论公司控制权市场的代理权争夺

代理权争夺是上市公司控制权市场上有别于企业并购的另一种控制权转移方式。从代理权争夺的原因、过程和特点来看，它的财富效应与其对公司治理具有积极意义。代理权争夺在中国证券市场已完成了数例实践，对这种金融创新进行法律规范有助于有效的公司控制权市场的形成。     

公司控制权市场中的代理权争夺原因及效应分析

现代企业中，由于股东与管理者之间的信息不对称和两者效用函数的不一致，使得股东必须通过公司治理结构对管理者进行监督和控制，这种控制分为内部控制和外部控制，内部控制主要是指公司管理者内部的竞争（如管理者的能上能下、竞聘领导职位等）、董事会的构成和大股东的监督等（威斯顿、郑光和侯格，1996）：外部控制主要是指代理投票权竞争、要约收购或兼并以及直接购入股票等（Manne，1965）。在公司控制机制中都会而临管理者相互之间争夺对公司资源管理权的问题，由此而来构成了公司控制权市场。     

从控制权市场看后股权分置时代我国公司治理的变化

股权分置改革是中国资本市场的根本性制度变革,它对改善我国上市公司治理具有重要的意义。众所周知,股权分置改革之前,我国公司治理存在着诸多问题,因此人们对股权分置改革寄予厚望。那么,股权分置改革将从哪些方面影响我国的公司治理呢?文章从控制权市场的角度,先分析了股权分置改革前我国上市公司治理中存在的种种问题,然后对股改完成后上市公司治理将出现的变化加以展望。     

谈我国公司控制权市场的完善

公司控制权市场概述目前被学术界普遍认可的公司控制权市场定义是:公司控制权市场是一个由各个不同管理团队在其中相互竞争公司资源管理权的市场。由于公司控制权市场常常是一个通过收集具有控制权地位的股权或者投票代理权来获得对公司控制的竞争市场,所以,不少人也将其称为接管市场。     

控制权机制对公司治理的影响研究

公司控制权是公司治理中的核心问题。近几年，国内关于公司治理的实证研究文献越来越多，但是讨论公司控制权与公司治理之间关系的实证研究文献却并不多，这是我国公司治理研究领域比较薄弱的一个环节。本文从我国证券市场的实际情况出发，以公司控制权机制对公司治理的影响为研究主题，通过实证分析，讨论了公司控制权机制对公司治理绩效的影响，并提出了一些建议。     

公司规模,收购绩效与控制权市场的有效性

本文采用中国上市公司1998年到2007年的768次收购事件作为研究样本,并对每个收购事件设定收购后4年的观察期。同时选取公司规模与收购绩效作为检测我国控制权市场有效性的指标,对我国控制权市场的有效性进行了实证研究。结果表明:公司的规模越大,控制权市场对其管制的程度越低;收购后绩效较差的公司,公司的控制权更容易被转移。此外,我国公司控制权市场仅仅对中小公司的管理者起管制作用而对大公司并不是一个有效的管理机制。     

主并公司股权结构与控制权转移短期市场反应

本文以2000年发生的79起控制权转移事件作为样本,测度和分析了上市公司控制权转移的短期市场反应。采用国外常用的事件研究方法,通过计算上市公司控制权转移第一次公告日前后(-10,30)天等不同窗口期的AAR和CAR,并进行统计显著性检验,本文测度了上市公司控制权转移的短期市场反应;从主并公司股权结构角度,通过分析主并公司股权结构与上市公司控制权转移前后短期市场反应的关系,本文发现了主并公司股权结构对上市公司控制权转移短期市场反应的影响,从而为有关此方面的研究文献做了有益的补充。     

公司债市场信用违约风险的传染效应与控制机理

本文基于2014年1月-2020年9月公司债市场信用违约与一级市场信用利差省级月度面板数据,运用固定效应与中介效应模型,分析公司债违约风险传染效应.发现:(1)公司债违约风险在公司债市场内部传染并产生结构化定价效应,区域商业银行投债机制、政府兜底机制是重要的风险中介传导机制;(2)不同类型、信用等级、区域的公司债发行价...     

The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm

The paper analyzes the role of agency driven takeover activity.The analysis shows that takeovers can play an important rolein reducing agency costs even though the gains from the corporaterestructuring that follows the takeovers are zero, which countersexisting models of agency driven takeover activity. The modelcan therefore form the basis for deriving empirical predictionswhich discriminate between the "agency paradigm" and the "corporaterestructuring paradigm" of takeover activity. Negative post-mergerperformance (Agrawal et al., 1992), which is inconsistent withcorporate restructuring is consistent with this model, and thattakeover target's investment levels are below or at the average(Servaes 1994), which is inconsistent with the free cash flowtheory is also consistent with this model. JEL numbers: G14,G31, G32, G34.     

