Stabilizing Endogenous Instability: Proposals for An Institutionalist Reform of Financial Regulation

A major and persistent question behind economic theories and related policies is whether the market can self-regulate without any restrictive exogenous intervention or whether regular and binding public regulation is necessary for ensuring the reproduction of the economic system in a sustainable way over time. This article considers this question with regard to the working of financial markets in a liberalized environment. Drawing upon an institutionalist stance, the article shows why the operation of a financialized capitalist economy usually leads to systemic imbalances and crises. The article then suggests an alternative framework for a consistent financial regulation that could prevent market actors from developing short-sighted strategies and gambling on macro stability.     

Collective Action and the Institutionalist Approach to Financial Regulation

Drawing on the institutionalist approach to a capitalist economy as a money economy, I regard financial regulation and supervision as a collective action problem. I argue that, given the basic characteristics of such an economy, a financial system may be considered as a public utility and financial stability as a public good. I then maintain that the provision of the latter could not rely on private market mechanisms, such as self-regulation and price-directed incentives. As capitalism develops through more financialized forms, new institutions and regulatory rules must be designed to reframe the market’s boundaries in order to consolidate systemic stability, which is a basic condition for continuous and sustainable economic relations in society. I then suggest a precautionary-principle-based macro-prudential approach to financial regulation in order to ensure a sustainable provision of finance and financial stability that is consistent with the characteristics of a money economy.     

金融管制的经济学分析

文章研究了基于一般产业管制模型基础上的金融管制,在界定了金融管制目标的基础上,分析了与金融管制目标相关的金融稳定函数、金融资源配置函数和金融管制成本函数,并进一步刻画了金融管制目标函数,同时根据金融市场和金融制度的不同状态,对金融管制目标函数进行了求解。在此基础上,结合实际讨论了中国金融管制的现状和问题。     

The Next Great Depression II: The Impending Financial Collapse

I seek to put social provisioning into perspective with regard to the financial instability issue in capitalism. My analysis rests on an institutionalist-Minskyian endogenous instability assumption and maintains that monetary/financial stability is a peculiar public good or specific commons since it concerns all of society and its viability in time, not individuals involved in private financial relations. Consequently, the provision of financial stability becomes essentially a matter of public policy and requires the intervention of public power in order to prevent finance from becoming a public “bad.” This result relies on the distinction between private “normal” goods and ambivalent/transversal money (and related financial relations). I point to the necessity of a public organization and tight regulation of finance and financial markets, when standard equilibrium models assume that social optimum and stability can be provided by private self-adjustment and market prices mechanisms.     

现代网络银行发展中的金融监管思考

网络银行是技术进步与金融产业相结合的产物，给传统中央银行监管提出了新课题。本文分析了网络银行对监管体制的挑战，概括介绍了国际实践经验与通行做法，结合我国网络银行发展的现实国情，提出了构建适应我国网络银行发展的金融监控体系设想。     

美国金融危机下金融监管模式的缺陷及对我国的启示

随着经济全球化的发展,国际金融的运行格局发生了巨大的变化,国际金融监管也出现了新的发展趋势。特别是2007年3月以来,美国的次贷危机引起了国际金融市场的大动荡,诱发了百年不遇的全球性金融危机。国际金融环境趋于恶劣,我国不可避免地受到了来自国际金融危机的影响,我国银行业能否抵抗这次金融危机的冲击,需要更深层次的慎思和积极应对。因此,我国需要从中吸取教训,防范金融风险,加强金融监管,弥补监管"缝隙",维护金融稳定。     

多元化金融集团监管的模式研究

多元化金融集团复杂的内部结构和持股关系 ,以及其特殊的风险特征使得传统的分业监管体制面临挑战。从集团的层次上对金融集团进行合并监管是近年来各国监管当局及国际金融组织不断探索的监管模式 ,这一趋势的发展为我国对多元化金融集团的监管提供了重要的参考依据。     

大型金融机构能否为中小企业提供融资服务——兼评“金融机构观”

本文认为“金融机构观”对解除虽小企业融资困境无补。无论从国外还是国内、从理论还是实践、从金融电子化发展还是行业特征看,目前 甸不缺少中小金融机构,尤其是小型金融机构,而缺少的是大型银行。大型银行依其众多的分支机构,良好的社会效益以及经济结构调整等优势,完全有能力为中小企业提供融资服务。     

