An empirical examination of transaction‐ and firm‐level influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm

A large literature has successfully employed transaction cost economic theory to describe how exchange conditions affect the optimal form of organization. However, this approach has historically not accounted for the influence of firm‐specific attributes on the governance decision. This paper develops a model based on insights from transaction cost economics, the resource‐based view, and real options theory to examine how transaction‐level characteristics, firm‐specific capabilities, and product‐market scope influence the governance of production. Empirical evidence derived from analysis of 469 make‐or‐buy decisions involving 117 semiconductor firms indicates that decisions regarding the governance of production activities are strongly influenced by both transaction‐ and firm‐level effects. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do firms both make and buy? An investigation of concurrent sourcing

Transaction cost economics, neoclassical economics, and the firm capabilities literatures propose theories of the firm that typically depict firm boundaries determined by a dichotomous choice: the make or buy decision. However, none of these theories presents a satisfying explanation as to why firms would concurrently source, i.e., simultaneously make and buy the same good. This study combines these organizational economics theories and compares when firms make, buy, and concurrently source through surveying small manufacturing firms. Support was shown for aspects of all three theories, with evidence indicating that concurrent sourcing is a distinctly different choice, rather existing along a make/buy continuum. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

EXPLAINING FIRM CAPITAL STRUCTURE: THE ROLE OF AGENCY THEORY VS. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS

The study of capital structure has increasingly gained importance in strategic management research. Paradigms derived from organizational economics have also gained popularity in explaining firm actions. Agency theory and transaction cost economics represent two such paradigms that rely on the notion of market imperfections. Notwithstanding the similarities between them, these two offer different explanations of the role of debt and equity in a firm. The governance abilities of the financing structures and the nature of assets of the firm provide two key sources of differences. Viewing capital structure from transaction cost economics gives rise to predictions that are contradictory to those presented by agency theory. It is argued that the extant evidence mainly supports the transaction cost viewpoint. Two organizational phenomena—leveraged buyouts and product diversification—are used to highlight the comparison.     

Reassessing the fundamentals and beyond: Ronald Coase,the transaction cost and resource‐based theories of the firm and the institutional structure of production

In this paper, three points are argued. The first is that Ronald Coase, best known as the forefather of transaction cost theory, foresaw many of the critical questions that proponents of the resource‐based view are concerned with today. The second is that resource‐based theory plays a potentially much more critical role in economic theory and in explaining the institutional structure of production than even many resource‐based scholars recognize. The last point is that a more complete understanding of the organization of economic activity requires a greater sensitivity to the interdependence of production and exchange relations. The arguments presented in this paper highlight important, but relatively ignored, elements in Coase's work that inform strategy research. More importantly, this paper makes the case for a triangular alignment between the triumvirate of governance structure, transaction, and resource attributes and demonstrates how the identity and strategy of a particular firm influences how its resources interact with the transaction and how the firm chooses to govern it. The general argument is then applied to the context of interfirm collaborative relations, where the key focus is broadened from just cost to also include skills/knowledge and the interdependence between cost and skills with respect to firm boundaries, both in terms of choice and nature. Such a broadening of focus enables us to additionally examine the transacting process as a productive endeavor, which underpins the co‐evolution of the competencies of partner firms. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Actions speak louder than modes: antecedents and implications of parent implementation capabilities on business unit performance

Firm boundaries and strategic execution affect the firm's ability to generate rents, grow, and survive. Boundaries are determined through governance mode choices, such as whether to make or buy a particular good or activity. While significant work has addressed the performance implications of this fit, less attention has been directed toward strategic execution, or implementation. In particular, the impact of corporate parents has been understudied. We suggest that parent‐level implementation capabilities of operating expertise gained through related experience and coordination from collocation combine with governance mode choices to jointly affect performance. By employing theories of organizational economics and testing predictions in casual dining chains, this paper unpacks the relationship between implementation, governance mode choice, and performance. Our findings suggest that parent capabilities may be more important than mode choice fit and that parent benefits are contingent upon mode choice and type of performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The performance implications of “grow or buy” decisions in the wine industry

This paper investigates how wineries’ decisions to grow or buy their provisions of grape affect their viticultural performance. While previous literature in agrarian economics suggests a direct association between vertical integration and performance, this research largely neglects the impact of transaction cost variables on governance mode choice and firm performance. This paper first demonstrates that neither outsourcing nor vertical integration per se result in superior performance; rather, a winery’s viticultural performance is contingent upon the alignment of winery’s governance decisions with the predictions of transaction cost theory.     

