The welfare cost of bank capital requirements

Capital requirements are the cornerstone of modern bank regulation, yet little is known about their welfare cost. This paper measures this cost and finds that it is surprisingly large. I present a simple framework, which embeds the role of liquidity creating banks in an otherwise standard general equilibrium growth model. A capital requirement limits the moral hazard on the part of banks that arises due to deposit insurance. However, this capital requirement is also costly because it reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity. The key insight is that equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength of households’ preferences for liquidity and this allows for the derivation of a simple formula for the welfare cost of capital requirements that is a function of observable variables only. Using US data, the welfare cost of current capital adequacy regulation is found to be equivalent to a permanent loss in consumption of between 0.1% and 1%.     

The pass-through of bank capital requirements to corporate lending spreads

We study the impact of higher bank capital requirements on corporate lending spreads using granular bank- and loan-level data. Our empirical strategy employs the heterogeneity in capital requirements across banks and time of implementation in Switzerland. We find that changes in the capital deviation from the regulatory minimum affect lending spreads asymmetrically. In response to a reduction in the capital deviation, banks with deficits with respect to their risk-weighted capital requirement raise spreads relative to banks with surpluses and de-leverage. Banks respond to higher requirements by raising spreads and, for deficit banks, by cutting lending.     

The impact of changes in bank ownership structure on the allocation of capital: International evidence

A new wave of bank privatizations in the past decade has significantly changed the ownership structure of banking systems around the world. This paper explores how these changes affect the allocation of capital within countries. Increases in domestic blockholder ownership of banks adversely affect the allocation of capital through increased lending activity to less productive industries and to those with less dependence on external finance. This result is more pronounced in countries with higher levels of corruption. I find some evidence that foreign presence improves capital allocation efficiency by increasing lending to more productive industries, primarily in common law countries.     

The impact of bank regulation on the cost of credit: Evidence from a discontinuity in capital requirements

We study the effect on credit relationships of the Small and Medium Enterprises Supporting Factor (SME-SF), a regulatory risk weight reduction on small loans to SMEs. Employing a regression discontinuity design and matched bank-firm data from Italy, we find that a 1 percent drop in capital requirements causes an average 13 basis points reduction in the cost of credit. Moreover, with a novel measure of bank regulatory capital scarcity, we show that the drop is larger for banks facing tighter constraints. Furthermore, the drop is larger for firms with low switching costs, while the sharp assignment rule may have led to the rationing of marginal borrowers. Such findings indicate that the entire distribution of firms and banks’ characteristics plays a crucial role in determining the impact of regulatory capital changes.     

The international transmission of bank capital requirements: Evidence from the UK

We use data on UK banks? minimum capital requirements to study the impact of changes to bank-specific capital requirements on cross-border bank loan supply from 1999Q1 to 2006Q4. By examining a sample in which each recipient country has multiple relationships with UK-resident banks, we are able to control for demand effects. We find a negative and statistically significant effect of changes to banks? capital requirements on cross-border lending: a 100 basis point increase in the requirement is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of cross-border credit of 5.5 percentage points. We also find that banks tend to favor their most important country relationships, so that the negative cross-border credit supply response in “core” countries is significantly less than in others. Banks tend to cut back cross-border credit to other banks (including foreign affiliates) more than to firms and households, consistent with shorter maturity, wholesale lending which is easier to roll off and may be associated with weaker borrowing relationships.     

The impact of foreign stock markets on macroeconomic dynamics in open economies: A structural estimation

With the increased international financial integration in recent years, bilateral financial linkages between countries may have a growing influence on their real economies. This paper employs a structural two-country New Keynesian model, which incorporates a cross-border wealth channel, to estimate the effect that foreign stock market fluctuations may have on macroeconomic variables in open economy countries.The model is estimated using Bayesian methods on a sample of open economies that can potentially be affected by changes in a larger foreign stock market: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland, Austria, and the Netherlands. The estimation allows for deviations from rational expectations and for learning by economic agents.The empirical results indicate important cross-country wealth effects for Ireland and Austria, from fluctuations in the U.S. and U.K. and in the U.S. and German stock markets, respectively; the wealth effect is largest in Ireland. The data favor, instead, specifications with no significant wealth effect for the remaining countries. Foreign stock price fluctuations, however, still play a role by affecting domestic expectations about future output gaps in all countries in the sample.     