RegTech: Theory and Practice in Technology Driven Financial Regulation

As a disruptive innovation, FinTech has posed risks in the financial industry that are more unidentifiable, sweeping, disruptive and influential. Given these new developments, deeper regulatory reform has become necessary to safeguard national financial security, and prevent and dissolve financial risks. On March 11, 2021, the 14th Five-Year Plan1 endorsed by the Fourth Session of the 13th National People’s Congress stressed that China will improve the modern financial regulatory system and shore up our weaknesses in the regulatory system, and boost the application of regulatory technology and financial innovation risk assessment. This marks that the establishment of a technology-driven financial regulatory framework has been put on the agenda. Based on an analysis of the essential implications and drivers of RegTech innovation, this paper discusses the theoretical logic of RegTech innovation. Technology enables intelligent regulatory processes, efficient information processing and robust risk control. The restructuring of the regulatory system has revealed shifts in regulatory paradigms. These include a shift from passive response to proactive change, a shift toward positive interactions between regulators and industry players, as well as more close coordination among regulators. These changes have resulted in more adaptable and efficient regulation. After summarizing foreign experience and Chinese practice, this paper presents optimal pathways for RegTech innovation in China in the following aspects: consolidating the rule-of-law foundation for RegTech innovation, speeding up institutional reforms, improving policy services, strengthening infrastructure development, and building multiparty cooperation mechanisms. This study serves as a reference for building a technology-centric modern financial regulatory system and a sound environment for FinTech development.     

金融并购条件下的金融监管:影响与趋势

本文分析了 2 0世纪 90年代出现的全球金融并购趋势及其成因 ,指出金融机构竞相以并购形式组建金融控股公司、开展混业经营的趋势对金融监管提出了新的要求。英国、韩国、日本等国家已经对此做出了反应 ,改变了监管体系。同期 ,美国对并购中产生的大的、复杂的金融机构的监管重心、监管方式也发生了变化。在此基础上 ,本文分析了中国目前的金融风险成因及其监管走向。     

An examination of firm licensing behaviour after a payday-loan ban

In 2008, Ohio enacted the Short-Term Loan Law capping interest rates to 28% APR, effectively banning the industry. Previous analysis has shown that while the policy was effective in eliminating the payday lending industry, expansion occurred within the pawnbroker, small-loan and second-mortgage lending industries in effective policy periods. Extending this previous analysis, using branch-level licensing records from the Ohio Division of Financial Institutions, this study examines the firm’s decision to license at the branch-level both with a zip code and within a county. I predict the effects of the ban on the likelihood of entry in the small-loan and second-mortgage industries while also controlling for incumbent status as a payday lender. Results at the zip-code level show that the likelihood of entering the lending market as a small-loan lender increases by 35.4% and initiating a second-mortgage license increases by 6.3% after the signing the Short-Term Loan Law. At the county level, the probability of initiating a small-loan licenses increases by 15.3%, while the likelihood initiating a second-mortgage license increases by 6.3%. At the county level, branches previously operating as payday lenders are 1.1% more likely to re-license as small-loan lenders, though has no effect on licensing as a second-mortgage lender.     

Too-Big-To-Fail: Why Megabanks Have Not Become Smaller Since the Global Financial Crisis?

ABSTRACT

More than ten years after the global financial crisis, what has happened to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) banks whose reckless behavior was among its preconditions, but which received public support and guarantees in the midst of that crisis? Insofar as this too-big-to-fail status helped create the crisis and then imposed costs on the rest of society, we would expect these banks to have shrunk. We investigate the evolution of 31 global-TBTF banks and find that their overall size has hardly recorded any substantial change. However, there is no sense of urgency in the flourishing post-crisis literature on TBTF banks about the need to contain their size; the prevalent view therein is that if properly regulated, the risks that arise from a financial system dominated by TBTF banks are manageable. This view rests on the same overly narrow theoretical underpinnings whose flaws were exposed in the crisis. We argue that too-big-to-fail banking is embedded in a set of self-reinforcing policies—consolidation, balance-sheet support through quantitative easing, favorable regulations, bank lobbying, and geo-economic and geo-political considerations—which explain why these banks have not shrunk and why they remain a threat to financial stability, well after the lessons of the crisis should have been learned.     