Transactional hazards,institutional change,and capabilities: Integrating the theories of the firm

Using a detailed dataset from the Chilean construction industry, we explore how the predictions of the transaction cost and capabilities theories interact to explain building contractors' decisions to ‘make or buy’ the specialty trade activities needed to complete a construction project. We show that the contractor's productive capabilities strongly mediate the relationship between transaction hazards that originate from either temporal specificity or an exogenous change in the subcontracting law and the vertical integration decision. The inclusion of differential capabilities and its interaction with transactional hazards infuse contractors' boundary choices with systematic patterns of heterogeneity and contribute to the integration of these theoretical perspectives. Our analysis corrects for the endogeneity of the capabilities variable and provides a detailed assessment of the marginal effects in logit models. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

公司治理合约的制度基础、演进机理与治理效率

最优公司治理合约是人们在给定局限条件下理性选择的结果。社会制度基础就是公司治理合约选择的给定局限条件。社会制度基础主要影响产权界定类型和界定效率，进而决定包括内生交易费用和外生交易费用在内的总交易费用以及交易效率，导致人们所选择的公司治理合约形式不同。特殊关系治理合约和普遍关系治理合约是两种典型的治理合约形式，其内生和外生交易费用的值不同。内生和外生交易费用是相互替代的，科学选择治理合约形式可以有效降低总交易费用。社会制度基础发生变化，最优的治理合约形式也将随之发生相应变化。而制度演化具有明显的路径依赖特征，简单模仿他国的经验是不可取的。     

Sourcing practices and boundaries of the firm in the financial services industry

We investigate sourcing decisions related to the back‐office operations of 108 processes used by financial services companies. Guided by the arguments of transaction cost economics and the resource‐based and knowledge‐based view of organizations, we hypothesize that service customization and volume represent two key drivers of a service company's sourcing decisions. The inherent uncertainty of service customization gives rise to the transaction cost risks of opportunism and holdups and thus favors insourcing. Moreover, the competency gained from performing high‐volume back‐office operations aligns with the tenets of the resource‐based view, which also favors insourcing. The empirical results corroborate these theoretical expectations. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Losing sight of the forest for the trees? Productive capabilities and gains from trade as drivers of vertical scope

Focusing on proving or disproving transaction cost economics has led to a relative neglect of some key drivers of vertical scope, such as differences in productive capabilities (as opposed to capabilities of governance). We consider how productive capability differences can shape vertical scope through gains from trade. Using highly detailed data from the mortgage banking industry, we find productive capabilities to be a key determinant of the make‐vs.‐buy decision. Our analysis also suggests firms' attempts to leverage a comparative advantage can also lead to the use of mixed governance modes (both ‘make’ and ‘buy’ in a particular part of the value chain). We conclude that the distribution of productive capabilities along the value chain, catalyzed by transaction costs, ultimately drives vertical scope. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How much to make and how much to buy? An analysis of optimal plural sourcing strategies

While many theories of the firm seek to explain when firms make rather than buy, in practice firms often make and buy the same input—they engage in plural sourcing. We argue that explaining the mix of external procurement and internal sourcing for the same input requires a consideration of complementarities across and constraints within modes of procurement. We create analytical foundations for making empirical predictions about when plural sourcing is likely to be optimal and why the optimal mix of internal and external sourcing may vary across situations. Our framework also proves useful for assessing the possible estimation biases in transaction level make‐or‐buy studies arising from ignoring complementarities and constraints. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

中国铁路重组的企业边界问题分析

中国铁路的重组问题实际上是一个企业边界重新划分的问题，本文试图根据科斯关于交易成本的概念和威廉姆森关于规制结构随交易性质而变化的观点，提出分析中国铁路重组中企业边界问题的思路。     

Choosing governance modes for external technology sourcing

This study examines the effect of uncertainty on governance mode choice of interfirm relationships in new business development (NBD). We combine transaction cost economics and real options reasoning, arguing that in the early stages of NBD, where technological and market uncertainty are very high, companies are better off using governance modes that are reversible and involve a low level of commitment. When uncertainty has decreased as a result of prior R&D investments, transaction costs considerations become dominant and companies will shift towards governance modes that are less reversible and more hierarchical. We argue that technological distance leads to less hierarchical governance modes and prior cooperation between firms leads to subsequent choices for more hierarchical modes. Finally, we propose that higher exogenous uncertainty leads to less hierarchical governance modes.     

