Government policy and the probability of coordination failures

This paper introduces an approach to the study of optimal government policy in economies characterized by a coordination problem and multiple equilibria. Such models are often criticized as not being useful for policy analysis because they fail to assign a unique prediction to each possible policy choice. We employ a selection mechanism that assigns, ex ante, a probability to each equilibrium indicating how likely it is to obtain. We show how such a mechanism can be derived as the natural result of an adaptive learning process. This approach leads to a well-defined optimal policy problem, and has important implications for the conduct of government policy. We illustrate these implications using a simple model of technology adoption under network externalities.     

Interest expectations and exchange rates news

Using a new survey data set ofmatched exchange rate and interest rate expectations for eight currencies relative to the German mark, we examine empirically the relationship between exchange rate returns, news and risk premia. News on interest differentials enters significantly in equations for the difference between the spot rate and the lagged forward rate for the British pound, Japanese yen, Spanish peseta and the US dollar. An unexpected rise in the interest rate differential tends to strengthen the domestic exchange rate. For each of these currencies, we also find significant effects of our ex-ante measure of the risk premium. In addition, we investigate the effect of lagged interest rate differentials as proxy for the risk premium and find that they do not capture time-varying risk premia as is widely suggested in the literature, but probably capture a peso-problem, learning about a policy change, a market-inefficiency or a combination of these factors.     

Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study

We use experimental methods to investigate what factors contribute to breakdowns in coordination among a bank’s depositors. Subjects in our experiment decide whether to leave their money deposited in a bank or withdraw it early; a bank run occurs when there are too many early withdrawals. We explore the effects of adding uncertainty about fundamental withdrawal demand and of changing the number of opportunities subjects have to withdraw. Our results show that (i) bank runs are rare when fundamental withdrawal demand is known but occur frequently when it is stochastic, and (ii) subjects are more likely to withdraw when given multiple opportunities to do so than when presented with a single decision. For the multiple-opportunity case, we evaluate individual withdrawal decisions according to a set of simple cutoff rules. We find that the cutoff rule corresponding to the payoff-dominant equilibrium of the game, which involves Bayesian updating of probabilities, explains subject behavior better than other rules.     

Beyond market failures: the market creating and shaping roles of state investment banks

The paper develops a typological framework of the roles of state investment banks (SIBs) in the economy. The typology identifies four different roles: countercyclical; developmental; venture capitalist; and challenge-led. The paper conceptually elaborates the typology by first providing a historical overview of SIBs, and then discussing how the mainstream “market failure theory” justifies them. It then advances a different conceptualization based on insights from heterodox economics, showing that all roles of SIBs are more about market creating/shaping rather than market-failure fixing. The paper concludes with a proposal of a new agenda for research on SIBs based on our typological framework.     

World real interest rates: a global savings and investment perspective

Over the past 15 years, long-term interest rates have declined to levels not seen since the 1970s. This article explores possible shifts in global savings and investment that have led to this fall in the world real interest rate. There are several key findings. First, the authors identify the relative weakness in investment demand as more important than the relative increase in desired global savings to explain the decline in global interest rates. Second, the results indicate that the key factors explaining movements in savings and investment are variables that evolve relatively slowly over time, such as labour force growth and age structure. The conclusions suggest that over the coming years, world real interest rates are likely to continue to adjust slowly, reflecting long-term trends.     

Interest rates and the fisher effect in India: An empirical study

This study throws light on the importance of adjustment lags, variability of inflation, changes in real income, etc. in the empirical estimation of Fisher hypothesis. Variability of inflation has a significant negative impact on both short- and long-term interest rates in a developing economy like India. The ‘Philips Curve Effect’ has not been operative in a developing country.     

Interest rates,expectations and the credibility of the Bank of Spain

The purpose of the paper is to pinpoint the date of the change of monetary policy regime which occurred in Spain during the year 1984, when it moved away from controlling monetary aggregates towards interest rate targeting. The most likely date for the change is estimated and, surprisingly, there is evidence that agents learned about the new intermediate target quite rapidly.A week after the change, the term structure of interest rates showed how market agents attributed much more informational content to interest rate changes than they had previously. Two types of transitions are tried: a one-step and a gradual logistic swithing function.     

Interest rates,government purchases and the Taylor rule in recessions and expansions

In this paper we study asymmetries in the Taylor rule for the United States during the 1970–2012 period. We show that monetary authorities have been constantly concerned with excess demand in overheated periods – when the output gap is positive or the unemployment rate falls below 7% or 7.5% – raising the interest rate aggressively in that case. However, the Fed seems more reluctant to decrease the fund’s rate during recessions. On the contrary, monetary authorities react symmetrically and forcefully to inflation in booms and busts. Finally, we provide evidence that an expansionary fiscal policy does not lead to an increase in interest rates, and thus there is not necessary a “crowding-out” effect in recessions.     

