中国银行业社会责任分项评价体系——基于利益相关者理论的视角

企业社会责任的履行绩效已影响到企业的可持续发展和相关者的切身利益,利益相关者理论已与企业社会责任理论实现了全面融合。建立以利益相关者理论为指导思路,以分项评价替代总体评价的评估模式,以客观性指标、半客观性指标、否决性指标等三位一体的计量指标体系,是全面、客观地评价中国银行业社会责任的履行状况的有效途径。在此基础上,本文构建了涵盖投资者、员工、消费者、商业伙伴、政府和社会公众与所在社区六方面利益相关者的银行业企业社会责任指标体系,并提出建立中国银行业履行社会责任年度分项排行榜的构想。     

VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. The author argues that because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a single‐valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy maximizes its total market value. The main contender to value maximization as the corporate objective is stakeholder theory, which argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm, including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, and governmental officials. Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests, they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no clear way to keep score, stakeholder theory effectively makes managers unaccountable for their actions (which helps explain the theory's popularity among many managers). But if value creation is the overarching corporate goal, the process of creating value involves much more than simply holding up value maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers. Thus, in addition to setting up value maximization as the corporate scorecard, top management must provide a corporate vision, strategy, and tactics that will unite all the firm's constituencies in its efforts to compete and add value for investors. In clarifying the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, the author introduces a somewhat new corporate objective called “enlightened value maximization.” Enlightened value maximization uses much of the structure of stakeholder theory—notably the need to consider the interests of all corporate stakeholders—while continuing to posit maximization of long‐run firm value as the criterion for making the necessary tradeoffs among stakeholders. The paper comes to similar conclusions about the Balanced Scorecard, which is described as the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. Although the Balanced Scorecard can add value by helping managers better understand the drivers of shareholder value, it should not be used as a performance measurement and incentive compensation system because it fails to provide a single valued score, a clear way of distinguishing superior from substandard performance.     

Evaluating the use of an integrated forest land-use planning approach in addressing forest ecosystem services conflicting demands: Experience within an Irish forest landscape

There is an increasing demand for genuine public participation in Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) planning to address the various demands for forests to deliver a range of ecosystem services. However, as of yet, there are few developed and tested mechanisms to help authorities and stakeholders with diverse interests to effectively work together to reach a common goal. Integrated Forest Land-Use Planning (IFLUP) is an approach that has the potential to accommodate multi-stakeholders’ demands in the field of SFM planning. In this paper an IFLUP framework process that facilitates stakeholder participation in future-oriented SFM planning is explored. This framework combines scenario analysis and stakeholder collaborative learning. Its application in a case study area in the West of Ireland is outlined and its effectiveness in accommodating conflicting stakeholder demands on forest ecosystem services as well as its potential opportunities and challenges are evaluated.Based on the results and participants evaluation feedback of the IFLUP workshop outcomes, there was a shared view that the IFLUP approach has potential to address conflicting societal demands on forest ecosystem services within local forest landscapes. Likewise, collaborative learning process helps build trust and respect among stakeholder groups as well as improving the legitimacy and acceptance of SFM planning outcomes.     

Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. I argue that since it is logically impossible to maximise in more than one dimension, purposeful behaviour requires a single valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that in the absence of externalities and monopoly (and when all goods are priced), social welfare is maximised when each firm in an economy maximises its total market value. Total value is not just the value of the equity but also includes the market values of all other financial claims including debt, preferred stock, and warrants. In sharp contrast stakeholder theory, argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm (including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, governmental officials and under some interpretations the environment, terrorists and blackmailers). Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no way to keep score, stakeholder theory makes managers unaccountable for their actions. It seems clear that such a theory can be attractive to the self interest of managers and directors. Creating value takes more than acceptance of value maximisation as the organisational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximisation is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers to create value. Seen in this light, change in long‐term market value becomes the scorecard that managers, directors, and others use to assess success or failure of the organisation. The choice of value maximisation as the corporate scorecard must be complemented by a corporate vision, strategy and tactics that unite participants in the organisation in its struggle for dominance in its competitive arena. A firm cannot maximise value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders. I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximisation and stakeholder theory. I call it enlightened value maximisation, and it is identical to what I call enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened value maximisation utilises much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximisation of the long run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders. Managers, directors, strategists, and management scientists can benefit from enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened stakeholder theory specifies long‐term value maximisation or value seeking as the firm’s objective and therefore solves the problems that arise from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. The same conclusions hold. Balanced Scorecard theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard which gives no score—that is, no single‐valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organisation or division (and it must be consistent with the organisation’s strategy). Given this we then encourage managers to use measures of the drivers of performance to understand better how to maximise their score. And as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organisation it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm.     

