Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem

We examine a setting in which property rights are initially ambiguously defined. Whether the parties go to court to remove the ambiguity or bargain and settle before or after trial, they incur enforcement costs. When the parties bargain, a version of the Coase theorem holds. However, despite the additional costs of going to court, other ex-post inefficiencies, and the absence of incomplete information, going to court may ex-ante Pareto dominate settling out of court. This is especially true in dynamic settings, where obtaining a court decision today saves on future enforcement costs. When the parties do not negotiate and go to court, a simple rule for the initial ambiguous assignment of property rights maximizes net surplus. A paper circulated under the same title and dated 6 March 2000 contained the basic structure examined in this paper, but did not develop many of the results reported here. For comments, we would like to thank participants at the WZB-CEPR contests conference and seminar audiences at the University of Southern California, the University of British Columbia, UC Davis, and UC Riverside.     

Much ado about nothing? The controversy over the validity of the Coase theorem

The controversy over the theoretical validity of the ‘Coase theorem’ is closely linked to the controversy over the correct statement of it, since the principal need is to determine what valid generalizations can be made on the basis of Coase’s 1960 Coase, R. H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3:1–44.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] examples. The present article does not aim to review the content of the controversy as such, but rather to question the reasons behind it: why so much noise about a proposition that is patently unrealistic (because of its assumption of zero transaction costs)? I argue that the prominence of the controversy, namely of the question of the validity (and statement) of the ‘Coase theorem’, can be analytically explained by the roles this ‘theorem’ plays in microeconomics: it is critical (of the standard theory of market failures), heuristic (drawing out the consequences of the efficiency assumption), and normative (conveying an optimistic view of the efficiency of exchange). I stress that these roles depend on the nature of the exchange defined in the formulation of the ‘theorem’. And I conclude that they rest upon the cooperative bargaining version, and therefore on an optimistic belief in the ability of people to find efficient agreements.     

科斯三定理的新表述与新证明

科斯第二定理指出,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,产权的不同界定会对资源配置效率产生影响。政府(或法院)的基本原则应该是把权利界定给能以较低交易费用解决外部性问题的一方。科斯第三定理的准确含义是,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,制度安排的生产本身是有成本的,净收益最大的制度安排就是最佳的选择。科斯第二、三定理为市场经济中普遍存在的外部性问题提供了新的解决措施和科学的决策原则,间接意味着科斯并非政府干预的完全反对者,科斯定理也不足以成为有些学者把新制度经济学定性为新自由主义的充分理由。     

Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem

We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62, D82.     

An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem

We investigate, in an experimental setting, the effect of private information on the Coase theorem's predictions of efficiency and allocative neutrality. For a two-person bargaining game, we find significantly more inefficiency and allocative bias in the case of private information compared with the case of complete information. We also find substantial bargaining breakdown, which is not predicted by the Coase theorem. For the case of private information, we reject the Coase theorem in favor of the alternative of a generalized version of the Myerson—Satterthwaite theorem, which predicts inefficiency, allocative bias in the direction of the disagreement point, and some bargaining breakdown.     

Segmented Work and Divided Workers: A Review Article

The Coase theorem is often interpreted as demonstrating why private negotiations between polluters and victims can yield efficient levels of pollution without government interference. It is considered by many to provide the theoretical underpinnings for "free-market" solutions to environmental problems. This article explains why misinterpreting Coasian negotiations as a market driven process leads to erroneous conclusions. More importantly, this article demonstrates why negotiations between polluters and victims would fail to yield efficient outcomes even if property rights were well-defined, even if there were only a single victim, even if negotiations entailed no transaction costs, and even if negotiators behaved rationally and reached a successful agreement. Unlike other critiques of the Coase theorem that focus on irrational behavior and transaction costs, our critique identifies perverse incentives that arise even under conditions most favorable to the theorem. By accepting, rather than challenging, the premises of the theorem, our analysis provides an "internal" critique that strengthens well-known "external" criticisms.     

