Creative capital,information and communication technologies,and economic growth in smart cities

ABSTRACT

We study aspects of economic growth in a stylized smart city with two distinct features. First, the modeled inhabitants of this city are smart because they possess skills. Using the language of Richard Florida, these inhabitants comprise the city’s creative class and hence they possess creative capital. Second, the city is smart because it uses information and communication technologies (ICTs) and we model one specific kind of ICT use. In this setting, we first derive expressions for three growth related metrics. Second, we use these metrics to show that the economy of smart city A converges to a balanced growth path (BGP). Third, we compute the growth rate of output per effective creative capital unit on this BGP. Fourth, we study how heterogeneity in initial conditions affects outcomes on the BGP by introducing a second smart city B into the analysis. At time t?=?0 two key savings rates in city A are twice as large as in city B. We compute the ratio of the BGP value of income per effective creative capital unit in city A to its value in city B. Finally, we compute the ratio of the BGP value of skills per effective creative capital unit in city A to its value in city B.     

Measuring ‘indirect’ investments in ICT in OECD countries

ABSTRACT

ICT components, such as microprocessors, may be embodied in other capital goods not recorded as ICT in National Accounts. We name ‘indirect ICT investment’ the value of embodied ICT components in non-ICT investment. The paper provides estimates of ‘indirect ICT investment’ based on detailed and unpublished Supply-Use tables (SUT) in 12 OECD countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Our main finding is that ICT investment appears significantly higher when considering its indirect component, the average increase being about 35%. The inclusion of indirect ICT investment, excluding software (for which firms’ expenditures are difficult to measure), changes significantly the relative position of countries with respect to the ICT intensity of their investments. The inclusion of software further increases indirect ICT investment but the increase is smaller (in percentage) than without this inclusion. A final result, but concerning only three countries, it that the diagnosis of a stabilisation, or even a decrease, of ICT investment in percentage of GDP or of total investment, observed from the beginning of the century, is not modified if we take into account the indirect ICT investment.     

ICT stochastic externalities,technology innovation and business services: is there an evidence of missed opportunity growth?

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present an analysis of the production process for some OECD countries and consider the new technology of the ICT capital as driver of growth. In doing so, the production function approach adopted allows to disentangle the externalities not exploited. In line with the general-purpose technology theory, we attribute such externalities to the new technology ICT capital. Business services are a relevant vehicle to use better the innovative capital embedded in the production process. We develop and implement a methodology for the evaluation of the effect on growth related to the interaction between innovative capital and business services. The main conclusion of the paper is that the potentials of new technologies in use are almost completely exploited during the productive process. Then, even if a competitive solution is viable, there are small, though possible, margins to improve a sustainable European growth in the long run linked to externalities. We also point out some conclusions on the capital and labor shares showing that the latter is ‘too small’ both in the long and short run.     

Perpetual growth,the labor share,and robots

ABSTRACT

The recent literature on the economic effects of machine learning, robotization and artificial intelligence suggests that there may be an upcoming wave of substitution of human labor by machines. We argue that these new technologies may lead to so-called perpetual growth, i.e. growth of per capita income with a non-progressing state of technology. We specify an exact parameter threshold beyond which perpetual growth emerges, and argue that ongoing technological change may bring the threshold in reach. We also show that in a state of perpetual growth, factor-eliminating technological progress reduces the role of labor in the production process and that this leads to a rising wage rate but ever-declining share of wage income. We present simulation experiments on several policy options to combat this inequality, including a universal basic income as well as an option in which workers become owners of ‘robots’.     

Overeducation,undereducation, and the theory of career mobility

The theory of career mobility (Sicherman and Galor, Journal of Political Economy, 98(1), 169–92, 1990) claims that wage penalties for overeducated workers are compensated by better promotion prospects. Sicherman (Journal of Labour Economics, 9(2), 101–22, 1991) was able to confirm this theory in an empirical study using panel data. However, the only retest using panel data so far (Robst, Eastern Economic Journal, 21, 539–50, 1995 Robst, J. 1995. Career mobility, job match, and overeducation. Eastern Economic Journal, 21: 539–50.  ) produced rather ambiguous results. In the present paper, random effects models to analyse relative wage growth are estimated using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. It is found that overeducated workers in Germany have markedly lower relative wage growth rates than adequately educated workers. The results cast serious doubt on whether the career mobility model is able to explain overeducation in Germany. The plausibility of the results is supported by the finding that overeducated workers have less access to formal and informal on-the-job training, which is usually found to be positively correlated with wage growth even when controlling for selectivity effects (Pischke, Journal of Population Economics, 14, 523–48, 2001).     

