Collective exclusion

This paper studies collusion among vertically integrated incumbents who may either delegate output production to a more efficient downstream entrant (“accommodating regime”) or refuse to supply the entrant and produce the final good themselves (“exclusionary regime”). Accommodating agreements yield higher collusive profits, but suffer from contractual frictions: An incumbent may first offer the entrant a high wholesale price for the input, and then undercut the entrant on the final good market, so that the entrant cannot recover its high input costs downstream. When the efficiency gap between the incumbents and the entrant is small, this hold-up effect dominates over the efficiency effect. Depending on modeling choices, exclusionary collusion is then either more profitable than accommodation, or is the only sustainable collusive regime.     

New Wine into Old Wineskins: Recent Developments in China’s Competition Policy Against Monopolistic/Collusive Agreements

China??s anti-monopoly law contains comprehensive legal rules against monopolistic/collusive agreements. However, the legal standards for defining monopolistic agreements and the applicability of exemption and leniency programs need to be further clarified. Moreover, several coordination problems caused by the special organizational features of China??s antitrust institutions need to be addressed carefully. The Chinese antitrust authorities therefore face tremendous challenges in enforcement given both the intrinsic complications of monopolistic conduct and the existence of some inadequacies in the existing competition policy regime.     

The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels

Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements. These programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion. We compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more effective way.We discuss possible adverse effects of whistle-blowing programs on firms' behavior, and particularly on turnover, incentives to innovate and cooperation. We also explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence.     

Collusive pricing patterns in the US airline industry

We formulate two empirical tests for collusive behavior based on the theoretical insights of Werden and Froeb (1994) and Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004). The first predicts that colluding firms will reduce pair-wise differences in prices within a market if demand satisfies certain properties. The second predicts that colluding firms will sacrifice efficiency in production by increasing price rigidity to avoid informational costs. Using panel data from the US airline industry and fixed-effects estimation, we find that greater multimarket contact between carriers leads to pricing patterns consistent with both theoretical predictions, while code-share agreements are consistent with the second prediction.     

Resale and Collusion in A Dynamic Market for Semidurable Goods

The paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second‐hand markets. It will be shown that such incentives crucially depend on the rate of depreciation of the durable good and on consumer heterogeneity. The main contribution of the paper shows that an active second‐hand market may strengthen the incentives to collude, as do policies that affect the functioning of the second‐hand market (e.g., leasing policy and buy‐back). It will also be argued that the oligopoly incentives to adopt strategies that strengthen collusion often differ from the monopoly incentives to increase profits.     

Multimarket contact in Italian retail banking: Competition and welfare

This paper studies banks' competitive behavior on the deposit side of the Italian retail banking industry. We use a structural model to estimate demand for deposit services and test several supply models. We find that both the competitive, differentiated product Bertrand and the perfectly collusive models are rejected against partially collusive models with coalitions based on the participants' market contact. In the best fitting collusive model, the coalition includes 8 banks with at least 19 overlapped regions. Banks with extensive multi-market contacts tend to be less competitive and behave as if they were maximizing their profit jointly, taking into account the competitive fringe of smaller banks.     

Types of synergy and economic value: The impact of acquisitions on merging and rival firms

Acquisitions, in general, have been demonstrated to create economic value. The intuitive reason underlying this value creation stems either from an ability to reduce costs of the combined entity, an ability to charge higher prices, or both. Current research in the area attributes these abilities to an opportunity to utilize a specialized resource. Our focus in this study is to compare three broad classes of resources that contribute to the creation of value. Following the conventional wisdom, these resources are classified as cost of capital related (resulting in financial synergy), cost of production related (resulting in operational synergy), and price related (resulting in collusive synergy). Given the limitations of our sample and research design, we find that collusive synergy is, on average, associated with the highest value. Further, the resources behind financial synergy tend to create more value than the resources behind operational synergy.     

Detecting Collusion

Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.     

On the nature and significance of collusive price leadership

With the help of a simple analytical model we are able to analyze and to further clarify the conditions for collusive price leadership as they were originally devised by Jesse Markham. Within the confines of this model we show how collusion increases price-cost margins, but at the same time decreases concentration in the industry.     

