共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 36 毫秒
1.
“Si él lo necesita” (if he really needs it) was the most common argument given by the subjects who accepted the zero offer in the ultimatum
game (strategy method) during experiments conducted among illiterate (adult) gypsies in Vallecas, Madrid. Interestingly the
acceptance of the zero offer was not a rare case but, in contrast, was the modal value. This is even more remarkable if we
consider that the 97% of the subjects proposed the equal split.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9126-0.
JEL Classification D63 · D64 · C93 · J15 相似文献
2.
Patrizia Sbriglia 《Experimental Economics》2008,11(2):107-121
The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of information on levels of reasoning on individuals' choices in p-beauty contest games. In the baseline design, subjects received information only on the average and target values from the
previous period. In the alternative design, the winner(s) explained in a short message (30 words maximum) what reasoning he/she
applied in selecting the target value and then stopped playing. The winner's message, the winning number, the target and average
values were then displayed on all computer screens. The results show that non-winning players imitate the level of rationality
of winners, and a significant proportion of the population adopt strategies which are best responses to other imitators' behaviour
rather than to the average level of rationality. Both the imitative strategies and the best responses to the imitative strategies
stimulate a strong acceleration of the learning process.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at .
JEL Classification C72, C91, C92 相似文献
3.
We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects’ concern
for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the
bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament
game with two control treatments affords us a clean test of subgame perfection as well as a measure fairness-induced play.
We find after 10 iterations of play that about half of all non-subgame-perfect demands are due to fairness, and the rest to
imperfect learning. However, as suggested by models of learning, we also confirm that the ultimatum game presents an especially
difficult environment for learning subgame perfection.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C91, D64, J52 相似文献
4.
Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building
on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we
document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of
uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of
participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a
significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many
others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on
the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision
making in economic situations.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y.
JEL Classification C91, D83 相似文献
5.
In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer significantly more than the minimum possible and Responders reject “unfair” offers. In this work, we show that when the ultimatum bargaining game is presented as an abstract game tree, the vast majority of behavior is consistent with individualistic preferences and subgame-perfection. This finding raises doubts about theories that ignore the potential influence of social context and experiments that do not control for social context. 相似文献
6.
Michael Peters 《The Review of economic studies》2001,68(3):613-631
A competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have correlated private information about their valuations. In contrast to the monopoly case where sellers charge entry fees and extract all buyers' surplus, it is shown that in the unique symmetric equilibrium with competition, sellers hold second price auctions with reserve prices set equal to their cost. Most important, it is a best reply for sellers not to charge entry fees of the kind normally used to extract surplus, even though it is feasible for them to do so. 相似文献
7.
Daniel Friedman Kai Pommerenke Rajan Lukose Garrett Milam Bernardo A. Huberman 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(1):79-104
We seek to isolate in the laboratory factors that encourage and discourage the sunk cost fallacy. Subjects play a computer
game in which they decide whether to keep digging for treasure on an island or to sink a cost (which will turn out to be either
high or low) to move to another island. The research hypothesis is that subjects will stay longer on islands that were more
costly to find. Eleven treatment variables are considered, e.g. alternative visual displays, whether the treasure value of
an island is shown on arrival or discovered by trial and error, and alternative parameters for sunk costs. The data reveal
a surprisingly small sunk cost effect that is generally insensitive to the proposed psychological drivers.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at .
Jel Classification C91, D11 相似文献
8.
We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision
environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and
a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner
belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual
donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve
a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be
irrelevant.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at .
JEL Classification C91, C72, D3 相似文献
9.
Consider a generalization of fictitious play in which agents′ choices are perturbed by incomplete information about what the other side has done, variability in their payoffs, and unexplained trembles. These perturbed best reply dynamics define a nonstationary Markov process on an infinite state space. It is shown, using results from stochastic approximation theory, that for 2 × 2 games it converges almost surely to a point that lies close to a stable Nash equilibrium, whether pure or mixed. This generalizes a result of Fudenherg and Kreps, who demonstrate convergence when the game has a unique mixed equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 000, 000, 000. 相似文献
10.
Paul Streeten 《Review of Political Economy》2013,25(4):587-588
Abstract In a contribution to this journal, Bernard Walters &; David Young offer a brief sketch of critical realism and three objections to it. This reply starts with three points of clarification to their sketch before going on to tackle their objections. 相似文献
11.
The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted. 相似文献
12.
