Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market

This paper extends the analysis of optimal income taxation under uncertainty studied by Cremer and Pestieau (International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 281–295, 1996). We introduce asymmetric information in the insurance market whereby private insurance companies cannot identify the risk probability of the agents, and we examine its effect on public policy. We consider the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629–649, 1976) and Riley (Econometrica, 47, 331–359, 1979) where the low risk agent is only partially insured. The presence of the distortion in the insurance market changes the affinity of labor, and in some cases, we show that the scope of redistribution and the resulting social welfare are higher under asymmetric information than under full information. We also show that the increase in social insurance affects the utility and labor incentive of the low risk type by relaxing the self-selection constraint in the insurance market. The policy implications of the redistributive taxation and social insurance are analytically and numerically examined.      

Adverse selection and the market for annuities

Adverse selection is often blamed for the malfunctioning of the annuities market. We simulate the impact of adverse selection on the consumption allocation of annuitants under alternative parameter values, and explore the resulting welfare implications. We show that, for most parameter values, the welfare losses associated with equilibriums that are subject to adverse selection correspond to a loss of wealth of around one percent in a first-best equilibrium. These losses are smaller than the corresponding losses associated with equilibriums with no access to an annuity market by an order of magnitude of ten. The existence of substitutes for annuities such as a bequest motive or a social security system intensifies the adverse selection but reduces its welfare impact.

Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance

A model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed. The model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. Qualitatively, for some agents, incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non-employment. Calibrating the model to a stylized version of the U.S. economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions. The optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1.94% relative to the current U.S. system, an additional 0.87% of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard.     

保险市场逆向选择与顺向选择共存研究

保险市场存在着逆向选择。经典逆向选择模型认为,风险高的人会购买更多的保险,但大多数实证研究表明保险市场还存在顺向选择。本文认为,逆向选择和顺向选择虽然对立,但共存于保险市场,在此基础上构建保险市场均衡模型,并进行了仿真研究。     

我国企业年金逆向选择和道德风险管理研究

当前形势下我国人口老龄化问题日益凸显,基本养老保险制度面临着巨大的支付压力。企业年金在缓解基本养老保险给付方面起到了重大的补充作用,但是我国现行的企业年金在实际运营管理中存在很多问题。论文从委托代理角度分析企业年金各主体之间的逆向选择和道德风险问题,并提出几点相关政策建议,以完善我国企业年金制度,使其更好地为企业职工提供更安全更实惠的社会福利。     

Adverse selection costs for NASDAQ and NYSE after decimalization

NYSE and NASDAQ completed their decimalization on January 29, 2001 and on April 9, 2001 respectively. In this paper, we compare adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread for NASDAQ and NYSE stocks after decimalization using the data from May 2001 and July 2001. We find that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is significantly lower on NASDAQ than on NYSE, and these differences cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the stocks traded in the two markets. In addition, we find that the adverse selection costs increase with trade size on NYSE, however there is no monotonic pattern observed for NASDAQ stocks. Lastly, we report that although the order flows arrived in the two markets are significantly different, they can at best explain a small portion of the observed differences in adverse selection costs.     

Adverse selection when loss severities differ: First-best and costly equilibria

With information asymmetry between contracting parties, adverse selection may result. A separation may be achieved if low-risk types can signal their identity—for example, by selecting from a menu of price-quantity contracts. In such models, signaling is costly and solutions are, at best, second best. These models characterize risk types by differences in the probability, rather than in severity, of the costs they impose. However, when severity differences also are considered, first best solutions become feasible. We identify the circumstances in which costly separating equilibria prevail and those in which full-information equilibria can be attained.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

The peer effect in adverse selection: Evidence from the micro health insurance market in Pakistan

The peer effect may amplify adverse selection in social networks, hampering the sustainable operation of microinsurance. This paper uses data from a micro health insurance program in Pakistan to test for the peer effect in renewal decisions and the role it plays in amplifying adverse selection within social networks. The paper finds evidence supporting that insurance renewal decisions are similar among peers in the same network, and the peer effect is stronger among households of the same risk type than households of different risk types, indicating that the heterogeneous peer effect acts as an amplifier for adverse selection. The paper provides policy implications for effective ways to mitigate the peer effect and adverse selection, based on the results of heterogeneity analyses. The policy recommendation is to enforce a minimum group enrollment rate requirement of at least 60% for large groups to mitigate the peer effect.     

Predicting the long-term stock market volatility: A GARCH-MIDAS model with variable selection

We consider a GARCH-MIDAS model with short-term and long-term volatility components, in which the long-term volatility component depends on many macroeconomic and financial variables. We select the variables that exhibit the strongest effects on the long-term stock market volatility via maximizing the penalized log-likelihood function with an Adaptive-Lasso penalty. The GARCH-MIDAS model with variable selection enables us to incorporate many variables in a single model without estimating a large number of parameters. In the empirical analysis, three variables (namely, housing starts, default spread and realized volatility) are selected from a large set of macroeconomic and financial variables. The recursive out-of-sample forecasting evaluation shows that variable selection significantly improves the predictive ability of the GARCH-MIDAS model for the long-term stock market volatility.     