A sociological view on why firms differ

Much theory and research that apparently seeks to explain why firms differ actually addresses the question of why successful firms differ. This article explains why the two questions are different and explores some of the implications of this difference for the field of strategic management. A wide variety of organizational and economic theories are reviewed in this context, including contingency theory, resource dependence theory, process models, dispositional models, transaction cost economics, organizational ecology and institutional theory. Further discussion considers why heterogeneity persists at the firm level when it becomes apparent that only certain types of firms will succeed.     

Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type

Formal and relational governance mechanisms are used in strategic alliances to coordinate resources and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. While recent work has shown that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, we understand little about when one approach is superior to the other. Using data on the governance choices and subsequent performance of alliances in the German telecommunications industry, we find that the optimal configuration of formal and relational governance mechanisms depends on the assets involved in an alliance, with formal mechanisms best suited to property‐based assets and relational governance best suited to knowledge‐based assets. Furthermore, a mismatch between governance mechanisms and asset type can harm the performance of the alliance. Our findings contribute to transaction cost economics, the literature on relational governance, and recent work studying their interaction. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Behavioral assumptions and theory development: the case of transaction cost economics

From a critical realist perspective, I discuss the role played by behavioral assumptions in organization theories, and use transaction cost economics as an illustrative example. Core behavioral assumptions often constitute the foundation of the mechanismic explanations of a theory, and thus should play a pivotal role in theory development. I distinguish between assumption‐based and assumption‐omitted theory testing, and show that empirical research in transaction cost economics has been dominated by assumption‐omitted testing. To establish a solid foundation for a new theory, management researchers should pay more attention to assumption‐based testing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Opportunity costs and non‐scale free capabilities: profit maximization,corporate scope,and profit margins

The resource‐based view on firm diversification, subsequent to Penrose ( 1959 ), has focused primarily on the fungibility of resources across domains. We make a clear analytical distinction between scale free capabilities and those that are subject to opportunity costs and must be allocated to one use or another, thereby shifting the discourse back to Penrose's ( 1959 ) original argument regarding the stock of organizational capabilities. The existence of resources and capabilities that must be allocated across alternative uses implies that profit‐maximizing diversification decisions should be based upon the opportunity cost of their use in one domain or another. This opportunity cost logic provides a rational explanation for the divergence between total profits and profit margins. Firms make profit‐maximizing decisions to increase total profit via diversification when the industries in which they are currently competing become relatively mature. Due to the spreading of these capabilities across more segments, we may observe that firms' profit‐maximizing diversification actions lead to total profit growth but lower average returns. The model provides an alternative explanation for empirical observations regarding the diversification discount. The self‐selection effect noted in recent work in corporate finance may not be indicative of inferior capabilities of diversifying firms but of the limited opportunity contexts in which these firms are operating. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The choice among acquisitions,alliances, and divestitures

This paper investigates how firms choose among acquisitions, alliances, and divestitures when they decide to expand or contract their boundaries. The dataset covers 9276 deals announced and completed by 86 members of the Fortune 100 between 1990 and 2000. Our findings support explanations based on resources, transaction costs, internalization, organizational learning, social embeddedness, asymmetric information, and real options, and suggest that these theories are highly related and complementary. We find less consistent support for theories based on agency costs and asset indivisibilities. The strong role of firm attributes explains in part why firms may pre‐specify whether they will pursue acquisitions, alliances, or divestitures as part of their corporate strategies. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Restructuring diversified telecom operators

The paper examines restructuring cycles among diversified major telecom operators from two different perspectives, the governance deficiency perspective of agency theory and the governance efficiency perspective of transaction cost economics, the former being less consistent with the spirit of recent pro-competitive regulatory reforms than the latter. This restructuring cycle describes how incumbent operators grew larger and more diversified during the telecom boom before they were transformed into more efficient scale and scope either by economizing managers or by market forces along with actively intervening owners and bondholders during the subsequent telecom bust. A cycle whose expansion phase is characterized by highly acquisitive companies expanding into non-related activities followed by a delayed contraction phase where overdiversified companies are being restructured by market forces and intervening owners and bondholders is consistent with the reform-non-compliant governance deficiency thesis of agency theory. A cycle whose expansion phase is characterized by acquisitive companies expanding into related activities followed by a contraction phase where companies are restructured by their own managers after having realized that previously acquired assets have become more redeployable and their services more tradable is consistent with the reform-compliant governance efficiency thesis of transaction cost economics. Now, in the aftermath of the contraction phase of the business cycle, more narrowly focused incumbents are once again ready for another round of acquisitive expansion. Anecdotal evidence from five restructuring cases, along with available secondary information about the development of the industry, seems to support the reform-noncompliant governance deficiency thesis of agency theory rather than the reform-compliant governance efficiency thesis of transaction cost economics.