化压力为创新：上级发展性反馈与自我效能感的调节作用

在压力中创新已成为企业对员工的基本要求,在此基础上,如何进一步提升员工创造力是企业管理者关注的重要问题。基于资源保存理论,检验上级发展性反馈与创造力自我效能感对挑战性压力源和员工创造力之间关系的影响机制。采用问卷调查法对372个企业员工样本数据进行分析发现,挑战性压力源对员工创造力具有显著正向影响;上级发展性反馈正向调节挑战性压力源和员工创造力间的关系并正向影响员工创造力自我效能感;员工创造力自我效能感正向调节挑战性压力源和员工创造力之间的关系;同时,上级发展性反馈对挑战性压力源和员工创造力关系的调节作用是通过员工创造力自我效能感的中介作用实现的。     

The creative class, its preferences, and unbalanced growth in an urban economy

We theoretically analyze unbalanced growth in an urban economy arising from the preferences of the creative class concerning the relative desirability of agricultural, manufacturing, and service goods. We study two cases. In the first case, the production functions for the three categories of goods are identical. Our analysis leads to four results. First, we compute the equilibrium physical to creative capital ratios and the relationships between the neutral productivity shifters and the output prices. Second, we show that agricultural and services consumption are a constant multiple of manufacturing consumption. Third, we note that under certain conditions, an equilibrium in which all sectors of our urban economy grow at a constant rate does not exist. Fourth, we show that a constant growth path (CGP) equilibrium exists in which, across the three sectors, the pattern of consumption changes and there is a reallocation of creative capital. In the second case, the production functions for the three categories of goods are dissimilar. In this more realistic setting, we study generalizations of the previously described four results.     

Financial Insecurity in a World of Plenty

Abstract

The U.S. economy is addicted to the simulative impacts of household borrowing. Household debt has grown dramatically since the 1990s and has served to mitigate the detrimental effects of stagnant household wages. The accumulation of this debt has also had the macroeconomic impact of stimulating the economy, pushing it closer towards full employment. However does full employment stimulated by household indebtedness actually represent economic progress? It is argued that even the poorest citizen in a modern industrialized society is better off than a king of feudal Europe, yet in the United States such material prosperity is often tied to social insecurity thanks to debt. The growth of this debt has been enabled by a financial system that has evolved dramatically over the past forty years. The U.S. financial system’s primary role is no longer to finance investment but is rather a tool that enables a separation of ownership from use. Debt has fueled corporate profits which have enriched the shareholding class while at the same time the system has reduced the financial security of the majority of workers. This article crystalizes these issues by analyzing the differentials in financial circumstances faced by workers and shareholders in several major U.S. firms.     

The productivity challenge. What to expect from better-quality labour and capital inputs?

The aim of this article is to develop and implement an analytical framework assessing whether better-quality inputs, via a rise of TFP, could compensate an ageing-induced slowing of economic growth. Here ‘better-quality’ means more educated and older/more experienced workforces; and also better-quality capital proxied by its ICT content. Economic theory predicts that these trends should raise TFP. To assess these predictions, we use EU-KLEMS data, with information on the age/education mix of the workforce, as well as the importance on ICT in total capital, for 34 industries within 16 OECD countries, between 1970 and 2005. We generalize the Hellerstein–Neumark labour-quality index method to simultaneously capture workers’ age/experience or education contribution to TFP growth, alongside that of ICT. The conclusion of the article is that the quality of inputs matters for TFP. We find robust microeconometric evidence that better-educated and older/more experienced workers are more productive than their less-educated and younger/less-experienced peers. Also, ICT capital turns out to be more productive than other forms of capital. And when used in a growth accounting exercise covering the 1995–2005 period, these estimates suggest that up to 40% of the recorded TFP growth could be ascribed to the rising quality of inputs.     