Stakeholder orientation and managerial incentives: Evidence from a natural experiment

This paper examines the influence of stakeholder orientation on the design of managerial incentives. Our tests exploit the quasi-natural experiment provided by the staggered adoption of directors' duties laws (i.e., state-level laws that explicitly expand board members' duties to act in the best interests of all stakeholders). We find that the enactment of these laws results in a significant decrease in the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the stock price. This decrease is mostly driven by firms most exposed to pressures to maximize short-term stock price. Our results suggest that the decrease in the sensitivity of CEO compensation to the stock price is an important channel boards use to internalize stakeholder orientation.     

Session III: Securities Law in Twenty‐First Century America: A Conversation with SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson

SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson comments on three major issues the Commission has been investigating: (1) the concentration of ownership among American stock exchanges; (2) the extent of common ownership of, and potential for undue influence over, U.S. corporations by large institutional shareholders; and (3) the role of corporate boards in promoting and protecting stakeholder interests as well as shareholder interests. In the first of the three areas, Jackson argues that the ownership of 12 of the 13 U.S. stock exchanges by just three financial conglomerates suggests a competitiveness problem— one that, despite the significant reductions in trading costs during the last 15 years, should receive further investigation. To the concerns raised by the common and increasingly concentrated ownership of U.S. public companies by institutional shareholders, the Commissioner's main response is to note that whatever culpability corporate America is forced to assume for our large and growing environmental and social problems must be shared with the largest U.S. institutional shareholders, whose collective resources and influence confer a responsibility to help guide companies when responding to such problems. Finally, on the issue of stakeholder theory and ESG, Jackson insists that asking corporate boards to put the interests of all stakeholders on a par with their shareholders’ when making strategic business decisions would be a mistake. Besides creating a major accountability problem, the adoption of stakeholder theory in place of “the clear, single‐minded objective function of increasing long‐run shareholder value” would deprive boards of their principal guide “when making the difficult tradeoffs among stakeholders that effective oversight and management of public companies require.”     

UK charity accounting: An exercise in widening stakeholder engagement

Given the economic and social impact of the charity sector in the United Kingdom (UK), the importance of good governance has been recognised as a basis for underpinning effective and efficient performance, and for ensuring that charities meet the legitimate aspirations of key stakeholders. A major aspect of this is high-quality accounting and reporting. Over the past 25 years attempts have been made to improve this through the medium of successive, evolving versions of a Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) for charities. As a foundation for the future review of the SORP (expected to be published in 2015), the SORP Committee undertook its largest ever consultation on an accounting pronouncement. This paper presents the findings of that consultation and, analysing them using stakeholder theory, concludes that this ambitious exercise facilitated much wider stakeholder engagement than had been experienced before and has the potential to legitimise further the SORP.     

Prioritizing stakeholder concerns in environmental risk management

The management of environmental programmes often involves several stakeholders with diverse, and often conflicting, concerns. This paper proposes a methodology for the assessment of stakeholder preferences regarding a number of objectives of environmental restoration activities, such as the minimization of costs and of the impact on human health and safety. This methodology is based on an analytic/deliberative process that starts with pairwise comparisons of these objectives using questionnaires that the stakeholders complete. This input is used to produce a first set of relative weights using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (the analytic part). This set, as well as possible inconsistencies of the stakeholder assessments, is discussed with the stakeholders to correct inconsistencies and revise the weights (the deliberative part). The stakeholders always have the final word regarding the relative weights. Insights gained from a case study are also presented. The feedback from the stakeholders participating in this exercise was positive.     

利益相关者会计行为的分析

本文把利益相关者纳入到会计行为分析的框架中进行分析,认为每一类利益相关者对待会计信息的态度都具有两面性。一方面,每一类利益相关者的经济利益都和会计信息有着密切的联系,自利的本性使他们都有通过操纵会计信息而谋取私利的动机,在条件具备时,这种动机就会转化为实际的操纵会计信息的行为;另一方面,各类利益相关者的经济利益之间存在着相互制约、此消彼长的关系,因此,可能遭受损失的利益相关者就会对其他利益相关者操纵会计信息的行为进行监督。这种两面性说明,每一类利益相关者的利益都可能受到来自其他类利益相关者操纵会计信息的威胁,因此,必须建立利益相关者相互之间进行会计监督的体系。     

Risk transfer and stakeholder relationships in Public Private Partnerships

Drawing on stakeholder theory, this study seeks to gain an insight into the stakeholder management strategies used by the Procuring Authority in Irish road Public Private Partnerships to manage its complex stakeholder relationships.Based on interviews with 38 key stakeholders the findings of this study indicate that the allocation, transfer and management of risk impact on the quality of stakeholder relationships. A proactive and somewhat accommodating approach is used by the Procuring Authority in its relationship with the Special Purpose Vehicle, while there is some evidence that collaborative relationships exist between the public sector bodies responsible for allocating risk.     

