find that commuting and satisfaction with job experiences are significant predictors of community volunteering, both the likelihood to volunteer and volunteering frequency. In turn, volunteering determinants previously explored with cross‐sectional data, such as managerial and professional jobs, employment sector and hourly paid contracts, are no longer statistically significant in the within‐person models. We discuss a number of important theoretical and practical consequences of these findings.     

Spanning the Union/Nonunion Boundary

Conflicts between the work boundaries established by union contracts and management's interest in efficient work flows have increased sharply as new technology and new management practices make traditional divisions in the organization of work obsolete. We use concepts from organizational theory to examine these conflicts and an innovative attempt to resolve them by defining union boundaries not on the basis of tasks performed, but rather on the basis of employment; the union contract applies to specific workers instead of job titles. This system provides greater flexibility and autonomy for employees, and the results of an attitude survey suggest that it is strongly preferred by workers who feel constrained by traditional union contracts.     

Market growth through mergers and acquisitions: The role of the relationship marketing manager in sustaining performance

This research suggests that firms considering a merger and acquisition strategy need to pay attention to the relationship marketing managers of the target firm and the implicit agreements that have kept them with the target firm. The results of this study convey that the joint activity of maintaining the implicit contracts and retaining the relationship marketing managers have a stabilizing and positive impact on the productivity of subordinate marketing employees. These employees are a key success factor that enables the target firm to function effectively after the acquisition.     

When does a partner’s reputation impact cooperation effects in partnerships?

We examine how formal contracts moderate the relationship between a partner??s reputation and cooperation effects in public-private (P-P) partnerships. We base our analysis on differences between formal contracts, which require a series of legal agreements, and informal contracts, which may be implicit and/or unwritten. We argue that a partner??s reputation is more likely to impact cooperation effects in the context of strong formal or informal contracts. Using a sample of 244 partners from various P-P partnerships in the medical and healthcare fields in China, we find that the positive relationship between a partner??s reputation and cooperation effects is stronger given the existence of strong formal and/or informal contracts. We conclude that in China, where there is a weak legal system that rarely offers or enforces sufficient protections to contract signatories, it is safer to cooperate with a partner who has a good reputation. Such a reputation correspondingly enhances cooperation effects. Moreover, this relationship may be amplified when there are strong formal and/or informal contracts, all of which may be associated with cooperation between the public and private sectors.     

团购的幻灭与进化

团购曾经是一个多么激动人心的行业!前面有快速成长的Groupon领跑，中间有各路VC争先恐后地注入资金，众多创业企业激情奋战，各种关于本地服务业电子商务的传说，多少上市公司的财富梦想，在这个冬天里，变得扑朔迷离。团购真的不行了吗？这个被资本迅速催生出来的行业，还有哪些可能的变数？     

The Economics of Internal Labor Markets

Our essay focuses on the economics of long-term contractual relationships between a firm and its employees, referred to as the internal labor market. We review the economics literature on match-specific investments, risk aversion, asymmetric information, and transaction costs. We argue that an integrated treatment of all four factors is needed in order to apply implicit contract theoy to internal labor markets. Integrating the topics also highlights the tradeoffs created among these factors. Our discussion stresses contract enforcement mechanisms, including self-enforcing contracts and third-party enforcement.     

Supermarket contracts and smallholder farmers: Implications for income and multidimensional poverty

Food systems in developing countries are changing rapidly with a growing role of modern supermarkets. Supermarkets influence supply chains and the way agricultural products are sourced from farmers. Especially for the procurement of fresh fruits and vegetables, supermarkets often contract farmers directly to ensure consistent and high-quality supply. One important question, which is addressed here, is whether smallholder farmers benefit from supermarket contracts. Previous studies address this question, but mostly focus on income effects without exploring implications for other dimensions of household welfare, such as nutrition, health, or housing conditions. Moreover, most existing studies rely on cross-section data. We add to the literature by analyzing effects of supermarket contracts on income and multidimensional poverty using three rounds of panel data collected from smallholder vegetable farmers in Kenya and econometric models with household fixed effects. On average, supermarket contracts increase household income by over 40%. We also find significant reductions in income poverty and multidimensional poverty. Quantile regressions show that farmers in all income groups benefit, but richer households benefit more than poorer ones in absolute terms. However, supermarket contracts cause the strongest reductions in multidimensional deprivations among the poorest households.     

