不对称合作关系的契约设计原理分析

不对称合作关系在企业合作中广泛存在。从合作产出、绩效衡量以及报酬补偿等方面分析不对称合作契约设计的原理;在构建不对称合作契约模型基础上,与完全信息下最优契约比较,说明不对称信息条件下双边道德风险对合作收益的影响;讨论不对称合作中不同绩效衡量和风险态度的契约激励效果;并据此阐释企业经济人的契约行为。     

基于委托代理理论的军用软件定价模型

对于军用定制软件,通常采用成本导向法进行定价。但是,现有方法在设置成本分担率这一参数时,没有考虑道德风险的影响,导致无法有效激励承包商降低成本。文章分析了军用软件采办中的委托代理关系,利用委托代理理论,分别在信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下,建立了军用软件的目标成本激励定价模型;通过模型的优化,确定了使军方期望效用最大化的成本分担率参数;最后给出了一个算例,并对相关参数变化对采办费用的影响情况进行了分析。实例分析表明,在信息不对称的条件下,可以通过在合同中引入激励机制,使承包商做出更大的努力,以达到控制采办费用的目的。     

基于非对称信息的闭环供应链激励合同策略研究

在价格敏感的随机需求量和与回收努力敏感的回收量条件下,假定供、销双方销售价格和分销商回收努力程度信息不对称,建立基于销量和废品回收量的双重激励机制,给出供应商为吸引分销商选择对自己最有利的售价和努力程度而设计的最优激励合同,比较了不同信息条件下供销双方的策略。     

分次赎货模式下银行对物流企业的激励研究

本文基于信息不对称理论分析了存货质押融资业务中以货易货的分次赎货模式,设计了银行规避换入销货物风险的激励模型。就目前银行与物流企业所采用的三种合约进行讨论,计算出了银行在采取三种不同合约时的最优激励函数以及在该激励函数下,物流企业的努力水平。     

信息不对称条件下我国医疗服务价格激励性监管模式研究

目前我国医疗服务市场存在严重的信息不对称问题,是导致我国医疗服务价格监管失灵的一个主要原因。本文借鉴西方主要的三种规避信息不对称的激励性监管模式的优点,在投资回报率价格监管模式的基础上,引入了价格上限因子和标准监管价格,同时考虑了医疗服务成本、医疗服务质量等因素,构建了我国医疗服务价格的监管模式,并对该模式进行了总结和评价。     

中小型公共图书馆网络信息服务的发展策略解析

中小型公共图书馆发展网络信息服务有利于提高图书馆公共文化服务在中小城市的辐射能力,有利于发展地区特色文化,从而让公众享受普遍均等的服务,丰富公众的休闲文化生活。目前服务理念认知尚浅、服务质量欠佳、专业人才匮乏和公众享用信息服务的意识不够等因素制约着中小型公共图书馆网络信息服务的发展。可以从创新网络信息服务理念、拓展立体服务空间、提供特色信息服务、培养新型服务人才以及开展公众信息素养教育等几个方面加以深化和改善,以期提升中小型公共图书馆的网络信息服务能力。     

Supplier incentives and resource constraints under uncertainty

Procurement in environments of cost uncertainty and asymmetric information require special arrangements such as the linear incentive contract. Usually the buyer is motivated to make investments that can relieve temporary supplier resource constraints during the procurement. Special problems arise, however, due to interactions between investments in suppliers and the risk-incentive trade-off achieved by the incentive contract. A cost signaling model is proposed to overcome these problems, where a supplier offers an equity share in the profit from the incentive contract to the buyer in return for a priori investment. The equity share signals the supplier's private cost information, and forms the basis for the buyer's investment decision. Under equilibrium the buyer can expect to recover the entire amount provided to the supplier through his or her share of the profit.     

研究型大学、教师行为与科研激励合同：基于委托代理关系的分析

作为研究型大学的主体,教师的行为受到科研激励机制的影响。大学通过激励机制来规范教师的行为,教师则通过自身的努力获取收益和规避风险。文章基于大学和教师之间的委托代理关系,在不对称信息条件下探讨大学和教师应如何订立科研激励合同。结果表明：当不考虑监控成本时,在最优显性激励合同中加入外控变量可以使得风险成本和激励成本下降,从而降低代理成本。在大学和教师的长期合作中,则必须充分发挥隐性激励合同的作用。     

Delivery of private toll roads: Incentive strategies for improving service quality and social welfare

