农村土地租赁博弈分析

在分析国内外有关农村土地租赁关系研究进展的基础上,从博弈论角度透视土地租赁关系,并依据入户调查资料,建立不完全信息静态博弈模型。研究结果表明：相比高地租土地,土地租入方对低地租和中等地租土地有激励;土地租入方实施＂冷酷到底＂策略,土地出租方没有激励实施机会主义行为;最终导致高质量土地退出市场,低质量和中等质量土地占据整个市场,土地资源的无效率配置。     

开征物业税对土地利用效率的影响——比较静态模型的理论分析与数值模拟

文章通过引入土地国有制,土地再开发等因素建立了符合我国土地市场制度特征的土地开发和物业税模型,然后以比较静态分析和数值模拟为主要研究手段,考察了物业税对土地利用效率的影响。结论是开征物业税对土地利用效率存在负面的影响。     

The fundamental problem of accounting

The fundamental problem of economic accounting is to determine a forward‐looking schedule of rentals, user costs or quasi‐rents to provide for the recovery of irreversible investments. The method derived herein relaxes some restrictive assumptions that are common in capital theory. There can be multiple forms of comprehensive capital. Accounting for all forms of capital, including tangible and intangible capital, is symmetrical. The analytical focus becomes one of fixities and frictions and not optimality. Rentals obey inequalities as opposed to marginal conditions. If discounted profit is positive, rentals, depreciation, and capital value are not unique.     

劳动力价值仍是公租房租金确定的基础——兼论公租房退出机制

在对公租房的经济地位进行理论分析的基础上,指出公租房租金市场化的实质仍是土地财政,并由此提出相应的政策建议。公租房介于商品房和廉租房之间,针对有一定市场支付能力但政府或无能力或无意愿填补其缺口的中等偏下收入消费者。由于商业租赁成本超过商业购买成本,公租房租金市场化的实质是通过制造无效供给,推脱住房保障责任,维护土地财政的既得利益。将劳动力价值作为公租房租金确定的基础,才能真正发挥公租房的住房保障职能。     

The immiseration of the landlords: rent in a Kaldorian theory of income distribution

This paper incorporates rent within a Kaldorian model of distributionwhere income shares depend on aggregate investment and the propensitiesto save out of profits, rents and wages. The model is used tointerpret the significance of the secular decline in rents asa share of national income and to specify the circumstancesunder which both the capital/output ratio and the wage shareof national income may rise. The author pursues Keynes's suggestiveremarks about land's liquidity value and shows how an increasein the demand for land, by producers, consumers or wealthholdersreduces the rate of profit and therewith the inducement to invest.     

宗族网络、村干部经商经历与农地经营权流转*

本文综合讨论了村干部和宗族组织对农地经营权流转的影响和作用机制，并且运用中国家庭追踪调查（CFPS）数据对理论分析假设进行了验证。研究结果表明：在农地产权配置和流转交易市场现实约束条件下，村干部和宗族组织作为村庄权威，均对农地流转具有显著影响。其中，以经商能人为代表的村干部对农户家庭农地有偿流转行为有显著的正向影响。宗族组织为维持组织网络结构稳定，对农地无偿流转有显著的正向影响，但是对有偿流转有显著的负向影响。此外，村干部和宗族组织显著抑制了农地撂荒现象的发生。本文的发现对理解村干部和宗族组织在农地流转市场化进程中的行为特点具有一定的意义。     

Voluntary collectivization: A model of producers' institutional choice

The concept of democratic transition to rural collective socialism is analyzed by modeling a village with both a collective farm and individual household plots. Labor is freely allocated by each household, and both the division of land between sectors and the system of distributing the net collective product are determined by majority vote, each household being equally represented. The effects of varying parameters of productivity, rent, and aggregate responsiveness to individual labor allocations are examined. A discussion of the model's relevance to Tanzania, China, and to the concept of voluntary rural collectivization concludes the paper.     

