Optimal choice of a reserve price under uncertainty

The revenue function for a standard auction is typically asymmetric around the revenue maximizing reserve price. Thus, choosing a reserve price that is smaller than the revenue maximizing reserve price can result in a substantially different loss than choosing one that is larger by the same amount. Therefore, when the revenue function is unknown, it is important to consider uncertainty around the revenue function and its asymmetric structure. For this purpose, I propose a Bayesian decision rule and illustrate its typical revenue gains. I then apply the rule to the bid data from the U.S. timber sales.     

Metaheuristic-based simulation optimization approach to network revenue management with an improved self-adjusting bid price function

Making accurate accept/reject decisions on dynamically arriving customer requests for different combinations of resources is a challenging task under uncertainty of competitors' pricing strategies. Because customer demand may be affected by a competitor's pricing action, changes in customer interarrival times should also be considered in capacity control procedures. In this article, a simulation model is developed for a bid price–based capacity control problem of an airline network revenue management system by considering the uncertain nature of booking cancellations and competitors' pricing strategy. An improved bid price function is proposed by considering competitors' different pricing scenarios that occur with different probabilities and their effects on the customers' demands. The classical deterministic linear program (DLP) is reformulated to determine the initial base bid prices that are utilized as control parameters in the proposed self-adjusting bid price function. Furthermore, a simulation optimization approach is applied in order to determine the appropriate values of the coefficients in the bid price function. Different evolutionary computation techniques such as differential evolution (DE), particle swarm optimization (PSO), and seeker optimization algorithm (SOA), are utilized to determine these coefficients along with comparisons. The computational experiments show that promising results can be obtained by making use of the proposed metaheuristic-based simulation optimization approach.     

First‐Price Sealed‐Bid Tender versus English Open Auction: Evidence from Land Auctions

This article compares whether the first‐price sealed‐bid tender or the ascending English open auction generates higher revenue for the seller. Using a unique set of data for land sales and accounting for the presence of an endogenous discrete mechanism choice variable, our results show that the first‐price sealed‐bid tender generates a lower land price, in the range of 1.2–9.6%, than the English open auction. Our results validate the theoretical prediction that open auctions result in higher prices because bidders can infer other bidders’ information by observing their bids in the common value auction paradigm.     

Optimal reserve prices in sealed-bid auctions with reference effects

The reference effect and loss aversion are incorporated into the buyer’s utility in the symmetric independent private value models of sealed-bid auctions. The buyer’s equilibrium bidding strategy and the seller’s optimal reserve price are derived for the first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions. In both auction mechanisms, the seller’s optimal reserve price and expected revenue are increasing in the reference point. We compare the seller’s expected revenues as well as the optimal reserve prices in the two auctions. The results show that the seller will set a higher optimal reserve price but obtain lower optimal expected revenue in the second-price auction compared to the first-price auction. Further, we extend the model to the gain-seeking case, and endogenize the reference point as the ex-ante expected price of the item in equilibrium. In contrast to the loss-averse case, the seller will set a lower optimal reserve price but obtain higher optimal expected revenue in the second-price auction compared to the first-price auction if the buyers are gain-seeking. With an endogenous reference point, similar results are obtained in terms of revenue comparison between the two auctions.     

Penny auctions

This paper studies penny auctions, a novel auction format in which every bid increases the price by a small amount, but placing a bid is costly. Outcomes of real-life penny auctions are often surprising. Even when selling cash, the seller may obtain revenue that is much higher or lower than its nominal value, and losers in an auction sometimes pay much more than the winner. This paper characterizes all symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria of penny auctions and studies penny auctions’ properties. The results show that a high variance of outcomes is a natural property of the penny auction format and high revenues are inconsistent with rational risk-neutral participants.     

How Do Land Auction Formats Influence the Market Structure and Aggregate Surplus of Real Estate Development?

This article proposes a duopoly dynamic game theoretic model to investigate the market structure and aggregate surplus of real estate development when land is sold in a sealed‐bid first price auction vis‐à‐vis an open English auction. It relaxes the assumption of symmetric bidders. The land values have common value and private value components. We find that the sealed‐bid first price auction introduces competition in the real estate development market. The open English auction leads a monopoly market. State agencies are recommended to increase the aggregate surplus of real estate development by publishing past bidding information under the sealed‐bid first price auction and reducing information asymmetry between bidders.     

