Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial—i.e., they select the dictator’s preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems.     

Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and Their Subclass of Data Games

The axiom of balanced collective contributions is introduced as a collective variant of the axiom of balanced contributions proposed by Myerson. It requires the identical average impact of the withdrawal of any agent from a game on the remaining population. It turns out that the axiom of balanced collective contributions and the classical axiom of efficiency characterize the equal allocation of nonseparable costs, an allocation rule that is extensively used in cost allocation problems and in accounting. In particular, the equal allocation of nonseparable costs coincides with the nucleolus on the class of data games within the European REACH legislation. While our result does not hold on data games, extra axioms enable provision of comparable characterizations of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs and the Shapley value on this class of games.     

Allocation problems among sharing groups

We deal with allocation problems among sharing groups. There are n agents. The agents are divided into several sharing groups. A homogeneous good is allocated among sharing groups rather than among the agents. The good is a private good for sharing groups, and a public good for the members of each sharing group. That is, all of them in the same sharing group can consume it without rivalry. We introduce some allocation rules and axioms. The utilitarian allocation rule and the egalitarian allocation rule are characterized by some axioms.     

中国制造业劳动力效率损失及其分解:理论与实证

现有文献在计算中国制造业劳动力配置扭曲所导致的TFP损失时,均没有剔除外部因素的扰动,从而高估了该损失.文章在Hsieh和Klenow(2009)理论模型的基础上,重新定义劳动力配置扭曲导致的TFP损失,在剔除外部因素扰动后,估算出劳动力配置扭曲导致的TFP损失从1998年的9.00%逐渐减少到2007年的7.39%.而现有文献也缺少在企业异质性模型下对TFP损失进行分解,文章将企业按特征进行分组,建立了分组之后TFP损失分解的理论.TFP损失的分解有利于分析TFP损失的构成,为制定相关政策提供参考,该理论不仅适用于制造业还适用于农业和服务业等,具有很强的适用性.文章最后以所有权分组为例分析了我国制造业1998-2007年劳动力配置扭曲TFP损失的构成.研究表明:(1)每个行业的劳动力配置扭曲导致的TFP损失是该行业的劳动力份额、产品替代弹性和劳动力成本产出比对数方差的增函数;(2)行业内各组之间不存在劳动力配置扭曲的条件为行业内各组企业的劳动力配置扭曲程度均值相等;(3)企业按所有权分组后,我国1998-2007年由劳动力配置扭曲导致的制造业TFP损失主要来自于组内,并且该损失在此时间段已经由国有企业和集体企业为主体变成了以其他企业为主体.     

On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost

This paper introduces a solution for the fair division of emission reduction costs in the climate change regime. Our primary focus is on the fair division of efficiency gains that arise from exchanging the initial allocation of emission entitlements, rather than the initial allocation itself. We propose to complement the competitive Walrasian solution with welfare bounds, the ethical justification of which rests on commonality of ownership. Simulations with an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model illustrate the relevance of such welfare bounds. For a wide range of initial allocations of emission entitlements – including an equal per capita allocation – we find that developing countries should be fully compensated for their emission abatement efforts, but should not receive any further transfers.     

论分配正义的本质特征及内在要求

分配正义作为一种社会价值观念，其实质就是人们基于特定社会物质生活条件，对分配主体物质利益关系的整合。实现分配正义，必须明确分配主体的基本权利和义务，保障分配主体的地位平等；规范分配程序，实现分配主体的机会平等；坚持合理的分配原则，促进分配结果公平。     

The Intergenerational State Education and Pensions

When credit markets to finance investment in human capital are missing, the competitive equilibrium allocation is inefficient. When generations overlap, this failure can be mitigated by properly designed social arrangements. We show that public financing of education and public pensions can be designed to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme supporting the complete market allocation. Neither the public financing of education nor the pension scheme we consider resemble standard ones. In our mechanism, via the public education system, the young borrow from the middle aged to invest in human capital. They pay back the debt via a social security tax, the proceedings of which finance pension payments. When the complete market allocation is achieved, the rate of return implicit in this borrowing–lending scheme should equal the market rate of return.     

Delegated portfolio management and optimal allocation of portfolio managers

In this article, we investigate whether the application of the mean-variance framework on portfolio manager allocation offers any out-of-sample benefits compared to a naïve strategy of equal weighting. Based on an exclusive data-set of high-net-worth (HNW) investors, we utilize a wide variety of methodologies to estimate the input parameters including exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA), generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) and Bayes–Stein shrinkage estimation. We apply nine different mean-variance models, but find that none of these present any consistent benefit over a naïve strategy of equal weighting.     