土地价格市场化对中国工业部门要素投入与技术选择的影响

土地价格市场化是中国要素价格改革的重要组成部分。文章基于2007-2013年中国工业部门面板数据,实证检验了工业用地相对价格变动对中国工业部门要素投入调整和技术进步偏向的影响。研究发现：短期内,东部地区工业用地相对价格上升抑制了工业用地需求,并诱致了非土地要素对工业用地的替代,但在全国层面和中西部地区并没有显著观察到土地要素相对价格变动的短期诱致替代效应;长期内,工业用地价格上升诱致了能源与物质资本节约型和知识资本使用型技术的使用,土地节约型技术进步特征仅在东部地区得到了显著支持,在全国层面和中西部地区都不显著,这与中国政府主导型的工业用地价格市场化改革特征密切相关。未来中国应以土地价格市场化改革为契机,重视土地价格杠杆对工业部门要素结构优化和技术创新的激励效应,推动工业转型升级。     

Terms-of-trade policy in a model with non-produced means of production

Terms-of-trade policies between agriculture and industry are analysed in a two-sector Sraffian model. If both sectors use only produced means of production and labor, it can be shown that an improvement in agriculture's terms of trade always leads to higher profits in agriculture. However, when non-produced means of production are introduced an exogenous increase in the relative price of agricultural commodities may cause the rate of profit in agriculture to increase, remain constant, or even decrease. Two preconditions are identified for the case in which a favorable movement in agriculture's terms of trade decreases that sector's profit rate. First at least one quality of competitively priced land must be scarce relative to the total output required. Second, the initial, economy-wide rate of profit must be positive. Finally, the effect of an input subsidy used in conjunction with terms-of-trade policy is considered. It is shown that under certain conditions reducing the price of production inputs can also cause profits to fall and rents to rise in agriculture.     

The impact of international students on housing markets

We study the impact of the 2005–2015 international student boom in US universities on local housing markets. By constructing a sample of American college towns characterizing rarely studied local markets in small urban areas, we show that international students exogenously sustained demand for rentals and residential investment, representing counter-cyclical shocks during the Great Recession. Exploiting the historical distribution of foreign enrolment across college towns and country-of-origin networks, we find that international students increased rents by 1.3% and home prices by 2.5% relative to the housing boom peak, translating into home equity gains of $4,000. An analysis exploiting within-city dynamics reveals that neighbourhoods near campus absorbed international inflows by replacing single-family homes with apartment rentals.     

信息化水平与技术创新能力的协整关系——基于2005—2010年中国工业行业面板数据的实证分析

利用2005—2010年中国工业37个细分行业的面板数据,运用面板单位根检验、面板协整检验、面板协整估计等方法检验了信息化水平、市场化水平、行业利润等因素对中国工业技术创新能力的影响。利用多种协整检验方法所得的结果一致表明,信息化水平、市场化水平、行业利润等与中国工业技术创新能力之间存在长期稳定的均衡关系;面板协整估计结果表明,信息化水平显著促进了中国工业技术创新能力的提升,但该影响具有明显的时序差异。     

Democracy,rent seeking,public spending and growth

Does democratization imply faster growth, less corruption and less inefficiency? Past studies yield ambiguous results on the effects of democracy on economic performance and growth. We develop a simple two-sector endogenous growth model that shows both very young and mature democracies grow faster than countries in mid stages of democratization, producing a ‘U’ effect. This effect results from the pattern of rent seeking as it diverts from the provision of public goods. Rent-seekers act as monopolistic competitors. Initially, more democracy increases their number, raising aggregate rents. However, rents per rent-seeker fall with the number of rent seekers. Due to this crowding effect and the increased competition among rent seekers, aggregate rents fall in mature democracies. Thus, rents show an ‘inverted-U’ effect in relation to democracy. We find fairly robust supportive evidence for the latter.     

Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D72     

Marx's analysis of the falling rate of profit in the first version of Volume III of capital

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value and the general law section of the first version of Volume III of Capital. It then considers Part III of Volume III, the evolution of Marx's thought and various interpretations of his theory in the light of this analysis. It is suggested that, as late as the 1870s, Marx had hoped to be able to provide a demonstration that the rate of profit must fall. The main conclusions are that (1) Marx's major attempt to show that the rate of profit must fall occurred in the general law section, (2) Part III does not contain a demonstration that the rate of profit must fall and (3) Marx was never able to demonstrate that the rate of profit must fall and he was aware of this.     

