Corporate investment and earnings surprises

ABSTRACT

We find that firm-level investment is negatively related to the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ short-term EPS forecasts. In a 35-year panel dataset of US based companies, we find evidence that suggests firms with the best growth opportunities, opaque firms, and firms with higher than usual bonus compensation, are the ones to alter investment in order to beat benchmarks. Utilizing the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley as a natural experiment we find that firms trade off accruals-based earnings management in lieu of investment cuts. Results are robust to a number of covariates, and endogeneity or reverse causality does not seem to drive our inferences. This study suggests that, consistent with survey results from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005. “The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 3–73], managers may reduce or delay corporate investment to meet or beat short-term earnings benchmarks.     

Corporate investment and stock market valuation

We study the driving forces behind the positive association observed between corporate investment and stock market valuation, and how they interact with managerial equity incentives and informativeness of investment. We build a dynamic model where managers use investment choices to influence investors' opinions about firms' future prospects and increase the market valuation. The incentives to manipulate the valuation processes increase with managerial equity incentives and informativeness of investment. Our empirical findings support the model's predictions that the tendency of using investment to boost market valuation is stronger when managerial stock ownership is high or when earnings quality is low (i.e., there is strong reliance on investment for information).     

Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of corporate actions and their debt-equity mix. Using this result, we show that asymmetric information induces firms with good prospects to speed up investment, leading to a significant erosion of the option value of waiting to invest. Additionally, we demonstrate that informational asymmetries may not translate into a financing hierarchy or pecking order over securities. Finally, we generate a rich set of testable implications relating firms’ investment and financing strategies, abnormal announcement returns, and external financing costs to a number of managerial, firm, and industry characteristics.     

Corporate efficiency,credit status and investment

This paper considers the relationship between financial frictions and investment. In an effort to clarify the role of cash flow in examining the impact of capital market imperfections, endogenous switching regression models are estimated for a panel of 1122 UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period of 1981–2009. Not only is the financial regime which the firm faces endogenous, we also allow the regime to change over time via modeling efficiency using stochastic frontier analysis. The results reveal that a firm's constrained credit status changes with the improvement of its efficiency. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that financially constrained firm's investment is comparatively more sensitive to its cash flow. Moreover, this sensitivity is statistically significant and is negatively related with corporate efficiency.     

Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets

Inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud, where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors' beliefs, has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention. We reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets, building on shareholder‐manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets. Because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof, the optimal renegotiation‐proof contract induces overstatements by managers, accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors. Our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud.     

Corporate diversification,investment efficiency and the business cycle

I document the time-varying investment efficiency of conglomerates compared with single-segment firms. I find that, during recessions, conglomerates have higher Q-sensitivity of investment than do stand-alone firms, in contrast to the relationship during expansion periods. I also find that conglomerates, with the benefits from internal capital markets, exhibit increased dependence of investment on internal capital during recessionary periods, while stand-alone firms significantly increase cash retention and deviate their investment from its optimal level more severely. I examine the effect of the degree of diversification and find consistent evidence on investment efficiency and deployment of internal capital. I also provide evidence that conglomerates with stronger governance do not improve investment efficiency during recession, which suggests that agency costs cannot fully explain the changes in investment of conglomerates.     

Corporate equity ownership, investment, and product market relationships

This paper examines the effect of corporate equity ownership on investment when firms have product market relationships. Firms have incentives to hold long equity positions when their products are complements. These equity positions induce the firms to increase their real investment expenditures. In contrast, firms have incentives to hold short equity positions when their products are substitutes. These short positions commit the firms to a more aggressive product market stance, and also result in increased real investment expenditures. Our model offers an explanation for the empirical relationship between the establishment of corporate equity stakes and increased investment spending documented by Allen and Phillips (2000).     

Corporate investment and bank-dependent borrowers during the recent financial crisis

We use the recent financial crisis period to analyse the effect of bank credit tightening on firm investment. We derive a new set of credit tightening indexes from the ECB Bank Lending Survey. Combining these with annual balance sheet data from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Portugal, we exploit the heterogeneity in the dependence on bank finance of different industries to identify real effects of credit tightening. We show that in response to tightening, investment falls substantially more in bank-dependent industries.     

