Evidence of Early Withdrawal in Time Deposit Portfolios

The embedded options found in some securities are known to have significant impact on product pricing, secondary market valuation, and risk measurement and management. The option to withdraw commonly found in bank deposits is one of the least studied of these. We help to fill this gap by examining the level and interest rate sensitivity of early withdrawals of retail time deposits using panel data from the Thrift Financial Report. We find that longer-maturity time deposit portfolios commonly experience early withdrawals at economically significant levels. Further, we find that depositors respond positively, with increased levels of early withdrawal, to the reinvestment incentive they face when new deposit rates rise. These findings increase our understanding of consumer behavior with regard to financial products and have significant implications for the competitive pricing of deposit products and the management of bank interest rate risk.     

商业银行同业存款利率定价方法研究

随着我国利率市场化进程的不断推进,同业存款在各项存款中率先实现了市场化定价。对同业客户财务价值和非财务价值的分析,是构建同业存款利率定价方法的关键。协调内部资金转移价格、提高流动性水平、完善定价信息系统,有利于提升定价效率。     

A computational approach to the optimal structure of bank input prices

Most bank deposits contain an embedded option which permits the depositor to withdraw funds at will. Demand deposits generally allow costless withdrawal, while time deposits often require payment of an early withdrawal penalty. Managing the risk that depositors will exercise their withdrawal option is an important aspect of input pricing. This paper acknowledges the threat of deposit withdrawal and then solves for the optimal structure of bank deposit rates.     

Identifying,valuing and hedging of embedded options in non-maturity deposits

Non-maturity deposits like savings accounts or demand deposits contain significant option risks caused by the bank’s discretionary pricing and the customers’ withdrawal right. Option risks follow from inherent non-linear factor exposures. I propose an ordinal response model for deposit rate jumps to identify non-linear factor exposures and a discrete-time term structure model to value the resulting option risks and to derive hedge measures “outside the model”. My delta profile resembles a constant maturity swap, but vega and gamma are more pronounced, which demonstrates that the widespread practice of static hedging with zero bonds is inadequate.     

Does deposit insurance improve financial intermediation? Evidence from the Russian experiment

This study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects depositors and banks, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system as a natural experiment. The fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit-taking and decreased reliance upon State-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits. We find that banks entering the new deposit-insurance system increase both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that do not enter the new deposit insurance system. These results hold up in a multivariate panel-data analysis that controls for bank- and time-random effects. The longer a bank has been entered into the deposit insurance system, the greater is its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets. Moreover, this effect is stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks. We also find that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system has the effect of “leveling the playing field” between State-owned banks and privately owned banks. Finally, we find strong evidence of moral hazard following implementation of deposit insurance in the form of increased bank risk-taking. Financial risk and, to a lesser degree, operating risk increase following implementation.     

Collateralization,leverage, and stressed expected loss

We describe a general equilibrium model with a banking system in which the deposit bank collects deposits from households and the merchant bank provides funds to firms. The merchant bank borrows collateralized short-term funds from the deposit bank. In an economic downturn, as the value of collateral decreases, the merchant bank must sell assets on short notice, reinforcing the crisis, and defaults if its cash buffer is insufficient. The deposit bank suffers from losses because of the depreciated assets. If the value of the deposit bank's assets is insufficient to cover deposits, it also defaults. Deposits are insured by the government, with a premium paid by the deposit bank equal to its expected loss on the deposits. We define the bank's capital shortfall in the crisis as the expected loss on deposits under stress. We calibrate the model on the U.S. economy and show how this measure of stressed expected loss behaves for different calibrations of the model. A 40% decline of the securities market would induce a loss of 12.5% in the ex-ante value of deposits.     

Central Bank Digital Currency,Credit Supply,and Financial Stability

We examine the implications of central bank digital currency (CBDC) for credit supply and financial stability using a monetary general equilibrium model. The introduction of deposits in CBDC account decreases credit supply by banks, raising the nominal interest rate and lowering a bank's reserve-deposit ratio. This increases the likelihood of bank panic in which banks exhaust cash reserves. However, once the central bank can lend all the deposits in CBDC account to banks, an increase in the quantity of CBDC which does not require reserve holdings can enhance financial stability by increasing credit supply and lowering nominal interest rate.     