Managing the service quality of toll roads delivered by using Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to ensure value for money to taxpayers is challenging for governments worldwide. An absence of critical research in this area has exacerbated this challenge. The upshot, in this instance, has been an inability for governments to engender and enact effective incentive strategies to operate and maintain private toll roads. To fill this gap, this paper aims to identify and examine incentive strategies for improving the operational quality of toll roads delivered by private entities. We develop a game model with four scenarios and then compare relevant decision behaviour and social welfare. The analysis reveals that only when the shadow cost of public funds is below a specific threshold there can be a feasible incentive strategy for ensuring quality improvement and higher social welfare. Furthermore, an incentive contract with a predetermined quality can enable a higher operational quality while requiring a higher incentive intensity. The contributions of this research are twofold: (1) we propose an enhanced model that is useful for governments to examine the impacts that different incentive strategies will have on the performance of transport projects; (2) we give an enhanced insight to support decision-making for incentives towards transport asset operations. This research will also be beneficial for governments in enhancing toll roads’ operational quality and social welfare for taxpayers.     

资格后审中激励机制对业主和承包商的博弈影响

随着建筑业的发展,工程中的合同形式也越来越多元化,而不同的合同形式业主和承包商所承担的风险也是不同的,业主为了减少风险更多的在合同中采取激励机制。文本主要站在业主的角度,运用不对称信息博弈理论,探讨了在招投标过程中采用资格后审的情况下,业主采取激励机制所可能承担的风险和损失,并据此提出了几点建议,有助于业主和承包商双方最终达到双赢的局面。     

非对称信息下供应链协调激励机制研究

建立了非线性需求下两级供应链模型,利用博弈论和委托-代理理论分别设计了对称信息和非对称信息下供应链协调激励机制,分析了非对称信息对供应链协调激励机制的影响,并进行数值分析与模型验证,最后得出研究结论。     

不对称信息条件下高校教师激励机制的契约分析

本文运用契约经济学的研究方法对不对称信息条件下高校教师的激励机制设计进行了分析,发现学校对教师的激励机制能否取得最佳效果取决于教师能力、风险厌恶程度,工作结果的不确定性以及教师对进修学习成本承担的比例。研究发现利用”标尺竞争”原理改进后的激励契约可以进一步提高对教师的激励强度,降低学校的代理成本。最后本文对高校教师激励机制设计给出一些具体的建议。     

Managing challenges in social care service triads – Exploring public procurement practices of Dutch municipalities

Buying services in a triad constellation is associated with challenges related to quality control, performance monitoring, and a deteriorating information position for the buyer. There is growing attention for service triads in Supply Chain Management (SCM) literature. However, these studies are mainly theoretical. The studies suggest to manage the identified challenges by monitoring supplier performance, maintaining a strong position in the service triad, developing collaborative trusting relationships, using outcome-based contracts, and aligning incentives between buyer and suppliers. Empirical studies on service triads and management mechanisms are rare, especially in a public procurement context. We study the application of management mechanisms in a public procurement context where 393 Dutch municipalities each had to contract social care service providers at the same time. This context allows us to study which of the management mechanisms proposed in literature are actually employed in a public procurement context, and whether other mechanisms are applied that are not addressed in the literature. We find municipalities deviate from traditional bureaucratic procurement procedures and apply a relational approach to the procurement procedure, including establishing social contracts, to cope with buyer challenges in service triads. Furthermore we identify municipalities apply ex post competition to drive up service quality through tendering framework agreements and allowing clients to choose their care provider of choice. This mechanism of ex post competition through the use of framework agreements has not been suggested in service triad literature before, and may be an effective mechanism in other service triads to address service quality and customer needs fulfilment issues.     

Separating the True Effect from Gaming in Incentive-Based Contracts in Health Care

This paper studies the effect of incentive regulation on health care. In the context of incentive-based health contracts, which might also introduce an incentive for the providers simply to report better treatment outcomes, evaluation of treatment using the information supplied by the providers (reported output) could be problematic. The systematic error on the output report is called providers' gaming behavior. This paper develops a general method for decomposing the effect of incentive-based contracts on performance into the true effect, which is the result of clinicians' improved effort induced by the contract, and the gaming effect, which is due to the change in the providers' reporting practice. The method follows the essence of linear structural relation (LISREL) models, and the true treatment output is modeled using a latent variable. Various output measures can be included in the structural evaluation model, but objective measure(s) (output measures not affected by providers' potential gaming) must be constructed based on available information to identify gaming through its correlation with the reported measures. The strengths of this method are that information from more than one output measure can be used, no monitoring system is required, and the construction of a gold-standard measure is not necessary. This method is applied to evaluate the impact of Maine's performance-based contracting on its public providers' substance-abuse services. Evidence of gaming is found in Maine's system, which remains robust in most of the sensitivity analyses. The methodology developed here can be used to evaluate the impact of a broad range of incentive-based contracts.     

