Firm-provided training and temporary contracts

This paper analyses the relationship between workers type of contract and the probability of receiving firm-provided training. In particular, we raise the following question: do workers with temporary contracts face the same probability of receiving training as workers with permanent contracts, once we account for the fact that both types of workers have different probabilities of being employed in a firm providing training? The results from our empirical analysis using data from the Spanish labour market suggest that workers with temporary contracts not only are less likely to be employed in training firms but, once they are in those firms, they also have a lower probability of being chosen to participate in firm-provided training activities.JEL Classification: J23, M53Authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from Universidad de Alcalá under research project La relación entre temporalidad y formación en la empresa: un análisis comparativo entre los países de la Unión Europea (award no. UAH2002/022) and from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under research project Observatorio del mercado de trabajo (SEC2001-0061). We have also benefited from our participation in the research project Estudio sobre la situación actual de la contratación temporal e indefinida en España financed by the Spanish Employment Office (INEM). We are grateful to participants in the XXVII Simposio de Análisis Económico (Salamanca), V Jornadas de Economía Laboral (Reus-Tarragona), and a seminar in the Istituto de Ricerca Sociale (Milano), and to one anonymous referee. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Earnings mobility in Spain: the role of job mobility and contractual arrangements

This paper analyses the relationship between earnings mobility, job mobility and changes in the contractual arrangement in Spain using a sample of Spanish workers aged 16–60 years extracted from the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP 1995–2001). Overall, earnings mobility remains mostly unchanged over time, although clear differences, both in terms of levels and trends, can be perceived among different types of workers. Results show that, in general, job mobility contributes to increase earnings mobility. Switching into permanent contract are associated with the highest probability of upgrading among those workers who remain with the same employer. In contrast, the highest risk of downgrading among stayers appears when changing from permanent to temporary. An analysis on low pay/no low pay transitions reveals that job mobility always increases the probability of moving from low pay to better-paid jobs among females. For males, in contrast, this occurs only when they were initially employed on a temporary basis. Furthermore, for females it is found that either switching into permanent contract while staying with the same employer, or changing employer while being employed on a permanent basis yield a higher chance of upgrading than staying with the same employer with a permanent contract.      

MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS ON PERMANENT VERSUS TEMPORARY MINIMUM WAGE EMPLOYMENT

We estimate the effect of minimum wages on employment using the Master Files of the Canadian Labour Force Survey over the recent period 1997–2008. Particular attention is paid to the differences between permanent and temporary minimum wage workers—an important distinction not made in the existing literature. Our estimates for permanent and temporary minimum wage workers combined are at the lower end of estimates based on Canadian studies estimated over earlier time periods, suggesting that the adverse employment effects are declining over time for reasons discussed. Importantly, the adverse employment effects are substantially larger for permanent compared to temporary minimum wage workers; in fact they fall almost exclusively on permanent minimum wage workers. (JEL J30)     

Starting Your Career With a Fixed-Term Job: Stepping-Stone or “Dead End”?

This paper uses panel data from the UK and Germany to investigate the difference in the learning effect between workers who enter the labour market with a fixed term and a permanent job. Our results verify the existence of a wage penalty for entering the labour market with a fixed-term contract for the British males (7.1%) and especially for the British females (21.2%). British females also have a very strong learning effect that is especially large for temporary starters. In Germany, the initial wage penalty for temporary starters is smaller than in the UK—4.5% for the males and 3% for the females—and is persistent only for the males. Although initial wage differences are mitigated through the accumulation of skills on the job, this process differs between temporary and permanent starters. This suggests that the type of the starting contract may be a feature of labour market segmentation.     

