Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.     

The manipulation of basel risk-weights

In this paper, we examine the relationship between banks’ approval for the internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches of Basel II and the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. Analysing a panel of 115 banks from 21 OECD countries that were eventually approved for applying the IRB to their credit portfolio, we find that risk-weight density becomes lower once regulatory approval is granted. The effect persists when we control for asset structure, and we provide evidence showing that this phenomenon cannot be explained by modelling choices, or improved risk-measurement alone. Consistent with theories of risk-weight manipulation, we find the decline in risk-weights to be particularly pronounced among weakly capitalised banks, where the legal framework for supervision is weak, and in countries where supervisors are overseeing many IRB banks. We conclude that part of the decline in reported riskiness under the IRB results from banks’ strategic risk-modelling.     

Evaluating the effectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell to bail-out?

In response to the economic and financial crisis, the EU has adopted a new regulatory framework of the banking sector. Its central elements consist of new capital requirements, the single rulebook, and rules for bank recovery and resolution. These legislations have been adopted to reduce the call for government bail-out of distressed banks in future crises.The present study performs a detailed quantitative assessment of the reduction in public finance costs brought about by the introduction of these rules. We use a microsimulation portfolio model, which implements the Basel risk assessment framework, to estimate the joint distribution of bank losses at EU level. The approach incorporates the complete safety-net set up in EU legislation to absorb these losses, explicitly modelling enhanced Basel III capital rules, the bail-in tool and the resolution funds.Using a near-full sample of commercial, cooperative and savings banks in the EU, we quantify the cumulative effects of this safety-net and the contribution of each individual tool to the total effect. Considering a crisis of a similar magnitude as the recent one, our results show that potential costs for public finances decrease from roughly 3.7% of EU GDP (before the introduction of any new tool) to 1.4% with bail-in, and finally to 0.5% when all the elements we model are in place. This latter amount is very close to our estimate of leftover resolution funds and the size of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme.This exercise extends the quantitative analyses performed by the European Commission in its Economic Review of the Financial Regulation Agenda by developing additional scenarios, crucial robustness checks, simulations for different annual data vintages, and by implementing some methodological improvements.     

新巴塞尔协议及其对我国银行业的影响

自 1999年 6月首次征求意见稿面世以来 ,新巴塞尔协议已引起国际银行界的普遍关注。与1988年协议相比 ,新协议的内容更广泛、更复杂 ,这充分地反映了银行业的进步。毫无疑问 ,新协议的实施与推广也必将给银行业带来深刻的影响。本文在简要介绍新协议主要更新内容的基础上重点分析了它给我国银行业所带来的影响。     

Modelling Credit Risk for SMEs: Evidence from the U.S. Market

Considering the fundamental role played by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the economy of many countries and the considerable attention placed on SMEs in the new Basel Capital Accord, we develop a distress prediction model specifically for the SME sector and to analyse its effectiveness compared to a generic corporate model. The behaviour of financial measures for SMEs is analysed and the most significant variables in predicting the entities' credit worthiness are selected in order to construct a default prediction model. Using a logit regression technique on panel data of over 2,000 U.S. firms (with sales less than $65 million) over the period 1994–2002, we develop a one-year default prediction model. This model has an out-of-sample prediction power which is almost 30 per cent higher than a generic corporate model. An associated objective is to observe our model's ability to lower bank capital requirements considering the new Basel Capital Accord's rules for SMEs.     

A real options approach for evaluating the implementation of a risk-sensitive capital rule in banks

I evaluate a bank's incentives to implement a risk-sensitive regulatory capital rule. The decision making is analyzed within a real options framework where optimal policies are derived in terms of threshold levels of credit risk. I provide a numerical example for the implementation of internal ratings based models for credit risk (the IRB approach) under the new Basel Accord (Basel II).     

The new Capital Accord and banks’ lending decisions

Capital requirements (‘pillar one’ of the new Capital Accord) rising with the increase in borrowers’ PDs were thought as being likely: (i) to have a serious impact on the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (usually riskier than large corporates) and (ii) to increase the procyclicality of the supply of credit.

The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical evaluation of the possible impact of the new Accord proposals on the lending policies of Italian banks. We compare the interest rate charged to a large set of Italian firms with the cost brought about by the change in the calculation of capital requirements. Since the two variables move together in response to an increase in borrowers’ PDs, we conclude that the new regulatory approach to measuring capital adequacy appears consistent with banks’ own risk evaluations. This result is supported by a ‘stress testing’ exercise: the relationship also holds in a distressed economic scenario, which replicates the financial conditions of the Italian corporate sector in the 1993–1994 recession.     