Effects of winsorization: The cases of forecasting non‐GAAP and GAAP earnings

This study examines how the winsorization procedure affects the performance of regression‐based earnings forecasting models. I find that the impact is multifaceted and depends principally on three factors: the level of data errors in the tails, the characteristics of firms affected by the process, and the use of scaling. For a non‐GAAP earnings yield specification, where data input errors exist, winsorization changes the information set in a non‐systematic way and helps to improve the performance of regression‐based forecasts, especially when the least squares estimator is employed. However, for a non‐GAAP earnings per share specification, with fewer data input errors found in the tails of the distribution, winsorization has a particularly strong effect on very large companies, lowering the economic value of earnings predictions. I observe similar results for corresponding GAAP earnings specifications. Robust estimators, such as least absolute deviation, high breakdown‐point and Theil‐Sen, appear to be a more effective solution than winsorization. Their earnings forecasts consistently yield significant positive abnormal returns across non‐GAAP and GAAP earnings specifications.     

Corporate investment myopia: a horserace of the theories

This paper tests two theories of corporate investment myopia which predict a distortion in investment policy with respect to the standard net present value rule. The theories are confronted with the empirical evidence, allowing the theories to compete to explain investment behavior. Research and development expense is used to proxy for long-term investment in a pooled, cross-sectional time-series regression. I find that research and development expense is decreasing in the age of the Chief Executive Officer. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that agency costs are lower when the firm invests myopically, rather than follow a standard net present value rule.     

Corporate financing of investment opportunities in a world of institutional cross-ownership

Institutional cross-owners, specifically institutional investors with significant stakes in multiple firms in the same industry, are becoming increasingly common in the United States. In this paper, we investigate and find that the presence of institutional cross-owners facilitates a firm's financing of its investment opportunities, consistent with institutional cross-owners reducing the adverse selection concerns of those who provide capital for the investment opportunities. We then examine the conditions under which the presence of institutional cross-owners is likely to more significantly reduce adverse selection and thereby have even more of a positive effect on the financing of investment opportunities. We document that relative to transient institutional cross-owners, dedicated institutional cross-owners facilitate more financing of investment opportunities. We also find that institutional cross-owners facilitate the financing of investment opportunities even more for firms with greater dependence on external financing, those with an opaque financial reporting environment, and those with more product market competition. Our paper offers novel insight into how a firm can benefit from the presence of institutional cross-owners.     

Corporate financing decisions, managerial market timing, and real investment

Both market timing and investment-based theories of corporate financing predict under-performance after firms raise capital, but only market timing predicts that the composition of financing (equity compared with debt) should also forecast returns. In cross-sectional tests, we find that the amount of net financing is more important than its composition in explaining future stock returns. In the time series, investment-based factor models explain abnormal stock performance following a variety of corporate financing events that previous studies link to market timing. At the aggregate level, the amount of new financing is also more important for future market returns than its composition. Overall, our joint tests reveal that measures of real investment are correlated with future returns and measures of managerial market timing are not.     

Corporate financial and investment policies when future financing is not frictionless

We study a model in which future financing constraints lead firms to have a preference for investments with shorter payback periods, investments with less risk, and investments that utilize more pledgeable assets. The model also shows how investment distortions towards more liquid, safer assets vary with the marginal cost of external financing and with firm internal cash flows. Our theory helps reconcile and interpret a number of patterns reported in the empirical literature, in areas such as risk-taking behavior, capital structure choices, hedging strategies, and cash management policies. For example, contrary to Jensen and Meckling [Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the Firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 305–360], we show that firms may reduce rather than increase risk when leverage increases exogenously. Furthermore, firms in economies with less developed financial markets will not only take different quantities of investment, but will also take different kinds of investment (safer, short-term projects that are potentially less profitable). We also point out to several predictions that have not been empirically examined. For example, our model predicts that investment safety and liquidity are complementary: constrained firms are specially likely to decrease the risk of their most liquid investments.     

Corporate cash holdings,foreign direct investment,and corporate governance

The determinants of corporate cash holdings in the context of corporate governance theories have recently been analyzed in the literature. In the present study, the behavior of corporate managers in countries with poor shareholder rights protection is more in conformity with the agency problem theory than other corporate governance theories. Also, smaller firms tend to hold larger cash balances relative to their total assets than their larger counterparts. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in today's highly integrated capital markets act as substitutes for corporate cash holdings. When firms in G-7 countries are separated from the ones in other countries, FDI inflows demonstrate different effects on international corporate cash holdings: They are substitutes for cash holdings in the former group of countries but become complements for cash holdings by firms in the latter one.     