金融危机对资本充足率监管与银行风险承担激励的影响：基于我国上市银行的实证比较

运用局部调整模型和三阶最小二乘法（3SLS）,分析了金融危机如何影响资本充足率监管与商业银行的风险承担激励之间的关系,并首次分析了金融危机发生前后我国上市银行在面临资本监管压力下资本水平与风险水平的调整。结果表明,金融危机强化了银行的资本充足率监管效果,但也增强了银行的风险承担激励,这与监管当局试图通过资本充足率监管达到维持银行系统稳定性的初衷相违背。此外,金融危机的发生没有显著影响银行资本调整与风险调整之间的关系。     

Financial Globalization,Social Exclusion and Financial Crisis

This paper suggests one set of mechanisms that ties financial globalization processes to local dynamics of financial inclusion or exclusion. Specifically, this paper explores the worldwide reconsideration of financial firms’ strategies that has accompanied financial globalization. It is shown that the neoliberal and asymmetric‐information approaches to credit markets and financial crises in developing economies overlook these dimensions of financial globalization because of their tendency to focus on representative credit markets. Banks’ strategic shift has led to the global homogenization and stratification of financial practices—and this in turn has been a key driver of processes of financial exclusion. Financial exclusion then involves bifurcation within financial markets, so that different markets serve different portions of the household and business population. This analysis suggests a reconstruction of Minsky’s microfoundational model of the origins of financial fragility and crisis, which shifts from Minsky’s emphasis on a representative borrower–lender relationship to a situation of borrower–lender relationships in bifurcated markets.     

系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度：历史与未来方向

系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度是后金融危机时代国际金融监管领域的重要理论和实践问题。探讨了系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度的重要性,在此基础上,梳理了系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度路径的历史演变,主要包括存款保险制度与最后贷款人机制。最后,讨论了“太大而不能倒”危机管理理念的缺陷,指出完善系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度的紧迫性及其最新发展趋势。     

分业经营向混业经营转变条件下的金融监管

面对国外混业经营金融机构的大举进入及国内的竞争压力,国内金融机构纷纷进行金融创新,不断突破原有的业务界限,逐渐走上了金融混业经营之路。但与此同时我们也发现,我国原有的适应分业经营的监管体制不能适应这一挑战,出现了很多问题。以分业经营向混业经营转变条件下的金融监管机制为研究对象,阐述了金融监管的理论基础,论述了不同时期的金融监管理论,及金融监管的发展变化趋势。     

居民储蓄率与金融风险

以间接融资为主的独特金融结构决定了我国金融体系的稳定性对于银行体系从而高储蓄率的依赖。因而,研究我国居民储蓄率的决定因素以及其波动趋势并在宏观调控层面予以关注、监控就应成为防范金融风险的重要举措。     

基于金融生态的新型农村金融机构发展障碍与对策

金融生态是由金融生态主体、金融生态环境与金融生态调节构成的有机系统。目前,新型农村金融机构发展较为缓慢,制约其可持续发展的障碍因素从金融生态主体方面看主要是经营人才缺乏、资金来源不足、创新能力不足和盈利能力有限,从金融生态环境方面看主要是农村信用体系不完善和群众认知程度低,从金融生态调节上看主要是自身内部调节与社会外部调节机制均不健全。为推进新型农村金融机构进一步发展,需要健全其金融生态主体,优化其金融生态环境和健全其金融生态调节机制。     

Financial Structure Changes and the Central Bank Policy

In a response to the financial collapse of 2007–2009, central banks overstepped their narrow role of lender of last resort (LLR) and acted as dealers or market-makers of last resort (MMLR). Such an evolution of the central bank policy stems from the endogenous process of growing securities markets, financial innovations, and market-based credit intermediation. This article examines how changes in the structure of the banking and financial system transforms the central bank policy in financial stability. It considers the separation or integration of the LLR and MMLR functions, revisits the debate opposing lend-to-market and lend-to-institution theses, and discusses the LLR standard rule and its transposition to the MMLR rule. Inasmuch as private securities markets and financial innovations determine the structure of the credit system, central banks endogenously adopt the integrated approach, so that the extensive LLR policy prevails.