Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option

We analyze the behavior of a firm where workers share profits with shareholders by using a model cast in an Aoki framework. There are two sorts of uncertainties: one relates to the market price, assumed to follow a random path in continuous time, while the other concerns internal organization, i.e. the share of profits to be distributed between workers and shareholders. In the institutional setting we adopt the firm is flexible, since it has the possibility of shutting down, by paying laid off workers a bonus, which represents a sunk cost. The distributive share is determined in the firm's internal labor market through a bargaining that takes place at two occasions: at the beginning of the firm's life and when profits reach a threshold level. The second bargaining is endogenized according to a procedure imposed upon shareholders and workers by a regulator who may use profit distribution as a way to intervene in the firm's internal labor market. Specificities make this market highly imperfect. Different share parameter patterns result, owing to a shut down option, according to whether (a) the regulator calls for renegotiation when profits are increasing or decreasing, (b) the regulator's rule is announced in advance or is discretionally set.     

A firm's external environment and the hiring of a non‐standard workforce: implications for organisations

This article empirically investigates organisations' strategic decision to hire non‐standard employees. Using US firm‐level data and a matched pair design, the study shows that firms operating in a more competitive environment and a less uncertain environment have a higher proportion of non‐standard workers. Further, firms with a greater proportion of non‐standard workers show higher financial growth. And finally, in a highly competitive environment, those firms that hire more non‐standard workers achieve significantly higher financial growth. Similar growth is experienced by those firms in the low uncertainty environment hiring more non‐standard workers. These results are all consistent with the research hypotheses.     

In the trenches at the talent wars: competitive interaction for scarce human resources

A number of indicators suggest that the social norms that once deterred labor market competitors from hiring or “poaching” each others' employees are breaking down. This study explores the competitive interaction that results when one firm attempts to hire employees from a competing firm (known as “talent raiding”). Results suggest that attributes of the raiding firm, the targeted firm, and targeted human capital will affect how a targeted firm responds to a talent raid. The study suggests a number of tactics raiding firms can use to avoid retaliation and suggests tactics targeted firms can use to repel would‐be talent raiders. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Skill development,bargaining power,and a theory of job design

We examine the job design decision in the context of skill development and bargaining power. The choice between specialization and multitasking requires employees to develop either specialized or varied task‐specific skills. Employees' (i.e., the owners of the acquired skills) bargaining power depends on their skill sets, which differentiate their ability to hold up production and threaten to leave a firm. When a firm cannot meaningfully elicit skill investments through job design, it will pursue inefficient multitasking to reduce production holdups or inefficient specialization to prevent skilled employees from leaving. We obtain inefficient job design results only for mediocre ability workers.     

Manager replacement,employee protest,and corporate control

When faced with the replacement threat, incumbent managers look for support from employees by investing in a non-contractible employee–friendly relationship. Enjoying the relationship, employees help managers preserve their job by protesting against shareholders. When the benefits from the good employee–manager relationship are large enough to cover the loss of managerial inefficiency, shareholders prefer to share the influential power at the firm with employees.     

Entrepreneurial dynamics of the self-employed and of firms: a comparison of determinants using Spanish data

Entrepreneurship is viewed at either an individual level (self-employment), or a firm level (firms’ creation) phenomenon. We also observe the self-employed and firms that hire employees and grow, and others that do not. This paper theorizes occupational and firm-creation decisions and uses Spanish data on industry, region and time to compare entrepreneurial indicators based on official statistics of the number of self-employed individuals and of the number of firms, both with and without employees. The results show that there are important differences in the patterns of the determinants of growth rates in the self-employed and in firms and, within each of them, between those that hire employees and those that do not. We establish sound arguments to recommend the highest level of disaggregation possible in entrepreneurship studies.     

Pacts for employment and competitiveness in Germany

Pacts for employment and competitiveness (PECs) in Germany reflect a process of organised decentralisation, delegating additional rights and responsibilities for industrial relations agreements to the plant level. PECs are now used by both struggling and prosperous firms. An analysis of the content of recent agreements shows that the economic situation of the firm has a significant impact on changes agreed at the firm level. Changes in working time are associated with the demand for the products and services of a firm while financial concessions by employees are more common in firms with weak profits.     