Gender wage differentials by education in Italy

In this article we evaluate wage differentials in Italy combining gender and education perspectives. The main goal of this article is to verify whether the extent of the gender pay gap varies between highly- and low-educated workers, and whether or not the role played by gender differences in characteristics and in market rewards is similar in the two groups. We apply quantile regression analysis and an adaptation of the procedure suggested by Machado and Mata (2005) to evaluate the predicted wage gap at different points of the female wage distribution scale. The analysis is carried out on the Italian sample of the last available year of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). We show that the extent and the trend of the gap predicted across the female distribution is sharply different between groups with diverse educational levels. In the case of low-educated workers, although the predicted gap is largely explained by differences in rewards, lower levels of education or experience are responsible for the gap, especially on the right-hand side of the distribution. On the contrary, highly-educated females have better characteristics than highly-educated men that partially compensate the rather high difference in returns, in particular at the extremes of the distribution.     

The importance of worker, firm and match effects in the formation of wages

This paper estimates a Mincerian wage equation with worker, firm, and match specific effects and thereby complements the growing empirical literature started by the seminal paper of Abowd (Econometrica 67:251–333, 1999b). The analysis takes advantage of the extensive Danish IDA data which provides wage information on the entire working population in a 27-year period. We find that the major part of wage dispersion in the Danish labor market can be explained by differences in worker characteristics. However, the relative contributions of the three components vary across subgroups of workers. The match effect constitutes a non-negligible part of the overall wage dispersion. An analysis of inter-industry wage differentials shows that firm characteristics are more important at the industry level than at the worker level. Similarly, we find evidence that high-wage workers tend to sort into high-wage industries to a larger extent than they sort into high-wage firms within industries. The mobility pattern of workers is related to the quality of the firm and the match. Finally, we find that firms’ wage policies differ across subgroups.     

Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining with private information

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.JEL Classification: J41, J50, J52We thank Juan Dolado and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Communitys program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Wage differentials by sector and gender: a quantile analysis for the Spanish case

This paper analyses existing wage differentials between workers in the public and private sectors and by gender in Spain. This analysis is run throughout the entire earnings distribution and observed wage differentials are decomposed into a part explained by differences in productive characteristics and a part due to differences in returns to such characteristics. Our results show that public sector workers tend to earn higher wages than private employees, although most of this sector wage gap is due to better public workers’ productive characteristics. A wage premium in favour of men is also found in both the public and private sectors, with the gender wage gap greater at the top of the earnings distribution.     

Promotions and wage discrimination in the federal government: Evidence from H.E.W.

This paper extends previous empirical studies of racial and sexual wage differentials in the federal government by analyzing the role of promotions in the creation of these wage differentials. It is found that in the subsample of federal workers analyzed, differences in promotion rates are a significant factor leading to wage differences by race and sex.     

Long-term union-firm contracts

We explore the possibility for self-enforcing long-term contracts between a risk averse union and a risk neutral firm, when these have the option to strike an efficient bargian at every stage, and the state of the world is variable. It is shown that any long-term efficient wage agreement satisfying individual rationality constraints involves a more even income stream to the workers (except for the case when the discount rate is high) and can be implemented by a Subgame-perfect equilibrium (by the threat of returning to short-term bargaining). Moreover, any such constrained efficient agreement can be supported by the threat of triggering agreements which themselves are constrained efficient, i.e., it can be implemented by a Renegotiation-proof equilibrium.This paper is a revised version of Strand (1988) and is part of the research project Wage Formation and Unemployment at the SAF Center for Applied Research at the Department of Economics, University of Oslo. We would like to thank seminar participants at Cambridge University for pointing out an error of an earlier version. Thanks also to Terje Lensberg, Kjell Erik Lommerud, Lars Thorlund-Petersen, and two referees, as well as seminar participants at the 1989 EEA Conference in Augsburg and at the Universities of British Columbia, Haifa, and Maryland for helpful comments.     

Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model

Summary. In order to get good positions in companies, people try to enter highly-ranked universities. However, abilities vary greatly between individuals. High-ability individuals have an incentive to send signals to firms by obtaining a higher level of education in order to distinguish themselves from low-ability individuals. This paper constructs an overlapping generations model in order to examine the macroeconomic consequences of such sorting behavior of individuals. There are two kinds of possible equilibria in our model. In one equilibrium, only the high-ability agent can obtain higher education and thus an elite society emerges. In the other equilibrium, all ability types have the chance to obtain higher education and thus a society with mass higher education emerges. We also discuss the possibility of multiple equilibria of these different steady states and the dynamic change in wage differentials.Received: 9 October 2002, Revised: 15 July 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D82, J31, O10.The authors acknowledge Osamu Hayashida, Noriyoshi Hemmi, Hideshi Itoh, Michihiro Kandori, Toshihiro Matsumura, Takuya Nakaizumi, Osamu Nishimura, Ryoji Ohdoi, Tadashi Yagi, Noriyuki Yanagawa, and seminar participants at Doshisha University, the University of Tokyo, and Contract Theory Workshop at Kyoto University for helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank an anonymous referee for valuable comments. This paper is part of the academic Project on Intergenerational Equity (PIE), funded by a scientific grant from Japans Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (grant number 603).     

Labour market institutions and the industry wage distribution

The paper studies the industry wage structures of Austria, Norway, the union sector of the U. S. as well as the non-union sector of the U. S. We make comparable regressions for each country, and are thus able to compare the sectoral earnings patterns controlling for the usual individual characteristics. Our results confirm the hypothesis that the pattern of the inter-industry pay structure is largely independent of labour market institutions: High paying industries in a non-union environment tend to pay high wages also in regimes where bargaining is very centralised and coordinated.This, however, does not mean that collective bargaining does not matter. The influence is mainly on the amount of wage dispersion: We find considerably lower industry pay gaps in centralised Austria and Norway than in decentralised U. S. Within the U. S., pay differentials within the union sector slightly exceed those of the non-union sector.The results give support to non-competitive explanations of the labour market. If efficiency wage mechanisms are the reason for wage differentials we expect central bargainers to internalise these effects. Competitive explanations, on the other hand, would predict no difference between the non-union outcome and a central agreement aiming at achieving full employment.This work was conducted while we were both affiliated with the University of California at Berkeley, and we thank the Institute of Industrial Relations at the University of California, Berkeley, for its support and hospitality. The research was supported by the Austrian Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung under the project JO548-SOZ (Zweimüller) and the Norwegian NORAS under the LOS program (Barth). A preliminary version of the paper was presented at the Labour Seminar at the University of California, Berkeley. We thank the participants, especially Bill Dickens and Jonathan Leonard for valuable comments. We are indebted to Bill Dickens also for giving us access to the U. S. data set CPS 1983. Thanks also to Herbert Walther for useful comments.     

THE DECREASING INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC MARKET STRUCTURE ON RACIAL EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS: 1984 TO 1996

This study investigates the market concentration/racial earnings discrimination relationship in two periods: 1984–90 and 1991–96. In each period, the racial wage gap and the residual wage gap are compared for union and nonunion workers in monopolistic and competitive industries. The authors find no evidence of market structure–driven discrimination for union workers in either period. However, from the first to the second period they find evidence of increased racial earnings differentials for nonunion workers, yet market structure–driven discrimination decreases. The authors suggest that concentration has become a less effective measure of market power and firms' latitude to discriminate. (JEL J31, J71 )     

Repeated moral hazard with persistence

Summary. This paper considers the optimal contract when the current (hidden) action of an agent has a persistent effect on the future outcome. The optimal contract in a two-effort choice, two-period setting is characterized analytically and numerically. In particular, we show that persistence tends to make compensation less responsive to the first-period outcome. At the extreme, there are cases where the agent is perfectly insured against the first-period outcome: the agent obtains the same utility regardless of the first-period outcome. The model is extended to three periods. We also present a computational method to characterize an N-period model with two-period persistence.Received: 9 December 2003, Revised: 13 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D82, J31, J65. Correspondence to: Ayegül ahinWe are grateful to an anonymous referee, Jack Barron, Mark Bils, Hugo Hopenhayn, Per Krusell, Lance Lochner, Steve Williamson, and seminar participants at Concordia University, Purdue University, the applied theory meetings at University of Rochester, the Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2003, the Rochester Wegmans Conference 2002, and the Society for Economic Dynamics Meetings 2003 for their comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Vera Brencic, Nancy Marmon, and Roxanne Stanoprud for excellent research assistance.     