法经济学视角下的环境规制问题研究

环境规制是一个已经讨论了很长时间的问题,其主要规制手段——行政手段和市场手段早已为人们所熟知。近年来,相对于坚持两种规制手段均为主的美、日、德等环境规制效果较好的国家,我国越来越倾重于以市场手段为主来进行环境规制,但规制效果相对以上国家却仍然存在较大差距。找到环境规制效果差别巨大的原因对于构建和谐社会,促进人与自然协调发展具有极为重要的关键性作用。以法经济学作为切入点来考察坚持两种环境规制手段均为主的原因以及这样做的意义和影响,从而指出我国环境规制政策中的不足和效果不佳的原因,并为我国进一步完善环境规制政策和改善环境规制效果提出意见建议。     

Coase on broadcasting, advertising and policy

The initial argument developed in this paper is that a wants-basedconception of the objectives of policy, clearly operative inhis broadcasting studies, together with the acceptance of certainassumed properties of the competitive process, tightly constrainCoase's work. At times, for example, when considering the impactof advertising, Coase accepts that the assessment of policymust be carried out on a broader basis. Coase does not, however,go on to develop a criterion beyond wants. Elsewhere, he highlightsthe importance of the distinction between wants and needs. Thispaper further argues that, by elaborating upon this distinction,it becomes possible to give an indication of how a broader frameworkfor the assessment of policy might be developed.     

现代不确定性理论的比较研究

不确定性分析是现代经济理论产生的前提.奈特是不确定性理论的开创者,在对风险和不确定性划分的基础上,奈特解释了利润的来源,并对企业的性质进行了界定.科斯在分析企业理论时,对奈特的不确定性理论进行了批判.威廉姆森是继科斯之后集交易成本理论之大成者.无论是奈特、科斯或是威廉姆森都重视不确定性对企业的影响,但他们三者在不确定性的内涵、理论地位及分析方法上都存在不同.     

The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.     

中国农民闲暇生活的困境与出路分析

农民闲暇是农民群众生活方式的重要组成部分。改革开放以来,中国农民闲暇生活方式发生了极大变化,农民对闲暇生活的需求日益凸显,但目前中国农村闲暇生活还存在休闲设施匮乏、休闲内容单一等困境,而造成这一现象的深层原因即是农村公共生活的匮乏。重建农村公共生活是解决农村闲暇生活不足的有效措施。     

信息通信公共服务:概念、内涵与评价体系

通过对信息通信公共服务的概念和内涵进行界定和探讨,构建了包含4项评价维度(服务投入、服务资源、服务提供和服务效果)和16项具体指标的信息通信公共服务评价体系,并采取层次分析法确定了指标权重。     

嵌入理论视角下军民科技人才共享模式、困境及治理

科技人才是国家战略性资源。我国军工科技人才和民用科技人才长期处于割裂状态,无法有效支撑国家创新驱动发展战略和军民融合发展战略。基于嵌入理论,分析军民科技人才共享的嵌入制度基础、嵌入需求基础和人才趋同基础。根据嵌入性质与人才隶属关系改变与否,提出虚拟嵌入、实体嵌入和智力嵌入3种军民科技人才共享嵌入模式。分析嵌入认知、嵌入关系、嵌入政策、嵌入结构和嵌入渠道等方面的困境,并提出相应治理策略。     

制度偏好差异与医药分业的困境

医药企业和患者集团对医药分业有强烈的制度偏好,是推动改革的主导力量。但由于其在制度体系中的地位以及自身特点等原因,对政策制定的影响力较弱。而处于政策制定核心地位的中央部门,由于过于强调争取和维护本部门利益,对医药分业制度安排难以达成一致意见,无法形成统一的方案,致使我国的医药分业改革进程陷入停滞。要推进改革,实现彻底的医药分业,需要协调各集团的利益,并构建各集团能够实现有序博弈的制度平台。     

Strength of the Social Dilemma in a Public Goods Experiment: An Exploration of the Error Hypothesis

We present the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in the interior of the strategy space. The treatment variable is the equilibrium contribution level. By increasing the equilibrium contribution level, we reduce the strength of the social dilemma. Though we observe that the average level of contribution rises with the equilibrium contribution level, the average rate of over-contribution is not affected in a systematic way. Over-contribution is statistically significant only at the lower level of equilibrium contribution but not at the higher levels. We show that the Anderson et al. (1998, Journal of Public Economics. 70, 297–323) logit equilibrium model which combines altruism and decision errors fits quite well our laboratory data.     

Autonomous government expenditure growth,deficits, debt,and distribution in a neo-Kaleckian growth model

This article is linked to some recent attempts at including a noncapacity creating autonomous expenditure category as the driver and determinant of growth into Kaleckian distribution and growth models. Whereas previous contributions have focussed on taming Harrodian instability, generated by the deviation of the goods market equilibrium rate of capacity utilization from a normal or target rate, we rather focus on the so-far neglected issues of deficit, debt, and distribution dynamics in such models. For this purpose, we treat the growth of government expenditures on goods and services, financed by credit creation, as the exogenous growth rate driving the system. We examine the long-run convergence of the system toward such a growth rate, analyze the related debt dynamics, and deal with stability and income distribution issues. Finally, we touch upon the economic and, in particular, fiscal policy implications of our model results.