Spectrum Auction Design

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. The standard approach is the simultaneous ascending auction, in which many related lots are auctioned simultaneously in a sequence of rounds. I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the approach with examples from US spectrum auctions. I then present a variation-the combinatorial clock auction-which has been adopted by the UK and many other countries, which addresses many of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction while building on its strengths. The combinatorial clock auction is a simple dynamic auction in which bidders bid on packages of lots. Most importantly, the auction allows alternative technologies that require the spectrum to be organized in different ways to compete in a technology-neutral auction. In addition, the pricing rule and information policy are carefully tailored to mitigate gaming behavior. An activity rule based on revealed preference promotes price and assignment discovery throughout the clock stage of the auction. Truthful bidding is encouraged, which simplifies bidding and improves efficiency. Experimental tests and early auctions confirm the advantages of the approach.     

基于神经网络方法的建筑工程投标估价研究

以招标件业主对工程质量、价格与工期的需要，及其所要求的技术、管理、服务三大目标为主导，投标公司据此相应地以人才为本，创新技术、管理与企业化，制定出技术上先进、经济上合理、社会上可行的三类方案，以分别实现业主要求的三大目标，从而保证中标。在估价过程中运用神经网络的方法，对最佳报价进行研究分析。     

The agency and wholesale models in electronic content markets

I analyze a model of dynamic competition between retail platforms in the presence of consumer lock-in. Two different revenue models are considered, one in which platforms set final retail prices and one in which the suppliers set final retail prices. Platforms have long-term (or strategic) pricing incentives but suppliers do not, which implies that the inter-temporal price path faced by consumers depends on the revenue model in place. When suppliers set prices instead of platforms, prices may be higher in early periods but lower in later periods, suggesting that appropriate antitrust enforcement ought to consider more than initial price changes when an industry shifts to the agency model. Indeed, consumers may (but need not) prefer the agency model even when prices increase in initial periods. A potential downside of the agency model is that it may align the incentives of suppliers and platforms and thereby encourage platforms to lower the competitiveness of the supplier market, harming consumers; no such incentives exist under the wholesale model. I relate my results to events in the market for electronic books.     

Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders’ values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.     

Inferring ascending auction participation from observed bidders

Participation in internet auctions goes well beyond those who place a bid. Participants arrive in random order, and if the auction’s standing price has already exceeded a participant’s valuation, she will not bid. Even so, her unreported valuation is a relevant part of demand for the item, and in an alternate random order, her bid would have been registered. I provide a method to estimate the average number of participants from the average number of bidders per auction. This enables estimation of the distribution of participant valuations from either the distribution of closing prices or the distribution of all observed bids.     

戴尔：最熟悉的陌生人

只过了5年,戴尔,这家1984年诞生于美国德克萨斯州、靠直销模式卖电脑起家、曾在21世纪初连续4年占据全球PC业头把交椅、目前年收入超过600亿美元的明星企业,几乎已经＂面目全非＂。戴尔用一种典型的戴尔速度,迅速改变了人们对它的惯性认知。戴尔公司的创始人、     

An integrated production–distribution model for the dynamic location and allocation problem with safety stock optimization

The design and management of a multi-stage production–distribution system is one of the most critical problems in logistics and in facility management. Companies need to be able to evaluate and design different configurations for their logistic networks as quickly as possible. This means coordinating the entire supply chain effectively in order to minimize costs and simultaneously optimize facilities location, the allocation of customer demand to production/distribution centers, the inbound and outbound transportation activities, the product flows between production and/or warehousing facilities, the reverse logistics activities, etc.Full optimization of supply chain is achieved by integrating strategic, tactical, and operational decision-making in terms of the design, management, and control of activities. The cost-based and mixed-integer programming model presented in this study has been developed to support management in making the following decisions: the number of facilities (e.g. warehousing systems, distribution centers), the choice of their locations and the assignment of customer demand to them, and also incorporate tactical decisions regarding inventory control, production rates, and service-level determination in a stochastic environment. This paper presents an original model for the dynamic location–allocation problem with control of customer service level and safety stock optimization. An experimental analysis identifies the most critical factors affecting the logistics cost, and to finish, an industrial application is illustrated demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed optimization approach.     

耐克＋苹果=？

像耐克那样运营,像苹果那样创新,在中国长三角地区,一家年销售额仅20多亿元的＂小不点＂公司玩起了混搭,一场机械制造业发展模式的创新实验正在这里悄然进行。 汽车在由无锡机场通往宜兴市周铁镇的公路上飞驰,车窗两边的景色截然不同：往左边看,成片的蔬菜大棚依偎在太湖边上;而另一侧,一排排现代化的厂房令人目不暇接。奇怪的是,这两种迥异的风景在这里丝毫不显得格格不入,就像这里随处可见的小灌木,红绿两色的叶子相伴而生,却还是那样自然而亲切。     

The Urban Homeowner's Residential Location Decision in an Asset-Pricing Context

Homeowners determine the maximum site bid price for homeowner housing within a two-period expected-utility model. The bid price is a function of the expected cash flows to sites, the quantity of housing consumed and a relocation option. The bid price is derived in the general case as a function of the homeowner's portfolio risk, including the total risk to the site, and the market price of risk. The bid price is derived under a spatial measure as a function of distance from an arbitrary location. Specific results are obtained when the household experiences log-linear utility for housing and other goods. Use of the market price of risk simplifies analytical solutions to the bid price equation.     