Migration,self‐selection and income distributions

Self‐selection in rural–urban migration is examined using three datasets from rural and urban China in 2002. We construct a migrant sample including both migrants who converted their hukou status from rural to urban (permanent migrants) and those who did not (temporary migrants). We find a strong positive selection for permanent migrants, but the selection for temporary migrants is ambiguous. We reach these conclusions by comparing migrants' counterfactual wage densities, assuming they are paid as rural local workers, to actual wage densities of rural local workers. Our results imply that permanent migration has negative effects on rural human capital accumulation and income levels.     

What’s up after brain drain? Sometimes, somewhere, someone comes back: a general model of return migration

Individual preferences and wage differentials are generally interpreted as determinants of agents?? migration decisions in search of job opportunities. Literature about migration flows usually describes both theoretical and empirical evidence for either temporary or permanent movements of workers, but brain drain migration has its own peculiar characteristics. This paper aims to obtain two results: the first is to present the law of determination that leads to the moment of the return decision, and the second is to analyse how the difference between the utility from domestic and foreign consumption evolves in time. The presented model explains how the return decision is determined, even in cases when the agent does not leave or does not return at all.     

Temporary and Permanent Immigration under Unionization

This paper investigates permanent and temporary immigration and remittance under the coexistence of unionized and non‐unionized manufacturing firms in a two‐sector economy. The impacts of immigration and remittance on respectively wages, employment, the union–non‐union wage gap and national welfare are analyzed. It is found that both permanent immigration (economy‐wide) and temporary immigration in agriculture bring positive effects on most variables (except the competitive wage), but widens the wage gap and causes income redistribution in the host country. However, if temporary immigrants work in manufacturing only, then all wages and the union–non‐union wage gap fall. That is, workers become more equally paid but poorer. In addition, remittance and globalization cause negative effects on union workers and employers. It is perhaps such consequences and the income redistribution effect of immigration that cause the media to paint a negative image of immigration.     

Sex Differentials in Earnings in the South Korean Labor Market

We examine gender differences in earnings among South Korean workers in 1988 – the year the South Korean National Assembly enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Using the "88 Occupational Wage Bargaining Survey on the Actual Condition," we calculate women's mean earnings as a percentage of men's mean earnings by major industrial category and educational attainment. We find a larger wage gap among clerical and sales workers than production workers or professionals. Generally, the more education a woman has, the smaller the gap between her earnings and those of her male counterparts. Women with a middle-school education have a mean income 53.5 percent that of comparable men, while the female-to-male wage ratio among college graduates is 76.1 percent. We analyze wage differences separately for women and men. Following Ronald Oaxaca's (1973) work, we decompose male–female wage differentials. We also calculate a discrimination coefficient. Our work shows that, all else equal, men earn from 33.6 percent to 46.9 percent more than women with comparable skills. We attribute the difference to gender discrimination.     

The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

General equilibrium with endogenous securities and moral hazard

Summary. This paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies in which the individuals endowments depend on privately observed effort choices and the financial markets are endogenous. The environment is modeled as a two-stage game. Individuals first make strategic financial-innovation decisions. They then act in a Radner-type economy with the previously designed securities. Consumption goods, portfolios, and effort levels are chosen competitively (i.e., taking prices as given). An equilibrium concept is adapted for these moral hazard economies and its existence is proven. It is shown through an example how incentive motives might lead to the endogenous emergence of financial incompleteness.Received: 18 March 2002, Revised: 16 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D52, D82, G10, G22.This paper is based on an essay from my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago. I am thankful for comments from Fernando Alvarez, Rodrigo Cerda, Pierre-André Chiappori, Rubens P. Cysne, Carlos E. da Costa, Milton Harris, Lars Stole, Juan P. Torres-Martínez, Paulo K. Monteiro, Philip Reny, Iván Werning, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the 6th SAET Conference and the 22th SBE Meeting. Financial support from CNPq is gratefully acknowledged.