The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm

The paper analyzes the role of agency driven takeover activity. The analysis shows that takeovers can play an important role in reducing agency costs even though the gains from the corporate restructuring that follows the takeovers are zero, which counters existing models of agency driven takeover activity. The model can therefore form the basis for deriving empirical predictions which discriminate between the agency paradigm and the corporate restructuring paradigm of takeover activity. Negative post-merger performance (Agrawal et al., 1992), which is inconsistent with corporate restructuring is consistent with this model, and that takeover targets' investment levels are below or at the average (Servaes 1994), which is inconsistent with the free cash flow theory is also consistent with this model.     

The Impact of the Corporate Control Market on IPO Decisions

Entrepreneurs who take their firm public during an active corporate control market face an increased risk of losing control through a takeover. I examine the extent to which the threat of takeover impacts IPO firms’ decisions and find that an active takeover market in an IPO firm's industry increases the probability that the firm incorporates in a state with state‐level antitakeover provisions. IPO firms backed by venture capital investors and reputable underwriters are less likely to incorporate in a state offering antitakeover provisions. A closer examination of equity carve‐outs suggests that control is not a first‐order consideration for some IPO firms.     

Private Equity,Corporate Governance,and the Reinvention of the Market for Corporate Control

In the early 1980s, during the first U.S. wave of debt‐financed hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts, finance professors Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback introduced the concept of the “market for corporate control” and defined it as “the market in which alternative management teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources.” Since then, the dramatic expansion of the private equity market, and the resulting competition between corporate (or “strategic”) and “financial” buyers for deals, have both reinforced and revealed the limitations of this old definition. This article explains how, over the past 25 years, the private equity market has helped reinvent the market for corporate control, particularly in the U.S. What's more, the author argues that the effects of private equity on the behavior of companies both public and private have been important enough to warrant a new definition of the market for corporate control—one that, as presented in this article, emphasizes corporate governance and the benefits of the competition for deals between private equity firms and public acquirers. Along with their more effective governance systems, top private equity firms have developed a distinctive approach to reorganizing companies for efficiency and value. The author's research on private equity, comprising over 20 years of interviews and case studies as well as large‐sample analysis, has led her to identify four principles of reorganization that help explain the success of these buyout firms. Besides providing a source of competitive advantage to private equity firms, the management practices that derive from these four principles are now being adopted by many public companies. And, in the author's words, “private equity's most important and lasting contribution to the global economy may well be its effect on the world's public corporations—those companies that will continue to carry out the lion's share of the world's growth opportunities.”     

Agency, Bid Resistance and the Market for Corporate Control

In this paper we investigate the effects of post-bid defence activity for a sample of takeover bids in the UK. We find that most of the defences investigated promote the interests of target managers by significantly lowering the probability of bid success. We also find that most of the defences promote the interests of shareholders by increasing wealth gains by an amount that varies between 9% and 14%. These results suggest that bid resistance is to the mutual benefit of the managers and shareholders of target firms. This conclusion is in line with recent developments in agency theory.     

Corporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs

We examine 132 mergers and acquisitions by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) during 1997–2006 and explore the relationship between acquirer external and internal corporate governance mechanisms and announcement abnormal returns. We argue that in regulated industries with absent active takeover market, the importance of outside governance mechanisms is diminished and substituted by internal governance controls. We focus on the REIT industry. We find that bidder returns are higher for REITs with smaller boards, with more experienced CEOs, but with shorter tenure. Acquirers’ announcement returns are also significantly and positively related to higher ownership by their CEOs and board directors. We find no significant relationship between presence of staggered board and abnormal bidder returns, which supports our hypothesis that anti-takeover defense measures have reduced importance for REITs.     

发展我国企业债券市场的路径选择

我国企业债券市场的发展主要受到政府干预过多、发债主体单一、市场流动性不足、企业积极性不高、信用评级体系不完善等方面的制约。我们应从正确评估我国的企业债券市场、大力发展信用评级机构、提高债券流动性、实现企业债券利率的市场化、改进和完善企业债券监管制度、积极引导国有企业利用债券融资、不断改善我国企业债券市场的发展环境等方面促进我国企业债券市场的发展。     

Impact of Shareholder Proposals on the Functioning of the Market for Corporate Control

Firms receiving shareholder proposals are 16% more likely to become a target of acquisition. Such companies earn approximately 7.2% lower acquisition returns compared to gains for targets with no proposals. Higher acquisition likelihood and lower target returns are primarily associated with proposals drawing a larger proportion of favorable votes, larger voter turnout, as well as with proposals submitted shortly before takeover announcements, and motivated by the removal of antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that shareholder proposals can assist bidders in the identification of targets or signal the willingness of target shareholders to accept bids with lower premiums.