隐性行业壁垒、市场集中度与中国保险经纪市场结构演进

对于保险经纪市场结构的研究,传统方法是运用市场集中度和市场壁垒指标,而由于我国正处在经济转型期,市场特点与发达国家有所不同,本文提出了隐性行业壁垒的分析方法。基于2005年~2009年保险经纪市场数据进行的两种不同的实证研究显示,我国保险经纪市场结构的演进趋势有所不同:传统分析方法的结果表明,保险经纪市场的总体特征是垄断性较低、竞争性较强,且呈现出竞争性逐步增强的趋势;隐性行业壁垒方法的结果表明,保险经纪市场中存在有较为明显的垄断性特征,且这种垄断性特征随着时间的变化呈现出增强的趋势,结论的差异值得保险经纪市场的监管者、参与者等利益相关者予以高度重视。     

中国财产保险市场分析

中国自1980年恢复国内财产保险业务以来,保费收入以年均25.3%的速度增长,分析中国财产保险市场状况,对完善我国财产市场,有着重要意义。目前我国财产保险市场在发育过程中还面临着较多的矛盾,应从财产保险市场主体、市场结构、产品体系、财产保险市场的空间布局、财产保险市场开放模式等多角度、多方面着手,完善我国财产保险市场体系。     

Risk selection in the London political risk insurance market: the role of tacit knowledge,trust and heuristics

This study demonstrates that the basis of decision-making and risk selection in the London Political Risk Insurance (PRI) market is a combination of Art and Science with such factors as trust and reputation playing an important role. The study breaks new ground by uncovering and examining different methods and strategies of political risk underwriting employed in the insurance market, which does not rely on statistical tools as seen in more traditional insurance types. Adopting a grounded theory approach, the data was generated through 14 semi-structured and unstructured interviews conducted with PRI experts from five PRI companies and two leading political risk broking houses. The data also included documentation reviews and observations.     

保险公司具有信息优势下的保险市场均衡问题研究

本文应用博弈论的方法,分析了当保险公司拥有信息优势时,在完全竞争、垄断经营和销售渠道垄断等不同竞争条件下的市场均衡状况,并通过航意险业务的实际发展过程说明从保险业长远发展角度看,应着力培养市场竞争环境,推动保险费率市场化,丰富保险销售渠道,提高投保人理性购买保险的意识,促使市场实现公平、有效的均衡。     

Audit opinions and information asymmetry in the stock market

This study analyses the relationship between the content of the audit reports and information asymmetry levels in the stock market for a sample of Spanish firms. By implementing an association study, we document (1) that firms with audit qualifications show higher information asymmetry levels than those with unqualified opinions; (2) firms with non‐quantified qualifications show higher informational asymmetry than firms with quantified qualifications; and (3) we find a stronger effect on the level of informational asymmetry in the case of going concern qualifications. Our findings suggest that audit qualifications reporting more uncertainty on firm accounting statements result in higher adverse selection risk.     

财产保险市场主体违规的羊群效应及其规制

本文提出了财产保险市场主体违规的羊群效应的表现形式,建立了监管机构与保险主体之间博弈的理论模型,分析了违规的羊群效应产生的机理,并提出了通过有效监管来规制违规的羊群效应、诱导合规的羊群效应的具体思路。     

保险中介市场风险状况及监管对策

当前,随着保险中介市场的快速发展,市场风险状况不容乐观,一般性风险普遍存在,个别机构因严重违法造成的风险已相当严重,同时,因保险中介经营模式创新引发的风险也不容忽视。这些风险如不能采取有效的监管措施加以控制,势必对保险中介市场平稳健康发展带来严重冲击。为此,应加快完善监管法律法规和制度,严格市场准入并建立有效的市场退出制度,强化保险公司对代理机构和保险营销员的管理责任,改革现行个人保险营销体制,细化从业人员资格考试,实行从业人员分级管理,充分发挥行业协会的自律职能。     

我国车险市场道德风险的博弈分析

车险已成为我国产险的龙头险种,但由于信息不对称,车险市场道德风险已严重制约产险业的发展。各利益主体为自身效用最大化不断博弈的最终结果,使得车险市场整体运行效率大打折扣。本文运用博弈论的研究方法,通过构建博弈模型,对投保人、保险人、保险代理人以及汽车修理商四方行为主体的道德风险进行博弈分析,探寻其最优策略,并给出对策建议。     

我国农业保险发展的市场运行机制研究

在市场经济环境下,市场运行机制是农业保险机制设计的重要组成部分,也是今后在条件成熟后主推的农业保险运行机制选择。但现有文献大多从农业保险发展模式的角度对农业保险进行探讨。本文从市场运行的角度,对农业保险发展的市场运行机制进行系统研究,探索构建我国现实背景下的农业保险发展的市场运行机制。     

Optimal Carried Interest: Adverse Selection in Islamic and Conventional Venture Capital and Private-Equity Funds

In an optimal carried interest model with adverse selection, the optimal profit-loss sharing ratio (PSR) explains how the risk aversion of the two parties can affect their bargaining powers by allowing investors to detect the true risk aversion of fund managers and not their true skills. The higher the management fee, the higher is the PSR. Our simulation exercise shows that when the fund manager is more risk averse than the investor for a higher invested capital and weaker expected net profit, the optimal negotiated profit-sharing ratio will be higher.