Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem

We examine a setting in which property rights are initially ambiguously defined. Whether the parties go to court to remove the ambiguity or bargain and settle before or after trial, they incur enforcement costs. When the parties bargain, a version of the Coase theorem holds. However, despite the additional costs of going to court, other ex-post inefficiencies, and the absence of incomplete information, going to court may ex-ante Pareto dominate settling out of court. This is especially true in dynamic settings, where obtaining a court decision today saves on future enforcement costs. When the parties do not negotiate and go to court, a simple rule for the initial ambiguous assignment of property rights maximizes net surplus. A paper circulated under the same title and dated 6 March 2000 contained the basic structure examined in this paper, but did not develop many of the results reported here. For comments, we would like to thank participants at the WZB-CEPR contests conference and seminar audiences at the University of Southern California, the University of British Columbia, UC Davis, and UC Riverside.     

科斯三定理的新表述与新证明

科斯第二定理指出,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,产权的不同界定会对资源配置效率产生影响。政府(或法院)的基本原则应该是把权利界定给能以较低交易费用解决外部性问题的一方。科斯第三定理的准确含义是,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,制度安排的生产本身是有成本的,净收益最大的制度安排就是最佳的选择。科斯第二、三定理为市场经济中普遍存在的外部性问题提供了新的解决措施和科学的决策原则,间接意味着科斯并非政府干预的完全反对者,科斯定理也不足以成为有些学者把新制度经济学定性为新自由主义的充分理由。     

Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem

We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62, D82.     

An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem

We investigate, in an experimental setting, the effect of private information on the Coase theorem's predictions of efficiency and allocative neutrality. For a two-person bargaining game, we find significantly more inefficiency and allocative bias in the case of private information compared with the case of complete information. We also find substantial bargaining breakdown, which is not predicted by the Coase theorem. For the case of private information, we reject the Coase theorem in favor of the alternative of a generalized version of the Myerson—Satterthwaite theorem, which predicts inefficiency, allocative bias in the direction of the disagreement point, and some bargaining breakdown.     

法经济学视角下的环境规制问题研究

环境规制是一个已经讨论了很长时间的问题,其主要规制手段——行政手段和市场手段早已为人们所熟知。近年来,相对于坚持两种规制手段均为主的美、日、德等环境规制效果较好的国家,我国越来越倾重于以市场手段为主来进行环境规制,但规制效果相对以上国家却仍然存在较大差距。找到环境规制效果差别巨大的原因对于构建和谐社会,促进人与自然协调发展具有极为重要的关键性作用。以法经济学作为切入点来考察坚持两种环境规制手段均为主的原因以及这样做的意义和影响,从而指出我国环境规制政策中的不足和效果不佳的原因,并为我国进一步完善环境规制政策和改善环境规制效果提出意见建议。     

The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.     

中国农民闲暇生活的困境与出路分析

农民闲暇是农民群众生活方式的重要组成部分。改革开放以来,中国农民闲暇生活方式发生了极大变化,农民对闲暇生活的需求日益凸显,但目前中国农村闲暇生活还存在休闲设施匮乏、休闲内容单一等困境,而造成这一现象的深层原因即是农村公共生活的匮乏。重建农村公共生活是解决农村闲暇生活不足的有效措施。     

信息通信公共服务:概念、内涵与评价体系

通过对信息通信公共服务的概念和内涵进行界定和探讨,构建了包含4项评价维度(服务投入、服务资源、服务提供和服务效果)和16项具体指标的信息通信公共服务评价体系,并采取层次分析法确定了指标权重。     

Strength of the Social Dilemma in a Public Goods Experiment: An Exploration of the Error Hypothesis

We present the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in the interior of the strategy space. The treatment variable is the equilibrium contribution level. By increasing the equilibrium contribution level, we reduce the strength of the social dilemma. Though we observe that the average level of contribution rises with the equilibrium contribution level, the average rate of over-contribution is not affected in a systematic way. Over-contribution is statistically significant only at the lower level of equilibrium contribution but not at the higher levels. We show that the Anderson et al. (1998, Journal of Public Economics. 70, 297–323) logit equilibrium model which combines altruism and decision errors fits quite well our laboratory data.     