Bank funding stability,pricing strategies and the guidance of depositors

Banks face a ‘behavioralization’ of their balance sheets since deposit funding increasingly consists of non-maturing deposits with uncertain cash flows exposing them to asset liability (ALM) risk. Thus, this study examines the behavior of banks’ retail customers regarding non-maturing deposits. Our unique sample comprises the contract and cash flow data for 2.2 million individual contracts from 1991 to 2010. We find that contractual rewards, i.e., qualified interest payments, and government subsidies, effectively stabilize saving behavior and thus bank funding. The probability of an early deposit withdrawal decreases by approximately 40%, and cash flow volatility drops by about 25%. Our findings provide important insights for banks using pricing incentives to steer desired saving patterns for their non-maturing deposit portfolios. Finally, these results are informative regarding the bank liquidity regulations (Basel III) concerning the stability of deposits and the minimum requirements for risk management (European Commission DIRECTIVE 2006/48/EC).     

De-branching,too-much-branching,and cost of debt of SMEs in Slovakia

We investigate nonlinear effects of bank branch saturation on SMEs' cost of debt at regional level in Slovakia over the period 2013–2019. We adopt the two-step approach by first constructing model of bank branch localization, and then analyzing effects of positive and negative deviations from the equilibrium level. We observe negative effect of debranching, but report no effect of positive increase in deviations from equilibrium level on SMEs' cost of debt. The most affected firms are middle-sized, domestically owned, operating in low-tech industries, and with better creditworthiness. Bank market characteristics also tend to matter for pricing of firm's debt.     

The competitive implications of multimarket bank branching

Retail banking markets have traditionally been viewed as locally limited. However, recent studies have found evidence that large multimarket banking organizations tend to offer uniform interest rates for retail deposit accounts throughout the area that they serve, at least within a given state. This uniform pricing phenomenon raises questions about the continued relevance of the concept of local banking markets for both research and antitrust purposes.We address this issue by employing a model designed to explain the pricing behavior of single-market banks that face competition from multimarket banks. Empirical results are found to be consistent with the many implications of the model. We find that even with multimarket banks present in the market, local market concentration influences the pricing behavior of single-market banks; however, this relationship weakens as the market share of multimarket banks grows. We also find that, on average, multimarket banks offer lower deposit interest rates than do single-market banks operating in the same market, and, in most cases, greater multimarket bank presence is associated with lower deposit interest rates offered by single-market banks.     

现代商业银行贷款定价模型及在我国的应用前景

商业银行贷款定价是商业银行信贷业务中至关重要的环节。关系到银行的资产质量和盈利水平。本文主要对基于现代金融理论的商业银行贷款定价方法进行评述,介绍贷款定价的最新进展,其中主要评述资本资产定价模型、期权定价模型、VaR和RAROC理论等在贷款定价技术中的应用。     

A Model of Monetary Policy and Risk Premia

We develop a dynamic asset pricing model in which monetary policy affects the risk premium component of the cost of capital. Risk‐tolerant agents (banks) borrow from risk‐averse agents (i.e., take deposits) to fund levered investments. Leverage exposes banks to funding risk, which they insure by holding liquidity buffers. By changing the nominal rate the central bank influences the liquidity premium, and hence the cost of taking leverage. Lower nominal rates make liquidity cheaper and raise leverage, resulting in lower risk premia and higher asset prices, volatility, investment, and growth. We analyze forward guidance, a “Greenspan put,” and the yield curve.     

Relationship Banking, Fragility, and the Asset-Liability Matching Problem

We address a fundamental question in relationship banking: whydo banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarilywith core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance suchloans with purchased money? We show that not only are relationshiploans informationally opaque and illiquid, but they also requirethe relationship between the bank and the borrower to endurein order for the bank to add value. However, the informationalopacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawalrisk that makes the bank fragile. Core deposits are an attractivefunding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidityservices to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihoodof premature deposit withdrawal, thereby facilitating the continuityof relationship loans. That is, we show that banks will wishto match the highest value-added liabilities with the highestvalue-added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizesthe bank's fragility owing to withdrawal risk and maximizesthe value the bank adds in relationship lending. We also examinethe impact of interbank competition on the bank's asset-liabilitymatching and extract numerous testable predictions.     