The Purpose of the Firm,Valuation, and the Management of Intangibles

This article provides a different way of thinking about, and responding to, four important issues that confront most public companies. First, in articulating the overarching corporate purpose, the author suggests a middle ground between shareholder value maximization and stakeholder theory that aims to achieve the end result of value maximization while taking a “holistic” view that meets most of the demands of stakeholder advocates. As described by the author, there are four critical steps for management and boards in creating such companies: (1) communicating a vision of the company and its purpose to employees as well as investors (and other key outsiders); (2) organizing to survive and prosper through efficiency and innovation; (3) working continuously to develop win‐win relationships with stakeholders and other companies; and (4) taking care of the environment and future generations. Second, in thinking about the corporate purpose and how to evaluate success in achieving it, managements and boards need a valuation model that provides a clear and insightful connection between long‐term corporate performance and market valuation, and how both might be expected to change as the firm matures. A strong case is presented for the life‐cycle valuation model, widely used by money management organizations, in which a company's projected cash flows reflect an expected “fade” in both economic returns on capital and reinvestment rates. The potential uses of this model are illustrated using lifecycle corporate performance data for 3M during the past 50 years. Third, in an effort to capture the value of innovation and investment in intangible assets, the author presents an alternative to the accounting approach of capitalizing and amortizing such assets that attempts to capture their expected future benefits by using more favorable forecasts of long‐term fade rates. Fourth, the author shows how incorporating Life‐cycle Reviews for each of a company's business units as part of its Integrated Reporting could improve management's resource allocation decisions, help build a shareholder base of long‐term investors, and provide management with the support and confidence to resist Wall Street's excessive emphasis on quarterly earnings.     

Intangibles Disclosure on Entrepreneurial Small Businesses’ Websites to Influence Stakeholders’ Impressions

This study examines the ways in which entrepreneurs influence stakeholders to form perceptions using intangibles disclosed on business websites. Interviews were conducted with 10 entrepreneurs, each representing an entrepreneurial business, and 17 intangible capabilities disclosed to impress three stakeholder groups using five impression‐management tactics were uncovered. The study uses an entrepreneurship perspective to investigate entrepreneurs’ motivation to share their beliefs with stakeholders, and resource‐based theory to posit that intangibles combined with business capabilities are competencies for such communication, in addition to stakeholder theory for targeting specific stakeholders.     

Value Maximization,Stakeholder Theory,and the Corporate Objective Function

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in increasing corporate productivity, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. Because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a “single-valued” objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy aims to maximize its total market value. The main contender to value maximization is stakeholder theory, which argues that managers should attempt to balance the interests of all corporate stakeholders, including not only financial claimants, but employees, customers, communities, and governmental officials. By refusing to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests, the advocates of stakeholder theory leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no clear way to keep score, stakeholder theory effectively makes managers unaccountable for their actions (which helps explain the theory's popularity among many managers). But if value creation is the overarching corporate goal, the process of creating value involves much more than simply holding up value maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers. Thus, in addition to setting up value maximization as the corporate scorecard, top management must provide a corporate vision, strategy, and tactics that will unite all the firm's constituencies in its efforts to compete and add value for investors.     

Stakeholder welfare and firm value

Using data from the independent social choice investment advisory firm Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD), we construct a stakeholder welfare score measuring the extent to which firms meet the expectation of their non-shareholder stakeholders (such as employees, customers, communities, and environment), and find it to be associated with positive valuation effects: an increase of 1 in the stakeholder welfare score leads to an increase of 0.587 in Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, the valuation effects vary across stakeholders and the aforementioned positive effects are driven by firms’ performance on employee relations and environmental issues. These results suggest that stakeholder welfare (in particular, employee welfare and environmental performance) represents intangibles (such as reputation or human capital) crucial for shareholder value creation rather than private benefits managers pursue for their own social or economic needs.     

The Relation between Stakeholder Management,Firm Value,and CEO Compensation: A Test of Enlightened Value Maximization

Whether firms pursue shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare is a controversial issue whose outcomes seem irreconcilable. We propose that firms are likely to compensate their executives for pursuing the firm's goal be it shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare. In this paper, we examine the correlation between firm value, stakeholder management, and compensation. We find that stakeholder management is positively related to firm value. However, firms do not compensate managers for having good relationships with its stakeholders. These results do not support stakeholder theory. We also find an endogenous association between compensation and firm value. Our results are consistent with Jensen's (2001) enlightened value maximization theory. Managers are compensated for achieving the firm's ultimate goal, value maximization. However, managers optimize interaction with stakeholders to accomplish this objective.     