Real effects of bank capital regulations: Global evidence

We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998–2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth.     

The impact of foreign bank entry in emerging markets: Evidence from India

This paper uses the entry of foreign banks into India during the 1990s—analyzing variation in both the timing of the new foreign banks’ entries and in their location—to estimate the effect of foreign bank entry on domestic credit access and firm performance. In contrast to the belief that foreign bank entry should improve credit access for all firms, the estimates indicate that foreign banks financed only a small set of very profitable firms upon entry, and that on average, firms were 8 percentage points less likely to have a loan after a foreign bank entry because of a systematic drop in domestic bank loans. Similar estimates are obtained using the location of pre-existing foreign firms as an instrument for foreign bank locations. Moreover, the observed decline in loans is greater among smaller firms, firms with fewer tangible assets, and firms affiliated with business groups. The drop in credit also appears to adversely affect the performance of smaller firms with greater dependence on external financing. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the exacerbation of information asymmetries upon foreign bank entry.     

The impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk

This paper examines the impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk. We use a static model on financial institutions’ risk-taking behavior to quantify the systemic risk in the cross-sectional dimension in both regulated and unregulated systems. Although imposing a capital requirement can lower individual risk, it simultaneously enhances systemic linkage within the system. By using a proper systemic risk measure combining both individual risk and systemic linkage, we show that systemic risk in a regulated system can be higher than that in an unregulated system. In addition, we analyze a sufficient condition under which the systemic risk in a regulated system is always lower.     

Credit cycles and capital flows: Effectiveness of the macroprudential policy framework in emerging market economies

I assess the effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools in containing credit cycles per se or the impact of portfolio inflows on the cycles in major emerging market economies. The results show that borrower-based tools, measures with a domestic focus, and domestic reserve requirements are particularly effective. The findings are, in most cases, stronger for the recent period during which most of the macroprudential actions are undertaken, and generally hold for alternative definitions of credit cycle, the monetary policy stance, and portfolio inflows. Weaker results emerge for financial-institutions-based or foreign-currency related macroprudential tools.     

Foreign bank penetration and the lending channel in emerging economies: Evidence from bank-level panel data

This paper examines the main implications of recently increasing foreign bank penetration on bank lending as a channel of monetary policy transmission in emerging economies. Using a dynamic panel model of loan growth, we investigate the loan granting behavior of 1273 banks in the emerging economies of Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe during the period from 1996 to 2003. Applying the pooled OLS, system GMM, and panel VAR estimators, we find consistent evidence that foreign banks are less responsive to monetary shocks in host countries, as they adjust their outstanding loan portfolios and interest rates to a lesser extent than domestic private banks, independent of their liquidity, capitalization, size, efficiency, and credit risk, and although there exists a bank lending channel in the emerging economies, it is declining in strength due to the increased level of foreign bank penetration. We also explore possible driving factors for the different responses of foreign and domestic banks to monetary policy shocks by investigating foreign banks’ different behavior during banking crises and tranquil periods, the effects of mode of entry to host countries, the home-country effects, and the response of foreign banks from OECD countries vs. all foreign countries including non-OECD countries. We suggest the access of foreign banks to funding from parent banks through internal capital markets as the most convincing explanation.     

Determinants of bank efficiency during unstable macroeconomic environment: Empirical evidence from Malaysia

The present study investigates for the first time the efficiency of Malaysian banking sector around the Asian financial crisis 1997. The efficiency estimates of individual banks are evaluated by using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach. To examine the robustness of the estimated efficiency scores under various alternatives and to differentiate how efficiency scores vary with changes in inputs and outputs, the present study focuses on three major approaches viz., intermediation approach, value added approach, and operating approach. The analysis further links the variation in calculated efficiencies to a set of explanatory variables, i.e. bank size, profitability, and ownership. The empirical findings clearly bring forth the high degree of inefficiency in the Malaysian banking sector, particularly a year after the East Asian crisis. The results suggest that the decline in technical efficiency is more abrupt under the intermediation approach relative to the value added approach and operating approach. The regression results focusing on bank efficiency and other bank specific traits suggest that efficiency is negatively related to expense preference behavior and economic conditions, while bank efficiency is positively related to loans intensity.     

