Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation

Financial intermediation naturally arises when knowing how loan payoffs are correlated is valuable for managing investments but lenders cannot easily observe that relationship. I show this result using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers' payoffs are correlated. When projects have correlated outcomes, learning the state of one project (via enforcement) provides information about the states of other projects. A large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement. Thus, intermediation dominates direct lending, and intermediaries are financed with risk‐free deposits, earn positive profits, and hold systemic default risk.     

The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm?s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.     

The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios

We offer evidence that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEOs’ incentive contracts influences the effect of risk‐taking incentives on both the magnitude and composition of firm risk. We find that, when the incentive design lacks RPE features, the incentive portfolio vega motivates CEOs to increase total risk through the systematic component because it can be hedged. In contrast, when the incentive design includes RPE features, CEOs prefer idiosyncratic risk because RPE filters out the systematic component of firm performance. We also document that the use of RPE reinforces the incentive portfolio vega's effect on the total risk.     

A knowledge‐based framework for incorporating investor's preference into portfolio decision‐making

This paper describes a framework for the integration of a rule‐based system capable of identifying an investor's risk preference into a quantitative portfolio model based on risk and expected return. By inferring rules consisting of an investor's objective and subjective risk preferences, the integrated methodology provides the assets suitable for the preferences. Through investment in the portfolio composed of the assets, the investor is able to obtain the following bene?ts: reduction of costs and time spent to determine target assets, and alleviation of anxiety from ‘out‐of‐favor’ assets. The framework is applied to the development of a knowledge‐based portfolio system for constructing an investor's preference‐oriented portfolio. In the procedure of the system for ?nding an optimal portfolio, the system uses an arti?cial intelligence method of a case‐based reasoning to obtain preference thresholds for an investor when the investor's past investment records are available. Experimental results show that the framework contributes signi?cantly to the construction of a better portfolio from the perspective of an investor's bene?t/cost ratio than that produced by the existing portfolio models. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive stock options,differential risk-taking incentives,and firm value

The sensitivity of stock options' payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms' risk more by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the firm's systematic risk can be hedged by a CEO who can trade the market portfolio. Consistent with this prediction, we find that vega gives CEOs incentives to increase their firms' total risk by increasing systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, our results suggest that stock options might not always encourage managers to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative.     

EVIDENCE OF SHIFTS IN PORTFOLIO ASSET COMPOSITION AS A MARKET TIMING TOOL

Previous research has investigated portfolio timing success by analyzing possible shifts in the beta of professionally managed portfolios. The methodology used by these studies usually involves calculating the betas of portfolios under varing market conditions using ex post holding period yields. Since a portfolio's beta can shift for reasons other than timing efforts, the results and interpretation of this type of analysis are limited. This paper takes a more direct approach to the analysis of timing by analyzing shifts in the asset composition of professionally managed portfolios. The asset composition is first analyzed to determine if portfolio managers are attempting to adjust risk exposure. Any shifts that are identified are compared to the market conditions that existed subsequent to the shift to determine if the shift was appropriate in terms of correct timing.     

Banks' interest rate risk: the net interest income perspective versus the market value perspective

We use portfolios of passive investment strategies to replicate the interest risk of banks' banking books. The following empirical statements are derived. (i) Changes in banks' market value and in their net interest income are highly correlated, irrespective of the banks' portfolio composition. (ii) However, banks' portfolio composition has a huge impact on the ratio of changes in net interest income relative to changes in market value. These results are important for the design and interpretation of interest rate stress tests for banks.     

The shrouded business of style drift in active mutual funds

This study investigates the motivation and performance consequence of intentional style drift in an exclusively in-house fund management industry in China. With style drift, fund investors are exposed to investment portfolio outside their risk-return preference but are generally unaware that their risk and return expectations are disrupted, and the functioning of the fund market undermined. Our study provides evidence for the first time about the incentive that motivates style drift behavior. We find that style drift increases a fund's subsequent net inflows, thus affirming the maximization of AUM-linked compensation as the motivation for fund manager's style drift behavior. We also find that larger funds have greater incentive to drift. We demonstrate that style drift behavior interferes with the picking of quality stocks to deliver fund performance for fund investors. Style drift as an unobserved risk behavior harms fund investor interest and undermines market integrity.     

Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios

Using data on European Central Bank's (ECB's) reserve currency portfolios, we find that money managers react to relative rankings (i.e., own vs. peers’ performance) by adjusting portfolio active risk levels measured ex ante by actual deviations from their benchmark. This occurs in the absence of explicit incentives as no monetary reward is promised for winning this “tournament” among portfolio managers. We collect information on managers’ characteristics, including age, education, tenure, salary, and career path, and investigate the role played by implicit incentives. We provide evidence that both individual career concerns and institutional peer pressure contribute to the documented relationship between ranking and risk taking.     

基于藤结构Copula的多元信用风险相关性度量模型及其比较

在信贷组合管理的框架下,以行业信用风险为基础,构建了基于藤结构Copula的多元信用风险相关性度量模型,并以2006年6月～2010年12月中国上市公司数据对模型进行了参数估计,发现Canoni-cal藤结构更适合度量行业信用风险相关性,以电力煤气及水的生产为代表的强周期性行业对信用风险起着引导作用。     

Ex Post Moral Hazard and Bayesian Learning in Insurance

We study a dynamic insurance market with asymmetric information and ex post moral hazard. In our model, the insurance buyer's risk type is unknown to the insurer; moreover, the buyer has the option of not reporting losses. The insurer sets premia according to the buyer's experience rating, computed via Bayesian estimation based on buyer's history of reported claims. Accordingly, the buyer has strategic incentive to withhold information about losses. We construct an insurance market information equilibrium model and show that a variety of reporting strategies are possible. The results are illustrated with explicit computations in a two‐period risk‐neutral case study.     

Clawback policy enforcement: To disclose or not to disclose

The SEC proposed in 2015 to require the disclosure of incentive compensation recovery efforts by companies' boards of directors. While such disclosure of enforcement can signal the effectiveness of corporate governance as the SEC suggested, firms have argued that the proposed enforcement disclosure may harm executives' reputation regardless of their involvement in misstatement because the clawback includes a no-fault clause. Results of our experimental study suggest that when the board does not disclose its clawback enforcement, investors perceive weak corporate governance, particularly when a restatement results from an intentional misstatement. This, in turn, leads investors to be less willing to invest than when clawback enforcement is disclosed. We also find that investors' perception of management reputation is not negatively affected following the board's clawback enforcement disclosure. Overall, our study provides insights into the potential effect of the SEC's proposal requiring the disclosure of clawback enforcement and addresses concerns raised in comment letters.     

Intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation

This paper examines the incentive problem between a bank and depositors (or deposit insurer): limited liability makes risk-shifting lucrative. We show how intertemporal diversification of lending decisions – i.e. bank’s loan portfolio consists of overlapping long-term loans and is thus gradually renewed – may solve the incentive problem of risk-shifting. A new (or expanding) bank sets a high-equity level and acquires depositors’ confidence. Subsequently, it can allow its equity to depreciate to a permanently lower level. Depositors can control the bank by monitoring equity and realized credit losses ex post; they do not have to monitor bank’s lending choices ex ante. Maturity mismatch – illiquidity of long-term loans and liquidity of deposits – is optimal. The analysis can be extended more generally to the borrower–lender relationship.     

Deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system

This paper analyzes how the deposit guarantee value affects the risk incentives in a mutual guarantee system. We liken the guarantee’s value to that of a European-style contingent claims portfolio. The main feature emerging from our model is that a mutual guarantee system would give banks an adverse incentive to increase riskiness. To mitigate this incentive, we introduce a regulatory provision modelled using a path-dependent contingent claim. By comparing the mutual guarantee system with a non-mutual one, we show that the former is less expensive, but implies higher adverse incentives for the banks, especially for undercapitalized institutions.     

Sovereign Debt Portfolios,Bond Risks,and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

We document that governments whose local currency debt provides them with greater hedging benefits actually borrow more in foreign currency. We introduce two features into a government's debt portfolio choice problem to explain this finding: risk-averse lenders and lack of monetary policy commitment. A government without commitment chooses excessively countercyclical inflation ex post, which leads risk-averse lenders to require a risk premium ex ante. This makes local currency debt too expensive from the government's perspective and thereby discourages the government from borrowing in its own currency.     