农户土地租赁行为及其福利效果

本文根据2003—2009年817个样本农户的微观面板数据,首先运用Biprobit模型,识别出了农户租入和租出土地决策的影响因素,解决了以往文献所忽视的内生性问题和"遗漏问题";然后运用多重内生处理效应模型估计了土地租赁的福利影响,解决了不可观测的变量所导致的自选择性问题,结论表明只要是在自愿基础上所进行的租赁,无论是租出土地还是租入土地,都会增加农户效用,提高农户福利水平。     

Unfair incentives: A behavioural note on sharecropping

We conducted a laboratory‐in‐the‐field experiment with real‐life tenants in Ethiopia to test the incentive effects of fixed wage, sharecropping, fixed rent, and ownership contracts. The experimental task resembles a common process in agricultural production. The sharecropping contract is a piece rate scheme framed as a profit‐sharing agreement. Sharecropping output was about 12 percent smaller than the fixed rent output. Surprisingly, it is statistically indistinguishable from the fixed wage output, despite substantial piece rates. This effect is driven by real‐life sharecroppers. Their sharecropping output was smaller than that of non‐sharecroppers, especially in a region where a controversial land reform took place. We argue that our subjects dislike sharecropping contracts because of the unfair profit sharing and the disputed allocation of land. Fairness concerns, therefore, may be another impediment to efficiency under the sharecropping contract.     

Regulatory Entry Barriers,Rent Shifting and the Home Market Effect

This paper introduces regulatory entry barriers in a model of the home market effect. The entry barriers generate local rents that have unexpected but significant implications. First, the home market effect is magnified. Second, when countries are sufficiently unequal in size and rents are sufficiently large, symmetric reductions in trade costs reduce welfare in the small country. Third, entry barriers increase the large country's market size and, surprisingly, can increase its welfare. Fourth, a unilateral increase in trade protection shifts foreign rents to the home country. This rent‐shifting effect amplifies the standard production relocation motive for trade policy intervention.     

城市绿色隔离地区规划策略研究 ——以石家庄为例

在快速城市化进程中,中心城区向外迅速扩展,大城市绿色隔离地区不断遭到蚕食,对城市的生态环境构成威胁,亟须对绿色隔离地区的规划建设进行有效控制。运用生态空间效能分析、建设用地蔓延分析、生态敏感性分析、产业适宜性分析和村庄布点因子分析等方法,以石家庄绿色隔离地区为例,分析其现状特征及问题,从地价差异、收入差距、管理权限等方面揭示其空间演变动因,提出分级分类分区的空间管控、优先保育自然生态、“调一限二兴三”的产业发展,以及集中集聚调整村庄布点的规划策略,以期有益于中国大城市绿色隔离地区的规划建设。     

制度-垄断地租与中国地方政府竞争:一个马克思主义分析框架

竞争性地方政府作为改革以来形成的重要制度形式,在相当程度上决定了中国社会主义市场经济体制的特点。本文不仅承续了既有文献中将地方政府的经济动机归于租金,并将土地财政视为地方政府利用租金开展战略投资的观点,而且试图在一个马克思主义框架内进一步发展这一观点。为此我们对租金的生产性利用和国家的经济作用的关系做了初步探讨,并将大卫·哈维的制度-垄断地租理论运用于分析中国地方政府围绕营建环境的投资活动。本文的基本结论是,中国地方政府在以土地财政为核心的战略投资中,充当了租金的生产性分配者和使用者的角色,并因之嵌入了原本由企业之间的竞争所带来的相对剩余价值生产过程,形成了中国经济特有的相对剩余价值生产双重结构,从而在相当长的时间内造就了世所罕见的高投资率,推动了中国经济的持续快速增长。     

Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets

Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable. Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: September 22, 1999