Concatenate coordination and mutual coordination

We tell of the evolving meaning of the term coordination as used by economists. The paper is based on systematic electronic searches (on “coord,” etc.) of major works and leading journals. The term coordination first emerged in professional economics around 1880, to describe the directed productive concatenation of factors or activities within a firm. Also, transportation economists used the term to describe the concatenation of routes and trips of a transportation system. These usages represent what we term concatenate coordination. The next major development came in the 1930s from several LSE economists (Hayek, Plant, Hutt, and Coase), who extended that concept beyond the eye of any actual coordinator. That is, they wrote of the concatenate coordination of a system of polycentric or spontaneous activities. These various applications of concatenate coordination prevailed until the next major development, namely, Thomas Schelling and game models. Here coordination referred to a mutual meshing of actions. Game theorists developed crisp ideas of coordination games (like “battle of the sexes”), coordination equilibria, convention, and path dependence. This “coordination” was not a refashioning, but rather a distinct concept, one we distinguish as mutual coordination. As game models became more familiar to economists, it was mutual coordination that economists increasingly had in mind when they spoke of “coordination.” Economists switched, so to speak, to a new semantic equilibrium. Now, mutual coordination overshadows the older notion of concatenate coordination. The two senses of coordination are conceptually distinct and correspond neatly to the two dictionary definitions of the verb to coordinate. Both are crucial to economics. We suggest that distinguishing between the two senses can help to clarify “coordination” talk. Also, compared to talk of “efficiency” and “optimality,” concatenate coordination allows for a richer, more humanistic, and more openly aesthetic discussion of social affairs. The narrative is backed up by Excel worksheets that report on systematic content searches of the writings of economics using the worldwide web and, using JSTOR, of Quarterly Journal of Economics, Economic Journal, Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, and Economica.     

Public sector motivation and development failures

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the relationship between public sector motivation and development. In the model the public sector produces a public good and workers are heterogeneous in terms of public sector motivation (PSM). Wages in the private sector increase with the quality of the public good. In this context, public sector wage premia (PSWP) have two opposite effects: low PSWP helps screen workers with PSM into the public sector, while high PSWP helps motivate workers to be honest. Raising PSWP may not improve the quality of governance and multiple equilibria might arise. The model highlights that the relative importance of workers selection and provision of ”on the job” incentives in the public sector varies in systematic ways with wages in the private sector. We provide anecdotal and original empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions and discuss some policy implications for public sector reforms in developing countries.     

Interest and profit

This paper argues that it is important to distinguish between the real rate of interest on money and the profitability of business enterprise. The former is a purely financial or monetary phenomenon （as claimed by Keynes） and the latter is in the nature of a surplus over and above the costs of production, including financing costs. There is an inverse relationship between the real rate of interest on money and the average mark-up or profit share. A synthetic theory of profit illustrates these points.     

中国的利率管制与利率市场化

中国政府的金融约束政策在维系金融体系稳定、促进经济发展和金融深化等方面曾取得令世人瞩目的成就 ,但利率管制的金融约束政策也付出了一定的代价。随着中国加入WTO的临近和中国金融市场的开放 ,利率市场化已经成为历史的必然 ,然而目前实施利率市场化仍然存在着众多的约束。只有解除这些约束 ,中国利率市场化改革方可稳健地进行     

Flows of direct investment and their effects on investment in Canada

An accelerator-flow of funds model of investment is used to estimate the effects of direct investment abroad by Canadian firms and direct investment by foreign firms on domestic investment in Canada for the period 1957.I–1971.IV. The results show that direct investment abroad has a negative effect, whereas foreign direct investment has a positive effect on domestic investment. The latter results confirm earlier findings by Caves and Reuber (1971).     

区域一体化、地方利益冲突与利益协调

由于区域利益与地方利益之间存在一致性与差异性、群体性与集中性、中观性与微观性的矛盾属性,导致区域合作中的地方利益冲突无法避免,且利益冲突涉及到社会、政治、经济和自然环境等诸多领域,阻碍了区域合作和经济一体化进程。为了协调利益冲突,亟待树立合作共赢理念,完善利益分配协商、利益分享与补偿、利益争端调解、利益共享等机制。     

Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties: An international political perspective

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognizing that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.