2010年建筑业发展统计分析

在翔实的统计数据基础上,从建筑业支柱产业地位、产业规模和效益、房屋施工面积、新签合同额、企业数量和从业人员、对外发展等方面对2010年建筑业总体情况进行了分析。总结出2010年中国建筑业地区发展差异较大、建筑市场分布相对集中等6个特点。从专业类别、资质等级、注册地区和登记类型4个角度,对2010年中国建筑业特级、一级企业的主要指标增长率、总产值比例、利润比例和新签合同额比例等基本情况进行了分析。     

Pensions and Deferred Befefits as Strategic Compensation

This paper examines labor-oriented aspects of pensions and deferred benefits. Recent work has embedded pensions in the framework of optimal compensation schemes that induce workers to behave in certain ways. Most pension formaulas present workers with securities that look like optioons the tendency for turnover rates to fall as vesting approaches, even though there has been no change in the naive valuation of pension accrual. The paper also discusses the use of pensions as severance pay and notes that the various pension formaulas have different incentive effects.     

On the competition enhancing effects of exclusive dealing contracts

Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that case, an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive contracts but induces buyers to breach. Because breaching buyers have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, the downstream profits they obtain when breaching must be large enough. Therefore, the entrant needs to set a lower wholesale price than absent exclusive contracts, leading to lower final consumer prices and higher welfare.     

Between contracts and trust: Disentangling the safeguarding and coordinating effects over the relationship life cycle

Despite a rich tradition in studying contract-trust nexus, the mutual relationship between these two modes of governance remains equivocal. Adopting a dual-functional and relationship-phase-contingent view of contracts, we theorize that firms' perception of the chief function of contracts varies throughout the relationship life cycle, which results in a relationship-phase-contingent contract-trust nexus. We tested our hypotheses with data collected from the supplier-retailer dyads using quasi-longitudinal analysis. The results indicate that contracts substitute goodwill trust in the exploration phase because of the significantly negative effect of the safeguarding function, whereas in the expansion phase, contracts complement goodwill trust because the positive effect of the coordination function dominates. In the maturity phase, because the effects of the two functions on goodwill trust are both significant, with neither of them dominating the total effect, the net effect of contracts on goodwill trust becomes insignificant. Overall, we provide new insights into when and how contracts complement or substitute goodwill trust throughout the relationship life cycle.     

The impact of trust and contract on innovation performance: The moderating role of environmental uncertainty

Research into two important control mechanisms for managing the supply chain relationship - contracts and trust - is on the rise. However, our understanding of how they influence innovation in a firm remains rather unclear. Thus, the primary objective of this study is to examine the individual and interactive effects of contracts and trust on firms' innovation performance and the contingent effects of environmental uncertainty on those relationships in China. The empirical results from a survey of Chinese manufacturing firms indicate that there is a positive relationship between trust and firms' innovation performance, an inverted U-shaped relationship between the use of contracts and firms' innovation performance, and that contracts and trust are substitutes. Moreover, we find that environmental uncertainty enhances the effects of trust, but does not influence the impact of contracts on innovation performance.     