制度偏好差异与医药分业的困境

医药企业和患者集团对医药分业有强烈的制度偏好,是推动改革的主导力量。但由于其在制度体系中的地位以及自身特点等原因,对政策制定的影响力较弱。而处于政策制定核心地位的中央部门,由于过于强调争取和维护本部门利益,对医药分业制度安排难以达成一致意见,无法形成统一的方案,致使我国的医药分业改革进程陷入停滞。要推进改革,实现彻底的医药分业,需要协调各集团的利益,并构建各集团能够实现有序博弈的制度平台。     

Ethnic diversity, tax limitations and public goods

One strand of research in public economics has found that increasing ethnic diversity leads to reductions in provision of productive public goods. Another strand of research has emphasized the key role that tax and expenditure limitations play in the provision of public services. This paper explores the interaction between these two effects. The regression results suggest that the prior results on ethnic diversity are robust when TELs are taken into consideration. In addition, the imposition of TELs mitigates the negative effect of ethnic fragmentation on the share of local spending on education and roads. It also mitigates the positive correlation between ethnic diversity and total local government revenue and expenditure per capita.     

“奥尔森困境”的博弈分析及对我国地方政府间区域公共产品有效提供的启示

在集体选择过程中,在许多情况下,多数人未必能战胜少数人,这种情况被称为"奥尔森困境".集体行动的决策实际上是集体内部的个体相互博弈的结果.     

Backward Induction and the Game-Theoretic Analysis of Chess

This paper scrutinizes various stylized facts related to the minmax theorem for chess. We first point out that, in contrast to the prevalent understanding, chess is actually an infinite game, so that backward induction does not apply in the strict sense. Second, we recall the original argument for the minmax theorem of chess—which is forward rather than backward looking. Then it is shown that, alternatively, the minmax theorem for the infinite version of chess can be reduced to the minmax theorem of the usually employed finite version. The paper concludes with a comment on Zermelo's (1913) nonrepetition theorem. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

劳动力市场搜寻与匹配理论——2010年诺贝尔经济学奖得主的重要贡献

彼得.戴蒙德、戴尔.莫滕森和克里斯托弗.皮萨里德斯三人因在劳动力市场搜寻与匹配理论及其应用的突出贡献,共同获得2010年诺贝尔经济学奖。其中,戴蒙德通过提出著名的戴蒙德悖论,开创了劳动力市场搜寻与匹配理论框架;在此基础上,莫滕森认为,建立工资公告等匹配机制有助于劳动力市场博弈实现均衡,从而拓展了摩擦性失业相关理论研究;而皮萨里德斯则通过推动匹配函数与工资议价等的确立,进一步完成了劳动力市场搜寻与匹配理论的系统化过程。借鉴该理论,中国劳动力市场应做出提高信息传播效率、提高农村的信息水平、政府制定针对性相关政策等改进。     

汇率冲击向贸易品价格传递的实质、研究维度与困境

汇率冲击向贸易品价格传递的实质是关于贸易品价格粘性的研究。经过近三十年的发展,对汇率传递现象的微观研究渐趋成熟。从不完全传递的微观成因、汇率波动的属性对汇率传递的影响以及实证研究方法等三个维度梳理主要的微观理论和实证进展,并指出近年来微观研究发展缓慢的原因及若干理论困境,包括汇率传递的不对称性和商品及国家间异质性的来源不清,经济全球化的新特征未能在微观理论研究上得以体现。     

电力产业化解两难困境的经济学研究

从供需均衡角度分析了长期困扰中国电力产业的两难困境(电力短缺和电价过高),而产生两难困境的根源在于垂直一体化垄断;尽管电力体制改革在一定程度上打破了这种垄断,但是电网公司的输配售一体化垄断仍然成为化解两难困境的梗阻;通过网售分开,在电力产业构建充分竞争的电力市场,有效降低电力的生产和零售成本,成本的降低推动供给曲线向右下方平移,在其他条件不变的前提下实现既降低电价又增加电量的目的,从而有效化解两难困境。