Short-term decision support system for maintenance task prioritization

Maintenance operations have a direct influence on production performance in manufacturing systems. Short-term production analysis is imperative to enable manufacturing operations to optimally respond to dynamic changes in the system behavior. However, most of the conventional decision support systems for production and maintenance focus on long-term statistic analysis, which is usually not applicable to a short-term period. Maintenance task prioritization is crucial and important for short-term analysis to reduce unnecessary or improper maintenance activities, especially when availability of maintenance resources is limited. The existing methods for maintenance priority assignment are often through heuristic methods or experience, which could cause unscheduled downtime and production losses. In this paper, a short-term decision support system for maintenance task prioritization based on the system operating conditions is introduced. The impact factor for priority assignment is obtained theoretically. A case study based on the simulation of an automotive assembly line illustrates that the proposed short-term system improves the system performance with a lower cost than the long-term method.     

基于等风险图和模糊综合评价法的投标报价风险分析

建筑企业在投标时对工程实际资料掌握的广度和深度非常有限，据此得出的投标报价是一个期望价格。实际施工时可能出现的种种不确定性因素（如恶劣的天气等）会导致工程实际造价高于投标报价，即投标存在风险。针对建筑企业在投标报价中所面临的各种风险因素，以概率估计和模糊数学分析理论相结合，研究这些风险发生的概率以及对项目收益产生的影响，以风险量值来衡量投标报价的风险值，为建筑企业投标提供新的决策依据。     

Auctions with quantity externalities and endogenous supply

This paper studies the design of license auctions when the number of licenses allocated in the auction determines structure of the post-auction market. I first show that a sequence of conditional reserve prices that specify minimum acceptable bid at each supply level can be used to determine supply endogenously. Then I construct a static auction called multi-dimensional uniform-price auction and a dynamic auction called Walrasian clock auction that allow the auctioneer to condition reserve price on supply and allow bidders to condition bids on supply. I show that both proposed auctions can implement the efficient market structure that maximizes total surplus in the post-auction market in a dominant strategy equilibrium. I next characterize the optimal auction and show that the two proposed auctions can yield the optimal revenue under a sequence of optimal reserve prices.     

Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The PCS spectrum was sold via a simultaneous multi-round auction, which forces bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. This exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance. Recently, a number of countries worldwide have switched to the combinatorial clock auction to sell spectrum. This two-stage auction uses a core-selecting payment rule. The number of possible packages a bidder can submit grows exponentially with the number of licenses, which adds complexity to the auction. For larger auctions with dozens of licenses bidders cannot be expected to reveal all their valuations during such an auction. We analyze the impact of two main design choices on efficiency and revenue: simple “compact” bid languages versus complex “fully expressive” bid languages and simple “pay-as-bid” payment rules versus complex “core-selecting” payment rules. We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. We find that simplicity of the bid language has a substantial positive impact on the auction?s efficiency and simplicity of the payment rule has as a substantial positive impact on the auction?s revenue. The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, achieves the lowest efficiency and revenue among all treatment combinations.     

对外贸易与中国制造业发展：基于可计算一般均衡（CGE）模型的模拟分析

运用CGE模型模拟分析了对外贸易对我国制造业主要行业的产出、收益及投资水平的作用效果。分析结果显示,制造业产出、收益和投资变化率与对外贸易变化率呈正相关;除了金属行业的收益增长率在贸易小幅增长时,其行业的收益率高于贸易的增长率以外,其余行业的贸易的增长率均大于各行业收益增长率,低于投资增长率;而贸易的小幅增长对于纺织业、金属行业、炼焦、煤气和石油加工业的收益水平的提升更有利;贸易的高度增长对于具有增长潜力的机械行业更有利;对于食品制造业、化学行业、非金属矿物制品业来讲贸易的适度增长对行业发展更有利。由此提出在大力发展制造业贸易的同时,要针对各行业对贸易的不同敏感程度,合理的调整产业政策,发挥技术创新能力,以此提升制造业的贸易利得。