Optimal indirect taxation with a restricted number of tax rates

This paper analyzes the optimal structure of indirect taxation when the number of available tax rates is smaller than the number of taxable commodities. Such a constraint requires to choose the levels of tax rates and the groups of commodities that will be taxed at equal rates (or exempted). In a partial equilibrium framework, with a single agent and a low amount of tax collection, it is shown that the process of allocation of commodities to groups depends on both price elasticities and consumption spendings. Still, the optimal tax structure displays a weak form of the inverse elasticity rule; consumption spendings influence the size of the fiscal base, and may lead to many tax exemptions.     

Advantageous monopolies

It is proved that in economies with one atom and one type of small traders, for each core allocation x there is a competitive allocation y whose utility to the monopolist is not greater than that of x, whenever either x is an equal treatment core allocation, or all small traders have the same homogeneous preferences. An example shows that these two requirements are, in general, indispensable for the result to hold.     

Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation

We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption, aid fatigue, and ethnic composition, in the donor country on the allocation of aid.     

Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies

Summary. In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms. Received: July 10, 1997 / Revised version: November 24, 1997     

A uniform core convergence result for non-convex economies

We prove a uniform convergence result for core allocations in non-convex economies. Representing all preferences by the minimum expenditure functions using a decentralizing price system, a trader with nonisolated characteristics will receive a bundle in the core allocation giving him a utility level approximately equal to his wealth evaluated by the decentralizing price system. With strict convexity we can easily strengthen the result to convergence in physical quantities. An example shows that strict convexity is necessary for this stronger result.     

Stable Assignment of Public Facilities under Congestion

We study the problem of locating multiple public facilities when each member of society has to be assigned to exactly one of these facilities. Individuals' preferences are assumed to be single‐peaked over the interval of possible locations and negatively affected by congestion. We characterize strategy‐proof, efficient, and stable allocation rules when agents have to be partitioned between two groups of users and discuss the normative content of the stability property. Finally we prove that when more than two groups have to be formed, even with common information on the distribution of the peaks, there is no strategy‐proof, efficient, and stable allocation rule.     

Political economy of income distribution dynamics

Income distribution varies considerably across countries; it tends to become more equal with development in some countries, but just the opposite occurs in other countries. This paper provides a theoretical investigation of the persistent differences in income distribution across countries over time. Motivated by the relationship between income distribution and public spending at different school levels for a broad range of countries over the past 30 years, the analysis centers on the role of public education where specific investments interact with political involvement by different socio-economic groups. Socio-economic groups may form lobbies to influence education policy making. The formation of lobbies is endogenous. Persistent inequality is caused by persistent lobbying efforts of the wealthy that lead to an allocation of public education spending more biased toward them.     

Cooperative Production: A Comparison of Welfare Bounds

In the production model with a one-input–one-output technology, we study welfare lower bounds that give a guarantee of welfare to each agent independent of the others' preferences. We obtain characterizations of egalitarian-equivalent allocation rules on the basis of two weak lower bounds, in striking contrast with Moulin's characterization of the equal budget Walrasian solution on a slightly smaller domain with a more demanding lower bound.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, D63.     

供货频次和需求配比视角下考虑动机公平的供应链

将Rabin构建的同时包含物质效用和"动机公平"的效用函数引入在供货频次和需求配比视角下构建的供应链模型,研究供应方间的"互惠性"非理性行为。研究表明:考虑动机公平后,供应方会获得更为均等的需求配比;需求方只要与动机公平偏好程度尽可能大的供应方合作,就能尽可能地降低仓储成本。     

Fair allocations of a renewable resource

In an economy with finitely many agents, one renewable resource, and an infinite horizon, it is shown that there is exactly one maximal allocation corresponding to given limiting shares of consumption and this allocation converges monotonically. Therefore, if there is no discounting, at most one fair maximal program exists—that which gives an equal amount to each individual in the limit. In this allocation, envy is always finite. However, only in special cases is it envyfree. This is in contrast to the case of finite economies where envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations may not exist or, if they exist, may not be unique.     

One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing

We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.     

Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Size Effects

We examine the allocation of prizes in contests in which the number of contenders affects the prizes and costs. We assume that there are two groups of contenders. The government allocates a prize to the two groups, and the contenders in each group respectively compete for the prize. Examining the prize allocation in such contests, we obtain the following results. The aggregate effort increases in the prize share of the larger group. In contests with size effects through costs, the aggregate resource expended in the contests and the aggregate payoffs are independent of group size distribution if the prize is allocated in proportion to group size. The integration of contests with size effects through prizes can yield higher aggregate effort and payoffs than the decentralized contests.