Re-connecting capitalism: prospects for the regulatory reform of the employee interest in UK takeovers

This article draws upon the disconnected capitalism thesis (DCT) to analyse UK takeovers and their implications for workers. The DCT refers to the disconnect between the source of value creation (the labour process) and the wider political economy. Specifically, we highlight a particular aspect of this disconnect whereby those who create value and have a long-term stake in firms (employees and managers at the firm level) are disconnected from decisions regarding takeovers, as a consequence of wider economic and political trends (processes of financialisation/marketisation and associated state support for a neoliberal takeover regime). We outline these trends and argue the case for a re-connect, which will require empowering employees and managers to have more influence in takeover decisions and, in turn, disempowering shareholders and financial intermediaries. The article thus highlights the regulatory space for takeovers and considers feasible policy options, a set of interlinked regulatory changes, which will in particular require a more assertive state.     

Quality investment timing by the startup and the established firm

This study investigates quality investment timing decisions of the established firm and the startup by a duopoly model, where firms can position quality early (demand uncertainty is high) or late (uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. The startup positions quality to maximize its survival probability, whereas the established firm maximizes profits. Results indicate that the startup positions quality earlier than the established firm when the demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline sharply over time. Additionally, policy analysis shows that subsidies work better than direct funds in encouraging quality innovation of the startup.     

Immigration and firm productivity: evidence from the Canadian Employer-Employee Dynamics Database

Previous studies on the impact of immigration on productivity in developed countries remain inconclusive, and most analyses are abstracted from firms where production actually takes place. This study examines the empirical relationship between immigration and firm-level productivity in Canada. It uses the Canadian Employer-Employee Dynamics Database that tracks firms over time and matches firms with their employees. The study finds that there is a positive association between changes in the share of immigrants in a firm and changes in firm productivity. This positive effect of immigration on firm productivity is small, but it is stronger over a longer period. The effect tends to be larger for low-skilled immigrants as compared with highly-skilled workers, as firm productivity growth is more strongly associated with changes in the share of recent immigrants (relative to established immigrants), and immigrants who intended to work in non-high skilled occupations (relative to immigrants who intended to work in high-skilled occupations). Those differences are more pronounced in technology-intensive and knowledge-based industries. Immigration is found to have little estimated effects on capital intensity in a firm. Finally, this study finds that high skill and lower skill immigrants have similar effects on average worker earnings arising from the positive productivity effect of immigration, but only skilled immigrants are associated with higher firm profits.

     

On recalls, layoffs, variable hours, and labor adjustment costs

The paper analyzes the employment policy of a firm that can vary both hours and the level of employment. The analysis differs from previous work in the adjustment cost literature in that the firm is able to change its employment not only through hires, layoffs, and quits, but also by recalls of employees who were previously laid off. Thus, we introduce the possibility of the firm inventorying the labor input. It is shown that this labor inventory potential is necessary if the firm is to ever lay off workers. Further, it is demonstrated that linear rather than strictly convex adjustment costs are then required if the firm is to always recall employees who were previously laid off prior to hiring new workers.     

$100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans

We identify employees at seven companies whose 401(k) investment choices are dominated because they are contributing less than the employer matching contribution threshold despite being vested in their match and being able to make penalty-free 401(k) withdrawals for any reason because they are older than 59?. At the average firm, 36% of match-eligible employees over 59? forego arbitrage profits that average 1.6% of their annual pay, or $507. A survey educating employees about the free lunch they are foregoing raised contribution rates by a statistically insignificant 0.67 percent of income among those completing the survey.     