Elicitation using multiple price list formats 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Steffen Andersen Glenn W. Harrison Morten Igel Lau E. Elisabet Rutström 《Experimental Economics》2006,9(4):383-405
We examine the properties of a popular method for eliciting choices and values from experimental subjects, the multiple price
list format. The main advantage of this format is that it is relatively transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives
for truthful revelation. The main disadvantages are that it only elicits interval responses, and could be susceptible to framing
effects. We consider extensions to address and evaluate these concerns. We conclude that although there are framing effects,
they can be controlled for with a design that allows for them. We also find that the elicitation of risk attitudes is sensitive
to procedures, subject pools, and the format of the multiple price list table, but that the qualitative findings that participants
are generally risk averse is robust. The elicitation of discount rates appear less sensitive to details of the experimental
design.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C9, D81, D91
An erratum to this article is available at . 相似文献
13.
In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical
model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model,
Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find experimental evidence that players select the center-sponsored star. Based on a slight
modification of Bala and Goyal’s model, we design a network formation experiment in which, depending on link costs, periphery-sponsored
stars and the empty network are the only strict Nash networks. We observe that almost all groups not only reach a strict Nash
network once but also switch the center player in periphery-sponsored stars several times. The main innovation in our experiment
is to use a continuous time framework which we believe to be a more realistic setting to study behavior in network formation
situations and which makes coordination on stars much easier than simultaneous strategy adaptation in discrete time.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9125-1.
JEL Classification C72 · C92 · D81 相似文献
14.
We run an experiment where 97 subjects could retrieve records of completed past auctions before placing their bids in current
one-bid, two-bid, and auction-selection games. Each subject was asked to participate in 3 current auctions; but could retrieve
up to 60 records of completed (past) auctions. The results reveal a positive relation between the payoffs earned by the subjects
and their history-inspection effort. Subjects act as if responding to the average bidding-ratios of the winners in the samples
that they have retrieved. They apply intuitive signal-dependent stopping rules like “sample until observing a winner-value close to my won” or “find a close winner-value and try one more history” when sampling the databases. History-inspection directs bidders with relatively high private-valuations to moderate bidding
which increases their realized payoffs. (JEL C9 D4 D8)
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C93, D44, D83 相似文献
15.
Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining
coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at
high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial
incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or
start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the
key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full
feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination
failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good
coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and
(3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full
feedback.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C92, D23, J31, L23, M52 相似文献
16.
We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of
politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents
is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model
by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation
of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social
costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent
is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player
can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at .
JEL Classification C91, D72 相似文献
17.
Tetsuo Yamamori Kazuhiko Kato Toshiji Kawagoe Akihiko Matsui 《Experimental Economics》2008,11(4):336-343
We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’
anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before
the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In
particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases.
Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
18.
Alexander Matros 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,111(1):110-124
Saez-Marti and Weibull (J. Econom. Theory 86 (1999) 268) investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's (J. Econom. Theory 59 (1993) 145) bargaining model, which is how they introduce “cleverness” of players. I analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games and show Young's (Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998) prediction to be robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategy distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents. 相似文献
19.
Eitan Israeli 《Games and Economic Behavior》1999,28(2):518
Consider a two-person repeated game, where one of the players, P1, can sow doubt, in the mind of his opponent, as to what P1's payoffs are. This results in a two-person repeated game with incomplete information. By sowing doubt, P1 can sometimes increase his minimal equilibrium payoff in the original game. We prove that this minimum is maximal when only one payoff matrix, the negative of the payoff matrix of the opponent, is added (the opponent thus believes that he might play a zero-sum game). We obtain two formulas for calculating this maximal minimum payoff. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8. 相似文献
20.
Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A Social Utility Analysis 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We explain the main features of the results of the four-country ultimatum bargaining experiments of Roth et al. (1991), Amer. Econom. Rev.81, 1068–1095) by a social utility model. The specification of social utility of a player has two parts: a linear combination of the monetary payoffs of the proposer and the responder and payoff uncertainty. We find that, on average, responders have negative regard for proposers' earnings in all countries. Proposers have negative regard for responders' monetary earnings in countries where responders have high negative regard for proposers' earnings (USA and Slovenia). In countries where responders have low negative regard for proposers' earnings (Israel and Japan), proposers are expected payoff maximizers. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: A13, C19, C44, C72, C92, D63, D64. 相似文献