Potential Competitive Effects of Basel II on Banks in SME Credit Markets in the United States

We examine the likely competitive effects of implementation of Basel II capital requirements on banks in the market for credit to SMEs in the U.S. Similar competitive effects from Basel II may occur for other credits and financial instruments in the U.S. and other nations. We address whether reduced risk weights for SME credits extended by large banking organizations that adopt the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (A-IRB) approach of Basel II might significantly adversely affect the competitive positions of other organizations. The analyses suggest only relatively minor competitive effects on most community banks because the large A-IRB adopters tend to make very different types of SME loans to different types of borrowers than community banks. However, there may be significant adverse effects on the competitive positions of large non-A-IRB banking organizations because the data do not suggest any strong segmentation in SME credit markets among large organizations. JEL classification: G21, G28, G38, L51     

中国商业银行资本监管:制度变迁和效果评价

资本监管是审慎银行监管的核心。上个世纪90年代以来,我国监管当局开始建立并逐步改进资本监管制度。本文分银行体制商业化转型初期、市场化银行体制形成时期、银行体系日益国际化时期三个阶段,对我国商业银行资本监管制度变迁过程进行系统性考察,全面评估不同时期资本监管的效果。本文认为,国有银行改革、银行体系开放、增强银行体系稳健性和资本监管制度与国际标准接轨四个方面因素的相互作用,为资本监管制度变迁注入的动力,决定了资本监管制度演进的方向;资本监管制度的变革既反映监管当局风险监管理念的进步,也体现了监管当局为增强银行体系稳健性、推动银行业改革和促进经济增长等多目标同时实现所做的持续努力和必要妥协。     

Freeing Greece from capital controls: Were the restrictions enforced in time?

Recent developments in Greece have caused for the implementation of banking capital controls on the outflow of funds, a policy decision not uncommon, especially in emerging markets. However, the issues of the Greek economy, which seem to stem from the public sector but have been passed on to the banking sector, pose a unique challenge to researchers. In this paper, we employ VBanking, an object-oriented model for banking simulations to examine whether capital controls in Greece were enforced at the appropriate time. Additionally, we propose that the banking sector will not purge this regulation soon. Finally, we demonstrate the destructive effects of capital controls both on the financial system and on the real economy. We present the empirical results of our work, which suggest that the Greek authorities’ response to the deterioration of the banking sector was lagged.     

巴塞尔协议的演变历程梳理

巴塞尔协议在金融国际化和全球化程度不断加深的大背景之下成立并随着经济形势的变化而不断演进。巴塞尔协议经历了三个历史阶段,每一次巴塞尔协议的演进都是对前一次的补充和修订,最低资本要求是三代巴塞尔协议的核心内容之一。本文旨在对巴塞尔协议的相关文件进行逻辑梳理,为其演变历程找出清晰的脉络。     

Effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on Bank Capital Requirements for SMEs

Using data from three countries (US, Italy and Australia) and surveying related studies from several other countries in Europe, we investigate the effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on bank capital requirements for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). We find that, for all the countries, banks will have significant benefits, in terms of lower capital requirements, when considering small and medium sized firms as retail customers. But they will be obliged to use the Advanced IRB approach and to manage them on a pooled basis. For SMEs as corporate, however, capital requirements will be slightly greater than under the existing Basel I Capital Accord. We believe that most eligible banks will use a blended approach (considering some SMEs as retail and some as corporate). Through a breakeven analysis, we find that for all of our countries, banking organizations will be obliged to classify as retail at least 20% of their SME portfolio in order to maintain the current capital requirement (8%). JEL classification: G21, G28     

改进我国银行业人力资本投资与使用的思路设计

我国银行业人力资本投资及使用状况不甚理想,当前应从投资意识、投资方式、个人投资激励机制、人力资本使用等几方面进行改进。     

国际银行监管合作中集体行动困境的博弈分析

国际经济合作中,集体行动困境现象随处可见。根据奥尔森的观点,由于搭便车倾向的普遍存在,个体理性不是集体理性的充分条件。本文试图回答这样一个问题,即以巴塞尔新旧资本协议为监管框架的国际银行监管合作是如何走出集体行动困境的?本文借鉴了博弈论分析框架,以巴塞尔新旧资本协议的历史演变为主线,分析了美、欧、日三方在实施国际银行监管规则中的博弈。最后,对国际银行监管合作的前景进行了展望,并对中国银行业实施新资本协议的相关策略提出了政策建议。