模块化与知识员工激励——一个博弈分析

知识员工的激励是企业知识管理的根本问题,但由于知识活动难以监控和测度的特点,传统的激励机制对知识员工而言效果不佳。模块化是广泛应用于欧美制造业的产品设计方法,应用于KM中的主要作用是将大型的复杂的知识体系分解相对简单、小型的独立模块,从而使小型长期的合作团队成为独立的企业基本知识活动单位。这种分解有利于产生一种基于利他合作的知识员工激励机制。本文构建了三个博弈模型:完全信息静态博弈模型、完全信息动态博弈模型和不完全信息动态博弈模型分别解释了没有激励的情况下知识员工的理性选择是不提供知识;小型团体中,只要参与者具有一定的耐心,依靠非正式的规则就可以理性地实现难以移植到大型群体的利他主义合作;长期合作的团队比短期的团队更容易实现合作。     

From the Arena Into the Streets: Hockey Violence, Economic Incentives and Public Policy

A bstract . The hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between violence and game attendance in the National Hockey League is tested; and the implications of the results for policies aimed at rectifying the violence considered. The empirical analysis, which is based principally on game by game data for the 1989/90 season, confirms the positive relationship, although it occurs mainly in American, not Canadian, cities. Since there is an incentive for teams to promote violence and because the legal system normally only prosecutes players not teams, the standard methods used to control violence—self regulation and the judicial process —are unlikely to work. Consideration should, therefore, be given to more direct control of violence.     

中国女足与世界女足强队防守技战术分析研究

运用录像分析与统计方法,通过对第五届女足世界杯赛中中国女足与世界强队防守技战术能力的比较,发现中国国家女足在防守技术、战术及心理等的各项指标上与世界强队有一定的差距,引起中国女足在防守技战术方面的重视,为提高中国女足在比赛中的作战能力提供理论依据。     

中国女足与世界女足强队技战术风格比较研究

随着世界女子足球的不断发展,特点不鲜明的球队是难以在发展越来越快、竞争越来越激烈的世界足坛有立足之地。通过对女子足球最重要的赛事一世界杯部分比赛的录像观察和数据的统计分析,把中国女足与第五届女足世界杯前三名球队的技战术风格特点进行比较,以探讨我国女足的技战术风格现状。     

Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games

A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive some terminal payoff.We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game terminates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than 1.We prove that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. If the game is not degenerate this ε-equilibrium is actually in pure strategies.     

Structure of teams—A cooperative game theory approach

One key task for HR departments and managers is to design the structure of teams in the firm. Two main dimensions when carrying out this decision are the size of the teams and the combination of specialized expertise within the team. In this article, we apply cooperative game theory to model this decision. First, we introduce production games. These games are an enhancement of team games and allow the modeling of teams. Together with the coalition structure approach of cooperative game theory, we analyze two standard situations of team theory.     

LEARNING WITH FIXED RULES: THE MINORITY GAME

Abstract This paper gives a critical account of the literature on adaptive behaviour in the minority game, a simple congestion game. The literature has proposed a model which differs markedly from many standard learning models in that players are endowed with a fixed subset of behavioural rules or response modes which map the observed history to actions. These rules need not have a behavioural interpretation or be derived from some form of optimizing behaviour. Nonetheless, this model gives rise to behaviour that is close to equilibrium behaviour at the aggregate level. The individual‐level behaviour predicted by the model seems to capture some aspects of observed experimental behaviour that are difficult to explain using standard models.     

The demand for game day attendance in college football: an analysis of the 1997 Division 1‐A season

This paper develops a predictive model which includes game, team and university specific factors that are likely to influence game day demand for Division 1‐A college football. Attendance during the 1997 regular season is used as the dependent variable. Tobit estimates of two separate equations reveal that the quality of both teams, traditional rivalry and membership of specific conferences have a significant influence on demand. In addition, colleges with lower enrollments and a higher percentage of off‐campus students attract smaller crowds. The presence of a nearby professional football team also detracts from a college team's drawing power. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

会计信息失真的博弈分析——从内部监管会计委派制角度的博弈分析

本文运用博弈论分析方法,针对目前会计信息失真这一严重现象,从内部监管会计委派制角度进行博弈分析。笔者首先从理想化会计委派制的博弈分析开始(即两方博弈),再从经营者与会计人员的博弈分析过渡到现实会计委派制的博弈(即三方博弈),最后得出,它的职能的发挥要和其他会计监管职能相结合才能达到最佳状态。     

The dark side of competition: Modeling status games

Though “teams” are supposed to work together for the benefit of the firm, suboptimal outcomes may emerge when individuals within a team are more concerned with their own status and outcomes relative to their “teammates,” behaving as if they are competitors. Using a version of the stag hunt coordination game, we develop hypotheses regarding the role of status and competitiveness on coordination on Pareto optimal solutions. We test these hypotheses using three studies, with manipulations for both role and status. Status is found to play a significant role, resulting in suboptimal outcomes for competitors but not teammates.     

Antiscalping laws and the selling of season tickets by professional sports teams

This note highlights some issues related to the distribution of season tickets by professional sports teams. I first consider a number of alternative methods teams could use to sell season tickets. I argue that primary ticket sellers do not want their tickets used as investments assets; rather, they prefer game tickets be viewed as consumption assets. In examining these alternatives, I argue that season tickets can be viewed as a bundle of prepaid forward contracts, which have a convenience yield. This can help explain the apparent “underpricing” of game day tickets, team reselling policies, and antiscalping laws.     