Different roles of control mechanisms in buyer-supplier conflict: An empirical study from China

Using transaction cost economics and contemporary insights from the literature on relationship contracts as a base, this paper focuses on how control mechanisms (contracts and trust) affect relationship conflicts in buyer-supplier relationships, and investigates the moderating effects of environmental uncertainty. Based on a sample of 162 Chinese buyers, this paper shows that contracts have a U-shaped effect on destructive conflict and an inverted U-shaped effect on constructive conflict, while trust has a negative effect on destructive conflict and a positive effect on constructive conflict. In addition, environmental uncertainty strengthens the U-shaped effect of contracts on destructive conflict, but weakens the inverted U-shaped effect of contracts on destructive conflict and strengthens the effect of trust on both types of relationship conflict. Our findings reveal the “double-edged sword” nature of contracts, especially the “dark side”, and highlight the importance of trust in buyer-supplier relationships in contexts of environmental uncertainty. These findings also have important implications for buyer-supplier relationship management research and managerial practices, particularly in regard to governance structure and conflict management in dynamic contexts.     

Exclusive Contracts And Market Power: Evidence From Ocean Shipping

There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of loyalty contracts, but relatively little empirical work. We employ the event study methodology to examine the competitive effects of exclusionary contracts in the ocean shipping industry, where they were the subject of an extended legal and political struggle. We find that some of the most important events in this conflict caused significant changes in shipping firms' stock returns, indicating exclusive contracts increased their profits. We then examine the effect of these events on net exporting industries' stock returns, and provide evidence that these contracts contributed to carriers' market power.     

Do resource differences between manufacturers and suppliers help or hinder product innovation of manufacturers? The moderating role of trust and contracts

It is a common practice of manufacturers to involve suppliers in new product development (NPD). Extant literature indicates that supplier integration has mixed effects on manufacturers' NPD and the contradicting findings result from either the external contingent factors or the tactical integration practices. We argue instead that the mixed effects are rooted in resource differences between manufacturers and suppliers. Further, we examine the functions of trust and contracts as the resource integration and coordination mechanisms to manage the effects of resource differences on product innovation of manufacturers. Based on a survey among 189 manufacturing firms, our research shows that resource differences follow an inverted U-shaped effect on product innovation of manufacturers and that trust strengthens while contract complexity attenuates the curvilinear relationship. As such, our research extends the existing body of literature to account for the divergent outcomes of supplier integration from the perspective of resource differences. Moreover, it demonstrates the double-edged effects of trust and contracts as devices of resource integration and coordination. Our research offers useful research and managerial implications.     

Exclusivity Contracts,Insurance and Financial Market Foreclosure

We study the trade‐off between the positive effects (risk‐sharing) and negative effects (exclusion) of exclusivity contracts. We revisit the seminal model of Aghion and Bolton [ 1987 ] under risk‐aversion and show that although exclusivity contracts induce optimal risk‐sharing, they can be used not only to deter the entry of a more efficient rival into the product market but also to crowd out financial investors willing to insure the buyer at competitive rates. We further show that in a world without financial investors, purely financial bilateral instruments, such as forward contracts, achieve optimal risk‐sharing without distorting product market outcomes. Thus, risk‐sharing alone cannot be invoked to defend exclusivity contracts.     

Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship

How the company is conceptualized has important implications for employees. Divergent theoretical approaches towards the company are synthesized below to form three models: the ownership, nexus of contracts, and social institution models. The first two endorse current UK corporate governance practice, in which companies are run for the ultimate benefit of their shareholders, who have the exclusive right to appoint the board. The third model questions this arrangement and, more generally, the characterization of the company as a wholly private association. The conclusion examines the implications of the third model for reform of company law and governance in the UK.     

Use of the written contract in long-lasting business relationships

While contracts are signed in most business dealings, they are seldom used. These contracts are drawn up for different purposes: as a communication tool, to reduce uncertainty, or simply because it is customary. This study investigates how contracts are used in long-lasting business relationships and what factors influence the use of contracts. A number of studies claim that the negotiation process and the relationships developed during that process influence the subsequent use of contracts. In many cases, parties conduct business without contracts as they develop trust-based relationships. A conceptual framework is developed, which is then used to analyze three in-depth case studies. Findings show that the contract itself, rather than the negotiation process, has the greatest influence on how the contract is used.