A theory of hub-and-spoke collusion

We develop a model of hub-and-spoke collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers. Demand is stochastic, and collusion between retailers is difficult; the best collusive equilibrium is inefficient (Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)). In the hub-and-spoke collusive agreement, retailers transmit their information about the state of demand to the supplier. The supplier uses this information to adjust the wholesale price. By organizing the collusion, the supplier increases profits of the vertical chain. We show that, surprisingly, this type of collusive agreement can under some conditions improve consumer welfare.     

The great school milk conspiracies of the 1980s

Various dairy companies' allocation of school milk contracts using signalling, sham bids to honor incumbency and other devices are examined to determine whether bidding was collusive or pure oligopolistic interdependent behavior following noncooperative game theory. The schemes used to allocate contracts were found to be efficient methods for reaching agreements. Since pure interdependent (noncoorperative) behavior requires rivals to corelate signals, coordinate expectations, and resolve timing-uncertainty problems within sealed-bidding constraints, detailed analysis of the economic evidence of bidding practices requires rejection of a Nash equilibrium explanation for the behavior.     

Towards a typology of collusive industrial networks: Dark and shadow networks

The prevailing understanding of collusive B2B networks is primarily based on the theories of industrial economists and organizational criminologists. ‘Successful’ collusive industrial networks (such as price-fixing cartels) have been seen to endure due to formal managerial structures of coordination and control. In this paper, we seek to transcend and challenge the understanding of these illegal forms of co-opetition by drawing on evidence from an in-depth examination of four price-fixing cartels that were facilitated chiefly by marketers. Our contribution introduces the notion of ‘shadow networks’ (networks where although attempts are made to ensure secrecy, multilateral modes of network structure dominate akin to ‘normal’ managerial endeavours such as joint ventures) and ‘dark networks’ (networks which appear more opaque and secretive through the adoption of bilateral modes of network structure and limited bureaucracy) to illustrate the types of collusive network forms that may exist. In addition, this allows us to build a deeper understanding of collusive network forms and related inter-firm interaction for an industrial marketing audience. We provide implications for marketing practice, theory, and policy. Specifically, we outline how organizations and the marketing function can perform self-administered antitrust audits in order to help avoid breaches of antitrust. Further, we consider the importance of the two forms of collusive inter-firm networks uncovered where marketers have attempted to render these secret from antitrust agencies, introducing a relatively new line of inquiry to the industrial marketing literature.     

ALTERNATING MONOPOLY AND TACIT COLLUSION*

This paper considers the use of the alternating monopoly strategy (AMS) as a (tacit) collusion device. We show that firms may choose this strategy in particular environments, when other collusive strategies are also feasible. In particular, we stress how the presence of an observable move (entry), distinct from the competitive stage (price setting), can serve as a coordination device, reducing monitoring costs in incomplete information environments. The paper thus shows that AMS may be preferable to the classic market sharing strategy (MSS) and in some cases it is the only collusive equilibrium.     

Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market

This paper studies how communication is used by a retail gasoline cartel in Australia to coordinate price increases, a role of communication in collusion not highlighted by Genesove and Mullin (Am Econ Rev 91(3): 379–398, 2001). A unique data set from the trial record allows for quantifying not only the pricing dynamics, but also the communication patterns. Both empirical and narrative evidence suggests the collusive communication and pricing behavior is well captured by the price cycle equilibrium of the Maskin and Tirole (Econometrica 56(3): 571–599, 1988) model.     

Price-Matching Guarantees and Equilibrium Selection in a Homogenous Product Market: An Experimental Study

Price-matching guarantees have been alleged to sustain collusive prices in a homogenous product market. Theories in this literature also suggest that there exist multiple equilibria (i.e., a set of price equilibria between the competitive and the monopoly price) when all sellers adopt these guarantees in such a market. Theoretical prediction in this case fails to pin down the actual behavior of players a priori. This paper illustrates the essential role of controlled experiment in testing the collusive theory of price-matching guarantees and thereby shedding light on the embedded equilibrium selection problem. In particular, this paper studies two highly stylized market models, obtains testable predictions, and lays out the design of the controlled experiment. Results indicate that these guarantees facilitate collusion among sellers and thus solve the equilibrium selection problem considerably. I am grateful to Jim Cox, Martin Dufwenberg, Haimanti Bhattacharya, and the editor of this journal and the two referees for their suggestions. I thank seminar participants at the University of Arizona and North American Economic Science Association meeting at Tucson, 2003 for their helpful comments. A research grant from ESL, University of Arizona, for this project is gratefully acknowledged. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors and omissions.     