Convex risk measures based on generalized lower deviation and their applications

Considering the implementability and the properties that a reasonable and realistic risk measure should satisfy, we propose a new class of risk measures based on generalized lower deviation with respect to a chosen benchmark. Besides convexity and monotonicity, our new risk measure can reflect the investor's degree of risk aversion as well as the fat-tail phenomenon of the loss distribution with the help of different benchmarks and weighted functions. Based on the new risk measure, we establish a realistic portfolio selection model taking market frictions into account. To examine the influence of the benchmarks and weighted functions on the optimal portfolio and its performance, we carry out a series of empirical studies in Chinese stock markets. Our in-sample and out-of-sample results show that the new risk measure and the corresponding portfolio selection model can reflect the investor's risk averse attitude and the impact of different trading constraints. Most importantly, with the new risk measure we can obtain an optimal portfolio which is more robust and superior to the optimal portfolios obtained with the traditional expected shortfall risk measures.     

On the distribution and estimation of trading costs

This paper investigates the uncertainty about the trading costs associated with a given portfolio strategy. I derive accurate approximations of the ex ante probability distributions of proportional trading costs and portfolio turnover under the conventional assumption of normal asset returns. Based on these approximations, I express the expected trading costs as a function of asset and portfolio characteristics. All else equal, the expected trading costs increase with: i) the deviations of the expected asset returns from the expected portfolio return, ii) the assets' volatility and iii) the portfolio volatility. At the same time, they decrease with the covariance between the assets and the portfolio. Furthermore, I propose novel estimators of the expected turnover and trading costs and show that they offer small bias and low variance, even when the sample size is small. Finally, I incorporate my results into a portfolio selection framework to produce portfolios with low levels of risk and trading costs. Several experiments with real and simulated data confirm the practical value of the results.     

PORTFOLIO CHOICES,CONSUMPTION, AND PRICES IN A MARKET WITH DURABLE ASSETS

Recent research in investments has focused almost exclusively on financial assets such as corporate stocks. Although durable assets constitute an important part of investors' holdings, little effort has been made to explore their role in individuals' investments decisions and on assets pricing. This paper establishes results concerning the role of durable assets in the determination of optimum portfolio choices. The paper explores the effect of consumption considerations related to the service flows generated by durable assets on optimum portfolio considerations and asset prices. The main result is tied to the existence, or lack thereof, of efficient rental markets. In the absence of rental markets (or with restrictions on renting), investors' portfolio choices are not independent of consumption considerations as they are assumed to be in the standard CAPM. Individuals may thus hold different portfolios, and prices reflect the owner's inability to trade consumption flows. Under perfect market assumptions with unrestricted rental markets, optimum portfolio choices are undistinguishable from those implied by the standard CAPM in the sense that they are mean-variance efficient and identical for all individuals. Consumption is adjusted by trading service flows in the rental market. Prices, and the price of risk, however, reflect the existence of durable assets service flows as well as the risks involved in trading these flows in the rental market. In the model, risky rental income is introduced by uncertain rental costs. Equilibrium rental rates, an important part of the return expected from holding durable assets, are determined in the context of the mean-variance framework as a function of return and undiversifiable risk.     

Comonotonic Approximations for Optimal Portfolio Selection Problems

We investigate multiperiod portfolio selection problems in a Black and Scholes type market where a basket of 1 riskfree and m risky securities are traded continuously. We look for the optimal allocation of wealth within the class of “constant mix” portfolios. First, we consider the portfolio selection problem of a decision maker who invests money at predetermined points in time in order to obtain a target capital at the end of the time period under consideration. A second problem concerns a decision maker who invests some amount of money (the initial wealth or provision) in order to be able to fullfil a series of future consumptions or payment obligations. Several optimality criteria and their interpretation within Yaari's dual theory of choice under risk are presented. For both selection problems, we propose accurate approximations based on the concept of comonotonicity, as studied in Dhaene et al. (2002 a,b) . Our analytical approach avoids simulation, and hence reduces the computing effort drastically.     

Assessing the impact of an EU financial transactions tax on asset volatility: An event study

Under the context of EMU debt and financial crisis, we assess the impact of EMU's announcement of a Financial Transactions tax (FTT) on bond and equity volatilities for seven countries, namely Germany, France (core EMU), Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (periphery EMU). In the absence of historical data on volume and volatility of transactions of such a tax, we utilize the event study methodology. The selected event date considering the FTT announcement was found significant for core EMU's equity portfolio and periphery EMU's bond portfolio. Moreover, under GARCH models, we found that the announcement effect of FTT increases the volatility of both core EMU's equity portfolio as well as periphery EMU's bond portfolio.