The impact of sovereign rating actions on bank ratings in emerging markets

This paper analyses the effects of sovereign rating actions on the credit ratings of banks in emerging markets, using a sample from three global rating agencies across 54 countries for 1999–2009. Despite widespread attention to sovereign ratings and bank ratings, no previous study has investigated the link in this manner. We find that sovereign rating upgrades (downgrades) have strong effects on bank rating upgrades (downgrades). The impact of sovereign watch status on bank rating actions is much weaker and often insignificant. The sensitivity of banks’ ratings to sovereign rating actions is affected by the countries’ economic and financial freedom and by macroeconomic conditions. Ratings of banks with different ownership structures are all influenced strongly by the sovereign rating, with some variation depending on the countries’ characteristics. Emerging market bank ratings are less likely to follow sovereign rating downgrades during the recent financial crisis period.     

The impact of FDICIA on bank returns and risk: Evidence from the capital markets

This study examines the impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 on bank stock returns and risk. We find that FDICIA had a generally positive effect on bank stock returns and resulted in a significant reduction in bank risk. The extent of the risk reduction varies based on the capitalization, size, and credit risk of the institutions with poorly capitalized, large, and high credit risk banks experiencing the greatest risk reduction. The results obtained using two separate control groups also bolster the conclusion that FDICIA’s passage resulted in a significant decline in bank risk.     

Regulatory impact assessment: a survey of selected developing and emerging economies

This paper reports on a survey of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) in 16 developing and emerging economies. RIA was playing an increasing role in these countries: eight had introduced RIA in the past 10 years; one had recently redesigned its existing RIA system; another had a long-standing RIA system in place. However, RIA was at an early stage of development in the majority of cases and six countries did not practise RIA.     

Credit constraints and investment in human capital: Training evidence from transition economies

Using a unique survey database of 8265 firms from 25 transition economies, I find that lack of access to finance in general, and to bank credit in particular, is associated with significantly lower investment in on-the-job training. This effect is stronger in education-intensive industries and in industries facing good global growth opportunities. To address endogeneity issues, I use the structure of local credit markets as an instrument for credit constraints at the firm-level. In addition, in panel estimates, I control for the presence of unobserved firm-level heterogeneity, as well as for changes in macroeconomic conditions.     

The misconception of the option value of deposit insurance and the efficacy of non-risk-based capital requirements in the literature on bank capital regulation

This study shows how the misconception of the option value of deposit insurance by Merton (1977) and its later misuse by Keeley and Furlong (1990), among others, have led some literature supporting the adoption of binding non-risk-based capital requirements to derive incorrect conclusions about their efficacy. This study further shows that what Merton defines as the option value of deposit insurance is actually a component of a bank's limited liability option under a third-party deposit guarantee. As such, it is already included in the value of the bank's equity capital, and the flawed definition makes the Keeley–Furlong model internally incoherent.     

The impact of non-traditional activities on the estimation of bank efficiency: International evidence

This paper investigates the relevance of non-traditional activities in the estimation of bank efficiency levels using a sample of 752 publicly quoted commercial banks from 87 countries around the world, allowing comparison of the impact of such activities under different levels of economic development, geographical regions and other country characteristics. We estimate both cost and profit efficiency of banks using a traditional function that considers loans and other earnings assets as the only outputs, and two additional functions to account for non-traditional activities, one with off-balance sheet (OBS) items and the other with non-interest income as an additional output. Controlling for cross-country differences in regulatory and environmental conditions, we find that, on average, cost efficiency increases irrespective of whether we use OBS or non-interest income, although the results for profit efficiency are mixed. Our results also reveal that while the inclusion of non-traditional outputs does not alter the directional impact of environmental variables on bank inefficiency, regulations that restrict bank activities and enhance monitoring and supervision provisions improve both cost and profit efficiency.     

The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy

This paper examines the impact of bank ownership concentration on two indicators of bank riskiness, namely banks’ non-performing loans and capital adequacy. Using balance sheet information for around 500 commercial banks from more than 50 countries averaged over 2005–2007, we find that concentrated ownership (proxied by different levels of shareholding) significantly reduces a bank’s non-performing loans ratio, conditional on supervisory control and shareholders protection rights. Furthermore, ownership concentration affects the capital adequacy ratio positively conditional on shareholder protection. At low levels of shareholder protection rights and supervisory control, ownership concentration reduces bank riskiness.