Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

Similarities and Dissimilarities between Original Institutional Economics and New Institutional Economics

Original Institutional Economics and New Institutional Economics display several similarities. However, differences in methodology and normative stance are too big to reconcile both approaches. Both approaches may keep each other sharp.     

我国制度经济学研究中的四大问题

西方新制度经济学对我国改革的理论和实践产生了重要的影响，中国的改革实践也为我国理论界对制度经济学的研究提供了土壤。本文认为，我国制度经济学研究中有四大问题值得我们深入探讨。一是制度是自然演化的结果还是人为设计的结果。我们应该重视自然演化这种制度创新方式。二是正式约束与非正式约束的关系。我们应该注意与市场经济相适应的非正式约束建立垢滞后对我国改革的制约。三是诱导性制度变过与强制性制度变迁的关系。在我国市场化的过程中，扩大诱致性制度变迁的范围越来越重要。四是制度设置与制度实施机制的问题。我们在注重制度创新的同时更要注意实施机制的建立。     

经济发展的新制度经济学:一个根本性的批判

本文将对关于制度与经济发展的新制度经济学文献提供一个根本性的批判.作者认为,既有的文献有四宗罪(四大缺陷),而其中每个缺陷都包含更具体的不足.这四大缺陷是:概念化和度量问题、理论严谨性不足、现代辉格式神话,以及对制度变迁与发展的非进化的理解.正是这四宗罪使得新制度经济学无法给出一个关于经济发展的制度基础的系统性阐述.这一根本性批评将为作者在别的地方系统性地阐述经济发展的制度基础奠定部分基础.     

马克思主义经济学与新制度经济学的主要区别与科学综合

马克思主义经济学与新制度经济学作为两个不同的理论体系,存在着许多重要差别,这些差别不仅表明二者具有对立性而且表明二者具有互补性。马克思主义经济学与新制度经济学也有着许多共同点或相通性。因此,我们应在马克思主义经济学科学方法论的指导下,认真地进行马克思主义经济学与新制度经济学的比较分析,努力实现二者的科学综合,从而推进马克思主义经济学的发展与创新,构造现代马克思主义经济学范式。     

"三农"问题的制度经济学分析

从制度经济学的角度来看,制度歧视、扭曲、农村组织缺位及制度变迁的滞后、非均衡是导致"三农"问题的直接原因,而诺斯的"国家理论"则揭示了"三农"问题的更深层原因。     

Economic Power and the Firm in New Institutional Economics: Two Conflicting Problems

The objective of this study has been to undertake an analysis of the economic and institutional determining factors of fiscal pressure in a group of European countries with different levels of economic development, recent history, or level of cooperation and integration among them. We have used a panel of data from 40 countries and a time period of eleven years. Apart from the variables generally used, we have introduced additional ones such as governing party ideology, rate of economic freedom of Euro-area countries, together with another set of institutional variables. Results obtained show that the purely economic model improves when institutional and geopolitical variables are included and, in this way, it is possible to see which countries governed by the left, belonging to the Euro-area or having been members of the Soviet block, and with economic freedom, are more liable to increase fiscal pressure.     

The Institutional Economics of Karl Polanyi

Economists tend to see the market as a default option for social order and a role for government only when markets fail. Developing a convincing analysis of the role of government in economic processes, however, needs to start by considering government failure in its own terms. Drawing on insights from institutional economics, law and economics and the philosophy of law, emphasizing the necessity of rules for the economy, this paper develops the concept of government failure. The paper identifies and develops four different types of government failure. Government can set rules for economic processes and actors that are (1) too specific, (2) too broad, (3) that are arbitrary, or (4) that conflict with other rules it has set out to address other, related issues (possibly primarily non-economic). Government failure is illustrated in the context of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) law as it relates to Anti-Trust law.     

论中国经济转轨的特殊性--对中国经济改革的制度经济学分析

90年代以来,在全球范围内掀起了一股从计划经济体制向市场经济体制转轨的潮流.但是,由于各国本身的社会历史及经济法律条件的不同,决定了不同的国家在转轨道路及转轨模式上有所不同.中国的经济改革,遵循的是一种特殊的思路,走了一条与众不同的道路.中国取得了特殊的经济成就,也遇到了特殊的经济问题.     

The Future of Personnel Economics

Personnel economics has grown over the past 20 years to become a major branch of labour economics. Although much has been learned, many important questions remain. For example, are worker wage profiles dependent on individual attributes or is the firm more important in determining wage growth? Why are executives so highly paid and why does pay take the form that it does? How can cross-country differences in pay patterns be explained? Does variable pay provide better incentives than fixed hourly wages? Under which circumstances is one form of compensation used over another? These questions and others are investigated and some conjectures offered.     

新制度经济学及其发展

本文简要概括新制度经济学的基本特征，描述其与新古典经济理论的不同之处，并运用这一框架来分析发展问题。     

The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists

There are two institutional economics approaches to law and economics. New institutional economists prescribe that arbitrators foster efficiency in setting economic disputes and original institutional economists focus on creating reasonable values – that is, balancing efficiency and justice. Disequilibrium between desired efficiency and perceived fairness triggers agency and is a source of coevolution of law and economics.     

新制度主义经济学与城市经营

近年来“经营城市”运作模式在我国取得一定成效的同时,也出现了一些偏差或负面效应。本文以新制度主义经济学为出发点,分析城市的本质是一种制度,因此,提出用“经营-管治”一体化制度安排来确保“经营城市”的健康发展。