The transformation of banking: Tying loan interest rates to borrowers' CDS spreads

We investigate how the introduction of market-based pricing, the practice of tying loan interest rates to credit default swaps, has affected bank financing. We find that market-based pricing is associated with lower interest rates, both at origination and during the life of the loan. Our results also indicate that banks simplify the covenant structure of market-based pricing loans, suggesting that the decline in the cost of bank debt is explained, at least in part, by a reduction in monitoring costs. Market-based pricing, therefore, besides reducing the cost of bank debt, may also have adverse consequences resulting from the decline in bank monitoring.     

Competition,transmission and bank pricing policies: Evidence from Belgian loan and deposit markets

This paper addresses the pass-through from market interest rates to retail bank interest rates. The paper advocates a heterogeneous approach and applies it to the Belgian banking market. A substantial proportion of the heterogeneity in bank pricing policies can be explained by the bank lending channel and the relative market power hypothesis. The results also suggest that the long-term pass-through is typically less than one-for-one, rejecting the completeness hypothesis. While there is no convincing evidence for asymmetry in retail rates, large deviations from equilibrium mark-ups are faster reduced than small deviations. Overall, conditions for corporate loans are more competitive compared to consumer loans. Demand and savings deposits have, by far, the most rigid prices.     

商业银行资金转移定价系统:转移方法、定价模式与实施建议

资金转移定价系统是商业银行进行利率风险管理、产品定价、资源配置、利润核算、绩效评价、优化决策和提高运营效率的重要工具.实施资金转移定价对商业银行经营管理水平的提高以及竞争力的提升具有很大的促进作用,对提高商业银行产品利率敏感性、完善货币政策传导机制具有不可忽视的影响.本文介绍了资金转移定价的模式和方法,比较了各自的优劣,并结合我国商业银行目前面临的内外部环境特征,指出我国商业银行实行资金转移定价必须注意的几个问题.     

The economics of credit cards,debit cards and ATMs: A survey and some new evidence

This paper provides a critical survey of the large and diffuse literature on credit cards, debit cards and ATMs. We argue that because there are still many outstanding issues and questions about the pricing, use and substitutability of these payment mechanisms, that there are significant further opportunities for research in these areas. A large number of questions are examined in this survey, including the pricing of credit cards, the impact of networks on the provision and pricing of ATMs, as well as the tradeoffs that consumers make between different types of payment mechanism, including debit cards, credit cards and ATMs. Importantly, this paper is also amongst the first to provide new evidence on this latter question from bank level data (from Spain). We conclude that point of sale (debit card) and ATM transactions are substitutes, and that ATM surcharges impacts point of sale volume significantly.     

Bank accounting conservatism and bank loan pricing

This paper studies the effects of bank accounting conservatism on the pricing of syndicated bank loans. We provide evidence that banks timelier in loss recognition charge higher spreads. We go onto consider what happens to the relationship between spreads and timeliness in loss recognition during the financial crisis. During the crisis, banks timelier in loss recognition increase their spreads to a lesser extent than banks less timely in loss recognition. These findings are broadly consistent with the argument that conditional accounting conservatism serves a governance role. The policy implication is that banks timelier in loss recognition exhibit more prudent and less pro-cyclical loan pricing behaviour.     

Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements

We analyze the loan pricing implications of the reform of bank capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains the correlation in defaults across firms. Our loan pricing equation implies that low risk firms will achieve reductions in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the IRB approach, while high risk firms will avoid increases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only a very high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed IRB capital charges, partly because the net interest income from performing loans is not counted as a buffer against credit losses. A net interest income correction for IRB capital requirements is proposed.     

Risk management strategies for banks

We analyze optimal risk management strategies of a bank financed with deposits and equity in a one period model. The bank’s motivation for risk management comes from deposits which can lead to bank runs. In the event of such a run, liquidation costs arise. The hedging strategy that maximizes the value of equity is derived. We identify conditions under which well known results such as complete hedging, maximal speculation or irrelevance of the hedging decision are obtained. The initial debt ratio, the size of the liquidation costs, regulatory restrictions, the volatility of the risky asset and the spread between the riskless interest rate and the deposit rate are shown to be the important parameters that drive the bank’s hedging decision. We further extend this basic model to include counterparty risk constraints on the forward contract used for hedging.