A generalized non-linear forecasting model for limited overs international cricket

This paper proposes a generalized non-linear forecasting model (GNLM) for forecasting the number of runs remaining to be scored in an innings of cricket. The proposed model takes into account the numbers of overs left and wickets lost. The GNLFM can be used to build a model for any format of limited-overs international cricket. However, the purpose of its use in this paper is for building a forecasting model for projecting second innings total runs in Twenty-20 International cricket. Our model makes it possible to estimate the runs differential of the two competing teams whilst the match is in progress. The runs differential can be used not only to gauge the closeness of a game, but also to estimate the ratings of cricket teams that take into account the margin of victory. Furthermore, the well-known original Duckworth/Lewis (DL) model and the McHale/Asif version of it for revising targets in interrupted matches are special cases of our proposed generalized non-linear forecasting model.     

演化博弈视角的会计准则变迁诠释

近年来,制度变迁研究日趋倾向于利用演化博弈论。会计准则作为一种制度,其变迁可以纳入制度变迁的理论框架中予以研究。本文在演化博弈论的基础上,构建了会计准则变迁的最优反映动态模型和复制动态模型,为会计准则变迁分析提供了新的视角。研究结论表明:会计准则变迁与博弈参与方获益结构的改变,会引起会计准变迁,博弈方收益和成本的具体水平和相对水平是会计准则变迁趋势和具体路径的选择依据,学习和模仿在会计准则变迁中具有重要作用。     

Temporal variations in technical efficiency: evidence from German soccer

This paper applies stochastic production frontier models with time-varying technical efficiency to a panel data set including hitherto unavailable information on team wage bills from the first division in German professional soccer (the “Bundesliga”) covering the years 1981–2003. We demonstrate that individual teams experience significant variation in technical efficiency over an extended period of 22 seasons while the league’s average level of efficiency remains constant over time. More detailed analyses reveal that, first, the decision to fire or to retain the head coach is mainly influenced by changes in managerial efficiency between two adjacent seasons and, second, relegated teams on average experience considerable reductions in technical efficiency compared to the previous season.     

Designing division of labor with strategic uncertainty within organizations: Model analysis and a behavioral experiment

For managers who are responsible for designing the division of labor, there are prototypes such as the divisional and functional designs, but insufficient knowledge of what to consider when selecting them. To address this shortfall, we developed a multiple economic game model with a two-step structure to examine the strategic interdependence between the two prototypes. We analyzed the model from three different perspectives: a traditional analysis, an equilibrium analysis, and a behavioral analysis followed by a laboratory experiment. While the first analysis revealed that the functional design would outperform divisional design when individual decisions are exogenous, the game theoretic equilibrium analysis demonstrated that the two prototype designs have similar equilibria when individuals are rational. However, assuming that individuals made autonomous decisions with accessible information under given organizational structures, behavioral analysis derived predictions that the divisional design was more likely to produce favorable consequences than the functional design. This prediction was confirmed by the economic experiment in the laboratory. These results imply that the strategic uncertainty within organizations differs according to the designs and affects organizational consequences.     

Paths and chains versus interactions

The various approaches to the construction of causal models are compared from a probabilistic point of view. Although all methods are equivalent in the mathematical manipulation of the equations of a model, three distinct approaches are discernible, depending on how numerical values of the coefficients are calculated. All rely to a greater or lesser extent on a deterministic base, as a result of consideration of the equations simultaneously. The problems of polytomous (nominal and ordinal) variables, of omitted variables, and of nonlinearity are discussed and solutions proposed, before going on to investigate the uses of interaction effects in such models. The interpretation of interactions and relationship to paths and chains is discussed in detail. One step in the analysis of a model describing the relationships of student attitudes to home and to school environments is provided in detail to illustrate the probabilistic concepts. These results are compared with those which might have been obtained if a causal model based on path analysis with least squares linear regression analysis had been applied.     

Modelling the long-term effects of transport and land use policies on industrial locational behaviour: A discrete choice model system

This paper describes a disaggregate behavioural model system developed for forecasting industrial locations. It is structured basically in terms of a nested logit model, covering relocation decisions, area-wide locational choices and local locational choices together with shipment destination choices. Several techniques are developed to overcome the difficulties in the application of discrete choice models to spatial problems. The model system was calibrated for the Nagoya metropolitan area in Japan and its validity was tested using another data set. It allows analysis of the effects of transport and land use policies not only by zone but also by firms of different attributes such as sector and capital size.     

A game theoretic analysis of interactions between law abiding citizens and criminals with respect to ownership of guns

In this paper, it is recognized that there are criminals and law abiding citizens in any society, and that their decisions to own guns are based on rather different, through interdependent, motives. These ideas are used as a conceptual basis for a game theoretic model which is used to analyze one isolated interaction and two forms of repeated interactions. The Nash equilibrium is the main results in the static form of the game. It is concluded from the analysis of the dynamic forms that this equilibrium in globally stable. The presentation proceeds to the study of possible consequences of direct and indirect policy interventions regulating the proportion of law abiding citizens and of criminals that own guns. The paper concludes with some observations on the model's limitations and some suggestions for its improvement.     

Strategic substitutes or complements? The game of where to fish

The “global game with strategic substitutes and complements” of Karp et al. (2007) is used to model the decision of where to fish. A complete information game is assumed, but the model is generalized to S>1$S>1$ sites. In this game, a fisherman’s payoff depends on fish density in each site and the actions of other fishermen which can lead to congestion or agglomeration effects. Stable and unstable equilibria are characterized, as well as notions of equilibrium dominance. The model is applied to the Alaskan flatfish fishery by specifying a strategic interaction function (response to congestion) that is a non-linear function of the degree of congestion present in a given site. Results suggest that the interaction function may be non-monotonic in congestion.