Information and communication technology diffusion and skill upgrading in Korean industries

We examine the relationship between the directly observable indicator of new technology, information and communication technology (ICT) investment intensity, and skill upgrading by analyzing changes in employment and wage structure of 25 Korean industrial sectors over the 1993–1999 period. The estimation results indicate the following implications. First, although ICT expenditure and investment have increased sharply since 1993, it appears that ICT investment has begun to be complementarily combined with skilled labor only since 1996. Second, our results support the ‘limited substitution hypothesis’. ICT has substituted low-skilled non-production workers, whereas the increased demand for high-skilled workers is driven by ICT diffusion in the second sub-period. This asymmetric trend between high-skilled and low-skilled non-production workers in Korea reveals significant differences in comparison with the experiences of other OECD countries. Third, the existence of substitutability between ICT diffusion and low-skilled non-production workers in Korea may cast doubt on the appropriateness of the non-production workers' category, a category regarded as a proxy variable of high-skilled workers in most previous studies.     

Celtic Phoenix or Leprechaun Economics? The Politics of an FDI-led Growth Model in Europe

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we argue that Ireland’s post-crisis economic recovery in Europe was driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) from Silicon Valley, and while this growth model was made possible by Ireland’s low-corporate tax rates, it was also a result of these firms using Ireland to directly access the European labour market. We evidence this contention via sectoral and geographic analyses while simultaneously showing that Irish fiscal policies have not redistributed gains from the recovery to the broader population. As a result, the economic recovery has been most actively felt by those in the FDI sectors, including workers from the EU and beyond. Building on theories from the study of comparative capitalism, we suggest that this experience indicates that Ireland’s FDI-led growth model has created clear winners and losers, with significant distributional implications. The FDI growth regime been made possible by inward migration and European integration, but given the unequal distribution of the economic benefits that this generates, it is unlikely to be politically, or electorally, sustainable.     

The economic impact of digital technologies in Europe

This paper analyses the economic impact of digital technologies in Europe distinguishing between different stages/domains of the digitalization process. A set of composite Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) indicators is used for capturing the access to ICTs, the ability to use them and the digital empowerment of individuals in key social and economic domains. We argue that the mere accessibility to ICT facilities is only a pre-condition for moving towards a digitalized society, while the ‘level’ and the ‘quality’ in the use of these technologies, as well as the conditions facilitating or hampering digital empowerment, play a much more important role. Several transmission mechanisms from ICT access, usage and digital empowerment to key macro-economic variables (namely labour productivity, gross domestic product per capita, employment growth and the employment rate) are identified. The econometric evidence supports our hypotheses showing that the usage of ICT, and mostly digital empowerment, exert the major economic effects, especially on employment also favouring the inclusion of ‘disadvantaged’ groups in the labour market. We conclude that digitalization may drive productivity and employment growth and that inclusive policies may effectively contribute to bridge the gap between the most favoured and the disadvantaged parts of the population, thus helping in achieving the 2020 Europe targets.     

Innovative growth: the role of market power and negative selection

ABSTRACT

This paper relies on register-based statistical data from Finland to measure broad research and development (R&D), organizational capital (OC) and information and communication technology (ICT) investments as innovation inputs in addition to formal survey-based R&D and CIS survey data on innovations. The linked panel data are appropriate for a comparison of low-market-share (small) and large-market-share (large) firms. We analyze the productivity growth and profitability of Finnish firms with varying market power. In contrast to high-market-share firms, low-market-share firms are characterized by low profit derived from new innovations. This study suggests that in addition to imitative growth, a ‘negative selection mechanism’ explains the high productivity growth relative to the low profits.     

组织信息化环境下知识流动对组织创造力的影响

通过解析知识流动和组织信息化环境的内部构成,探究知识溢出/知识扩散、高管支持/ICT应用对组织创造力的差异性影响,以及不同组织信息化环境对知识流动与组织创造力关系的调节作用。利用信息化程度较高的企业数据,使用层级回归分析进行实证检验。结果表明：组织创造力受知识流动的正向影响,知识扩散对其的正向影响更强;组织信息化正向影响组织创造力,相比ICT应用,高管支持对组织创造力的正向影响更强;高管支持在知识溢出/知识扩散与组织创造力之间的正向调节作用显著;ICT应用对知识扩散与组织创造力的强化作用显著强于对知识溢出与组织创造力之间的调节作用。     