Corporate financing and anticipated credit rating changes

Firm circumstances change but rating agencies may not make timely revisions to their ratings, thereby increasing information asymmetry between firms and the market. We examine whether firms time the securities market before a credit rating agency publicly reveals its decision to change a firm’s credit rating. Using quarterly data, we show that firms adjust their financing structures before credit rating downgrades are publicly revealed. Specifically, firms on average increase their debt financing by 1.29 % before the disclosure of a rating downgrade, and this increase is due to the issuance of debt rather than the repurchase of equity. In contrast, firms do not take significant financing actions before credit rating upgrades.     

Corporate investment during the financial crisis: Evidence from China

China's growth model suggests that the 2008 financial crisis may have affected the Chinese economy differently from what one observes in mature market economies. In this paper, we examine how Chinese corporate investment responded to the financial crisis by using 1689 listed nonfinancial firms during Q12006–Q32010. We document that (1) the overall impact of the financial crisis on Chinese corporate investment is negative; (2) among three channels conveying the effect of the financial crisis, namely, the demand channel, the financial constraints channel, and the uncertainty channel, the demand channel dominates; (3) financial assets held by a nonfinancial firm are important in explaining the firm's fixed investment behaviour; (4) as compared to non-state firms, state-controlled firms are less affected by the financial crisis and more active in engaging in financial assets investment; and (5) foreign ownership can be seen as a buffer against the negative effect of the financial crisis and foreign-involved Chinese firms are less active in financial assets investment as compared to domestic firms.     

Economic consequences of mandatory GAAP changes: The case of SFAS No. 158

This study examines management's reaction to the SFAS No. 158 requirement to recognize previously disclosed post-retirement benefit obligations on the balance sheet. The results indicate that managers attempted to mitigate the impact of the standard by increasing the assumed pension discount rate in subsequent periods. Further, the discount rate choice was related to the magnitude of the SFAS No. 158 balance sheet adjustment. Specifically, firms with larger required liability adjustments and more volatile pension assets and obligations were more likely to increase their discount rates. The findings have important implications for research regarding the economic consequences of accounting regulations and in particular the debate surrounding recognition versus disclosure since they indicate that managers react to the relocation of information from the financial statement footnotes to the balance sheet.     

Corporate liquidity,investment and financial constraints: Implications from a multi-period model

In single period models, financially constrained firms invest more in response to increases in their net worth or interest rate cuts. We examine whether or not these results necessarily hold in a multi-period setting. We present a multi-period version of the Holmstrom and Tirole moral hazard model and show that the probability of investment (or the hurdle rate for investment) in the first period of a two-period model is non-monotonic in the level of liquid balances [Holmstrom, B., Tirole, J., 1997. Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector. Quart. J. Econ. 112 (3), 663–691. August; Holmstrom, B., Tirole, J., 1998. Private and public supply of liquidity. J. Polit. Economy 106 (1), 1–40. February; Holmstrom, B., Tirole, J., 2000. Liquidity and risk management. J. Money, Credit, Banking 32 (3), 295–319. August]. When a risk-free interest rate is introduced in the model, we show that a lower interest rate (or a downward shift or the yield curve) can lead to less current investment due to the interaction of future financial constraints and discounting of cash flows. Our results have implications for the effect of monetary policy on investment by financially constrained firms. They also address several recent empirical debates, such as the relationship between liquidity and the cash-flow sensitivity of investment, and whether or not accumulation of cash balances by Japanese firms can be consistent with the existence of financial constraints affecting investment.     

由美国会计准则的制定方式和概念框架在GAAP中层次的发展想到的

一、美国会计准则的制订方式将向以原则为基础、以目标为导向发展2000年后,美国上市公司连续出现安然、世通等财务欺诈案件,导致了《2002萨班斯—奥克斯莱法案》的出台。该法案的重要性,特别是对财务会计和报告的影响,不亚于1933年《证券法》和1934年的《证券交易法》。除组建上市公司会计监督委员会(PCAOB),加强对独立审计师的监管外,会计方面主要采取两大措施:一是改革会计准则的制订方式,提出从以规则为基础(Pules—based),转向以目标为导向,以原则为基础(Anobjectives—oriented,Principlesbased);二是改进完善现有的财务会计概念公…