Accounting conservatism and corporate social responsibility

In this paper, we examine whether a firm's stakeholder orientation, as manifested by its social responsibility endeavors, matters for its choice of accounting conservatism. We find that the level of conservatism in financial reporting significantly increases with socially responsible activities. This result is robust to several conservatism aspects, including market-based conservatism measure, the aggregate of R&D reserves, advertising reserves, and LIFO reserves, and accrual-based conservatism construct. Moreover, our two-stage regression results validate that conservatism is more pronounced for firms that devote more resources to social responsibility programs. Consistent with stakeholder theory, these findings indicate that CSR-oriented firms are more likely to use accounting conservatism to credibly commit to acting in the interests of stakeholders. As a whole, our results provide a novel implication that the extent of accounting conservatism can be entailed by a firm's efforts to enhance stakeholder relations.     

VALUE MAXIMIZATION AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY: COMPATIBLE OR NOT?

Complicating the current corporate governance controversy is a major disagreement about the fundamental purpose of the corporation. There are two main views on what should constitute the principal goal of the firm. Most economists tend to endorse value maximization—that is, maximization of the value of the firm's debt plus equity—or a version of value maximization known as “value‐based management” (VBM) that aims to maximize shareholder value. The main challenger is “stakeholder theory,” which argues that the corporation exists to benefit not just investors but all its major constituencies—employees, customers, suppliers, the local community, and the federal government, as well as shareholders. Thus, whereas the success of a corporation under VBM could be assessed simply by its long‐run return to shareholders, under stakeholder theory a company's success would be judged by taking account of its contributions to all its stakeholders. Using statistical analysis of various measures of corporate success in satisfying non‐investor stakeholders, the author investigates whether a broader focus on multiple stakeholders is necessarily inconsistent with the pursuit of long‐term shareholder value. His main findings in fact suggest just the opposite—namely, that long‐term value creation appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining corporate investment in stakeholder relationships. More specifically, the author's study shows that companies with higher levels of value creation tend to have stronger reputations for treating stakeholders well while companies that create little value end up shortchanging not just their shareholders but all their constituencies. For profitable companies that have previously failed to devote the optimal level of resources to their non‐investor stakeholders, the message of this article is that investing in stakeholders can add value—and, in fact, it pays for companies to spend an additional dollar on stakeholder relationships as long as the present value of the expected (long‐run) return is at least a dollar.     

The Importance of Intellectual Capital for Firm Performance: Evidence from Australia

This study investigates the dynamic relationship between intellectual capital (IC) and firm performance (FP) through system generalised methods of moments, when previous studies produced divergent results based on static OLS or fixed‐effects estimations. Based on 571 listed firms in Australia for the period of 2005–2014 (5518 firm‐years) this study reveals that IC efficiency is positively significant with ROA and ROE – which endorses resource‐based theory. Further analysis shows that human capital, structural capital and physical capital are also significant and confidently endorse resource‐dependency and organisation‐learning theories. The findings of this study are vital for stakeholders such as management, shareholders and potential investors to understand the role of IC for FP. Moreover, the findings are particularly important for policy‐setters to highlight the importance of IC and develop a systematic framework for IC disclosure. This study also opens new avenues for future research to consider the dynamic nature of the IC–FP relationship and account for endogeneity.     

‘Pushing the Boundaries’ versus Identifying the Boundaries: An Institutional Perspective on NPM Principles

This paper considers the boundaries of new public management (NPM) principles in the context of the mandate for a commercial approach within a New Zealand state‐owned enterprise (SOE). Investigating a commercial approach to NPM through an institutional theory lens, the case study highlights complexities and potential conflict between structured NPM principles and the more complex reality. Analysis reveals blurred lines and boundaries have implications for public sector organisations such as SOEs, government and other stakeholders, where managers push the boundaries beyond the point where stakeholders are comfortable. Thus, a key challenge involves developing clearer institutional boundaries to balance freedoms with stakeholder acceptability.     

The disclosure of corporate social responsibility reports and sales performance in China

Based on legitimacy and stakeholder theory, we investigate whether there is an association between the disclosure of corporate social responsibility reports and a firm's sales performance in China. The empirical results reveal that the return on sales and sales growth are positively associated with the level of corporate social responsibility reporting in China. This positive association is strengthened when firms have concentrated customers. Firms use corporate social responsibility reports to improve sales performance and attract customers, who are one of their major stakeholders, and retain their legitimacy.