Human capital and firms’ innovation: evidence from emerging economies

ABSTRACT

We explore the relationship between human capital and firms’ innovation in emerging economies. Most papers consider the formal knowledge developed in R&D laboratories as a major source of innovation. However, a critical portion of knowledge required for innovation resides in human resources and is created outside any formalised R&D activity. We consider that, to improve their technological capabilities, firms should invest in different forms of human capital, namely highly educated workforce and experienced managers, but also in strategic human resource (HR) practices aimed at developing human capital by increasing employees’ firm-specific technical skills and competences. Besides looking at the type of innovation outcomes, we place greater emphasis on the strategies of innovation development, as these should signal an improved firms’ ability, not just to innovate, but to put their own creative effort in the development of innovation. Our results contrast with the traditional view of firms in emerging economies as mainly relying on the external acquisition of innovations, by showing their actual ability to develop new technologies. In this respect, HR practices aimed at fostering employees’ learning and autonomy at work appear more important than the educational attainment of workers, whilst the experience of managers does not seem effective.     

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and Singapore’s economic growth

Singapore’s remarkable success in economic development has been strongly associated with the country’s vigorous efforts to embrace the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution to promote economic growth. This study provides a comprehensive investigation of the contributions of ICT to Singapore’s economic growth during the 1990–2008 period. It documents three key findings. First, there is a strong positive association between the intensity of ICT use and value-added and labor productivity growth at the sector level. Second, ICT investment contributed approximately 1 percentage point to Singapore’s GDP during 1990–2008, and its role in driving economic growth has become increasingly important over time. Third, the contribution of the ICT manufacturing sector to Singapore’s growth was notable, but it was on the decline and faced difficult restructuring challenges. This paper also provides valuable policy lessons and strategic insights for governments in both developed and developing countries that aspire to embrace ICT to promote economic growth.     

信息技术的分配效应*——论“互联网+”对劳动收入份额的影响

现有文献大多关注信息技术的“增长效应”，但对其“分配效应”没有进行深入的探讨，尤其是没有研究信息技术如何影响企业初次分配中资本和劳动两种要素的收入份额。本文使用中国工业企业数据库2004—2007年的微观数据，分析企业使用信息技术对要素收入分配格局的影响。本文研究发现，使用信息技术的企业其劳动收入份额更高，并且这一结论对于不同的变量、样本和模型设定都十分稳健。信息技术的分配效应也存在异质性，在内资企业、内销企业、东部地区的企业表现更加明显。对影响机制的讨论表明，使用信息技术在提高企业增加值的同时，更大幅度地提高了平均劳动报酬，从而导致初次分配更加偏向劳动。本文不仅填补了相关领域的空白，而且具有明显的政策含义。     

Learning as an emergent,creative process

In Creating a Learning Society, Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald examine the role of knowledge in economic growth. They view economic growth as an impersonal and automatic phenomenon. The history of economic growth, however, suggests that it is a creative and personal process. We argue that the analytical framework deployed by Stiglitz and Greenwald is unsuited to study the creation of new products, new ways of doing things, and the discovery of new markets. While the questions Stigltiz and Greenwald ask are of fundamental importance, their analysis is neutered by the inability of their conceptual toolbox to grapple with creativity and novelty.     

Creativity over time and space

Creativity is often highly concentrated in time and space, and across different domains. What explains the formation and decay of clusters of creativity? We match data on notable individuals born in Europe between the eleventh and the nineteenth centuries with historical city data. The production and attraction of creative talent is associated with city institutions that protected economic and political freedoms and promoted local autonomy. Instead, indicators of local economic conditions such as city size and real wages, do not predict creative clusters. We also show that famous creatives are spatially concentrated and clustered across disciplines, that their spatial mobility has remained stable over the centuries, and that creative clusters are persistent but less than population.

     

A model of trade between creative regions in the presence of sector specific learning by doing

We analyze a model of trade between two heterogeneous regions that are creative in the sense of Richard Florida. One region is larger than the other region in terms of its endowment of creative capital. Each region produces a single final good with inputs 1 and 2 that are traded. There is learning by doing only in the sector producing input 1. Our primary objective is to study the impacts of this sector specific learning by doing and trade on the economies of the two regions under consideration. Our analysis leads to two salient results. First, when a specific condition holds, the smaller region specializes completely in the production of input 1 but there is incomplete specialization in the larger region. In particular, at time t = 0, not all creative capital in the larger region is employed in sector 2 and there is some learning by doing in this larger region as well. Second, in the long run, the smaller region continues to specialize completely in the production of input 1 but the larger region specializes completely in the production of input 2.