创业投资契约机制与机会主义行为

文章从"经济人"的自利性、公平理论和信息不对称等方面分析创业投资活动中道德风险产生的理论原因,并根据投资方和创业方对创业投资契约条款的认知不同,对创业投资契约条款进行分类分析,找出双方的主要分歧,分析创业投资道德风险产生的现实原因。根据道德风险产生的原因,提出建立契约设置的动态调整机制,合理分配投资方和创业方的收益,减少投资方与创业方委托代理关系中的道德风险。这种动态调整机制包括企业价值动态分配机制、信息共享机制、支配权的相机调整机制、双向激励机制和风险分担机制。     

Hospital service quality evaluation with IVIF-PROMETHEE and a case study

Measuring satisfaction of patients and understanding their perceptions are important for the hospital management to respond to customers' growing demands for acceptable quality of healthcare services. The main purpose of this paper is to present a methodology that can be used in the healthcare service quality evaluation. IVIF-PROMETHEE method is applied for service quality evaluation based on patients' views in a real-life case study of a public hospital in Istanbul and the results are compared with the results from IVIF-TOPSIS method. Interval Valued Intuitionistic Fuzzy (IVIF) set is considered an appropriate tool because of the complexity and vagueness of the evaluation of healthcare services. The evaluation of the quality level of the healthcare service provides detailed information about the effects of considered criteria as well as creates opportunities in implementing effective procedures to overcome service quality problems via analysing the patients' views. The proposed methodology can be a useful tool for hospital management.     

Understanding how heterogeneous agents affect Principal's returns: Perspectives from short-termism and Bayesian learning

We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents. Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent, incentive cost, and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards. Agents with higher moral levels were more likely to choose higher effort and lower manipulation. Simultaneously, the principal offers lower incentives and receives more significant payoff. We also extend our model to investigate the benefits of Bayesian learning. Furthermore, we compare the principal's returns in general and learning models and find that the learning contract can bring more profit to the principal.     

Applications integration in a hybrid cloud computing environment: modelling and platform

With the development of application services providers and cloud computing, more and more small- and medium-sized business enterprises use software services and even infrastructure services provided by professional information service companies to replace all or part of their information systems (ISs). These information service companies provide applications, such as data storage, computing processes, document sharing and even management information system services as public resources to support the business process management of their customers. However, no cloud computing service vendor can satisfy the full functional IS requirements of an enterprise. As a result, enterprises often have to simultaneously use systems distributed in different clouds and their intra enterprise ISs. Thus, this article presents a framework to integrate applications deployed in public clouds and intra ISs. A run-time platform is developed and a cross-computing environment process modelling technique is also developed to improve the feasibility of ISs under hybrid cloud computing environments.     

基于收入共享契约的供应链协调研究

主要研究了收入共享契约对供应链的协调。在市场需求不确定下,分别建立了对称信息下与非对称信息下的供应链收入共享契约协调模型,分析了在此模型下供应商与零售商的决策行为,及其参数的约束条件。由此,得到了供应链的最佳利润。最后,通过算例分析,验证了收入共享契约对供应链的协调作用。     

Decision analysis and coordination of dual supply chain with retailer's offline return service and online reviews

Based on the centralized and decentralized decision-making cases, this study constructs a dual-channel supply chain game model that considers offline return service and online reviews, and explores the pricing decisions and benefits of supply chains under the dual influence of return service level and online reviews. The impact of return rate, return service level and perceived quality of online reviews on optimal supply chain decisions and profits are further analyzed. Finally, considering the phenomenon of double marginalization in the supply chain, this study coordinates the supply chain based on the benefit-sharing contract coordination model to achieve Pareto improvement. The research shows that: The manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the optimal online selling price and the retailer's optimal offline price are positively correlated with the perceived quality of online reviews and the level of return service. Compared with the return service level, the perceived quality of online reviews has a greater impact on the overall profit of the supply chain. Under the dual influence of the perceived quality of online reviews and the level of return service, the supply chain profit in the centralized model is better than that in the decentralized model. The coordination model can effectively coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, when the sharing ratio of manufacturers is obviously lower than that of retailers, the coordination effect is better at this time.