When prohibiting wholesale price-parity agreements may harm consumers

We study the competitive and welfare effects of wholesale price-parity agreements. These contracts prevent a monopolist, who sells its product to final consumers both directly and indirectly through alternative distribution channels, to charge different input (wholesale) prices to competing intermediaries (e.g., platforms). In a multi-channel and multi-layered industry, organized as an agency business model, we find that the monopolist and the intermediaries do not necessarily have aligned incentives concerning the introduction of wholesale price-parity. While these agreements always hurt the monopolist, they may benefit the intermediaries when competition between the direct and the indirect distribution channels is sufficiently intense. Moreover, when this is the case, in contrast to retail price-parity agreements that typically reduce consumer welfare, wholesale price-parity may also benefit consumers.     

Cooperatives in Bolivia: Customer ownership of the local loop

Cooperatives have been used by the inhabitants in rural areas to gain access to telecommunications. In Bolivia and Finland, for example, consumer cooperatives have been for many years the only mechanism to provide local telecommunication services to the whole country. This paper studies the effects of the Bolivian market's structure on the development of competition as well as on universal access and service policies. It argues that some cooperatives after the liberalisation of the market are not helping to develop competition. Cooperatives may have incentives to increase the interconnection charges that they receive from long distance firms to cross-subsidise the prices of local calls. Moreover, as some cooperatives have entered the long distance market, they may try to restrict competition through collusive agreements. Finally, the paper suggests that the excessive price of the cooperatives’ shares may have damaged the possibility of reaching a higher penetration level and greater coverage in rural areas.     

Family business groups in Thailand: coping with management critical points

Using insights drawn from business history and business group literature, we develop a model to analyze how family business groups in late industrializing countries cope with management resource limitations that plague them in their pursuit of growth and diversification. A field study was conducted analyzing 215 family business groups in Thailand. Results suggest that family business groups will survive, and even prosper, if they are able to adapt their strategies and modernize their management styles to overcome three management resource limitations (or “management critical points”)—fund raising, production technology, and human resources. There is a detailed discussion of the different strategies that help to extend these upper limits or management critical points. We then divide family business groups into four types, which are based on their diversification and management strategies. We argue that their performances vary and that the modernized single business type and the modernized conglomerate type will be the future forms of family business groups, which will ensure that they remain competitive in the new global economy. Using our model, we conclude that family business groups in Thailand are still disinclined to make the transition to managerial enterprises, according to the conventional Anglo-Saxon model.     

Food aid as a tool of development: The experience of PL 480, Title III

This article reviews the experience of the US Food for Peace Program (PL 480) under Title III, with the objective of identifying some of the limitations and possibilities of using food aid as a development tool. It will argue that while multi-year agreements are inflexible, the settings in which the agreements are to be implemented are turbulent and uncertain. Combining food aid with development also makes severe demands upon the administrative capacity of both field missions and recipients, resulting in a reluctance on the part of both to initiate agreements.     

Optimal Comparable Selection and Weighting in Real Property Valuation

This paper formalizes certain aspects of the sales comparison approach to valuation that heretofore have been quite ad hoc. Specifically, it applies statistical theory to decisions about how many comparables to select, what the criteria for comparable selection should be, and how the proper weights for each adjusted value estimate can be determined such that the final value estimate is both unbiased and of minimum variance. Several results are derived that run counter to conventional practice; for example, it may not always be optimal to consider first the "best" comparables because of a lack of independence among their adjusted value estimates. Furthermore, it is always desirable to consider more comparables (regardless of how "bad") so long as their adjusted value estimates are optimally weighted in the final value estimate. Finally, weights usually selected for "inferior" comparables are typically too small. A final exercise empirically applies the methodology to a sample of sales.