Power shifts in organizations: the role of high-performance work systems

This paper analyses the effects of high-performance work systems (HPWS) on the rent appropriation of employees and shareholders in firms from the viewpoint of appropriation theory. Applying a meta-analytical approach I test the hypothesis that HPWS shift the balance of power between stakeholder groups in an organization, favouring employees over other stakeholders. This hypothesis is confirmed. However, the overall results of HPWS are positive for both stakeholder groups, as HPWS also increase firm value creation. My study also emphasizes the need to decompose the construct ‘firm performance’ into value creation and value distribution among stakeholder groups. Directions for future research and recommendations for management practice conclude the paper.     

On the impact of managerial bonus systems on firm profit and market competition: the cases of pure profit,sales, market share and relative profits compared

By designing remuneration schemes based on a bonus rewarding specific firm‐level outcomes, the owners/shareholders of a firm can manipulate the behavior of their managers. In practice, different bonus anchors take center stage: some are profit‐based, others use sales as the key yardstick and still different ones focus on relative performance vis‐à‐vis a peer group. In this paper, we focus on the impact of remuneration schemes on firm‐level profitability. The profit effect is investigated for (all possible combinations of) four bonus systems using delegation games. In the context of a linear Cournot model for two or three firms, we model a two‐ or three‐stage decision structure where, in the first stage (or first two stages), an owner decides on the bonus system for his manager and where, in the final stage, the manager takes the daily output decision for her firm. It appears that the bonus system based on relative (profits) performance is superior throughout. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Use of employees and alternative work arrangements in the United States: a law,economics, and organizations perspective

This paper considers the incidence of employees versus other forms of work in the United States, including temporary agency workers, contract company workers, independent contractors, and self-employment. It does so within a single, unifying framework. The approach takes an economics of organizations focus to consider when it is optimal for the firm to control the work routine instead of the worker. This is critical in defining and determining employment versus other forms of work. The cost of measuring output and monitoring effort and of worker versus firm expertise are important in determining the organization of work. This approach proves fruitful, but it also is important to account for the impact of certain legal restrictions in the U.S. labor market. The empirical findings show that independent contractors are in jobs that require worker expertise and training and for which monitoring of worker effort is difficult. Contract company workers' characteristics are a hybrid between independent contractors' and employees'. Temporary agency workers occur where the firm wishes to legally outsource its low-wage workers yet still maintain a degree of control over their work routine.     

Corporate takeovers,bargaining and managers' incentives to invest

This paper analyzes the impact of potential takeovers on the investment decisions of managers. The takeover involves bargaining over the potential surplus between the acquiring firm, the target manager, and shareholders of the target firm. The anticipation of future takeover gains will influence the decision‐makers to invest ex ante. Interestingly, both over and underinvestment might prevail, depending on the relative bargaining powers of the parties. The model encompasses specific cases documented in the empirical literature and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) practice. It is, therefore, particularly suited to focus on the desirability of anti‐takeover legislation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.     

The effect of international firm mobility on wages and unemployment

Although the increase in international firm mobility is well documented, its effects on macroeconomic aggregates and the labour market remain controversial. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) benefit from an international outside option during wage bargaining, leading to a decrease in average wages. However, a strategic incentive to hire extra workers in a foreign (home) plant in order to reduce wages in the home (foreign) plant has an indirect positive effect on wages due to spillovers resulting from an increased demand for labour. In a framework of frictional unemployment, permitting MNEs leads to a decrease in unemployment. Abstracting from transport and plant fixed costs, MNEs lead to higher wages. Including transport and plant costs generally leads to lower wages, though the effects are small. The strategic hiring effect is important in mitigating the fall in wages.     

Dual Commitment: Contract Workers in Australian Manufacturing Enterprises

A growing trend in employment practices is for firms to concentrate on their core functions and outsource peripheral activities. While an assessment of the economic benefits of outsourcing has been the subject of a number of research projects, little attempt has been made to evaluate the impact of such practices on employee commitment. This is the purpose of this paper. The central questions are can employees be committed to their employer and to their host enterprise, and what determines each form of commitment? The research is based on a survey of employees working for a major labour hire firm. The key finding of the research is that employees can have a dual commitment, although different factors influence commitment to the employer and to the host firm.